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Abstract: 
 
This thesis investigates the allure of narrative genres, such as horror, that have historically 
been viewed as philosophically (and often morally) problematic owing to their negative 
content and the painful emotional responses they elicit. It departs from the majority of 
classical and contemporary solutions to the alleged paradox posed by such genres, in that it 
does not attempt to render their pleasures explicable by appealing to their fictive status, 
thematic or ideological meanings or the more comprehensibly-pleasurable meta-responses 
they inspire. Rather, this account suggests that we choose to consume stories – fictional 
and factual – that depict violent or distressing situations and evoke discomforting 
emotions, for the same reason we choose to engage with less obviously conflict-filled 
narratives.  
 
Fictions compel our attention insofar as they resemble potentially salient information, 
appealing to a set of deeply ingrained and unconscious cognitive biases that prompt us to 
attend to certain kinds of stimuli. We are capable of finding narrative genres such as 
horror, tragedy and the ‘misery memoir’ compelling – without, it is important to note, 
finding their content in any way pleasant – because we are predisposed to find some types 
of mental effort rewarding. While horror is often criticised – and defended – on the 
grounds that its pleasures must lie in slaking anti-social appetites, this thesis criticises the 
model of fiction’s appeal on which such assumptions are based. Instead it suggests that 
narrative pleasure characteristically resides in intellectual and emotional absorption or 
stimulation rather than any straightforward fulfilment of our real life desires.  
 
In support of this contention, this account incorporates analyses of a number of related 
topics, examining subjects such as the alleged rationality of the emotions, whether our 
attraction to non-factual narratives represents an adaptive trait and how fiction-making, 
criticism and consuming function as cultural practices.  
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i. Introduction 
 
 
“What Int’rest springs from barb’rous deeds?/ What Joy From Misery?” 
 – William Hogarth, 1751: The Four Stages of Cruelty 
 
 
This thesis investigates the appeal of genres which characteristically elicit negative 
emotional responses, deciphering the “unaccountable pleasure[s]” (Hume, 2004 [1742]:25) 
afforded by horror, tragedy and other narrative media defined by their aversive content. 
Horror is often figured not only as paradoxical but as abhorrent: while tragedy’s perplexing 
pleasures have historically been seen as cause for introspection and philosophical inquiry, 
horror is as likely to be viewed as morally problematic, warranting urgent corrective action 
in the form of critiques, boycotts and even censorship. For this reason, popular writings on 
the paradox of horror often adopt an implicitly defensive or supplicating posture, with 
many justifying the genre’s existence by means of appealing to its ostensible therapeutic 
properties: horror does not inflame our aggressive impulses but purges us of them: and it is 
attractive because it provides a safe outlet for our darkest, most misanthropic desires, 
ultimately reaffirming the status quo.  
 
More scholarly considerations of the genre have also tended to present its pleasures as 
peculiarly psychological, with theorists such as Robin Wood, Judith Halberstam, Linda 
Williams, Barbara Creed, James Twitchell and Carol Clover interpreting horror narratives 
in terms of repressed wishes and culturally-reviled Others: if I find myself transfixed by 
Psycho or repulsed by Dracula it is in part because I am enacting the “work of abjection” 
(Creed, 1993:10), ritually disavowing the “castrating mother” figure (Creed, 1993:1) or 
racialised others who threaten to pollute the boundaries of the clean and proper self. While 
not all of these accounts are intended as totalising or general ‘solutions’ to horror’s appeal, 
and undoubtedly offer valuable insights into particular themes and narratives within the 
genre, such analyses serve once again to position horror as having a specialised function, a 
genre notable for being tasked with the “dirty job” (King, 1993 [1981]:205) of engaging 
and appeasing our fearful fantasies.  
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Any discussion of the paradox of horror unavoidably occurs against the background of its 
cultural disreputability, the perennial popularity of psychological ‘answers’ to its enduring 
appeal. It is for this reason that this thesis begins with an exploration of horror’s seamy 
reputation. Throughout the first three chapters I examine, and contest, the charges most 
commonly levelled against horrific media, explaining why the genre owes its perpetually 
problematic status not to its effects but to the apparently paradoxical nature of its 
pleasures. I have chosen to focus on horror’s cultural reception in such depth not chiefly in 
order to mount an extended apologia for the genre or to attempt to rehabilitate its 
(decidedly shabby) reputation, but because of the ways in which its continued ignominy 
usefully illuminates the operation of certain assumptions about narrative pleasure. Horror 
is so often viewed as aberrant, and its pleasures as necessarily extra-aesthetic in nature, 
because of the way in which deep-seated misapprehensions about our engagement with 
fictions shape cultural discourse about aversive genres.   
 
Marshalling evidence from across several disciplines, I will argue that, far from 
representing anomalies, curious exceptions to the customary ‘rules’ of narrative pleasure, 
genres such as horror and tragedy in fact serve as more extreme instantiations of the same 
agonistic principle: fictions are overwhelmingly, and cross-culturally, organised around 
some central problem, conflict or goal-oriented activity. These genres do not call for 
extraordinary explanation, or necessitate appeals to mysterious (and often subjectively-
inaccessible) internal drives or processes. Rather, when we find horrific and tragic fictions 
attractive it is largely for the same reasons that we find any fiction attractive – because they 
succeed in eliciting our curiosity and engaging our emotions.   
 
The view that agonistic curiosity provides the main impetus for our consumption of 
horrific and/or tragic narratives – and the suggestion that suspense or fascination is often 
integral to our interactions with fictions in general – has been expressed elsewhere, albeit 
in comparatively undeveloped, flawed or variously-interpretable forms. In ‘Of Tragedy’ 
Hume conducts a tantalisingly brief and ambiguous exploration of the paradox of tragedy, 
which is both rich with insights into the genre’s seemingly-paradoxical pleasures yet, at 
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times, frustratingly opaque (indeed, the variety of interpretations provoked by this essay 
serves as testament both to its perception and its polysemousness). I have chosen to focus, 
and build, on his observations about the necessity of narrative conflict and his striking 
appraisal of the relationship between our enjoyment of a fiction and our affective 
engagement with it.  
 
In Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful, he suggests that our desire to witness scenes of misery and destruction – which 
he refuses to limit to fictions, arguing that audiences would unanimously abandon the 
performance of “a most sublime and affecting tragedy” (Enquiry:47) in order to flock to a 
public execution – in fact represents the promptings of a divinely-instilled and adaptive 
drive to attend to other people’s suffering.  Like Hume, Burke also identifies tragedy’s 
pleasures with its pains, arguing that it is precisely because the tragic and the sublime 
arouse violent passions and sensations that we find them attractive. Burke hypothesises 
that we seek out the negative pain or “delight” (Enquiry:136) afforded by sublime and 
tragic stimuli because it acts on the mind like a species of exercise: just as uninterrupted 
physical relaxation or indolence weakens the body, “tak[ing] away the vigorous tone of 
fibre which is requisite for carrying on the natural and necessary secretions” 
(Enquiry:135), so unimpeded mental relaxation is detrimental to one’s health, and we are 
in fact benefited by the rousing effects of a dose of diluted “terror” (Enquiry:134).  
 
Noël Carroll’s The Philosophy of Horror represents the most detailed exposition of the 
fascination hypothesis, with Carroll offering nuanced and persuasive analyses of recurrent 
horror plot-structures and themes in support of his account. In contrast to Carroll, however, 
in whose coexistentialist account fear and disgust are incidental to our attraction to horror 
fictions – the compound emotion of art-horror representing “the price we are willing to pay 
[in order to satisfy our curiosity about] that which is impossible and unknown” 
(Philosophy: 186) – I will emphasise the central role negative emotions play in narrative 
pleasure. As Hume notes, “we are pleased in proportion as we are afflicted” (Hume, 2004 
[1742]:25): our sorrow in response to a tragedy’s content and our pleasure in its eloquence 
are crucially intertwined.  I attempt to clarify the nature of this relationship between 
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painful emotions and narrative absorption. Although, as I have noted, several other 
theorists have espoused variants of the agonistic curiosity thesis, there are several major 
points of departure between my own account and previous formulations. 
 
The majority of writers and audience members are intuitively aware of the conflict-driven 
nature of most narratives; it is well known that fictions stall in the absence of convincing 
and emotionally-arresting jeopardy, whether it is physical or emotional, grimly realistic or 
utterly fantastical. However, despite the fact that ‘everybody knows’ that stories require 
some kind of conflict, there have been surprisingly few in-depth analyses of why this 
might be the case. Those theorists, like Hume, Burke and Carroll, who note the 
significance of this association identify curiosity and affective entanglement as the main 
snares by which fictions secure our attention. While building on this common observation, 
I undertake what I hope is a far more pervasive analysis, assembling a theoretical 
framework which renders the relationship between apparently aversive content and 
narrative pleasure explicable. Because my thesis straddles disciplinary boundaries, 
adducing and interpreting the discoveries of theorists from a number of fields, I have been 
able to develop a comprehensive and empirically-grounded solution to the alleged paradox 
posed by horror and related genres that incorporates a detailed assessment of our 
interactions with fictions in general. 
 
My model also differs from many existing solutions to the paradox in two other respects. 
First, like Burke, I suggest that our responses to horrific or tragic fictions are not 
completely divergent from our responses to factual narratives. I will argue that fictions are 
in fact shaped by the same attentional biases that prompt us to attend to certain kinds of 
information or perceptual stimuli in real life, and that many of us are equally fascinated by 
factual tragedies and horrors. Secondly, I will stress the ambivalent and at times genuinely 
painful nature of our engagement with aversive narratives. Historically, theorising about 
the pleasures of tragedy (which considerably predates horror as a recognised genre) has 
sought to dissolve the genre’s paradoxicality by stressing its fictive nature and/or 
attributing its allure to its more comprehensibly pleasurable or rewarding features. Indeed, 
Michelle Gellrich charges tragic theory with ‘digesting’ tragic practice, arguing that much 
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theory essentially amounts to an ethically and rationally ameliorative project, concertedly 
minimising tragedy’s subversive or disquieting aspects. Even those theories, like Hegel’s, 
that focus upon the agonistic elements of tragedy arguably neutralise its representation of 
conflict by presenting it in rationalising and affirmative terms: while Antigone’s suicide 
and Creon’s loss of his family are terrible, their suffering is ultimately necessary or 
justified, embodying a higher telos. Gellrich asserts that the need to find intelligibility in 
tragedy’s depictions of suffering and disorder results in an over-emphasis on the aspects of 
tragedy, and its pleasures, that conform to the requirements of such theories, and a 
concomitant lack of critical attention to the parts of tragedy that are interrogative and 
unsettling (Gellrich,1988).  
 
Certainly, many prominent theories of tragedy emphasise its affirmative aspects, as well as 
characterising our pleasure in positive terms (i.e. we do not simply enjoy being sad, but 
experience more comprehensibly enjoyable emotions or reflections in response to various 
features of tragedies e.g. imitation, the delineation of vice and virtue, feeling the “sweetly 
melting softness” (Wasserman, 1947:291) of compassion etc). For example, theorists such 
as Schiller and D.D. Raphael argue that tragedy’s end, and the source of its pleasures, is its 
evocation of the sublimity of human effort, our heroic capacity to demonstrate moral 
resistance in the face of insuperable external forces.  We enjoy and esteem tragedy 
because, in Raphael’s words, the genre “exalts man in our eyes” (Raphael, 1960:31). 
Suffering of the wrong sort cannot, therefore, attain the status of the ‘tragic’ – while, in 
colloquial terms, the dreary, unrelieved misery of those too downtrodden to even 
apprehend their plight might seem tragic,  “[the pitiable] by itself is not tragic because it is 
not uplifting” (Raphael, 1960:32):  tragedy (in the normative sense of the word), thus 
becomes anti-tragic (in the everyday sense of the word), a potent antidote to common or 
garden sadness.  
 
Contemporary theorist Susan Feagin presents a similarly rosy view of tragedy’s pleasures, 
arguing that tragedy affords us “profound feelings of satisfaction” because it speaks to 
“important human interests” (Feagin, 2004 [1983]:186) rather than “superficial ones” 
(Feagin, 2004 [1983]:186): our positive valuation of a genre that is dedicated to depicting 
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human suffering, to inspiring human sadness, is not due to some perverse desire to wallow 
in negative emotions but our normal, or even laudable, appreciation of the morally-
edifying meta-responses it provokes. Finally, while theories such as the Lucretian return 
upon the self do not present the pleasures of tragedy as particularly ethical or improving, 
instead appealing to schadenfreude and self interest, they still act as a neatening or 
rationalisation of what appears to be a decidedly paradoxical enjoyment of negative 
emotions.  
 
I would argue that Burke and Kant’s theories of the sublime perfectly instantiate two poles 
of theorising about the problematic pleasures of genres such as horror and tragedy. While 
Burke’s theory ascribes our enjoyment to our direct responses, founded in instinct and 
entailing an ecstatic suspension of reason and self awareness, Kant locates the pleasures of 
the sublime wholly in the favourable, self-directed meta-responses it elicits. Such theories 
simultaneously render our enjoyment more circuitous and more straightforward, purging it 
of any disquieting or paradoxical implications. 
 
In contrast to this tendency, my theory is genealogically related to the rarer accounts of 
tragedy and horror that link our attraction to these genres to the intense and often alarming 
responses they elicit, and those that recognise the commonalities between our fictive and 
factive emotions. I assess the strengths and shortcomings of the models of theorists such as 
Hume, Burke, Schier and Gaut, building on their insights as I construct my own solution to 
the paradox.  I will argue that our engagement with fictions, and with narratives in general, 
can often best be characterised less in terms of simple or easily-recognisable ‘pleasure’ so 
much as a wholehearted absorption or fascination. By organising my account of fiction’s 
appeal so that attentional and affective engagement, rather than any narrowly-construed 
pleasure, is foregrounded, I will attempt to dissolve the paradox entailed by painful genres, 
as well as elucidating our responses to fictional and factual narratives as a whole.  
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Outline of Thesis and Methodology 
Chapter 1: 
 
In my initial chapter, I discuss the history of social concern about violent and horrific 
media, arguing that the regular eruptions of intense cultural anxiety about populist and 
youth-oriented media with aversive content can be identified as moral panics. These 
periods of pronounced concern seem to be cyclical in nature, and do not reliably 
correspond to any rise in crime or drastic increase in media violence – notable examples 
include the Victorian belief that penny dreadfuls were inciting copycat crimes among 
working-class youths, the 1930s crackdown on what were perceived as dangerously 
imitable horror and crime films and the popular denunciation (and effective 
criminalisation) of so-called video nasties in the eighties and nineties. I analyse how 
discourse about seemingly-disparate forms of violent and aversive media betrays important 
underlying similarities that indicate why these anxieties prove so recurrent, so resistant to 
being dispelled. I suggest that people readily – and insistently – identify violent narratives 
as a source of social ills, despite the noticeable lack of evidence to suggest that any of these 
vilified genres were linked to real-life crime waves or increases in moral degeneracy, 
because the causal hypothesis possesses a certain ‘charm’ or intuitive quality. We are 
primed to accept as plausible the notion that violent narratives lead to violent people, that 
like creates like, in part because genres with aversive content subvert the model of 
narrative pleasure I term the ‘fantasy model’. This folk-theory is seldom explicitly 
discussed except in those cases where it most obviously breaks down; while, as I have 
noted, the vast majority of fictions feature some central conflict, most genres do not so 
clearly throw into relief the assumption that we typically engage with fictions in order to 
gratify our real life desires and to stimulate uncomplicatedly pleasant feelings.  
 
This chapter plays an important role in the exposition of my solution to the paradox of 
horror because it illustrates how the genre’s culturally problematic status hinges on its 
philosophically problematic aspects when viewed through the filter of certain pervasive 
misapprehensions about our interactions with fiction. In other words, the persistent 
construal of horror and related media as criminogenic is predicated on the assumption that 
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anomalous genres must have anomalous audiences, that narratives with morally 
questionable content can only appeal to morally questionable individuals. By highlighting 
the ways in which the fantasy model informs mainstream and theoretical discourse about 
aversive fictions, this section is designed to illustrate how a revised model of narrative 
engagement would dispel the view of certain genres as paradoxical.  
 
In the next two chapters I address two potential objections to my contention that horror 
(and other populist genres with aversive content) is primarily viewed as morally 
objectionable because of assumptions about the nature of its pleasures rather than owing to 
the observation of any legitimately worrisome effects.  
 
Chapter 2 
 
First, I assess the body of research dedicated to investigating whether exposure to violent 
media encourages violent or aggressive real-life behaviours. During recent moral panics 
about the popularity of violent and distressing fictions, concerned commentators often 
adduce this area of research as confirmation of such media’s harmfulness, appealing to an 
overwhelming critical consensus that (narrative) violence breeds violence. I will reject the 
version of the causal hypothesis espoused by prominent effects-proponents and 
organisations such as the American Academy of Paediatricians – according to which media 
violence presents a grave risk to social order, sowing moral turpitude and sparking 
imitative acts of aggression – arguing that the available evidence in no way justifies this 
view. I criticise the methodology of several high-profile experiments and studies which are 
frequently cited as proof of violent media’s negative effects, as well as questioning 
dominant interpretations of the resulting data. I also note that more direct investigations 
into risk-factors for criminality and violence (those which begin by studying those known 
to have committed crimes and examining their lifestyles) typically find no correlation 
between above-average exposure to violent media and aggressive and unlawful behaviours. 
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Chapter 3 
 
In the third chapter I address another possible criticism of my hypothesis: the charge that 
horror and other violent (and populist/low-brow) media are generally viewed with 
suspicion because their audiences are anomalous, comprised largely of those individuals 
who are “disposed to derive positive enjoyment from seeing [acts of] violence” 
(Seduction:34) presented in ways that could only  repel the morally normal. I challenge this 
assumption, exploring the research of theorists who study neglected and invisibilised 
audiences, as well as discussing how textual analyses of those horror texts most commonly 
seen as exploitative and straightforwardly misogynistic  belies the claim that viewers are 
commonly invited to identify with killers and vicariously participate in acts of 
metaphorical and literal sexual violence.  
 
This section also begins to develop my earlier claim that curiosity and emotionally-
ambivalent compulsion are crucial to the appeal of genres characterised by their negative 
content. Brigid Cherry’s and David Buckingham’s qualitative studies both include in-depth 
interviews specifically designed to investigate how audience-members themselves 
characterise their engagement with violent and distressing media, how they describe its 
pleasures and pains. Their respondents’ testimony evinces certain themes, shared 
preferences and experiences that are highly relevant to any discussion of the paradox of 
horror. Significantly, both the female and child participants in these studies reported 
experiencing considerably ‘mixed feelings’ in response to horror narratives, most valuing 
those narratives that afforded them genuine fear, and feeling compelled to revisit the 
fictions or themes that scared them most.  
 
Having anticipated and addressed two potential criticisms of the claim set forth in my 
introductory chapter – that much of the cultural disapprobation of genres such as horror is 
in fact attributable to the folk-theory that we paradigmatically engage with narratives in 
order to access feelings and experiences we find uncomplicatedly pleasant – I begin to lay 
the conceptual groundwork for my own theory.  
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Chapter 4 
 
In my fourth chapter I discuss different philosophical theories of the emotions, assessing 
the respective merits of cognitivist models and neo-Jamesian accounts. I will argue that, 
while cognitivists have generated some important insights about our emotional lives, such 
theories are unable satisfactorily to accommodate recent empirical discoveries which seem 
to problematise the conflation of emotions with judgements. I particularly focus on how 
these two competing theories approach cases in which we seem to exhibit paradoxical, 
recalcitrant or illogical affective responses – a category our emotional responses to known 
fictions are often thought to occupy. This chapter plays a pivotal role in elaborating my 
theory for two reasons. 
 
First, in a later chapter I discuss integrationist solutions to the paradox of horror (and 
related genres) which rely on cognitivist models of the emotions. Theorists such as Kendall 
Walton, Alex Neill and Berys Gaut argue that we are able to enjoy genres, like horror and 
tragedy, that elicit negative emotions because emotions are defined by evaluations rather 
than feelings. In other words, I can affectively judge the events depicted in a fictional 
narrative to be pitiable or horrific without finding my emotional state displeasurable 
because negative emotions are not necessarily identified, or accompanied by, an unpleasant 
hedonic tone. I will object to this cognitivist-inflected answer to the paradox, advancing 
my own theory in which physiological responses and phenomenological feelings are 
central to the character, and the allure, of our interactions with fictions, even when these 
emotions are genuinely painful. For this reason, it is important to justify my later rejection 
of solutions grounded in the judgement model, as well as clarifying the theoretical 
framework on which my account is founded.   
 
This chapter on the emotions is also integral to my thesis because of its bearing on the 
paradox of fiction: in later chapters I argue that our attraction to fictions is due to their 
ability to act as super-normal stimuli. In Steven Pinker’s words, fictive narratives serve as 
simulated gossip, mimicking, in enticingly exaggerated form, the sort of information to 
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which we are predisposed to attend. This hypothesis is clearly incompatible with 
cognitivist views of the emotions, which stress the rational and information-sensitive 
nature of the passions. In contrast, I present our fictive emotions as a form of ‘affective 
illusion’: just as we are inclined to be visually ‘taken in’ by optical illusions, even when we 
are consciously aware that our eyes are deceiving us, so many of us respond emotionally to 
the travails of non-existent others.  
 
In my fifth and sixth chapters, I continue to explore the nature of our affective, attentional 
and critical engagement with fictions, defending two theoretical positions that undermine 
the assumption that we characteristically consume fictions in order to gratify our real-
world appetites and experience unadulteratedly pleasant emotions.  
 
Chapter 5 
 
In chapter 5, I enter the ‘ancient quarrel’ about fiction’s epistemological value, assessing 
the arguments of ‘no truth’ theorists such as Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen who  reject 
the notion that literary works can impart non-trivial truths or that considerations of truth 
and falsity play any role in our appraisals of fictive narratives. In stark opposition to this 
view, I will argue that fictions (and similarly immersive, emotionally-involving factual 
narratives) are particularly well-suited to conveying certain kinds of information, eliciting 
insights and refining our deliberative faculties: in some respects fictions act like thought-
experiments – forcing us to occupy unfamiliar and often uncomfortable perspectives, 
exposing us to novel points of view and experiences and presenting us with thorny moral 
dilemmas or ideological conflicts that can compel us to re-examine our assumptions. I will 
also emphasise that if (like Lamarque and Olsen) one disputes the notion that evaluations 
of works in terms of truth and falsity are aesthetically relevant, one must nonetheless 
concede that they are commonly practised. Even if the widespread tendency to deplore 
works whose narratives are deformed by excessive sentimentality, pessimism or 
implausibility represents a lamentable lapse from the correct aesthetic attitude it still 
reflects the way in which we spontaneously view and engage with fictions. Our inability 
imaginatively to ‘decouple’ when consuming a fiction – entirely insulating our evaluation 
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of a text’s literary worth from our appraisal of its perspicacity, its mimetic accuracy as 
regards important human concerns – indicates that the evaluative criteria for a fictional 
work do not conform to the model of narrative pleasure suggested by the fantasy model. 
We at least treat fictions as if they represent potential sources of information or 
enlightenment – comparing them against our own experiences, our knowledge of related 
subject matter, and disvaluing those we find to embody trite, misleading or morally 
impercipient worldviews.  
 
Chapter 6  
 
In my sixth chapter, I expand on this point, examining how naturalistic analyses of the 
human propensity for fiction-making and consuming serve to clarify certain aspects of our 
interactions with fiction. As I stress during this section, naturalistic accounts are not 
interchangeable with adaptationist ones: while proponents of both begin from the premise 
that apparently cross-cultural and trans-historical human traits and behaviours are the result 
of evolution’s operations on human biology and psychology, adaptationist theories suggest 
that the phenomena they are explaining serve some adaptive function, prevalent on a 
species-wide level because they increased fitness in our ancestral environment. Meanwhile, 
one can interpret behaviours – in this case, our unlikely predilection for elaborate, known 
falsehoods – as the product of evolution, without suggesting that they exhibit the tell-tale 
traces of adaptive ‘design’ or that they conferred any advantage in our environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). 
 
I assess the theories of those, like Denis Dutton and Brian Boyd, who view our eagerness 
to engage with fictions as an evolved adaptation. According to these theorists, humans are 
the possessors of an innate ‘fiction instinct’: we crave stories and feel moved to invest our 
time and efforts in fabricating accounts of the activities of non-existent people because it 
is, or has been, adaptively advantageous for us to do so. They suggest that regular exposure 
to fictions helps to refine certain mental faculties, acting as a form of cognitive play that 
serves as a pleasurable way of honing skills such as practical deliberation and mind-
reading.  Dutton and Boyd invoke certain traits of fiction as a human practice in support of 
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this hypothesis, emphasising its universality, costliness, anthropocentricity and 
pleasurability, and – most pertinently to my thesis – its puzzling preoccupation with 
conflict. This feature suggests that “the pleasure specific to literature does not limit itself 
to vicarious participation in fantasy fulfilments [my italics]” (Carroll, 2004a:133). As I 
note in the previous chapter, however ‘paradoxical’ it might seem, narrative pleasure is 
typically grounded in pain and conflict: we attend to fictions that depict problematic 
situations and arouse a spectrum of emotions, and esteem those that are ‘intelligent’, 
‘truthful’ and ‘perceptive’, because our affinity for fictional narratives does not stem from 
the desire to realise our fantasies, to avoid all mental effort or emotional discomfort. 
 
While I ultimately reject the notion that there is sufficient evidence at this time to support 
Boyd and Dutton’s adaptationist account of fiction’s origins and allure, I will build on their 
persuasive analysis of apparently cross-cultural/trans-historical storytelling norms, their 
incisive description of our engagement with fictions as a form of pleasurably stimulating 
cognitive play. I suggest that our fiction instinct may well represent a fortuitous exaptation 
or spandrel: we seem to seek out fictions insofar as they act as a form of super-stimulus or 
simulated gossip, appealing to genuinely adaptive traits – such as our craving for social 
information, our fascination with the anomalous, our compulsion to monitor potentially 
threatening beings and situations – in order to secure our attention. In other words, while 
fictions act as a pleasure technology of sorts, the magnetism they exert has little to do with 
any straightforward gratification of our real life desires but in their calculated frustration. 
Depicting conflict, and eliciting negative emotions, is so often central to fiction because 
attention, rather than any narrowly-defined pleasure, is the chief ‘currency’ of storytelling. 
 
Chapter 7  
 
In this chapter I develop, and explore the implications of, several points touched on in 
earlier chapters, this section representing the fullest and most explicit articulation of my 
central argument. Initially, I reiterate how fictional narratives’ typical structure is 
inconsistent with the fantasy model or set of assumptions that render genres such as 
tragedy and horror paradoxical. I suggest that if fictions were paradigmatically designed to 
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allow us access to straightforwardly pleasurable experiences and emotions they would 
surely display less of an overwhelming preoccupation with conflict, less of a determination 
to deny their characters any stretch of uncomplicated, unthreatened happiness until the end 
of a story. I argue that these observed ‘rules’ of storytelling are, however, perfectly 
consonant with a model that foregrounds cognitive and affective engagement and 
stimulation: it is precisely by calculatedly thwarting our desires, expectations and values 
that fictions contrive to ensnare our attention, exploiting our attraction to certain kinds of 
information by mimicking them in intensified form.   
 
I discuss how my model has been influenced by earlier theories that ascribe the pleasures 
of aversive genres to their content and the direct responses they inspire (rather than 
resolving the paradox by appealing to more traditionally pleasurable narrative features and 
meta-responses). Theorists such as Du Bos, Burke and, according to certain interpretations, 
Hume evoke a more expansive vision of narrative pleasure, capturing the contrarieties, the 
peculiar charge and ambivalence of engaging with painful fictions. Gilbert Ryle 
characterises pleasure in general as a form of wholehearted attention or engrossment: 
according to such a model, our attraction to tragic and horrific fictions does not imply that 
we find their negative content agreeable in itself, but that we are inexorably drawn to it 
because it serves to magnetise our attention to the narrative. If one discards the 
assumptions which coalesce to form the fantasy model, rejecting the notion that narrative 
pleasure necessarily coincides with that which we would customarily regard as pleasant, 
then such genres no longer appear paradoxical. 
 
I go on to formulate a hypothesis as to why conflict-driven fictions are so effective at 
compelling our attention: after all, even if we do not select narratives in order to gratify our 
real life desires, it remains unclear why we should often specifically seek out stories that 
flagrantly contradict them. Rather than inventing counterfactual accounts about the 
obstacles encountered by human (and psychologically human-like) beings it is theoretically 
possible that we could instead choose to devise affectively-neutral stories, or to compose 
fictional histories of (non-anthropomorphised) golf balls, planets, colours or numbers. As 
Hume observes, emotions, and particularly negative ones, play a vital role in fixing our 
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attention on a story; in the absence of some central problem or conflict which is 
significantly humanly-salient that we feel ourselves to have an emotional stake in its 
outcome, fictions remain inert and lifeless.   
 
In Chapter 4, I suggested that the ‘quick and dirty’ nature of our affective responses could 
help to explain why we are able to experience emotion in reaction to known fictions. 
Because our unconscious, affective appraisal of a stimulus occurs prior to our cognitive 
evaluation of it, we can experience illogical or recalcitrant emotions, many of which 
cannot entirely be suppressed. Emotionally-involving fictions essentially act as an affective 
trompe l’oeil, sufficiently immersive, detailed and affectively-relevant to elicit these initial, 
unconscious and automatic appraisals despite our rational awareness that the depicted 
events are imaginary.  
 
In this section, I link my earlier analysis of fictive emotions to the role that negative 
emotions in particular play in our engagement with fictional narratives. I argue that fictions 
typically focus on problematic situations, events and themes calculated to inspire at least 
mildly negative emotions, because painful passions serve to ‘flag’ their eliciting stimuli as 
noteworthy, giving them an illusory sheen of personal salience. As I will discuss, there is 
empirical evidence to suggest that we preferentially attend to words and images that are 
negatively-valenced, instinctively keeping an eye on those aspects of our environment that 
might be potentially harmful or contrary to our interests. We immediately and reflexively 
classify stimuli as either positive or negative, the intrinsic “highlighting” (Error:174) 
properties of negative emotions directing our attention toward  those ideas and objects we 
affectively appraise as a possible threat or obstacle.  Fictions turn on conflict because it 
represents the most reliable means of ensnaring audience members, usurping our attention 
and eliciting our curiosity.   
 
I next address one possible objection to this model, discussing Berys Gaut’s contention that 
we can enjoy fictions that arouse negative emotions because there is nothing intrinsically 
displeasurable about being in such states – an elegant solution which, if true, obviates the 
need for theories such as my own. While my account stresses the importance of negative 
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emotions, the integral role they play in the pleasures of genres such as tragedy and horror, I 
argue that such emotions are not only defined by their evaluative content but by their 
painful or negative hedonic tone. Drawing on the research of theorists such as Antonio 
Damasio and  Joseph LeDoux, I argue that emotions such as fear are themselves 
distinctively “uncomfortable” (Emotional:232), exerting powerful effects on cognitive 
processing and behaviours, whereas ‘cold’ cognitive evaluations of risk which are 
unaccompanied by any affectively  “painful body state” (Error:180) are not equivalently 
motivating. As with physical pleasure and pain, affective appraisals are indispensable 
because they are quick and dirty, capable of redirecting our attention and prompting 
behaviours conducive to our survival or flourishing in advance of any cognitive 
deliberation.  
 
However, while I present negative emotions as intrinsically painful and broadly 
eudaimonistic insofar as they generally serve to ward us away from potentially harmful 
stimuli, this does not imply that we are incapable of deriving pleasure from consuming 
narratives that elicit emotions such as fear, disgust, sorrow and pity. Because narrative 
pleasure often inheres in curiosity rather than comfort, stimulation rather than fantasy-
fulfilment, the additional “impulse or vehemence” (Hume, 2004 [1742]:26) that negative 
emotions lend our engagement with a narrative can sometimes be desirable. 
 
Finally, I argue that there is evidence to suggest that we are typically attracted to painful 
fictions for much the same reason that we are attracted to factual narratives with negative 
content, owing to an essentially epistemological drive that prompts us to attend to certain 
kinds of information. This claim is founded on my solution to the paradox of fiction – the 
assertion that fictions act as a sort of affective illusion, compelling to the extent that we 
affectively appraise them as potentially relevant information – and observations about the 
broad similarity of our preferences and reactions when selecting and consuming narratives 
from both of these categories.  
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Chapter 8      
 
In my final chapter, I assess horror-specific solutions to the apparent paradox posed by 
aversive genres. This section is critical to the development of my thesis because – having 
given a full explication of my own account in the previous chapter – in this section I 
address why I rejected existing solutions as sufficient explanations of the genre’s appeal. I 
argue that the expressivist, psychoanalytic and ideological readings which represent the 
most popularly-adopted accounts of horror’s pleasures are inadequate when evaluated as 
comprehensive solutions to the paradox. I also discuss two highly influential philosophical 
theories that were explicitly intended to serve as general accounts of horror’s appeal: Noël 
Carroll’s coexistentialist model and Berys Gaut’s integrationist theory. I argue that, while 
each of these theorists offers a nuanced analysis of the genre’s pleasures, they too fail to 
capture important dimensions of our engagement with horrifying fictions.   
 
My discussion of these latter models is particularly significant because of the extent to 
which my own theory is indebted to them, influenced by both their insights and their 
omissions. Like Carroll, I postulate that agonistic curiosity plays a pivotal role in our 
attraction to horror; however, whereas, in Carroll’s model, negative emotions merely 
coincide with our pleasure, springing from the same source – “the self-same features of the 
monster that give rise to fascination also give rise to fear and disgust” (Carroll, 1995:67) – 
I suggest that fear and disgust positively contribute to our narrative experience. Similarly, 
like Gaut, I reject those theories of horror’s appeal that require us simply to discard 
audience members’ own description of their pleasures, arguing that the negative emotions 
horror fictions elicit are observably central to their allure. However, in addition to the 
theoretical objections to his theory laid out in the previous chapter, in this section I 
anatomise the ways in which his account of horror’s pleasures subtly mischaracterises our 
emotional engagement with fearful fictions. 
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Final Notes 
 
Before embarking on the main text, it is important to stress that this thesis, and the solution 
to the ‘paradox’ of horror elaborated herein, is chiefly intended to address narrative media 
with fearful, violent or otherwise distressing content, encompassing fictions such as novels, 
films, short stories, comics and oral folk tales or urban legends, as well as detailed factual 
accounts including memoirs and documentary programmes and films. This is for two main 
reasons.  Firstly, it is because this solution is grounded in my account of our relationship 
with narratives in general, and my critique of the fantasy model – building on the central 
proposition that we characteristically value narratives for their ability to excite our 
curiosity and engage us emotionally, rather than to gratify our real life aspirations or afford 
us pleasing meta-responses and reflections on the self.  Secondly, while there are 
undoubtedly paintings, sculptures and even pieces of music  that captivate our interest 
while evoking feelings of fear and/or disgust and depicting (or referring to) horrifying 
objects, horror has most flourished in narrative formats, and, accordingly,  the majority of 
cultural consternation and puzzlement about  the genre arises in response to such media. 
Since it was this history of social concern that provided the catalyst for this project – 
demonstrating the extent to which horrifying fictions are popularly regarded as morally 
and, I suggest, philosophically, problematic – this thesis primarily addresses itself to the 
‘paradox’ posed by narratives with aversive content. However, this does not mean that this 
account might not also apply to the pleasures of relevantly similar media that are partially 
or wholly non-narrative based. For example, although ‘survival horror’ games such as 
Resident Evil and Silent Hill surely derive some of their appeal from extra-generic and 
non-narrative factors (e.g. visually-pleasing graphics, well-designed strategy problems etc), 
much of their success must also be attributable to their arresting and suspenseful content, 
the tantalising questions they raise and the charged feelings they engender . 
 
It is my hope that this account contributes to the body of research about philosophically-
problematic genres such as horror by providing a clear and detailed hypothesis as to how 
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certain widespread – and arguably adaptive – human traits combine to result in our 
attraction to narratives that depict undesirable situations and evoke painful emotions.   
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Chapter 1: A Disreputable Genre 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will analyse the ways in which the horror genre is commonly positioned as 
problematic or aberrant, identifying the unspoken common sense assumptions about the 
nature of horror’s appeal that drive much anti-horror sentiment. I will also analyse how 
certain folk-theories of fiction’s pleasures drive moral panics about horror (and other 
related, and equally maligned, forms of entertainment) in the media and, finally, discuss 
the ways in which theories that purport to explain horror’s attractions reproduce, are 
shaped by, and defend against such assumptions. 
 
I will begin by discussing the 1980s controversy about ‘video nasties’ (a loose category 
composed, for the most part, of little-seen horror and exploitation films), arguing that the 
hyperbolic and frequently unsupported claims employed by anti-video campaigners and the 
exaggerated sense of threat built up by news media meet the defining criteria for a moral 
panic. I will support this contention by demonstrating the lack of any verifiable causal 
connection between the video nasties and the high profile crimes that they allegedly 
inspired – events that were then and now adduced as conclusive evidence of horror’s 
harmfulness. In addition to this, I will examine how studies and discourse that supported 
the view that violent horror videos posed a significant risk to society were afforded 
consistently greater or more favourable media coverage than those which seemed to 
contradict this contention, even in those cases when supportive studies were 
methodologically inferior.  
 
I will next discuss how certain titles have recently been granted certification despite the 
fact that throughout the eighties and much of the nineties they were regarded as legally 
obscene – likely to kindle moral corruption in a significant percentage of those exposed to 
them. I will argue that the BBFC’s changing assessments of, and statements about, such 
films expose discrepancies between their declared reasoning for prohibiting any title and 
their actual decisions, and betray other, murkier motivations that may be at work.  
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In the following section I will relate the media-driven crisis about video nasties to the 
history of moral panics and disquiet about the violent/distressing elements of populist 
media, analysing the clear commonalities in the claims and rhetoric employed by those 
speaking out against, for example, the penny dreadfuls of the Victorian era, the burgeoning 
cinema of the twenties and thirties, the horror comics of the fifties and the video nasties. In 
each case, critics of the new (or newly popular) genre/technology emphasised how 
radically they differed from earlier media, crediting them with unprecedented levels of 
violence and malign influence over an impressionable youth audience. As theorists Martin 
Barker, John Springhall, Graham Murdock and Julian Petley note, such campaigns are 
often saturated with a “potent strain of class dislike and fear” (Petley, 1997:87), invoking 
the spectre of a degenerate underclass whose unmonitored children are not only attracted, 
but dangerously susceptible, to the violent media which we instinctively recognise as 
artistically vacuous and morally repugnant. Although the aforementioned theorists 
emphasise the socio-political dimensions of these moral panics I will adopt a somewhat 
different perspective. While drawing on their insights I will argue that the chronic cultural 
unease about horror (and violent media in general) proves so resistant to being dispelled 
because it is motivated as much by an ingrained set of common-sense intuitions, persistent 
misgivings about the appeal of narratives with aversive subject matter, as by any evidence 
of harm. 
 
I will then relate the video nasties panic – which was framed as the response to a surge in 
acts of imitative violence – to the misgivings about another lowbrow genre whose 
pleasures seem to reside in its exquisitely detailed evocation of others’ pain. A rash of 
articles published in the late ‘noughties’ identified both a new genre and a problem: “the 
bestseller lists [were] full of memoirs about miserable childhoods and anguished families”, 
books which shops such as Waterstones housed under the label ‘Painful Lives’, and that 
the Bookseller magazine dubbed “‘mis lit’ or ‘misery memoirs’” (O’Neill, 2007). As with 
the horror videos of the eighties, people’s desire to consume misery memoirs soon came to 
be figured as a “shameful appetite” (Sarler, 2008), indicative of a perverse enjoyment of 
other people’s suffering. Yet, for various reasons, it was not possible to position “misery 
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porn” as a credible threat to public order: unlike horror, which is (probably undeservedly1) 
seen as an overwhelmingly masculine genre, publishers asserted that “the market for these 
memoirs is "80% or 90% female" (O’Neill, 2007). In other words, in contrast to the 
presumed audience for the video nasties – composed mostly of impressionable adolescent 
boys and sinister ‘rogue males’ – misery memoirs attract a demographic group who are 
markedly less likely to commit crimes in general, and particularly violent crimes. There 
were no high profile alleged copycat crimes which could be adduced as proof of its 
malignancy or any body of research devoted specifically to assessing its risks. Despite the 
absence of any equivalently plausible threat of concrete harms, misery lit was described in 
strikingly similar, and similarly disapproving, terms to the video nasties. I will argue that 
this genre and horror inspire disquiet for the same reason: each are defined by their 
preoccupation with human suffering, and, unlike tragedy (another genre whose pleasures 
are often identified as paradoxical) are unambiguously populist and generally lowbrow.  
 
Finally, I will look at how this disquiet about violent and distressing media, these generally 
unspoken axioms about the appeal of popular fictions, also permeate and structure the 
counter-discourses intended to defend/decipher horror. I will argue that certain models 
which are regularly invoked in propitiatory explanation of horror’s pleasures – such as the 
theory that violent narratives are valuable because they allow us to purge ourselves of 
aggressive impulses, or that a liking for horror narratives is necessary/unremarkable at 
certain developmental stages – ultimately serve to perpetuate the view of horror as an 
aberrant genre. By locating its appeal in its alleged psychological/therapeutic functions, 
such theories further entrench the conception of horror as an atypical genre whose 
pleasures must be extra-aesthetic in nature. In contrast to such accounts, throughout this 
thesis I will argue that the nature of horror’s allure – as well as that of other equally 
‘paradoxical’, if less frequently vilified, genres such as tragedy – does not  differ from that 
of more comprehensibly pleasurable genres as radically as it is typically thought.   
 
 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 3, in which I discuss Brigid Cherry’s analysis of how female horror aficionados are commonly 
erased in mainstream and fan discourse about the genre. 
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1.1 Anatomy of a Panic 
  
The increasing popularity of home video recorders in the early nineteen eighties ushered in 
a – perhaps inevitable – backlash; one that started “relatively innocuously […] the general 
anxiety that comes with any new technology manifest[ing] itself in public fears of burglary 
and addiction” (See:27). It “was feared that people were becoming addicted to watching 
videos, especially late at night. Without the discipline of television’s midnight termination, 
it was believed that video would wean a nation’s worth of insomniacs” (See:26). These 
initial concerns, however, were rapidly superseded by more ominous worries about the 
new technology’s content. The catalyst for the ensuing media storm, which was to rage 
intermittently across the pages of the British tabloids over the next decade (and was 
revivified in 1993 amidst allegations implicating ‘video nasties’ in the murder of James 
Bulger, as I will later discuss) was the “appearance of lurid advertisements for video films 
in the early months of 1982 [which] sparked off criticism from members of the public and 
the BVA” (See:27). 
 
Tabloids such as the Daily Mail began to castigate the ‘video nasties’ for their alleged 
sadism, conflation of sex and violence, corruption of the nation’s children and degradation 
of women. As the panic gathered steam, media and public alike became more sensitised to 
the subject, with unsubstantiated claims about the morally corrosive effects of the films 
being widely reported in newspapers. Unease was heightened by the fact that this new 
technology allowed consumers to rent/purchase and view films that had often not obtained 
theatrical certification, and, most crucially, to enjoy them in the privacy of their own 
homes rather than in a public theatre. Headlines at the time emphasised this point, stressing 
the alarming new possibilities afforded by this combination of clandestine consumption 
and novel technology – such as slow motion and freeze frame – that would allow viewers 
to furtively “revel in the gory bits as often as they like” (Seduction:14). James Ferman, the 
Director of the BBFC, argued that there was a particular need to prohibit violent videos, 
since they could be “viewed over and over again by people teetering on the edge of using 
material the wrong way” (Seduction:47) 
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Equally pronounced among the newspapers, public figures and politicians who led the 
charge was, as aforementioned, an emphasis on the dangerous likelihood of children being 
exposed to inappropriate material via this new medium: “Wardell, the MP for Gower 
argue[d] that […] ‘It is appropriate today that the House should focus attention on the 
heavy responsibility carried by any parent that permits a video machine in the home. It is a 
potentially dangerous weapon that may be used to attack the emotions of our children and 
young people” (Seduction:17). ‘Video nasties’ possessed viral properties, infiltrating and 
defiling the minds of the innocent, “as great a danger to a child’s mind as any infectious 
disease is to the body”.2 Such films were repeatedly likened to dangerous, habit-forming 
drugs or demonic agents, with mainstream newspapers describing how children had been 
“taken over” or “possessed”3 following exposure, and speculating as to whether rapists’ 
and child molesters’ crimes could be attributed to their “addict[tion] to ‘video nasties’” 
effecting drastic “changes [in] personality”4. Video “chillers [were charged with] 
unleashing mad killers”5, with the mainstream media, public figures and researchers such 
as Dr Clifford Hill collectively arguing that “continued exposure to scenes of violence” 
leads to “desensitivisation [sic]” and addiction, viewers eventually becoming dependent 
upon screen violence “just as if they were hooked on drugs” (Seduction:51). Newspapers 
even invited readers to “burn [their] video nast[ies]”6 in order to counteract the disastrous 
moral pollution they could otherwise wreak.  
 
During the period when nasties were the focus of the greatest public concern, research 
supporting the hypothesis that simulated violence incites imitative acts was widely 
reported and presented as authoritative and dramatic new findings. Meanwhile, equally or 
more methodologically sound studies with less arresting conclusions were granted 
comparatively little media attention. 
 
For example, in 1983 The ‘Parliamentary Group Video Enquiry’ (in fact a research group 
commissioned and privately funded by a coalition of churches and individuals, and led by 
                                                 
2
 September 25
th
 1982, the Daily Mirror (Seduction:22) 
3
 August 4
th
 1982, the Daily Mail (Seduction:22) 
4
 August 5
th
 1983, the Times (Seduction:22) 
5
 May 2
nd
 1990 , the Sun (Seduction:68) 
6
 November 26
th
 1993, the Sun (Seduction:74) 
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the sociologist Dr Clifford Hill) released a widely-publicised report designed to coincide 
with the Video Recordings Bill’s passage through the House of Commons. During the 
course of their research they claimed to have discovered that 45.5% of children have been 
exposed to at least one video nasty (Seduction:22). This figure went on to be repeated 
across mainstream newspapers, with both the Daily Mail and the Daily Express featuring 
headlines to that effect. Problematically, however, the report’s list of ‘Children’s Top Ten 
Nasties’, gleaned through surveying 6000 children, contained a nonexistent film known as 
Zombie Terror (a later study undertaken by different researchers (Bates and Cumberbatch) 
found that 68% of their eleven-year-old correspondents purported to have seen similarly 
nonexistent nasties when counterfeit titles were deliberately included in questionnaires). 
There were further troubling revelations subsequent to the publication of the study’s 
results; the Oxford Polytechnics Research Unit (who had been tasked with carrying out the 
research) alleged that before they had had a chance to process the data it had been seized, 
“misused” (Seduction:29) and publically misrepresented by Hill and his fellow researchers.  
 
As with the later Newson report, although those involved in the study claimed to have 
discovered worrisome new proof about the ubiquity and/or harmfulness of violent videos, 
the bulk of the report was in fact composed before any statistical evidence was available. 
Perhaps most damaging to the report’s credibility was its mysterious inclusion of two 
Coventry children’s comments on video nasties – “Warren ’I like all the blood coming out’ 
and Steve ‘I like the bit in Driller Killer where he puts a man up on sticks and then he gets 
a drill and puts it through his stomach and he screams for ages’” (Seduction:29) – when no 
Coventry primary schools had participated in the survey
7
 . Such discrepancies at the very 
least suggest a lackadaisical approach towards methodology, and at worst leave the 
researchers involved vulnerable to charges of distorting or even falsifying evidence in 
service of a pre-existing agenda. Despite the problems with this prominent study, and the 
remaining lack of evidence that that video violence constituted a significant threat to 
society, the Video Recordings Act passed on July 12
th
 1984, making it a prosecutable 
                                                 
7
 The information on which the study was based was gathered by providing a number of schools with 
questionnaires designed to investigate children’s viewing habits and preferences. 
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offence to supply uncertified videograms. The Act also empowered the police to search 
video suppliers and seize suspected legally prohibited material at will. 
 
Cultural anxieties about media violence flared once again following the high-profile 
murder of James Bulger (a crime which was erroneously linked to Child’s Play 3). Amidst 
the furore provoked by the killing, Professor Elizabeth Newson (head of Nottingham 
University’s Child Psychology Unit) and 25 co-signatories from related fields submitted a 
letter to the Home Secretary testifying to the perils of simulated violence. The media 
widely heralded Newson and co.’s paper as a “startling admission [...] by 25 leading child 
psychologists that they had underestimated the link between video and real life violence”8. 
Newspapers which had previously led the charge against video nasties presented the letter 
as a dramatic about-face precipitated by compelling evidence of violent video’s 
harmfulness: “Britain’s top psychologists finally admitted [...] that the Daily Mirror got it 
right”9. “Astonishing”10, “unequivocal”11 new proof had forced formerly “wishy-washy 
liberal”12 academics to concede that video nasties spark imitative violence, vindicating the 
common-sense view that many had held all along.  
 
There was one glaring problem with this interpretation of events. Professor John Morton, 
head of the Medical Research Council, disputed Newson’s characterisation of her findings, 
arguing that the paper “should not be taken as an independent report by psychologists [but 
a] commissioned piece by David Alton” (Seduction:81), a vociferously pro-censorship MP. 
In fact, the report contained no new research, but relied extensively upon detailed case 
studies of allegedly media-influenced acts of violence such as the Bulger killing.  
 
Despite the fact that the report contained no new research, dubious 
reasoning/methodology, and consisted chiefly of unsubstantiated (and later discredited) 
claims about individual cases it was widely disseminated and promoted as an important 
new study demonstrating the dangers of violent media. It was able to become so 
                                                 
8
 April 1
st
 1994, the Guardian (Seduction:79) 
9
 April 1
st
 1994 , the Daily Mirror (Seduction:79) 
10
 April 1
st
 1994, the Star (Seduction:80) 
11
 April 1
st
 1994, the Daily Telegraph (Seduction:80) 
12
 April 1
st
 1994 , the Nottingham Evening Post (Seduction:79) 
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influential, even given its paucity of evidence and argument, because its sweeping 
assertions seemed intuitively plausible, resonating with people’s sense of what was 
obvious, what was self evident. Even following the release of a – considerably more 
methodologically-sound – contradictory study by the Policy Studies Institute, many 
mainstream newspapers continued to present the dangers of violent media as self-evident: 
asserting that “we all know [that video nasties] breed imitative horrific rapes and other 
brutal crimes”13 extolling the virtues of those studies that “support [...] the common-sense 
view that video violence [does] corrupt the young [my italics]”14. 
 
Shortly after Newson’s much-publicised letter, The Policy Studies Institute released their 
own report on Young Offenders and the Media. In striking contrast to the view then being 
propagated by many mainstream news sources, they found that the viewing habits of 
convicted young offenders did not differ in any significant way from those of non-
offending teenagers, other than that young offenders had “less access to television and 
videos than other children” (Seduction:84). While some newspapers reported on this 
research, many others ignored it and any possible implications it held for the campaign 
against the nasties, continuing to print articles in favour of a protective “crackdown”15 on 
the grounds that violent films were known to “warp [...] young minds”16.  
 
The video nasties furore could, like earlier crusades against media violence, reasonably be 
classified as a ‘moral panic’. The term, coined by Stanley Cohen in 1964 in response to 
sensationalistic British media coverage of youth gatherings in the mid nineteen sixties, 
designates a “‘fundamentally inappropriate’ reaction by much of a society to certain 
relatively minor events and conditions [During panics] the seriousness of events   
[pertaining to the area of concern tends to be] exaggerated and distorted” both in terms of 
scale and damage: “obviously false stories [may be] repeated as true [and] unconfirmed 
rumours […] taken as fresh evidence of further atrocities” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda 2009 
[1994]:22). Once the community has become sufficiently sensitised to this new hazard an 
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“overheated and exaggerated sense of threat” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda 2009 [1994]:22) 
begins to permeate discourse about the designated behaviour, with relatively minor events 
attracting unwarranted press and/or police attention. Owing to their intensity, panics are 
inherently short-lived, too fervid and volatile to be sustained, although some may flare up 
intermittently over the space of some years. The concept of disproportionality is equally 
central to the notion of the moral panic, inevitably exposing those who use the term to 
charges of fraudulently assuming a mantle of neutrality in order to dismiss public concern 
over issues that seem unproblematic from their own ideological perspective. However, 
although this criterion is obviously subjectively applied there remains an objective, 
measurable dimension to it – while one cannot conclusively demonstrate that media 
violence does not play any role in real life violence one can certainly demonstrate that it 
did not play a role in the individual, highly publicised cases it was popularly believed to 
have inspired, and around which much of the video nasties controversy eventually came to 
be centred. 
 
For example, following his 1987 murder spree the tabloid press initially dubbed Michael 
Ryan the ‘Rambo’ killer owing to putative similarities between his acts and the film’s plot, 
arguing that his crime constituted the indisputable, “tragic proof”17 of video violence’s 
virulence. In fact, there was no evidence to suggest he was even in possession of a video 
recorder, lending scant support to the widely-reported claim that he had been obsessed 
with, or ‘inspired’ by, this particular film.   
 
Similarly, in the wake of the James Bulger murder, the trial judge Mr Justice Morland 
ventured a tentative hypothesis as to the killers’ motivations, commenting that “how it 
came about that two mentally normal boys aged ten and of average intelligence committed 
this terrible crime is hard [...] to comprehend [...] I suspect that exposure to violent video 
films may in part be an explanation” (Seduction:71). These remarks were soon widely 
publicised, and had the immediate effect of prompting calls for further restrictions to be 
imposed upon the sale of “horror videos” (Seduction:71). David Alton (a Liberal Democrat 
MP) and Michael Alison (a Tory MP) jointly argued that the situation called for an urgent 
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investigation into “the role played by violent films in the psychological impulses that led to 
[the Bulger] murder”, as well as still “tighter controls of violence on TV and through 
videos” (Seduction:71). Alton and Alison were the first to name Child’s Play 3 as a 
particular nasty that could have instigated the crime. The day after Morland suggested a 
possible link between violent media and the killing, the Daily Mail printed an article in 
which it was claimed that the judge had specifically mentioned Child’s Play 3 in 
connection to the crime, the headline reading “Film a Judge Damned – Did this Grotesque 
Video Inspire a Boy to Murder”18. The Sun, the Star, the Express and the Mirror soon 
followed suit, anatomising how the film’s influence was discernible in features of the 
crime, describing Bulger’s murder as a “chilling replay”19 of the video. Several papers 
cited anonymous experts and police sources attesting to the dangers of violent media in 
general and the Child’s Play series in particular, with the Express asserting that “detectives 
[...] strongly suspect that Venables, and perhaps his fellow killer, watched the film”20. The 
Independent featured an editorial which spoke of the “uncanny resemblance”21 between the 
film and certain aspects of the murder, and the Guardian, while relatively reticent on the 
subject, perpetuated the claim that Child’s Play 3 had been “referred to by the judge in the 
James Bulger murder trial”22 
 
To this day Child’s Play 3 – a relatively innocuous and decidedly fantastical horror sequel 
starring a homicidal doll – remains notoriously linked in the public imagination with the 
murder of James Bulger. As I have indicated, the film was widely “held up as being 
causative in James Bulger’s murder […because] it was suggested that a copy of the film 
had been in Jon Venable’s home three weeks before he and Thompson murdered Bulger” 
(See:325). In fact, there was no evidence that the boys had viewed the film, or indeed any 
video nasties, prior to committing the crime. Dr Susan Bailey, the consultant forensic 
psychologist who had been tasked with writing a report on Venables reported that the child 
“recoiled from violent scenes in videos and his favourite film was The Goonies”23. 
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Furthermore, the detectives who had been investigating the case denied such a link, stating 
that they had found no material during the course of their enquiry that could “have 
influenced a boy to go out and commit murder?”24 Contrary to Morland’s characterisation 
of the boys as otherwise “normal” children who might have been compelled to kill by the 
film’s malign influence, both exhibited troubled tendencies long before the murder, with a 
known “track record of arson and animal torture” (Seduction:73). The putative similarities 
between Bulger’s death and acts of violence depicted in the film also dissolve under closer 
inspection. “Bulger had been splashed with paint and the doll in the film is struck with a 
paintball; Bulger died on a railway line and a set-piece in the movie takes place on a ghost 
train ride; the killers admitted that Bulger constantly got back on his feet no matter how 
hard they hit him and the doll in the film shows a similar indestructibility” (See:325). 
Suggestive though such parallels might have seemed at the time, the boys had originally 
planned to push Bulger into traffic in order to disguise the nature of his death, and 
Thompson had previously informed schoolmates of his “long-standing plan to push a child 
under a bus” (Seduction:73). All the evidence available strongly suggests that the way in 
which Bulger was killed did not reflect an obsessive desire to recreate fictional events, but 
the murderers’ childish lack of effective planning and forethought; after abducting Bulger 
Venables and Thompson wandered around for miles (their incriminating journey witnessed 
by numerous passersby) discussing and attempting several different means of killing him, 
before eventually planting his body on a railway line in an effort to make it appear as 
though he had wandered onto the tracks.  
 
The Bulger killing is not the only high-profile crime that remains linked in the public 
imagination to Child’s Play 3. In 1992, Suzanne Capper was kidnapped, tortured and 
finally murdered by six of her acquaintances. Insofar as a satisfactorily explanatory 
‘reason’ for such an act could ever be provided, there is nothing to suggest that media 
violence played any role in the killers’ motive or modus operandi. The accomplices 
claimed to have been motivated by minor personal grievances against Capper, suspecting 
that she might be responsible for their contraction of pubic lice and for the theft of a “pink 
duffel coat worth [fifty] pounds” (Foster & Connett, 1993). The charges of media influence 
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arose from the fact that one of the tapes the murderers used as part of their torture of 
Capper featured a song which contained lines sampled from the film. The media 
extrapolated from this fact to suggest that the killers must have been inspired by Chucky’s 
actions, becoming “programmed” for violence through their contact with the “demonic 
doll” (Jones, 2009). There are several reasons to suspect that the connection drawn 
between the murder and Child’s Play 3 is spurious. Most importantly, the police who had 
been investigating the crime explicitly disavowed any link, describing the putative 
connection as “tenuous” (Seduction:77) and utterly unsupported by their interviews with 
the offenders themselves. As with Michael Ryan (the ‘Rambo’ killer), two of the crime’s 
chief instigators did not in fact own a video player, which hardly buttresses the claim that 
they were obsessively interested in violent videos, or that excessive exposure to such films 
must have played a causal role in their crimes. Finally, there is no reason to suggest that 
the track played as part of Capper’s torture was especially selected because of its link to 
the film; rather, it was a popular song that the killers happened to have recorded when it 
was being broadcast from a local radio station. 
 
The hyperbolic claims that came to pervade discourse about violent media and their social 
effects throughout the early eighties to mid-nineties, the mass of articles in which videos 
were credited with near-diabolical influence, capable of compelling otherwise ordinary 
people to kill, are, simply put, flagrantly untrue and as easily falsifiable now as at the time 
of their publication. Indeed, the fact that such assertions continued to be uncritically 
published by mainstream newspapers is, I would argue, illustrative of an underlying sense 
of resonance, an instinctive ‘rightness’ about such claims that – as the numerous appeals 
made to self evidence attest
25
 – is not primarily contingent upon empirical evidence. 
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1.2 Disturbing Effects or Disturbingly Effective: Conflicting Rationales for Film 
Censorship 
 
Significantly, many of the notorious banned nasties of the 1980s have since been quietly 
granted certification for home viewing by the BBFC. David Cooke, the board’s current 
Director, justifies what critics might perceive as a tacit admission of past error or 
arbitrariness by arguing that it is the board’s duty to “classify for contemporary standards”, 
aiming to “reflect [...] broad scale public opinion”(Cole, 2012). He argues that, because 
many such films have grown “dated”, they have now “lost much of their impact and power 
to shock”, thus no longer posing a “significant harm risk” (Cole, 2012). Cooke’s wording 
here seems to suggest that the board’s past decisions regarding video nasties were 
predicated primarily upon the desire to protect unsuspecting audience members from 
emotional trauma; only now that the average viewer is relatively inured to cinematic 
violence, habituated to the superior special effects and stylistic conventions of modern day 
nasties like Saw, is it safe for these films to be released for home viewing.  
 
However, James Ferman, the presiding Director of the BBFC until 1998, describes the 
board’s motivations and remit very differently. In a 1999 article reflecting on his career, 
Ferman defends his (successful) efforts to “bring films within the Obscene Publications 
Act” (Ferman, 1999). Because of this move, “the test of criminality would no longer be 
offensiveness, but harm to the morality of a significant proportion of the likely audience. 
The ‘deprave and corrupt’ test could have been conceived to hold the line against the 
exploitation of sexual violence and torture, the biggest problems of the 1970s. It might also 
have been framed to provide the ideal weapon against the video nasties of the 1980s, where 
it proved its effectiveness repeatedly” (Ferman, 1999). In other words, if one accepts the 
reasoning of the board members during the period in question, the populace’s increasing 
desensitisation to violent media surely implies that society is in urgent need of censors who 
are even more firm-handed. If the films that rightly horrified audiences of the 80s and 90s 
are now viewed as quaint and ineffectual it must indicate a significant deterioration in our 
moral character. 
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If the BBFC’s job lies in the protection of audience members from ethical corruption, it is 
the acceptance of media violence that should prove most troubling, representing a 
tendency that is imperative for censors to counteract rather than merely acquiescing to the 
public’s tolerance for escalating levels of onscreen brutality. In some cases, it is 
indubitably true that the public’s willingness to countenance violent/negative content in 
fictions can function as a barometer of what is socially regarded as acceptable. The waning 
public tolerance of (certain forms of) gendered violence has indeed been reflected by a 
marked reduction of the kind of light-hearted, normalised depictions of domestic violence 
that used to appear in otherwise non-violent programmes/films such as I Love Lucy or The 
Honeymooners. Similarly, characters who are nowadays intended to be perceived as 
sympathetic seldom make overtly racist statements or use racially derogatory terms. In 
other words, the fact that mainstream audiences of the period during which such scenes 
and references were more common did not, for the most part, find them offensive or 
objectionable was both genuinely problematic and indicative of certain moral blind spots. 
 
However, I would contend that our eagerness to engage with violent narratives does not 
necessarily act as an equivalent gauge of our real life attitudes towards violence. The 
central misapprehension that powers much anti-media violence discourse is the 
presumption that, in order to derive any pleasure from violent narratives, one must in some 
way side, sympathise, or, in effects-researchers’ parlance, identify with the perpetrator(s). 
Viewers’ capacity to enjoy witnessing acts of simulated violence thus serves as an 
indictment of their moral fibre. As I discuss in further detail in Chapter 3, there is actually 
very little empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the ‘sympathy for the devil’ 
model represents our prototypical mode of engagement with violent fictions. In fact, in 
those instances where media influence seems to have played a significant role in inciting 
real life violence, the violence in question is generally conceived of as (or justified as 
being) retaliatory/defensive in nature, figured as a means of taking action against those 
depicted as threatening aggressors-in-waiting. 
 
For example, “according to FBI statistics, anti-Latino and Latina hate crimes [in the US] 
increased 40 percent between 2003 and 2007 – the same period that politicians started 
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using anti-immigration platforms to garner votes for elections [...employing rhetoric that 
presented the demographic as] dangerous lazy criminals set on violating and destroying the 
American way of life [...some of whom are even capable of] ‘coming to kill you, and you, 
and me, and my children and my grandchildren’”26 (De La Torre, 2011). Equally, 
Rwandan news media prior to and during the 1994 genocide have been charged with both 
“inciting the hatred that led to violence [...and, even more crucially,] spreading fear, 
rumour, and panic by using a kill-or-be-killed frame”, urging Hutus to exterminate their 
Tutsi neighbours before it was too late (Kellow & Steeves, 2006:112). The media 
researchers Christine L. Kellow and H. Leslie Steeves argue that Radio-Télévision Libre 
des Mille Collines (RLTM) was particularly culpable for the ensuing persecution and 
murder of Tutsi citizens (and insufficiently anti-Tutsi Hutus, who were portrayed as 
insidious ‘collaborationists’). The network regularly “broadcast [...] inaccurate and 
inflammatory” (Kellow & Steeves, 2006:117) claims about the Tutsis, repeatedly telling its 
audience that “’the RPF is coming to kill people, so defend yourselves’” (Kellow & 
Steeves, 2006:120). The RLTM consistently “emphasised a ‘risk and danger’, ‘kill or be 
killed’ frame”, legitimising acts of violence against Tutsis by presenting them as self-
protective: one “May 20 1994 broadcast described Tutsis as gathering guns, killing Hutu 
families and burning down their houses” (Kellow & Steeves, 2006:120). 
 
However one conceives of the pleasures of violent narratives, the fact that formerly-banned 
films have now been made available for private viewing without generating any 
appreciable rise in violent crime and imitative acts, indicates that the BBFC’s stated 
justification for prohibiting certain films – their judgement that the video nasties exhibited 
the “tendency to deprave and corrupt (e.g. make morally bad) a significant proportion of 
those likely to see [them]” (BBFC, 2012) – is invalid. I would suggest that Cooke’s 
description of how the board determined that once-dangerous nasties like Salo or Cannibal 
Holocaust no longer posed a threat – a complex calculation involving “questions of 
stylistic treatment, whether the material still looks credible, whether it now seems 
ridiculous, or whether it still carries a significant charge” (Cole, 2012) – provides a 
compelling alternative explanation for the board’s dramatic reversal.  
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One of the most notorious – and critically acclaimed – films that was for a long time 
refused certification, widely unavailable for public or home viewing until as late as 1998, 
is The Texas Chainsaw Massacre. It is important to note that Tobe Hooper, the film’s 
director, had deliberately included little graphic violence and gore in the hope of attaining 
a (more commercially desirable) PG rating; the BBFC’s “misgivings” could not be 
assuaged by cuts to the most violent acts or scenes because “the film relied for its effect 
upon creating an atmosphere of madness, threat and impending violence” (SBBFC, 2012). 
Instead, two successive heads of the BBFC (Stephen Murphy and James Ferman) denied 
the film certification altogether, perturbed by its pervasively “disturbing tone” and “focus 
on ‘abnormal psychology’” (SBBFC, 2012). Ferman in particular related the board’s 
decision to the disquieting “sense of menace” that is sustained throughout the film’s latter 
half, likening it to a “‘pornography of terror’, in that its intention seemed to be to invite the 
audience to revel in a vulnerable woman's distress” [my italics] (SBBFC, 2012). Such 
remarks cumulatively support a reading in which Hooper’s film can be seen as a victim of 
its own success; so effective at evoking human anguish and depravity, at eliciting negative 
emotions, that it also serves to activate underlying concerns about the nature of other 
people’s attraction to violent material. Significantly, the BBFC explained their eventual 
decision to grant the film certification for video release in 1999 by appealing to changing 
stylistic conventions and expectations: by contemporary standards, the film seemed 
comparatively “dated and feeble” (SBBFC, 2012).  
 
Following the passage of the Video Recordings Act, the Attorney General Sir Michael 
Havers produced an outline of features that could render films obscene/prosecutable, most 
liable in the eyes of censors to deprave and corrupt. In addition to naming specific acts that 
would be considered taboo (such as cannibalism or violence perpetrated by children) he 
warned that films that “portray [...] violence to such an extent, or so explicitly, that its 
appeal can only be to those who are disposed to derive positive enjoyment from seeing 
such violence” (Seduction:34) are especially likely to be judged obscene. Similarly, he 
cautioned that “the more convincing [a film’s portrayal of violence is], the more [morally] 
harmful” it will be (Seduction:34). The reasoning behind these edicts is far from self-
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evident if one is in fact approaching the subject from a harm-reduction perspective: 
decades of effects research has failed to establish whether realistic violence is more or less 
likely to elicit imitative aggression than fantastic violence, whether perfunctory or 
lingering depictions of suffering are more morally perilous (indeed, it is most unclear why 
representing victims’ suffering in great length and detail is more likely to glamorise or 
normalise violence than a cartoonish, emotionally shallow treatment would). However, 
such stipulations closely conform to those traits one might predict to cause viewers the 
most visceral, emotional and philosophical discomfort. 
 
1.3 From Video Nasties to Penny Dreadfuls: Recurrent Concerns about Violent 
Media  
 
Throughout this thesis, I argue that much discourse and theorising about media 
violence/media with negative content operates according to one implicit assumption (or set 
of assumptions) that I term the fantasy model. It is this folk-theory of fiction’s appeal that 
generates the putative paradoxes of tragedy and horror, rendering our attraction to painful 
genres problematic insofar as it departs from this model. In this section I will highlight the 
commonalities between superficially quite dissimilar media panics, not in order to present 
critics of various iterations of violent/distressing media as irrational or ill-motivated, but to 
point out how strikingly persistent, and deeply culturally embedded such misgivings are – 
apparently as spontaneous and ubiquitous as our propensity to be attracted to such media in 
the first place.  
 
The desire for violent representations is not a deviation from the social or historical norm; 
while critics of contemporary media often characterise today’s fictions as unprecedentedly 
bloodthirsty and ‘infective’, or appeal to a bygone age of kinder, gentler entertainments, 
violent fictions and anxieties about violent fictions seem to be equally perennial. While the 
populist entertainments and ‘nasties’ of the past tend to strike us as quaint and ineffectual, 
highly unlikely to spark imitative acts or indeed to rouse any strong feelings whatsoever, 
they too were often the focus of intense public concern.  
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In his Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers, Henry Fielding attributes 
this spreading evil or “disease” (Fielding [1751]:xi) in the “lower Branches of our 
Constitution” (Fielding [1751]:x) to the great changes wrought in the “Customs, Manners, 
and Habits” (Fielding [1751]:xxi) of the Commonalty by their access to popular 
entertainments. Unlike the industrious, humble working classes of the past, Fielding argued 
that today’s Commonalty had been corrupted by a historically unprecedented “Torrent of 
Luxury”, preferring to disport themselves in a fashion more befitting their “Superiors” 
(Fielding [1751]:6), and to sustain themselves by criminal means, than to labour honestly.  
 
In his exploration of the ‘Seven Curses of London’, the Victorian writer James Greenwood 
attributed the “growth of juvenile criminality” (Greenwood, 2012 [1869]) to the popularity 
of penny dreadfuls or ‘gallows literature’ such as The Skeleton Band, Tyburn Tree, The 
Black Knight of the Road, Dick Turpin, The Boy Burglar and Starlight Sall, likening them 
to the vectors of some contagious disease. Just as a “tainted scrap of rag [can] spread 
plague and death through an entire village [so] a stray leaf of Panther Bill or Tyburn Tree 
may sow the seeds of immorality amongst as many boys as a town can produce” 
(Greenwood, 2012 [1869]). Greenwood also argues that, while middle class boys are likely 
to prove immune to the poisonous wiles of such publications, having “minds too pure 
either to seek out or crave after literature of the sort in question”, their “poor brother[s] of 
the gutter” are all too often led astray by these “open encouragers of boy highwaymen”, 
their malleable young minds easily primed for criminality by tales of “‘daring exploits’” 
(Greenwood, 2012 [1869])).  
 
Critics of the nineteen thirties decried films such as The Raven for “exploiting cruelty for 
cruelty’s sake” (Seduction:195) and censors forced cuts to films that could be considered to 
demonstrate criminal uses for everyday objects. For example, Tod Browning’s 
controversial film Freaks (1931) concerned censors because it displayed a close up of a 
woman pouring poison into her husband’s bottle of champagne, and they demanded it be 
cut from the film “lest it incite real life crimes of a similar nature” (Skal, 1993:172). 
Similarly, in Mystery of the Wax Museum (1932) the New York authorities imposed cuts 
on a scene in which “a character [lights] a piece of paper with a cigar in preparation to burn 
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the museum for its insurance money” (Skal, 1993:172). Finally, horror and crime comics 
of the fifties were deplored for “introduc[ing] the element of pleasure into violence”; 
unlike the “comics which charmed [the] childhood[s] [of past generations, which] did 
nothing but good to those who read them”, critics accused these publications of 
“encourag[ing] sadism” and juvenile delinquency (Edelman, 2012 [1952]). 
 
The controversy that led to the moral panic about the video nasties clearly conforms to an 
ongoing, cyclic trend, “fitting a pattern that can be traced back through campaigns against 
comics books and cheap paperbacks in the 1950s, Hollywood gangster and horror films in 
the 1930s, and the Penny Dreadfuls and Penny Theatres of the Victorian era” (See:33), 
each of which “inspired a clampdown of some form or a complete ban, the primary 
motivation of which was always cited as being the protection of juveniles” (See:33). The 
very fact that commentators during this period stressed what they perceived as a radical 
discontinuity between old, ‘safe’ horror – the decorous “spine-chillers in a tradition that 
stretches back to Conan Doyle and Edgar Allan Poe
27” – versus this new wave of “nasties 
[which they deemed to be] far removed from traditional suspense and horror films” 
(Seduction:8), closely parallels criticisms made about the dethroned ‘nasties’ that appalled 
previous eras.  
 
As Julian Petley notes in his analysis of historical and contemporary discourse about media 
effects, just as the youth of each era is judged by its elders to be peculiarly disreputable, 
more feckless, cosseted and disrespectful than any earlier generation, so certain elements 
of its media tend to be identified as posing an unprecedented threat to the cultural order, 
acting to foment social unrest and juvenile delinquency. While this fact does not in itself 
discredit the claim that violent media could exert culturally/ morally-deleterious effects – it 
is possible that societies might be ever-lamenting various phenomena because they are 
legitimately objectionable – this pattern of recurrence does seem to belie many effect-
theorists’ claim that current levels of media violence represent a completely novel, and 
uniquely perilous, departure from previous cultural norms. 
 
                                                 
27
 30
th
 May 1983 the Daily Mail (Seduction:8) 
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In other words, it is would-be censors’ damaging historical myopia, their ignorance of this 
recurring phenomenon, that leads them to drastically overestimate the dangers of new 
cultural forms. As Petley and Barker point out, the past crises about media that have been 
obliquely discredited by their subjects’ uneventful demise/absorption into the mainstream 
“fade into history” (Barker, 1997:26). This results in persistent misapprehensions about the 
comparative virulence of one’s own era’s entertainments. It is possible for mainstream 
papers unselfconsciously to claim that “the traditional horror film did not encourage 
imitation [while] the modern slasher and gang-rapist films [...] rape the imagination and 
[engender] copycat crimes”28 only because they lack crucial context for their view of 
modern media as uniquely violent, corrupting and perilous to society. 
 
As research on the long history of moral panics about violent media (and the striking lack 
of any observable surges in copycat crimes) demonstrates, the recurrence and obvious 
resonance of this spectre does not reflect any dramatic empirical discoveries about the 
emotional/behavioural effects of our engagement with fictions. Nor yet do panics about 
unprecedentedly violent media necessarily correspond to any radical increase in media 
violence. Rather, I would argue that horror (and other narrative genres characterised by 
their violent/aversive content) is so often construed as morally problematic because of the 
ways in which it is philosophically problematic.  
 
Descriptions of the undesirable audience, the audience who consumes violent media in 
what then-secretary of the British Board of Film Censors termed “the wrong way” 
(Seduction:8) betray a pervasive anxiety about the dangers of insufficiently or incorrectly 
civilised human nature. Graham Murdock argues that, despite its continued inability to 
provide compelling evidence of harm, the “banal science” of the “dominant ‘effects’ 
tradition [that seeks to demonstrate a causal connection between viewing violent media and 
becoming desensitised to real life violence or behaving more aggressively] has proved so 
resilient partly because it chimes with a deeply rooted formation of social fear” (Murdock, 
1997:83). The very premise of censorship presupposes the division between an impervious 
‘us’ and a suggestible ‘them’: “as Horace Kallen [observed of censorship of Hollywood 
                                                 
28
 October 27th 1993 the Times (Seduction:71) 
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films in the 1930s] ‘ When a censor proclaims that a state of danger has been created by... 
a motion picture... whose is the danger? His own? Never” (Murdock, 1997:83). Murdock’s 
argument (as it is framed here) is flawed, since his ideological opponents could simply 
note that there are cases where we recognise as unproblematic the need for qualified 
individuals to peruse materials that are off-limits to the general population. Indeed, in the 
case of experts whose job involves researching child pornography, their presumed lack of 
enjoyment of what they are looking at is far from unimportant: it is hardly contentious to 
note that those with the most interest in viewing such images are the least ‘qualified’ to do 
so, the most likely to be susceptible to any dangerous influence or messages. So by 
analogy could film censors be immune to any corrupting effects precisely because of their 
distaste for what they are watching, unlike those audience members who seek out violent 
entertainments of their own volition (who surely, according to the reasoning of those 
opposed to violent media, are more predisposed than most to violence already)? 
 
Barker advances a more plausible variation of Murdock’s anti-censorship argument, 
suggesting that the dominant effects-model is predicated upon the (illegitimate) assumption 
that the researchers themselves are superior to, or at least different from, the subjects they 
study for signs of media-induced aggression. While the researchers’ work “brings them 
into regular contact with the supposedly corrupting material […they] are unconcerned for 
their own well-being as they implicitly ‘know’ that the effects could only be on others” 
(Gauntlett, 2005:61). In fact, as Gauntlett states, this division between a responsible, 
known ‘us’ and a shadowy, unspecified ‘them’ seems to be central to common sense 
thinking about the risks of media violence – “surveys typically show that whilst a certain 
proportion of the public feel that the media may cause other people to engage in antisocial 
behaviour, almost no-one ever says that they have been affected in that way themselves” 
(Gauntlett, 2005:61) 
 
Of course, this fact, while suggestive does not constitute an unassailable rebuttal of the 
researchers’ claims. It is similarly true that, while most of us accept in principle that social 
conditioning and cultural norms shape human behaviour and personality, we can often be 
highly resistant to viewing our own lives through such an impersonal and deterministic 
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lens. It might therefore be the case that, prone though we are to believe ourselves to be 
especially insulated against adverse media influences, we are all affected negatively, with 
some vulnerable outliers exhibiting even stronger effects than the rest of us.  
 
However, given that effects-researchers’ experiments are often structured in such a way 
that a single dose of media violence is administered to randomly sampled and 
developmentally typical subjects who are then tested for aggressive or antisocial 
behaviours and attitudes, it does, as Gauntlett notes, seem that by their own logic the 
researchers in question should themselves be more vulnerable.  If otherwise typical 
subjects’ short term behaviours are perceptibly altered by a single exposure then those 
researchers who are in regular proximity should surely display an even more noticeable 
shift in behaviour or attitudes. The next chapter will discuss how this flaw in effects 
researchers’ reasoning is reproduced in their problematic attribution of behaviours more 
consistent with short-term arousal to social learning/modelling. 
 
This implicit double-standard is, paradoxically, particularly evident in discussions of the 
moral danger of works that have some claim to being art (in the evaluative sense) as 
opposed to merely entertainment. Even as opponents concede that enlightened readers may 
be able to discern and appreciate the aesthetic qualities of provocative works such as A 
Clockwork Orange or Lady Chatterley’s Lover they argue that the masses cannot read in a 
similarly critical fashion, must instead be stuck at surface level, remaining passively 
transfixed by a text’s sensational subject matter rather than engaging with its haunting 
themes or satirical insights. Thus any interest such individuals evince in violent or 
disturbing narratives is immediately rendered suspect.  
 
This “bifocal vision” (Murdock, 1997:84) remains surprisingly evident across historical, 
recent and contemporary discussion of contentious works and genres. While this view may 
be most perfectly and notoriously encapsulated by the prosecution’s question in the 1960 
Lady Chatterley trial – “Is it a book that you would [...] wish your wife or your servants to 
read?” – in a 1993 edition of the Independent Bryan Appleyard unwittingly echoed the 
lamentations made  thirty (or 130) years earlier. Appleyard argued that the putative laxity 
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of film censorship in Britain results not just in the free availability of “vicious drivel for the 
masses [...but] unarguably fine films such as Taxi Driver and Goodfellas, which, if you are 
honest, you would rather were not watched by certain types of people” (Petley, 1997:97). 
Equally, during the video nasties panic of the mid-eighties Ken Penry (then deputy director 
of the BBFC) remarked that that “now and again, you get clever dicks who say [of violent 
horror films] ‘Ah, this is art, this is bigger than it seems.’ But I think of Joe Bloggs who’s 
going to the Odeon on a Saturday night who’s not on that wavelength. He’s going along 
seeing it literally, and I always keep that in mind. Joe Bloggs is the majority and film 
censorship is for the majority” (Petley, 1997:94). Strikingly, Appleyard and Penry do not 
view those likely to be affected adversely by violent films as an anomalous minority whose 
responses must nonetheless be taken into account (a possibility I briefly discuss in the next 
section of this chapter), rather, they view certain works as intrinsically unfit for mass 
consumption. 
 
John Springhall and David Buckingham also emphasise the continuities between moral 
panics elicited by “fears of new technology interacting with revised forms of popular 
culture” (Springhall,1998:157), pointing out the ways in which new or newly popular 
media are repeatedly framed as uniquely dangerous, utterly divorced from the ‘safe’ media 
of the past. Springhall argues that modern fears about the moral threat posed by, for 
example, gangsta rap and video games, “have their roots in nineteenth century anxieties 
about the ‘ill effects’ of popular forms of amusement on the ‘children of the lower 
classes’” (Springhall,1998:2), particularly emphasising the paedophobic overtones of many 
moral panics. However, like Barker and Buckingham, he attributes adult disapproval of 
youth-oriented and populist media as being, in part, due to a pervasive cultural idealisation 
of childhood.  
 
Insofar as “‘childhood’ equals hope for the future” (Barker & Petley, 1997:6), acting as the 
repository of our own aspirations, we are heavily invested in preserving (the myth of) 
children’s innocence. As Buckingham argues, the combination of children and modern 
culture/novel technologies is “bound to invoke profound concerns about the continuity of 
the social order and of fundamental human values [my italics]” (Buckingham, 1997:32) If, 
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as in the common sense intuitions cited by many critics of popular media, 
violent/sensational popular fictions are pleasurable because they enact our darkest desires, 
their ubiquity, and particularly their consumption by children, is profoundly discomforting, 
appearing to indicate that sadism is not inculcated but inborn. By decrying violent 
narratives and striving to limit their availability, by framing their popularity as a novel, and 
unnatural, state of affairs and, above all, by charging the mass media with indoctrination of 
an ultimately passive and undiscerning youth audience, public figures could be seen to be 
attempting to defuse and contain the ideological threat posed by violent media. According 
to such a reading, moral panics about the corrupting effects of various media can be seen to 
reflect a kind of paradoxical utopianism, operating to defend the belief that humankind is 
perfectible against the (perceived) counter-evidence constituted by our attraction to violent 
fictions.  
 
1.4 Video Nasties, Misery-Lit and other Despised Genres 
 
Horror is actually just one among a number of disreputable, low-brow genres that is 
frequently invoked in connection with pornography, popularly viewed as a means of 
gratifying primitive appetites. While horror’s lurid and often patently fantastical violence 
renders it particularly vulnerable to this type of critique, a similar cultural unease lingers 
around other populist media defined by their preoccupation with human torment. 
Significantly, such misgivings also attach themselves to those narratives/genres where the 
suffering in question is largely psychological or unlikely to spark imitative acts. The semi-
recent boom in popularity of ‘misery lit’ or ‘misery porn’ saw a spate of articles expressing 
consternation about the appeal of the trend, and what it implies about its voracious readers. 
Vocal critics of the genre, such as Carol Sarler, accused readers of being “in thrall to 
paedophilia [...and vicariously] wallowing in the muck of it” through the medium of these 
texts (Sarler, 2008). Significantly, Sarler concedes that “the majority of the purchasers of 
such books [would not themselves be] able, willing or prepared to damage a child”, but 
maintains that “for an adult reader to enjoy any kind of frisson [...] from the suffering 
endured by the authors of these memoirs is abhorrent” (Sarler, 2008). 
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Another critic from within the publishing industry, Danuta Kean, equated the publication 
of memoirs of sexual abuse with an “emotional striptease”, arguing that the “vivid”, 
“explicit” level of detail provided risks teetering into titillation (Kean, 2007). Kean decried 
readers’ eagerness to “revel in the pornography of misery” (Kean, 2007). The genre united 
the Guardian and the Daily Mail in shared disapprobation, with writers from each 
publication describing such books as “distasteful” and worryingly “titillating” (Kean, 
2007), “bacteria”- like in their virulent “infect[ion] of the bestseller charts” (Addley, 
2007). Tim Adams queried why we are “so addicted to other people’s agony”, again 
highlighting the degree of “minutely described […] stark, compendious detail” (Adams, 
2006) in which abuse is described. Esther Addley also questioned why it is, given that 
these books are “rarely mediated by much literary merit”, that people are so quick to 
“whisk [...] such tales off the shelves”, speculating that some element of “prurience, or 
worse,” (Addley, 2007) must play a role in this genre’s popularity. Notably, as with the 
video nasties, the fact that such narratives are defiantly lowbrow and populist, sold, as 
critics repeatedly noted, in “stacks in the aisles [of] supermarket[s]” (Kean, 2007), renders 
them intrinsically suspect. The set of tacit assumptions that form the fantasy model dictate 
that we select non-literary texts for their easy pleasures; had we wished to be in any way 
challenged or provoked we would not have chosen to immerse ourselves in “parodically 
named”, mass market paperbacks known for their reliably leaden prose and bathetic cover 
images of pretty, “saucer-eyed” (Addley, 2007) child victims. Instead, the consumers of 
such texts must be “pander[ing] to their baser voyeuristic instincts” (Mangan, 2010) or 
seeking the thrill of ‘sudden glory’ that attends the appreciation of one’s good fortune in 
comparison to another.  
 
In summation, I would argue that much of the popular concern about misery memoirs was 
not based in any posited causal relationship between actual wrong-doing and the 
enjoyment of sad memoirs, but in a non-consequentialist moral revulsion at the insatiable 
avidity with which its readers appear to regard human suffering. Populist narratives that, 
like the misery memoir or ‘shock doc’, foreground and detail suffering, and apparently do 
so with the end of pleasantly diverting the reader, are regarded by their critics as morally 
repugnant, indulging readers’ vicarious sadism. As I will argue in a later chapter, this 
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(mis)characterisation of the emotions afforded by narratives that are based around violence 
or suffering, or indeed, depict undesirable acts of any kind, as uncomplicatedly pleasant or 
positive, falsifies the nature of such narratives’ – bittersweet – pleasures. Certainly, it is 
possible to be compelled by a tragic or otherwise upsetting narrative without deriving any 
sort of clearly discernible enjoyment from one’s engagement with the text – rather, one can 
be gripped by a queasy, sweaty-palmed fascination, a compulsion to read on and determine 
what happens next, that cannot properly be characterised as either strictly pleasurable or 
displeasurable so much as intensely arresting. 
 
1.5 ‘I Know Very Well What They Are’: Common Sense and the Philosophy of 
Horror 
 
In June 1983, Mary Whitehouse asked the DPP to prevent the documentary A 
Gentleman’s Agreement from airing “on the grounds that it contain[ed] excerpts from the 
convicted videos S.S Experiment Camp and I Spit on Your Grave” (Seduction:20). While 
Whitehouse admitted that she had not actually viewed the offending programme (or indeed 
the now-censored films from which the clips had been excerpted) she maintained that “it 
really would not have made the slightest difference, because I know very well what they 
are” (Seduction:20). While many more moderate, mainstream critics of media violence 
might chafe at being compared to Whitehouse, I would argue that her statement here 
reflects in microcosm the reasoning behind the video nasties panic in particular, and 
indeed, much anti-horror/anti-media violence sentiment in general: according to such a 
view, “there are ‘bad materials’ out there, and we only have to look to know that they are 
bad” (Barker, 1997:17) (although dangerous others will find them positively enticing).  
 
As David Mellor stated after viewing the notorious ‘mondo’ film Faces of Death: “I found 
it particularly offensive and revolting as did everyone else who saw it [...] it was a 
disgusting film plainly intended to stimulate particularly base and deplorable instincts [my 
italics]” (Barker, 1984:22). The “reasonable person” (Seduction:20) standard relies upon a 
shared view of what is plain, what is self-evident, and this common sense view is 
inherently selective about what constitutes evidence of a narrative’s harmfulness and what 
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is merely happenstance. It is obvious that someone who views a horror film (or even an 
unassuming sex comedy like Confessions of a Window Cleaner
29
) and goes on to rape or 
murder someone might have been adversely influenced while, in the (perhaps more 
representative) case of a father who murdered his infant daughter as a religious “sacrifice” 
(Barker, 1997:15) after viewing a film about the life of Christ, no newspapers recounting 
the event thought to trace any causal link back to his viewing habits. The narratives 
mobilised in response to, for example, the suggested link between Child’s Play 3 and the 
Bulger and Capper murders, simply fit such cases, resonating with many people’s 
common-sense assumptions about the appeal of violent media. On the other hand, 
instances such as the adolescent boy who committed suicide in order to become a Lion 
King,
30
 or Fred West’s improbable affection for Disney videos, do not possess the same 
aura of significance, of explanatory power. 
 
As I discussed in the first section of this chapter, the 1994 Newson report about the effects 
of violent media on children exemplifies the intractability of this sort of reasoning, serving 
as a “classic case of ‘common sense writ large’” (Barker, 1997:12). Similarly, despite the 
refutation of claims that Child’s Play 3 played a role in various high profile murders, no 
retractions were issued in the newspapers responsible for promoting the charges, many of 
which still allude to the discredited connection to this day
31
. Barker cites such erroneous 
but enduring associations as emblematic of the way that “quick-fix explanations that seem 
to ‘make sense’” (Barker, 1997:14) linger in the collective imagination, even when such 
explanations are lacking in evidential support, or have been debunked outright. 
 
                                                 
29
 In 1983 a 16-year-old being tried in juvenile court for attempted rape cited the film as an inspiration: “I 
watched the film and then went out because I wanted to have sex with a girl.” (Seduction:19) 
30
 In fact, the link in this case was, unlike the vast majority of crimes attributed to video nasties, quite well 
founded (although, as in the case of those claiming that viewing violent films provoked their crimes, it is 
debatable to what extent it can really be said to have induced the subject to act): the fourteen year old had 
been fixated by The Lion King, and left a suicide note that explicitly cited the film as the inspiration for his 
act: “I killed myself because I wanted to become a Lion King” (Seduction:92). 
31
 For example, this recent article in the Sun perpetuates the notion that there was a connection between 
Child’s Play 3 and the Bulger and Capper murders: “James Bulger’s killers Robert Thompson and Jon 
Venables were fans of Child’s Play 3 [...] The same year gang victim Suzanne Capper, 16, was also taunted 
with lines from the film as she was murdered”. (Lowe, 2009)  
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It is perhaps hardly surprising that mainstream discourse about violent media/narratives 
with aversive content should be pervaded with ungrounded assertions and appeals to self-
evidence. However, the series of assumptions that structure anti-horror arguments are 
equally discernible even in many of the counter-discourses designed to defend, or make 
comprehensible, horror’s attractions. 
 
As Steven Jay Schneider notes “there is no dearth of scholarship on cinematic horror”, 
indeed, he acerbically argues, the (fittingly) monstrous proliferation of writing about horror 
in recent years suggests that “the horror film’s oft-noted propensity for redundancy, 
sequelization, and overkill has found its non-fictional correlates in the world of academia” 
(Schneider, 2004:131). Yet, as Matt Hills asserts, much contemporary writing on horror 
still retains a curiously defensive tone, having, he suggests, “unwittingly adopted media 
discourses surrounding horror via its willingness to view horror’s pleasures as a puzzle, 
conundrum or ‘problem’” (Hills, 2005:3). If mainstream, common sense views of the genre 
all too often characterise its pleasures as aberrant, it is a symbolic equation that persists 
even in many sympathetic studies of horror. (That it should do so to an extent is 
unsurprising given the pervasive cultural antipathy towards horror, an antipathy that is not, 
as one might think, restricted to “UK newspapers participating in moral panics” (Hills, 
2005:4) but also emerges in an academic contexts).
32
 Horror remains, in a sense, 
perpetually on trial, the counter-discourses constructed by ostensibly pro-horror writers 
reproducing problematic mainstream assumptions even as they attempt to defend against 
them.  
 
In his study of the horror genre (Dreadful Pleasures) James Twitchell argues that horror 
narratives serve as “formulaic rituals coded with precise social information” (Twitchell, 
1985:7), crypto-conservative fables of sexual identity evolved to induct adolescents into 
                                                 
32
 For example, “moral philosopher Colin McGinn has argued that sympathetic pain (at another’s suffering) 
can be replaced by pleasure taken in the other’s pain if an ‘association’ is set up between ‘the pleasure of 
entertainment’ and the witnessing of suffering” (Hills, 2005:4). Even within the field of aesthetics (which one 
might have thought would be more congenial to non-literalist readings of the pleasures of horror) many hold 
stern views on horror: in Susan Feagin’s essay ‘The Pleasures of Tragedy’, in which she argues for the 
morally beneficent properties of tragic narratives, she discusses the related genre under the unpromising 
subheading of ‘Immoral Art’, attributing the attraction of slasher films such as Halloween to a misogynistic 
audience’s desire to vicariously experience, and collude in, the actions of a gynocidal maniac. 
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reproductive maturity and warn them away from non- or mis-procreative sexual practices 
such as onanism and incest. Twitchell certainly takes as his study’s starting point the 
common sense viewpoint that horror’s pleasures are anomalous, indicative of some 
psychological peculiarity on the part of its audience; horror’s hold on its audience is, he 
asserts, not “artistic” but “psychological” (Twitchell, 1985:127), as inadvertently revealing 
as one’s response to a Rorschach inkblot. Twitchell depicts an attraction to the horror 
genre as both formatively essential and essentially juvenile, a phase through which one 
must necessarily pass and slough off upon reaching maturity: “If you think back you will 
probably recall with amazing clarity the first instance where you were shocked by horror 
images, and then, after a few years you ceased to be frightened and turned to other sights, 
other myths […] But you were; in fact there was a time in your life when you were 
probably fascinated by them [although] it may be a little shameful to admit” (Twitchell, 
1985:66-67). Horror is, in Twitchell’s estimation, child’s play, fairy tales for the pubescent 
which, in place of the younger child’s fear of parental abandonment, deal with adolescents’ 
anxiety about their newly burgeoning sexuality, inculcating in them the sexual norms and 
taboos of their society. 
 
Those who persist in consuming horror post-adolescence, the solitary ‘rogue males’ who, 
Twitchell asserts, lurk at the back of the theatre like “sour Humbert Humberts” (Twitchell, 
1985:69) are judged in a rather less indulgent light. Twitchell argues that they are “not 
there to be frightened but to participate” (Twitchell, 1989:69), ascribing to them a sadistic 
desire to punish sexually active young women – “the older males mutter [encouragement 
to the antagonist] ‘yeah, get her, get even, knife her, punish her!’ – everything but what 
they may really be thinking, which is rape her! Rape her!’” (Twitchell, 1985:70) Like those 
mainstream critics of horror who routinely collapse together the real and the fictional, so 
that pleasure derived from ersatz violence becomes indistinguishable from pleasure derived 
from real violence, Twitchell presents an ongoing attraction to horror as the result of 
sadism and sexual neuroses, perpetuating the common sense perception of lifetime horror 
fans as maladjusted loners and oddballs.  
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If horror’s audience amounts to a crowd of conflicted voyeurs, both titillated and repelled 
by the sexual fantasies/cautionary tales played out before them then its creators become 
unwitting exhibitionists. Twitchell interprets the self-deprecating utterances of many horror 
authors about their chosen genre – “where academic practitioners like Le Fanu, M.R 
James, Blackwood and the rest are downright apologetic about manipulating ‘those 
devices’ and ‘that claptrap’” (Twitchell, 1985:74) – as betraying an uneasy consciousness 
that “he knows that he is doing something in public that is really rather private” (Twitchell, 
1985:74). 
 
Through such a reading authorship too becomes a form of (implicitly sexualised) self 
exposure, the indiscreet outpourings of a troubled unconsciousness. Although Twitchell’s 
analysis of the horror genre is not, for the most part, overtly antagonistic it certainly 
reproduces troubling common sense assumptions about the aberrance of its devotees and in 
places perpetuates the crude elision of fantasy and reality that contributes to much of the 
mainstream hostility against the genre.  
 
In Savage Pastimes, Harold Schechter undertakes a detailed study of the history (and 
historical ubiquity) of violent media, including the horror genre, in order to challenge one 
common-sense assumption – the view that contemporary entertainment media are suffused 
with unprecedented levels of violence (and, concomitantly, the notion that modern society 
is infinitely more perilous than the idealised past against whose wholesome, pro-social 
media our own are unfavourably juxtaposed). However, despite working to counteract 
certain claims of critics of violent narratives, Schechter implicitly replicates, and 
reinforces, another central assumption that, as I have argued, lies behind much of the 
antipathy towards media violence in general and horror in particular: the notion that violent 
narratives flourish because they speak to some primitive craving for bloodshed, that our 
narrative preferences necessarily mirror our real life desires. I will discuss Schechter’s 
reasoning – and unexamined assumptions – at length since his work acts in many ways as 
an expanded, more thorough-going iteration of an argument often employed in defence of 
violent media: that by emotionally engaging with fictive violence we are somehow purged 
of our antecedent aggressive impulses.  
57 
 
 
Since, Schechter argues, his survey of violent media throughout history demonstrates that 
“explicit violence has always been an integral feature of popular culture [... it follows that] 
there is only one conclusion to be drawn from this fact – namely, that one of the main 
functions of the popular arts is precisely to provide us with fantasies of violence, to allow 
us to vent – safely, in a controlled, socially acceptable, vicarious way – those ‘undying 
primal impulses which, however outmoded by civilisation, need somehow to be 
expressed’” (Savage:136). Schechter, like King and many other critics who defend 
horror/fictive violence on the grounds that it affords us some kind of catharsis, retains the 
premise central to his opponents’ critique of media violence – that fictions, and particularly 
low-brow or popular fictions, primarily depict events and situations that their audiences 
desire to enact, granting audience members licence to satisfy their darker appetites in a 
consequence-free fashion – while rejecting their accompanying conclusion that such 
fictions are morally pernicious and should be discouraged or suppressed. I would argue 
that by founding their arguments on this imported – and unexamined – equation of fictions 
with fantasies, by solving the paradox of horror (or, more generally, of narratives with 
aversive subject matter) in the same way as their ideological opponents, proponents of this 
variation of the purgation/catharsis theory render their arguments vulnerable to the same 
criticisms. 
 
For example, Schechter argues that the historical omnipresence (and perennial popularity) 
of violent narratives indicates that media violence serves a necessary function, acting as 
some sort of pressure valve for our atavistic, antisocial instincts. However, just as moral 
guardians’ insistence that contemporary media are unprecedentedly violent and responsible 
for a dramatic (or impending dramatic) increase in crime is problematised by the 
aforementioned availability of equally violent media in the idealised past, so Schechter’s 
assertion here jars with his own historical analysis. As Schechter himself notes, while our 
fictions may be more convincingly grisly than those devoured by past audiences, it is 
because of our access to more technologically sophisticated special effects; in terms of 
inventive/excessive narrative cruelty we rival, rather than outstrip, the pop culture of the 
past. If media violence does indeed act as a proxy for real life violence, if it satisfies, and 
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so defuses, our aggressive impulses, it seems hard to account for the ubiquity of similarly 
violent media in times when the violent or ‘bad death’ that fictions obsessively recreate 
was far less removed from the average person’s real life experience. 
 
Similarly, Schechter shares such critics’ view that populist entertainment acts, by its very 
nature, as a form of wish-fulfilment, arguing that “pop fantasy [including non-violent 
genres such as the romance...] celebrates all kinds of taboo behaviour” (Savage:11). 
Unbound by the aesthetic concerns of more self-consciously artistic genres, populist media 
are pleasurable by virtue of the fact that they are utterly servile to our repressed desires, 
our unacceptable appetites, devoted to “feed[ing] our less decorous selves” (Savage:11). 
For this reason, he views alternative explanations as to violent media’s popularity as a 
“form of denial” (Savage:7), bad-faith attempts to disavow our aggressive impulses, our 
discomforting fascination with violence. This reductive view of violent media’s pleasures, 
and scepticism about any alternative explanation of its attractions, permeates his analysis 
of the historical texts he discusses.  
 
Since violence/suffering is so clearly the ‘point’ of the popular media he analyses, the 
pivot on which the narratives turn, Schechter is dismissive of (what he perceives as) any 
superfluous moralistic or thematic trappings that seem designed to obfuscate this basic 
function, ascribing such efforts solely to cynical paratextual concerns such as the desire to 
evade censure: “these crudely printed publications [detailing sensational trials in the mid-
nineteenth century] adopted the traditional pose of piety, presenting themselves as morally 
edifying works, complete with ‘long warnings about God’s anger against criminals and 
man’s need to beg forgiveness in the face of divine wrath’” (Savage:61). His normative 
account of violent narratives’ pleasures reflects, if in a negative/inverted form, the 
comments made by many of those calling for their censorship, who are highly resistant to 
any alternative readings of what violent texts ‘mean’, what feelings they are destined to 
provoke. Just as, during the 1980s video-nasties moral panic Roger Scruton described the 
pro-nuclear disarmament polemic The Day After as a “particularly disgusting video nasty”, 
castigating it for being both morbid and (insincerely) sanctimonious, “larded with 
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moralising cant” (Barker, 1984:14), so Schechter figures violent narratives with artistic or 
moral aspirations as essentially inauthentic.
33
 
 
Schechter is equally cynical about the true allure of more ‘literary’ treatments of violent or 
disturbing subject matter, arguing that “great literature offers something besides Beauty 
and Truth – [also providing] an escape into realms of forbidden experience” (Savage:7). 
He cites Edgar Allan Poe’s continuing popularity – particularly compared to other notable, 
and arguably more deserving, authors from the same period – as an illustration of our 
underlying inclinations: “of all the great American writers of the mid-nineteenth century, 
Poe is far and away the most widely read by modern audiences, and it’s definitely not the 
‘formal felicities’ of his writing […] that accounts for his appeal […] There’s only one 
explanation for this state of affairs: the over the top, sadistic violence of his most famous 
tales” (Savage:7). Schechter suggests that those attributing Poe’s popularity to other 
aspects of his storytelling are engaging in a form of denial, “invoking the talismanic word 
‘art’” (Savage:7) in order to obscure their real motivations. He rejects other standard 
solutions to the paradox of horror/tragedy, including the doctrine of catharsis-as-
clarification, arguing that “the only moral to be gleaned from a story like ‘The Fall of the 
House of Usher’ is the inadvisability of entombing your sister alive” (Savage:7).  
 
In fact, I would argue that populist fictions, including those whose appeal could be said to 
reside in their ability to act as a form of wish-fulfilment, frequently set out to deny and 
frustrate audience members’ desires for as much of the narrative as possible. As I suggest 
in my later discussion of adaptationist views of fiction, since conflict generates story, 
narrative impetus tends to ebb once characters attain their goals. Even in the genre that is 
arguably most premised upon a hedonistic identification with the protagonist’s desires – 
the romance – authors invariably litter obstacles along the characters’ path to blissful 
union. Insofar as narrative dynamism (and unsatisfied romantic longing, the genre’s 
emotional ‘hook’) necessitates the depiction of a problematic state of affairs, there can be 
                                                 
33
 As I will argue in further detail during my chapter relating the pleasures of horror to those of tragedy and 
the sublime, Schechter and many critics of violent media succumb to the same fallacy in their thinking about 
(particularly populist/low brow) fictive violence/suffering: they share the assumption that narrative pleasure 
is essentially uncomplicated and unambivalent, that if one enjoys a text it is because fulfils and reflects, 
rather than thwarts or transgresses, one’s desires and values. 
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no uncomplicated conflation of the audience’s interests with the protagonist’s, or of an 
audience member’s real life and narrative desires: romantic fictions teem with antagonistic, 
sparring couples, doomed lovers and infidelity, among other situations most of us 
recognise to be undesirable in reality but appealing in fictions.  
 
The theories of horror’s appeal formulated by theorists such as Twitchell, King and 
Schechter manage to serve both as a corrective to mainstream perceptions of horror – a 
direct inversion of that still-popular view of horror as a source of moral contagion – while 
paradoxically also affirming horror’s status as the product of regrettable human drives. 
Schechter and King’s (familiarly literalist) equation of fictional and real violence positions 
horror as necessary but ultimately ignoble. While none of these theorists depict an 
enjoyment of horror as inherently pathological they reproduce, to a surprising extent, 
mainstream assumptions about the psychological derivation of horror’s appeal.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Horror, like tragedy, poses a paradox. In contrast to the sunny, readily comprehensible 
pleasures afforded by genres such as the comedy or the romance, horror’s appeal is 
initially obscure. Insofar as violence/suffering is the point of horror, the organising 
principle of an otherwise heterogeneous genre, it is perhaps inevitable that many interpret 
the horror genre as essentially sadistic, by definition entailing that its audience wittingly 
seek out, and derive pleasure from, others’ pain.  
 
Despite the extravagant claims made by horror’s more vehement critics, there exists no 
compelling empirical evidence of any clear, causal relationship between the consumption 
of violent media and the committing of violent acts, let alone of the direct, almost coercive 
model of media effects promulgated at the height of the video nasties panic. Rather, I 
would argue that the (self-) evidence of horror’s perniciousness does not reside in any 
readily determinable external harms; where it is reviled it is reviled, first and foremost, 
because of the ways in which it appears to be a product of humanity’s darker appetites, 
indicative of some essential malignancy of the human heart. 
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 As Susan Sontag notes, depictions of human suffering are intrinsically charged, often 
making conflicted voyeurs of us, because they extend an implicit challenge to prospective 
viewers – “invit[ing] us to be either spectators or cowards, unable to look” (Sontag, 
2003:38). Yet even as they command our attention, such images provoke a powerful 
unease. Because they are “circulated so diversely [...we know that] there is no way to 
guarantee [that pictures are seen in properly] reverential [viewing] conditions” (Sontag, 
2003: 108). Stripped from their original context, such ‘orphaned’ images might be received 
in any number of ways, viewed in an unsuitably prurient or salacious manner. 
 
Although Sontag is specifically discussing photographic depictions of real life suffering, 
her description of the tensions such images arouse in viewers, her evocation of what might 
loosely be termed the ethics of representation, is equally applicable to our relationship with 
non-visual media and with known fictions. Violent or otherwise distressing images and 
narratives inspire disquiet about the reactions of unknown others for the same reason they 
elicit our attentional and emotional engagement in the first place: they touch upon basic 
human issues, primitively, reflexively compelling insofar as they appeal to our craving for 
certain kinds of information. In short, other people’s responses matter to us because such 
issues matter to us; the cultural anxiety about people deriving pleasure from violent media 
stems from a more general concern about our inability to anticipate or influence people’s 
interpretations of (or reactions to) critical subjects. The desire to monitor, control or even 
restrict other people’s access to potentially volatile material periodically erupts into moral 
panics about reviled genres – such as horror – whose appeal can be cast as morally 
problematic.  
 
In other words, horror is not reviled solely, or even primarily because of “what [it] does, 
[but because of] what it is” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009 [1994]:45). Like those anti-
pornography feminists who view pornography as a kind of secular “blasphemy” (Goode & 
Ben-Yehuda, 2009 [1994]:45), an affront against women whose very existence constitutes 
an act of rhetorical violence, irrespective of what dark deeds it might inspire in its 
audience, I would contend that horror is similarly felt by its most persistent critics to be 
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inherently, rather than consequentially, wrong, that it provokes uneasiness because of what 
it says (or is believed to say) about human nature rather than owing to any concrete harms 
it might conceivably cause. While this point might seem initially contentious it is, I would 
maintain, congruent with cultural anxiety about other forms of entertainment that 
foreground suffering – such as the ‘misery memoirs’ mentioned earlier in the chapter – 
without being contingent upon similar claims of harm. Articles about the consumption of 
‘misery-lit’ unambiguously display a non-consequentialist moral discomfort with the idea 
of suffering-as-entertainment, while utilising otherwise eerily similar language and tropes 
as those employed by horror’s critics. 
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Chapter 2: The Case Against Horror 
 
Introduction 
 
As I argued in the previous chapter, horror remains a peculiarly disreputable genre, in large 
part because it is – axiomatically – concerned with fear, pain and violence. In this chapter I 
will address one potentially damaging counter-argument to my contention that horror is 
reviled primarily for its affects, the ostensible implications its popularity holds for human 
nature, assessing the validity of claims about the morally questionable appeal and effects of 
media violence. I will address two strands of the research concerning media violence – first 
concentrating upon the more overtly politicised question of simulated violence’s effect 
upon its audience, and, in my next chapter, examining various theories about what it is that 
attracts people to violent media, in particular querying whether there exist neutral, or even 
benign explanations for why people might find simulated violence appealing. 
 
The precise model of media effects that I am interrogating is the hypothesis that violent 
“mass media will commonly have direct and reasonably predictable [negative] effects” 
(Gauntlett, 2005:55) on a significant percentage of those exposed to them; that simulated 
violence is criminogenic,  awakening (or intensifying) sadistic urges, desensitising people 
to real life violence, and ‘modelling’ or normalising the use of force so that frequent 
viewers are more likely to behave in a violent fashion in their everyday lives. To question 
this model does not entail that one must deny all media effects, however, or view audience 
members as impervious, immaculately media-savvy monads. Indeed, even the most 
vociferous critics of mainstream effects-research accept that our interactions with various 
media can have all sorts of effects on our lives, both negative and positive – alerting us to 
important events and phenomena, shaping public opinion, sparking trends and introducing 
us to new ideas and interests. In fact, in the final section of this chapter I will address what 
might be termed the ideological dangers of violent media, assessing whether certain kinds 
of violent representations might work to contribute to a sense of individual 
disempowerment or to legitimise state violence and punitive ‘law and order’ politics. 
However, I will reject the notion that media violence in itself constitutes a meaningful 
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category which can coherently be judged to be dangerous or morally infective, as well as 
the claim that there is a wealth of research that overwhelmingly supports this 
characterisation of violent media. 
 
In this chapter I will review the corpus of empirical research devised to test the effects 
model, paying particular attention to those trends and experiments that are commonly 
adduced as staunch evidence for the causal hypothesis. Just as, in the previous chapter, I 
interrogated the assumptions on which this research is premised, throughout this chapter I 
will evaluate the design and execution of notable studies and experiments. I will also 
emphasise that – contrary to the hyperbolic claims of effects proponents such as Brad 
Bushman or Craig Anderson – far from yielding unanimous and strongly affirmative 
conclusions, this research in fact generates a significant proportion of mixed or non-
supportive results. I will not assess such studies, since their results do not impinge upon 
my central thesis. However, given this omission, it is important to note that, as effects 
sceptics like Jonathan Freedman, Christopher Ferguson and John Kilburn point out, those 
studies which contradict or offer no support for the effects model employ, on average, 
larger sample sizes and more reliable and standardised measures of aggression than those 
that yield positive results. Throughout my own discussion of these studies, I will refer 
frequently to meta-analyses and reviews conducted by theorists critical of the view that 
media violence reliably inspires imitative violence and aggression, particularly drawing 
upon Freedman’s detailed summary and critique of the existing research on media’s 
influence on aggression. 
 
Popular discourse about the public health risks of media violence tends to be dominated by 
vivid, emotionally-compelling and, crucially, memorable narratives. Many more of us are 
familiar with the image of the Columbine killers as friendless, trench-coated outcasts 
operating under the malign influence of Marilyn Manson, The Basketball Diaries and 
Doom than the more mundane reality – that Harris and Klebold in fact both enjoyed 
middling popularity, that they had never been members of the ‘Trenchcoat Mafia’ and that 
the boys, particularly Harris, were more infatuated with Nazi Germany than any 
contemporary cultural phenomenon. Equally, as I discussed in depth in the previous 
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chapter, the Bulger and Capper murders remain linked in the public imagination to the 
unremarkable horror sequel Child’s Play 3 despite the utter lack of evidence that the film 
played a role in either crime. 
 
While scholarly proponents of the causal hypothesis tend to eschew the simplistic, 
anecdote-based mode of analysis employed in mainstream discussions of media violence, 
many of their public proclamations are nonetheless equally flamboyant and conspicuously 
lacking in evidential support
34. As Jonathan Freedman points out, a “long list of prestigious 
scientific and medical organisations [including the American Psychiatric Association, the 
Canadian Psychological Association and the American Academy of Paediatrics] have said 
that the evidence is in and the question has been settled” (Media:8): media violence has 
conclusively been proven to increase aggression and/or inspire imitative violence, 
particularly in children. 
 
For example, “the policy statement from the American Academy of Paediatricians 
published in 1999 [asserts that] ‘more than 1000 scientific studies and reviews conclude 
that significant exposure to media violence increases the risk of violent behaviour in 
certain children and adolescents’” (Media:9). A later statement from the same organisation, 
released in November 2001, claimed that over “3500 research studies have examined the 
association between media violence and violent behaviour [and] all but 18 have shown a 
positive relationship” (Media:9). The American Psychological Association, which takes an 
equally vehement stance against violent media, was comparatively restrained, citing mere 
“‘hundreds’” (Media:13) of studies. Nonetheless, they argue in various statements that 
“there is absolutely no doubt that higher levels of [media violence] are correlated with 
increased acceptance of aggressive attitudes and increased aggressive behaviour” 
(Media:13), claiming that affiliated groups had “reviewed [the existing research] to arrive 
at the irrefutable conclusion that viewing violence increases violence” (Media:13). 
                                                 
34
 For example, the effects researchers Brad Bushman and Craig Anderson argue that the association between 
media violence and real life aggression is comparable to the correlation between smoking and lung cancer. 
As Ferguson and Kilburn point out in their meta-analysis of effects research, “by the most liberal estimates 
available (r
2 
= .02 compared with r
2
=.16 for smoking/lung cancer), the effects seen for smoking and lung 
cancer are at least 8- times stronger than for media violence exposure [and imitative violence/aggression.] By 
using the more conservative figures of r=.9 for smoking and lung cancer and r=.08 for media violence 
exposure, that number is close to 135- times stronger.” (Ferguson and Kilburn, 2008:4) 
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Yet there is far less evidence to support such authoritative-sounding claims than these 
organisations’ pronouncements at first suggest. First of all, it is impossible for the groups 
involved to have examined thousands of studies since, during his own analysis of the 
existing research, Freedman discovered that “there are not that many studies now [in 2002] 
and there were certainly not that many when [the excerpted] reviews were done” 
(Media:13). In fact, there are around “200 separate scientific studies that directly assess the 
effects of exposure to media violence on aggression and on desensitisation” (Media:24).35 
In their public pronouncements these organisations repeatedly appeal to an overwhelming 
critical consensus, arguing that such unanimity must surely compel us to recognise violent 
media’s role in increasing aggressive behaviour and desensitising viewers. As I will argue 
throughout the course of this chapter, not only is there no decisive ‘smoking gun’ – with 
many of the studies frequently cited as such marred by significant methodological failings 
– but even the overall trends which moderates point to as evidence of violent media’s 
harmfulness are in fact fairly weak and far from inexplicable by other means . According 
to the reviews and meta-analyses conducted by theorists such as Freedman, Cumberbatch, 
Ferguson and Kilburn the preponderance of studies in fact “show no ill effects of exposure 
to media violence [and] there is virtually no research showing that media violence 
desensitises people” (Media:10) to real life violence. Although vocal opponents of violent 
media employ analogies which suggest that the case is already closed, likening “the effects 
of video game violence on aggression [to those of] smoking [on] lung cancer [...] 
(Bushman & Anderson, 2001)” (Ferguson, 2011), the alleged perils of media violence 
actually remain highly contentious, with the body of effects research leaving considerably 
more room for alternative interpretations than such comparisons imply.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 These inflated figures may have originated with the effects researcher John Murray, who, when associated 
with a 1982 review of television conducted by the National Institute of Mental Health, estimated that there 
were “approximately 2,500 publications of all kinds that were relevant to [the study, including] articles in the 
popular press and theoretical articles” (Media:24) and pertaining to all aspects of the review, rather than just 
the effects of television violence on aggression. 
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2.1 Laboratory Experiments 
 
Of the eighty-seven laboratory experiments testing the causal hypothesis, it is arguable that 
“fewer than half” (Media:57) can be classified as supporting the contention that exposure 
to violent media increases aggression. As with the survey-based research designed to 
investigate whether there is an association between aggressive behaviour and media 
violence, these laboratory studies generated inconsistent results. However, while individual 
surveys differed greatly, with the observed correlations ranging from “strongly positive to 
essentially zero” (Media:42) even amidst a set of cross-national studies using consistent 
measures and methodology,  the  pattern of results as a whole indicated a positive 
correlation for some demographic groups (children under ten). In contrast, the laboratory 
experiments lacked any such overall trend. 
 
In this section I will anatomise the ways in which these – already underwhelming – results 
are rendered dubious by certain endemic structural failings of laboratory-based effects 
research. The five main flaws I will discuss are: 
 
1.) An overreliance on proxy measures of aggression 
2.) A failure to control for general arousal 
3.) A failure to replicate normal conditions of viewing 
4.) A failure to take the sponsor effect/demand cues into account when interpreting 
subjects’ responses. 
5.) Anomalous or expedient statistical measures 
 
2.1.1 Questionable Analogues 
 
Because, for obvious reasons, experimenters cannot encourage participants to engage in 
overtly hostile or violent behaviours, they often rely upon analogues or alternative 
measures designed to reflect any increase in aggression – such as recording subjects’ 
thoughts and associations after exposing them to a violent film. It is questionable how far 
such measures really approximate/predict genuinely aggressive and violent behaviours: in 
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one (admittedly extreme) instance “the measure of aggression was to ask a child whether 
he would pop a balloon if one were present” (Media:61 referring to Mussen & Rutherford 
1961). 
 
Importantly, Albert Bandura’s 1961 study (arguably one of the most frequently cited, and 
formative, inquiries into the causal hypothesis) uses such a dubious proxy, with Bandura’s 
aggression measure being child participants’ readiness to terrorise an inflatable ‘Bobo’ 
doll. The Bobo experiment was designed to assess the importance of observational learning 
in the acquisition of aggressive behaviours by children. Observational learning or 
‘modelling’ does not necessarily involve the exact replication of an observed novel 
behaviour (although, as in the case of the Bobo experiment, it often can) but describes the 
process through which we adopt new behaviours or modify our existing behaviour in 
response to viewing novel actions by others. 
 
The experiment (which originally took place in 1961, though Bandura also conducted 
modified versions in 1963 and 1965) involved exposing nursery school aged children to 
footage of an adult physically attacking and verbally berating a five foot tall inflatable doll: 
“after observing an adult strike the Bobo doll on the head with a mallet; throw it and kick it 
about the room; and saying verbally aggressive statements such as, “Sock him in the nose”, 
“Throw him in the air”, and “Kick him”, preschool children mimicked those aggressive 
actions toward the doll during a period of free play.” (Kirsch, 2006:119) In contrast, a 
second, control group of preschool children, who were not exposed to this violent 
behaviour, failed to behave in a similarly aggressive fashion.  
 
In 1965 Bandura “replicated and extended” (Kirsch, 2006:120) this earlier research, 
modifying certain aspects of the original experiment in order to investigate additional 
concerns. In this version of the experiment “preschool children were randomly assigned to 
one of two experimental conditions, ‘model-rewarded’ and ‘model-punished’, or the 
control condition, ‘no consequences’. In the ‘model-rewarded’ condition, children 
witnessed an adult getting rewarded for hitting and kicking a doll. The reward consisted of 
being given candy and soda and being called a ‘strong champion’ by the experimenter. In 
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the ‘model-punished’ condition children observed the adult getting punished for brutalising 
the doll. The adult model who was punished was verbally chastised (i.e. ‘You quit picking 
on that clown. I won’t tolerate it.’), sat on, and spanked with a magazine. Finally, in the 
‘no consequences’ condition, children were spectators to the model’s severe maltreatment 
of the doll, but no rewards or punishments were doled out.” (Kirsch, 2006:120). Children 
in both the ‘model-rewarded’ and ‘no consequences’ groups imitated the modelled acts to a 
similarly greater extent than their counterparts in the ‘model-punished’ group. When 
offered a monetary reward in exchange for imitating the assault on Bobo all children were 
able to perform equally well indicating that the ‘model-punished’ group too “had learned 
the modelled acts of aggression” (Kirsch, 2006:120) but had also learned that violent 
actions reap negative consequences and so modified their behaviour accordingly. 
 
Given that Bandura’s study is often cited by those who believe there to be a link between 
media violence and aggressive behaviour as evidence of simulated violence’s negative 
effects upon a youthful audience it is important to reiterate effect-sceptics’ critique of such 
aggression ‘analogues’: namely, that the actions of the children in the study can just as 
easily be interpreted as ‘rough and tumble’ play as “aggressive behaviour aimed at hurting 
someone” (Kirsch, 2006:121). Since the acts in question are directed against an inanimate 
object, whose very design encourages a somewhat ‘aggressive’, physical manner of play 
(as an inflatable doll that bobs back upright after being hit) it seems likely that the children 
simply experienced hitting the doll as a novel game rather than as an act of aggression. 
Furthermore, as Richard Felson also points out in his analysis of this study, generally, 
definitions of what constitutes violence or aggression would include some notion of 
harmful intent, which seems questionable in this case. 
 
Another unaddressed, and potentially subversive, point is the fact that that the 
‘punishment’ incorporated into the 1965 experiment in itself constitutes an act of physical 
aggression (and against a sentient being rather than an inanimate
36
, if anthropomorphised, 
                                                 
36
 Kirsch notes that those laboratory experiments which found no relationship between viewing violent 
cartoons and an increase in aggression in early childhood recorded only peer to peer acts of aggression rather 
than also looking at preferential selection of aggressive toys (toy guns etc) and ‘aggression’ against objects. 
He argues that the apparent lack of a link could thus be due to socialisation: most children are aware that peer 
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object at that) and was not, presumably, imitated by the children who witnessed it. 
Arguably, the mini-narrative played out in this chain of events more closely approximates 
the types of media violence young children might be exposed to (such as superhero 
cartoons in which the protagonists perpetrate textually-justified, retributive violence 
against those villains who prey on the weak) than the isolated act of aggression presented 
in the original scenario. As David Buckingham contends, “violence should not be treated 
as a singular category whose meaning could be taken for granted” (Moving:5). In other 
words, all forms of media violence are not created equal; although there is certainly much 
evidence to support Bandura’s assertion that we  learn through observing others, 
manifestations of ‘media violence’ are sufficiently heterogeneous that we may never arrive 
at one clear answer as to whether, and how, it causes, influences or shapes aggressive 
behaviour. 
There are in fact many contextual and genre-specific cues that can affect viewer 
perceptions of violence. Two major factors in the recognition of violence levels are 
cognitive transformation and perceived reality. Cognitive transformation refers to the 
process through which violent acts occurring in certain genres tend to be ‘camouflaged’ i.e. 
they are not perceived by viewers as being violent. Priming is a “reading process in which 
related thoughts, emotions and concepts residing in memory are activated” (Kirsch, 2006: 
164). In most cases where acts of violence are depicted, such as in violent drama or crime 
narratives, the activation of related, aggressive thoughts, emotions and concepts will occur. 
However, if depicted in a comedic context, such as in cartoons, “priming not only occurs in 
aggression-related thoughts, concepts, and feelings but in humor-related thoughts, 
concepts, and feelings as well.” (Kirsch, 2006:164) As a result of this “dual priming” 
(Kirsch, 2006:164) the perceived level of violence may be diminished. Howitt and 
Cumberbatch (1975) found that “most adults do not perceive humorous cartoons as 
violent” (Kirsch, 2006:162), while Gunter and Furnham (1984) found that “violence 
depicted in humorous cartoons is perceived [by adult viewers] as less violent than the same 
                                                                                                                                                    
to peer violence is viewed unfavourably by those in authority and will reap negative consequences for 
perpetrators, while object-oriented aggression is not viewed as negatively, so channel their increased 
aggressive impulses into rough play with objects. Kirsh’s commitment to a definition of aggression that 
encompasses object-directed acts could perhaps explain his contrasting characterisation of many of these 
experiments. 
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behaviour enacted by live actors” (Kirsch, 2006:162). Obviously unrealistic violence, of 
the sort which predominates in cartoons, science fiction and fantasy, tends not to register 
as violence in the same way as violence that appears in a more realistic context. Some 
theorists (Potter 2003) suggest that the level of perceived violence depends upon a sense of 
personal salience, which tends to be missing from fantastic or animated narratives. 
In other words, different types of media almost certainly differ in their potential to move, 
harm and heal. Exposure to sensitive, thoughtful examinations of violent subject matter 
will probably reap different consequences than exposure to more perfunctory, 
sensationalistic treatments, and individual differences will, to a certain extent, determine 
meaning; my own experiences and character might lead me to interpret an act of cinematic 
violence as textually justified and admirable while yours might lead you to view it as 
unprovoked and morally repugnant, resulting in very different affective and behavioural 
responses. 
Problematically for proponents of the causal hypothesis, when studies using questionable 
analogues for aggression are excluded, the resultant body of research provides 
considerably less support for the theory. When Freedman reviewed only those experiments 
using more plausible measures, he found that a mere 28% supported the thesis that violent 
media increase real life aggression. Even more significantly, multiple theorists have found 
another systematic difference between experiments yielding supportive and unsupportive 
results: while sample size seemed to have no particular effect on the conclusions of 
experiments featuring adult subjects, among studies with child participants sample size was 
inversely correlated with supportive results (contrary to what the causal hypothesis would 
predict). According to Freedman’s analysis, “the experiments [with child subjects] that 
found supporting results had an average of 51.6 children, those that got mixed results had 
an average of 63, and those that did not support the hypothesis had an average of 100.8” 
(Media:65). This trend indicates that the effects attributed to violent media in some 
smaller-scale experiments might be due to chance. 
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2.1.2 Aggression versus Arousal 
 
There is another significant problem with the methodology of many laboratory studies. 
There is evidence to suggest that the results of those studies which seem to hint at a causal 
connection between violent media and aggressive/violent behaviours could in fact be the 
artefact of a confounding variable that is already known to influence aggression: arousal. 
 
In laboratory-based experiments studying the affective/behavioural effects of violent media 
it is imperative that “the violent and non-violent films or television programs or live 
models must [otherwise] be as similar as possible” (Media:76). Ideally, in order to 
completely isolate the effects of violence from those of additional variables that are 
incidental to the hypothesis, the films would be identical in all dimensions except that one 
film contains violence while the other lacks it. In actuality, there are many difficulties 
extricating the behavioural repercussions of violent media per se from the effects of the 
type of media that often contain violence. In his analysis, Freedman notes that almost all 
the films shown during laboratory-based research differed in one important dimension 
other than the presence (or absence) of violence. Little deliberation or effort seemed to 
have been put into ensuring that the non-violent films were as exciting, as physically 
arousing, as the violent ones. Given that violence is in itself stimulating, as well as 
typically coinciding with other factors that can cause arousal, such as high-stakes conflict, 
physical peril, strong action, loud noises and fast-paced music, the failure on researchers’ 
part even to attempt to control for such elements indicates a lack of rigour. In fact, in some 
studies violent, and presumably exciting, programmes were paired with no alternative 
stimulus – one experiment “involved showing some children a twenty-two minute episode 
of the Power Rangers while showing other children nothing (Boyatzis, Matillo & Nesbit, 
1995)” – while in others, control groups were shown films hardly calculated to elicit an 
equivalent degree  of excitement, “the most extreme [disparity being] a study that 
compared the effect of a film about a violent, bloody prize fight with that of a film about 
canal boats” (Media:78, referring to Berkowitz , Corwin & Heironymus 1963). 
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Effects sceptics’ concerns about this aspect of researchers’ methodology could be 
dismissed as merely speculative or ideologically-motivated, the efforts of dedicated 
opponents of the effects model to discredit results that are inharmonious with their thesis. 
However, the effects of arousal on aggression levels are far from contentious; indeed, 
Craig Anderson and Brad Bushman – who are, ironically, among the most vehement 
proponents of the causal hypothesis – argue that that “arousal from an irrelevant source can 
energise or strengthen the dominant action tendency [meaning that] if a person is provoked 
or otherwise instigated to aggress” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002:39) after being exposed to 
an exciting stimulus their reactions may be intensified. Equally, arousal resulting from 
irrelevant stimuli such as exercise and unusually hot temperatures can be “mislabelled as 
anger in situations involving provocation” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002:39), resulting in 
more ‘angry’ or aggressive behavioural responses. Dolf Zillman’s influential experimental 
research into ‘excitation transfer’ – the process through which residual arousal from one 
stimulus can heighten subjects’ excitatory response to a subsequent stimulus – serves as 
evidence of this tendency. Significantly, Zillman points out that although media-inspired 
arousal inflates aggression in the short term, the effect is demonstrably impermanent: a 
simple “cooling off” period suffices to negate violent media’s ‘instigational’ or aggression-
promoting properties by allowing viewers’ arousal to “decay” (Zillman, 1971:427) to 
normal levels before they engage in any other activities. Furthermore, Zillman found that 
equally arousal-producing non-aggressive media exert similarly inflammatory behavioural 
effects; indeed, when he exposed one group of subjects to a film clip depicting a couple 
“tender[ly]” engaging in “intimate, apparently pre-coital behaviour” (Zillman,1971:426) 
and another to a “violent prize fight” (Zillman, 1971:425),   the “instigational effect of the 
aggressive film was lower than that of the erotic film [my italics]” (Zillman,1971:430). In 
light of Zillman’s research, I would argue that, contrary to the claims of theorists such as 
Bandura, when subjects display increased aggression levels directly after exposure to 
violent film clips this effect is likely to be due to temporary excitation transfer rather than 
any form of imitative/social learning. 
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2.1.3 Atypical Viewing Environments 
 
As David Trend points out in The Myth of Media Violence, the very feature of laboratory 
experiments that makes them seem so reassuringly scientific – their ability to isolate, and 
so, theoretically, render measurable and predictable, complex interactions between specific 
environmental factors and human behaviours – also means that their results may be of 
questionable generalisability when extrapolated to the outside world. Trend criticises 
experiments of this sort on the grounds that they decontextualise violent media by 
‘administering’ them to subjects in amounts and environments “quite unlike everyday 
viewing” (Myth:41). Like Trend, Freedman argues that the behavioural effects of exposure 
to a brief and isolated excerpt consisting only of violent scenes might well differ 
considerably from a ingesting a varied daily ‘diet’ of media in which episodes of violence 
are, rather more realistically, interspersed with many other types of content. If, as many 
theorists argue, arousal itself is linked to a temporary increase in aggressive impulses or 
behaviours, the use of short clips unintegrated into any overarching plot may act to 
exaggerate and misrepresent the behavioural effects of violent media. In real life, films and 
television programmes rarely consist of uninterrupted blocks of arousal-producing 
violence; the most depraved of horror narratives or thrilling of action films naturally 
incorporate lulls or less eventful periods, if merely in service of preventing audience 
members from succumbing to adrenaline-fatigue (after one hour of continuous explosions 
the most gung-ho of viewers are likely to grow jaded). In fact, Zillman and his co-
researchers noted that under more prolonged exposure to violent media (i.e. the length of a 
full horror/action film, rather than a brief clip) arousal does tend to ebb due to habituation 
or exhaustion, resulting in a subsequent fall in aggression levels. 
 
2.1.4 Demand Cues   
 
As in any other social context, participants in laboratory-based research are likely to 
register, and respond to, behavioural/environmental cues, modifying their behaviour 
accordingly. For this reason, results from laboratory-based effects research are likely to be 
distorted by experimenter demand unless careful counter-measures are taken. In his article 
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‘Mass Media Effects on Violent Behaviour’, Richard Felson argues that the apparently 
suggestive findings of the many laboratory experiments in which participants are shown 
violent film clips and then observed for an increase in aggressive behaviours may be 
muddied by demand cues and the sponsor effect. Demand cues are “instructions or other 
stimuli that indicate to subjects how the experimenter expects them to behave” (Felson, 
1996:105-6). At their most flagrant, demand cues could even communicate the desired 
outcome/hypothesis of the experiment. So, Felson argues, subjects who perceive that they 
are ‘supposed’ to act more aggressively post-viewing might well comply. In fact, this 
phenomenon is likely to be particularly pronounced in laboratory-based studies since such 
settings tend to exaggerate “the effects of conformity and social influence” (Felson, 
1996:106) owing to subjects’ underlying awareness that they are being monitored by 
socially “prestig[ious]” others in a novel situation/environment (Felson, 1996:106).  
 
Similarly, he argues that, if insufficiently careful in the design of their study (e.g. 
neglecting to absent themselves before the film is shown, showing the film in the same 
room in which the rest of the experiment occurs), experimenters showing violent films can 
create a generally permissive atmosphere by implication, which encourages non-aggressive 
as well as aggressive anti-social behaviour.  Indeed, meta-analyses seem to show that 
“exposure to violence is related to non-aggressive forms of antisocial behaviour. Hearold 
(1986) performed a meta-analysis of experiments that included studies of effects of 
exposure to media violence on antisocial behaviour generally. The effects of media 
violence on antisocial behaviour were just as strong as the effects of media violence on 
violent behaviour. A more recent meta-analysis that focused on all types of studies yielded 
similar results (Paik and Comstock 1994)” (Felson, 1996:115). These findings are 
consistent with a sponsor effect rather than a ‘modelling’ one. Furthermore, one study 
found that participants in an experiment where they were instructed to deliver electric 
shocks to another subject were willing to deliver greater shocks when they anticipated 
being shown a violent film, without actually being shown one at all (Leyens et al, 1975). It 
seems likely that this was due to experimenters being perceived as permissive or as 
endorsing more violent behaviour, rather than the insidious influence of even unseen 
screen violence. 
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2.1.5 Flawed Statistical Measures 
 
Finally, in their meta-analysis of media violence studies, Christopher Ferguson and John 
Kilburn suggest that the “invalid and unreliable” (Ferguson & Kilburn, 2008:759) 
aggression outcome measures employed by many effects researchers are responsible for 
the alleged causal relationship between media and real life violence. They investigate this 
hypothesis by testing the following predictions:  
 
1) Aggression outcome measures that are unstandardised or unreliable will produce 
higher effects than established standardised and reliable measures.  
2) Aggression measures with poor validity will produce higher effect sizes than 
those with well-established validity. 
3) Effect sizes for outcomes will decrease the closer that outcomes approximate 
actual physical aggression or violent criminal behaviour (Ferguson & Kilburn, 
2008:759). 
 
Their findings were consistent with these predictions, indicating that the prevalence of 
results supportive of the causal hypothesis could be the artefact of unsuitable aggression 
measures, flawed use of statistical measures (most notably in the case of Anderson and 
Bushman’s comparison of the carcinogenic effects of smoking to the pernicious 
behavioural effects of violent media exposure), and publication bias. 
 
In conclusion, I would argue that, even when one excludes such methodological problems 
from one’s consideration of the research, overall the laboratory experiments offer at most 
very qualified support for the contention that violent media pose a significant public health 
risk. Of equal significance is the fact that they are by no means in collective agreement 
about important questions such as which type of violent narratives are more morally 
perilous (those that present acts of violence as justified or unjustified; those depicting 
realistic or fantastic/comedic violence) or the mechanisms by which violent media increase 
violence (increasing overall aggression or inspiring acts of imitative violence; inducing 
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audience members to view violence as positive/everyday or merely unconsciously 
‘priming’ them to respond in violent ways when provoked). Those who invoke the 
‘majority’ of effects research when  arguing that media violence is deleterious neglect to 
note the major issues on which ostensibly positive studies disagree. I would argue that the 
theoretical incoherence of such appeals reflects one central problem with the effects model: 
a general lack of internal critique or adequate interrogation of its core claims and precepts. 
 
2.2 Field Experiments 
 
One famously non-supportive field experiment arguably highlights several problems with 
the crude, ‘hypodermic’ conception of media effects employed in much public discourse 
about the perils of violent fictions. “In a now famous study conducted in the 1970s [...a 
group of American researchers (Fesherbach and Singer)] decided to study teenage boys 
who lived in residential facilities and boarding schools where television viewing could be 
completely controlled. For a period of six weeks, half of the boys were permitted to watch 
only violent programs and the other half non-violent shows.” (Myth:1) In accordance with 
the hypothesis endorsed by the dominant effects model – that imitative violence/increased 
aggression is a reliable consequence of regular exposure to violent media- the researchers 
predicted that those boys consuming a televisual ‘diet’ composed solely of violent 
programmes would display a marked increase in aggressive and antisocial behaviour. In 
fact, “as the weeks went by [it was] the boys watching the non-violent shows [who began] 
start[ing] fistfights [...] and vandalising the schools [...] while the groups viewing the 
violent shows remained peaceful and studious” (Media:1).  
 
This study’s counterintuitive results cannot, Trend argues, be taken as confirmation of the 
discredited ‘purgation’ model promoted by some defenders of violent media, however 
tempting it might be to construe them in such a way. Rather, upon further investigation it 
was determined that the boys’ misbehaviour could be attributed to their mounting 
frustration at being forced to miss their favourite shows – “they were especially upset 
about Batman” (Media:1). Media violence itself could not be demonstrated to have played 
any significant role in subjects’ aggressive behaviours; as anti-‘effects’ theorists have long 
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argued to be the case, each boy’s overall situation and mental state proved a considerably 
more reliable instigator/indicator of subsequent aggression levels. Equally, this increase in 
aggression was observed only among boys living in the residential facilities, suggesting 
that their environment played an important role in how they experienced, and managed, 
quotidian frustrations of this sort. 
 
Since the majority of field experiments offer similarly non-supportive or mixed results, I 
will not address this body of research in great depth, again focusing upon those few studies 
that are problematic for my thesis (that media violence cannot be demonstrated to pose a 
significant public health risk). 
 
Field studies are differentiated from laboratory experiments by their setting, occurring in 
the less artificial-seeming environment of the subjects’ own ‘habitat’. For the purposes of 
his review, Freedman defines field experiments as “studies in which subjects are exposed 
[to violent films or programmes] in their own homes, or classes” (Media:85), or other 
locations in which they might expect to view films anyway. Because they take place in 
more naturalistic settings, field studies have greater ecological validity, better-suited to 
obtaining reliable and generalisable data about the behavioural effects of violent media by 
virtue of their minimisation of demand pressures. While laboratory-based studies tend to 
employ very brief film clips as their violent stimulus – a typical laboratory experiment 
“shows children or adults [a film that is] sometimes as short as three minutes [in duration, 
and] rarely longer than ten minutes” (Media:86), with subjects tested for increased 
aggression shortly afterwards – field experiments allow researchers to observe participants’ 
behaviours in response to a more leisurely-paced and representatively varied televisual 
diet. For this reason, field experiments are likelier to capture the (surely more worrisome 
and socially deleterious) effects of longer term exposure to violent films and to assess 
accurately how long-lasting such effects might be. Equally, rather than relying upon 
questionable measures of aggression such as subjects’ willingness to pop a hypothetical 
balloon or assault an inflatable doll, field experiments observe subjects’ propensity for 
engaging in real aggression against real people. Since, as Freedman, Trend, and Felson all 
argue in their critiques of the predominant interpretations of effects research, many 
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experimenters testing the causal hypothesis fail to adequately distinguish between ‘rough 
and tumble’ play and intentional acts of aggression calculated to harm others, this 
represents a valuable methodological refinement. 
 
In contrast to the laboratory experiments – which, while producing highly inconsistent 
results did overall indicate a slight positive correlation between media violence and higher 
levels of aggression – Freedman concludes that the field experiments “provide little or no 
support for the causal hypothesis” (Media:107). As with the laboratory-based studies, the 
experiments that yielded positive results had smaller sample sizes, whereas “at least some 
of the experiments that obtained non-supportive results had quite large samples, in the 
hundreds” (Media:107). Only three of the field studies Freedman reviewed suggested any 
positive relationship between media and real life violence/aggression. 
 
The researchers who conducted the first of these supportive studies (Black and Bevan, 
1992) interviewed adults either before or after they viewed the films available at a local 
cinema. Some subjects were attending a violent Chuck Norris film about a soldier 
mounting a rescue attempt to retrieve American prisoners of war (Missing in Action), while 
others planned to view the rather more sedate and contemplative A Passage to India. 
Subjects were given a questionnaire designed to measure feelings of hostility. The 
researchers administering the questionnaires found that “those at the violent film scored 
higher in hostility, both before and after the viewing [with] the hostility scores of those at 
the violent movie increas[ing] significantly” (Media:97) after having watched the film, 
while those of audience members at the non-violent film remained stable. Although these 
results appear to offer support for the effects thesis there are several problems with the 
design of this piece of research. 
 
First, since the subjects were not randomly-assigned to the violent/non-violent conditions, 
this cannot be classified as an experiment as such: because the different groups were self-
selected they are likely to already differ in some significant ways. Those who choose to 
attend action-oriented B-movies starring the notoriously macho Chuck Norris might be 
willing to profess to higher levels of trait and reactive hostility than those who go to see 
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films based upon E.M Forster novels. As Buckingham repeatedly emphasises throughout 
his discussion of the interviews he conducted with children, responsible researchers must 
always take into account the performative/self-defining nature of subjects’ responses to 
such questioning. Since the interviews occurred outside a cinema (already an intrinsically 
social and highly public space) participants had already decided to view their respective 
films ‘in the open’, implying that their choices conformed to a cultural persona or profile 
with which they were comfortable (or even aspired to). More seriously, not only does the 
study contain no behavioural measure, relying solely on people’s (hardly neutral or 
transparent) testimonies about their own aggression levels, but the two films chosen to 
serve as the violent and non-violent stimuli differ in almost every other respect. Missing in 
Action is likely to be highly arousal-producing, unabashedly built around a succession of 
action scenes. Meanwhile, A Passage to India, while addressing serious and potentially 
disturbing themes, is, for the most part, decidedly lacking in explosions. The wildly 
varying quality and content of these two films reflects the aforementioned lack of care 
taken by effects researchers to ensure that the stimuli presented to each group are – apart 
from the inclusion or absence of violence – as similar as possible. 
 
There were similar problems with the design and execution of the other two apparently 
supportive field experiments (Parke, Berkowitz, Leyens, West and Sebastian, 1977; and 
Leyens, Camino, Parke and Berkowitz, 1975). During these related and methodologically-
similar studies, groups of boys at residential homes were shown either violent or non-
violent films over the course of a week, with their subsequent behaviours monitored for 
any fluctuations in aggression. While, unlike the Black and Bevan study, the researchers 
involved monitored their subjects’ actual behaviours in a relatively unconstrained, 
naturalistic setting, rather than relying on aggression analogues or survey-responses, they 
still failed to differentiate between essentially good-humoured, if boisterous, play-fighting 
and willed, malicious acts of aggression. In fact, the observers were explicitly instructed to 
ignore the intent of the actions, perhaps in order to minimise their interpretative role. 
Crucially, although the participants’ increase in (ostensibly) aggressive behaviour 
immediately after their exposure to violent stimuli is consistent with the causal hypothesis, 
Freedman is careful to note that there was no cumulative effect from multiple viewings. In 
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fact, the boys’ aggressive behaviour subsided shortly after the films were shown, with “no 
consistent effect of the films on [subjects’] aggression” (Media:100) over any sustained 
period.  
 
This short-lived rise in aggression can certainly be construed as supportive of the effects 
model – as it frequently has been by effects proponents– but it also contradicts the model 
in an equally important sense. Surely, according to the predictions of the effects thesis, if 
subjects’ increased hostility is due to modelling or imitative learning, the new behaviours 
they acquire after exposure to a violent stimulus should intensify over time/with each 
exposure. Indeed, such a result is equally, if not more, consistent with another plausible 
theory discussed in my analysis of the laboratory research: that the participants’ temporary 
rise in aggression was caused by a similarly short-term rise in arousal, or that this 
heightened arousal ignited (a basically playful and non-aggressive) desire to engage in 
energetic, rough and tumble play. 
 
2.3 Longitudinal Studies 
 
In this section, I will discuss those longitudinal studies most frequently cited in support of 
the causal hypothesis, again drawing upon the critiques of anti-effects theorists. 
Longitudinal research begins from the premise – established by the survey research – that 
exposure to media violence is somehow associated with increased aggression levels. 
Owing to their impressive complexity and breadth, longitudinal studies are ideally situated 
to investigate the precise nature of this association. It therefore seems reasonable to 
assume that such studies could determine whether if, as proponents of the causal 
hypothesis would have it, exposure to violent media really causes an increase in 
aggressiveness; if aggressive individuals tend to prefer, and so consume more, violent 
media; or if some other, as yet unaccounted-for, variable causes people to both enjoy (or to 
be more likely to confess to enjoying) violent media and to be more aggressive. 
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2.3.1 Centerwall  
 
Subsequent to the introduction of television to the United States and Canada in the 1950s, 
both countries experienced a precipitous rise in violent crime. Brandon Centerwall, an 
epidemiologist and psychiatrist, holds that this natural experiment serves as incontestable 
proof of the malign influence of violent media. In a famous 1989 paper, Centerwall 
attributed this rise to children’s exposure to violent television programmes, arguing that 
children born during this period had been affected by their access to unprecedented 
amounts of fictional violence, with many more than the norm committing violent crimes 
upon reaching maturity. 
 
Centerwall took advantage of the wide scale social experiment posed by the introduction 
and popularisation of television in various nations in order to investigate his hypothesis 
that increased exposure to media violence results in increased real life violence. Centerwall 
“graphed the murder rates for whites in Canada and the U.S. from 1945 to 1974 against 
television ownership and compared them to the white murder rate in South Africa
37
 [where 
television was banned until 1975] during the same period” (‘Violence’:3). Centerwall 
found that while the white murder rate in South Africa remained stable during this period, 
the murder rates for whites in the two control populations doubled during the same period. 
Centerwall extrapolated from this striking disparity, venturing to speculate that if 
“television technology had never been developed, there would today be 10,000 fewer 
homicides each year in the United States, 70,000 fewer rapes, and 700,000 fewer injurious 
assaults” (‘Violence’:3, quoting Centerwall). 
 
As many other theorists point out (including later effects researchers such as Steven J. 
Kirsch who are essentially in sympathy with the causal hypothesis), a more plausible, 
albeit mundane, explanation for this increase is the demographic shift that occurred due to 
the surge in births between 1947 and 1964. This boom resulted in a higher than normal 
number of young males (who commit most murders) maturing at around this time. This 
                                                 
37
 Notably, in South Africa during this period whites represented “fewer than five per cent”(‘Violence’:3) of 
all murder victims, which, Rhodes argues, makes his chosen populations  so dissimilar in dimensions other 
than television exposure/ownership that they cannot reasonably be compared. 
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latter explanation is supported by the fact that levels of murder have not continued to rise 
(as one might expect given the further increase in the average child’s exposure to violent 
television programmes), in fact “when America's violent crime statistics are extended 
beyond Centerwall's cut-off date of 1975 and beyond the dates of his publications, the 
weakness of his causal argument becomes clear. Violent crime in the1980s remained high, 
but as the baby boom cohort members aged past their 30
th
 birthdays in the l990s crime 
began to decline. FBI statistics show that from 1991 onward the violent crime rates have 
decreased each year. Moreover, rates for property crimes have been decreasing since 1980. 
Thus, as more entertainment violence has become available on television, crime rates in 
the United States have been decreasing.” (Kirsch, 2006:10) 
 
In order to explain this apparent divergence from his model, Centerwall modifies his thesis 
and methodology in two significant ways. First, he concedes that the design of his original 
study was flawed; he should, he notes, have factored countries’ respective economic 
conditions into his research. It is, he states, well known that a nation’s economy influences 
its murder rate, with prosperity bearing an inverse correlation to violent crime. Thus, 
although the U.S and England remain barraged as ever by violent media, their recent 
declines in homicide rates could, he suggests, be due to the ameliorating influence of 
increased national wealth. Furthermore, Centerwall argues that the lack of any further 
increase in imitative violence/aggression following his period of study (a trend which 
seems to contradict his hypothesis as it was originally formulated) merely indicates that 
violent media’s effects do not spread or worsen indefinitely. He maintains that the basic 
pattern/relationship observed in his 1989 study reflects a genuine causal relationship 
between violent media and violent crime, accounting for such apparent discrepancies by 
suggesting that television’s negative behavioural effect “eventually saturates, after which 
its influence on the murder rate is steady-state” (‘Violence’:3). 
 
In addition to this revised model’s suspiciously ad hoc provenance (formulated long after 
the original study was conducted in order to encompass conflicting data, and in response to 
serious criticisms regarding his theory’s lack of predictive power) Centerwall does not 
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offer any thorough or convincing explanation of how this saturation process works, 
venturing no predictions as to when and how the expected levelling off might occur. 
 
Equally problematically, other countries experienced a similarly vertiginous rise in 
televised violence during this period without exhibiting any accompanying increase in 
violent crime. In order to investigate this issue further, two legal scholars named Franklin 
E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins tested Centerwall’s hypothesis by examining the 
homicide rates in four other industrial democracies excluded from Centerwall’s original 
study: France, Germany, Italy and Japan. The theorists discovered that “the incidence of 
murder in those countries either remained more or less level (Italy) [during the period that 
television’s morally deleterious effects allegedly became visible] or actually declined 
(France, Germany and Japan) with increased television exposure. These counterexamples, 
they write, ‘disconfirm the causal linkage between television set ownership and lethal 
violence for the period 1945-1975.’” (‘Violence’:3) 
 
For these reasons I would argue that Centerwall’s theory amounts to a not particularly 
well-camouflaged iteration of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, substituting 
correlation/temporo-spatial contiguity for adequate causal investigation. 
 
2.3.2 Eron and Huesman 
 
Another frequently-cited and influential longitudinal study covering violent media’s 
behavioural/temperamental effects is the twenty-two year study into aggression in school 
children, conducted by Leonard D. Eron (and, from 1970 onwards, L. Rowell Huesman). 
The study took place between 1960 and 1982, and followed a mixed-sex group of 875 third 
graders (or 8-9 year olds) as they matured. Unlike many of the studies Freedman and 
others criticise for their use of dubious aggression analogues, Eron and Huesman employed 
peer-ratings, questioning parents, teachers and other children about subjects’ overall levels 
of aggression and the frequency with which they committed violent acts. Although this 
study later came to be widely known in relation to its findings regarding media effects, the 
researchers originally intended to investigate which “childhood experiences correlated with 
85 
 
mental health problems later in life” (Myth:5), focusing upon aggression in particular as 
they believed it to be more objectively measurable than other personal traits.
38
 They 
additionally recorded subjects’ family values, popularity, anxiety, IQ and exposure to 
violent media. 
 
In 1963, Eron reported finding a positive correlation between “aggressive behaviour at 
school (as estimated by classmate peers) and violent television watching at home” 
(‘Violence’:5). Notably, this correlation did not apply equally to both sexes – while boys 
who watched more violent programmes were evaluated as more aggressive by their peers, 
female subjects exhibited no equivalent trend. Furthermore, the researchers found that 
those subjects who watched the most television overall displayed the least aggression, and 
Eron himself later asserted that, at the time, he was doubtful about the significance of this 
association. 
 
In 1970, however, the U.S. Surgeon General’s committee became interested in this earlier 
finding: the third graders of 1963 were now nearing their high school graduations, and the 
governmental body came to appreciate the possible implications such an association might 
hold for future crime rates. The National Institutes of Mental Health awarded Eron and his 
colleagues (a group which now included Huesman) a $42,000 grant to investigate this 
correlation further. 
 
After securing this funding, Eron and Huesman were able to find and re-interview 436 of 
their subjects. Following this additional research they found a .31 correlation between male 
subjects’ preference for violent television programmes at age 8 and peer-rated levels of 
aggression at 18. This finding indicates that exposure to violent media during childhood 
could account for 10 per cent of the variance in male subjects’ aggression as young adults. 
However, once again, Eron and Huesman found no correlation for their female subjects in 
                                                 
38
 In fact, Eron, who had originally been sceptical about the public health risks posed by violent media – 
including data about his subjects’ viewing habits “almost as an afterthought” (‘Violence’:5) – later confessed 
to feeling pressured by government officials who were eager for the researchers to provide them with 
decisive evidence for the causal hypothesis. He described the media violence component of the study as “the 
tail that wag[ged] the dog” (‘Violence’:5), attracting the support and funding of the NIMH and other 
interested parties, even though it only represented a peripheral concern of the researchers themselves. 
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any of the measures. This means that “only one of six possible correlations [turned] out to 
be significant, and that one only weakly” (‘Violence’:6). 
 
The psychologist David Sohn suggests that there are deeper problems with these findings. 
He argues that one would generally predict childhood influences of this sort to weaken 
over time, modulated by subsequent experiences and influences. At age 8, Eron had 
discovered a .21 correlation between stated preference for/exposure to violent media and 
peer-rated aggression (i.e. he and his co-researchers at the time found that violent 
television exposure could account for 4 per cent of the variance in aggression). Indeed, at 
age 13, when a partial sample of 64 boys was re-interviewed, the correlation seemed, as 
anticipated, to have significantly lessened, in fact disappearing entirely. This unusual and 
intermittent upwards trend implies that “an eight year old’s television exposure influences 
his aggression immediately, has no measurable influence five years later, then 
mysteriously re-emerges five years after that” (‘Violence’:6) to exert renewed –and 
increased – behavioural effects on an eighteen year old. Huesman explained this 
discrepancy by attributing it to incompetence on the part of those conducting the 
interviews, charging the researchers involved during this period with amassing 
“incomplete and clearly biased” (‘Violence’:6) information. Once he became Analysis 
Director of the project in 1970, Huesman argued against “analyzing or reporting at all on 
the 8
th
 grade data” (‘Violence’: 6), meaning that the famous .31 correlation was generated 
by excluding some of the (potentially relevant) data. While, as I have discussed earlier, it is 
likely that sample sizes as small as the eighth grade pool of interviewees could have 
distorted the findings, resulting in a ‘false negative’, Huesman’s decision to refrain 
altogether from including them in his subsequent analysis could lead to a equally 
misrepresentative final outcome. (His decision to omit this set of findings on the basis of 
sample size is also deeply suspicious given his later actions, as I will explain). 
 
After the impressive findings of the 1970 study, Eron and Huesman were awarded further 
funding, again collecting information about, and re-interviewing, as many subjects as 
possible between 1980 and 1982 (by which point their participants were around thirty 
years old). Following this round of interviews, the researchers reported uncovering a 
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dramatic correlation between adult criminality and early exposure to violent television (as 
well as television viewing in general). In fact, Huesman (when serving as an official 
representative of the American Psychological Association in 1986)  supplied the senators 
to whom he was presenting the results with a bar graph designed to serve as “a visual 
illustration of the correlation between age 8 TV violence viewing and adult criminality” 
(‘Violence’:6)  The graph recorded subjects’ ‘Seriousness of Criminal Convictions by age 
30’ (from a scale of 1-10) and charted these figures against ‘Boys’ Preference for Violent 
Television at Age 8’. It consisted of three black bars “stepping up from low preference 
(4.23 on the seriousness scale) to medium preference (4.71 on the seriousness scale. The 
high preference group at 9.71 almost doubled on seriousness of criminal convictions, 
bumping the 10 limit” (‘Violence:7). As Rhodes notes in his review of the study, the 
implications of this graph are clear: sustained exposure to simulated violence during 
childhood  drastically increases subjects’ likelihood of growing up to become “a rapist or a 
murderer” (‘Violence’:7). 
 
As one might expect, these alarming findings were taken to present a strong case for 
further inquiry into the causal hypothesis, if not justifying immediate prophylactic action. 
Indeed, in the early 1970s when the U.S. Surgeon General founded a committee to 
investigate and evaluate effects research, Eron and Huesman’s study played a key role in 
determining the reviewers’ conclusions. Equally, Rhodes points out, years later effects 
proponents continued to appeal to their work when pushing for legal reforms designed to 
protect children from violent media: as recently as 1996 when Congress passed a 
Telecommunications Act requiring all new television sets to come equipped with a ‘V-
chip’39, the text of the Act “implicitly invoked Eron and Huesman’s findings to justify its 
intrusion [stating that]: “Studies have shown that children exposed to violent video 
programming at a young age have a higher tendency for violent and aggressive behavior 
later in life than children not so exposed.” (‘Violence’:5) 
 
                                                 
39
 A device enabling parents to control their children’s viewing, minimising their exposure to simulated 
violence (among other unsuitable content). 
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Troublingly, while Huesman’s interpretation of his and Eron’s research was widely 
promulgated, influencing both mainstream and political discourse about media violence for 
some time, there is evidence that he may have been far less confident in his conclusions 
than his public proclamations seem to indicate. For example, the strong association 
between exposure to simulated violence and adult criminality “went unmentioned in the 
final report on the 22-year aggression study that he and Eron published [in] Developmental 
Psychology in 1984” (‘Violence’:7), as did the alleged .31 correlation between childhood 
viewing habits and aggression at eighteen. 
 
Notably, this report was, unlike Huesman’s public testimonies, reviewed by fellow 
psychologists (prior to its inclusion in a “prestigious” (‘Violence’:7) and peer-reviewed 
journal). In fact, Rhodes observes, none of the researchers’ sensational findings regarding 
the effects of violent media were included in this piece, instead, they commented mainly 
upon the cyclical, banal nature of violence, noting that “early aggressiveness predicts later 
violence and that violence runs in families” (‘Violence’:7). This set of findings presents a 
very different picture of how violent criminals are formed: far from spreading 
unforeseeably through insidious sites of contagion – with violent television programmes 
acting to ‘deprave and corrupt’ otherwise unremarkable individuals – the acquisition of 
violent behaviour emerges as a drearily predictable process, very much a family affair. 
 
In his review of Eron and Huesman’s study, Rhodes argues that the striking absence of 
media-violence related content from the researchers’ final summary calls for further 
investigation. During his inquiry into the reasons for this omission, he unearthed a 
potentially significant statement by Huesman. In a 1994 paper on ‘The Long Term Effects 
of Repeated Exposure to Media Violence in Childhood’, the researcher cautioned readers 
that the sample on which his conclusions about the link between violent media and violent 
criminality was founded was “unfortunately[...] very small because of technical difficulties 
[...] mostly reflect[ing] the behaviour of a few high violence viewers” (‘Violence’:7). 
Rhodes contacted Huesman and asked for further information about the original data. In 
response, Huesman disclosed his methodology, revealing that, in actuality, his sensational 
conclusions about the public health risks of violent media were based on the actions of 
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only three subjects. The notorious bar graph that he presented on behalf of the APA acted 
to obfuscate his methodology and findings; as Rhodes points out, since “all three boys 
scored ‘High’ on TV violence viewing [...Huesman] had no factual basis for presenting 
‘Low’ and ‘Medium’ bars” (‘Violence’:8), indicating that these measures were falsified 
and included for effect. 
 
2.3.3 Other explanations for any association between simulated violence and real life 
aggression 
 
Like Rhodes, Freedman is highly critical of the claim that the existing longitudinal 
research offers strong support for the causal hypothesis. He argues that the “only clear 
support for [the effects thesis] comes from three studies [including Eron and Huesman’s 
twenty two year study]” (Media: 128), each of which are undermined by similar 
methodological problems to the laboratory research – namely an utter failure to distinguish 
between malicious/aggressive behaviours and rough and tumble play and/ or the 
employment on dubious statistical methodology.  
 
Even if one takes these few weakly positive results at face value, once they are placed in 
the context of the many non-supportive studies, it becomes apparent that the longitudinal 
research does not support the causal hypothesis. However, although Freedman is sceptical 
about the effects paradigm, and highly critical of many of its proponents’ methodology, he 
acknowledges that, as with the survey research, even though the longitudinal studies 
“found almost no significant effects [my italics]” (Media:125) of violent media exposure 
on aggression, they nonetheless yielded a “preponderance of positive associations” 
(Media: 125). While “many of the coefficients were close to zero and explained virtually 
none of the variance in aggression” (Media:130), he reasons that, from a ‘no effects’ 
perspective, one would predict that such non-significant correlations are purely due to 
random variation or statistical ‘noise’ and, as such, would be evenly divided between 
positive and negative. This pattern of associations can be explained in one of two ways. 
First, one could construe this effect as indicating that “viewing violent programs has a 
small effect on aggression” (Media:131). While such an effect would be markedly weaker 
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than the majority of effects theorists claim, accounting for only a “tiny percentage in the 
variation in aggression” (Media:131), it would still constitute mild support for the causal 
hypothesis. 
 
An alternative explanation is that this pattern could be the result of a third factor “that 
differentially affect[s both the] viewing of violent programs and aggression” (Media:131) 
For example, Milavsky and his co-researchers – who themselves conducted a multi-wave 
study into the effects of media violence (Milavsky, Stipp, Kessler & Rubens, 1982) – posit 
that the influence of an individual’s peer group could lead to  both a predilection for 
violent media and a propensity to behave more aggressively over time. They hypothesise 
that if a child joins a social group which values “action, adventure and aggressiveness” 
(Media:131), initially she may adopt “milder behaviours such as watching violent 
programs and being slightly aggressive” (Media:131), creating the appearance of a causal 
relationship between these two variables. If, over time, she becomes cumulatively more 
influenced by the values and behaviour of her peers and begins to participate in serious 
acts of aggression or violence, “this would produce the pattern [displayed in some effects 
research] – a same age correlation between viewing violence and aggression, and a positive 
coefficient between early violence viewing and later aggression even after early aggression 
was controlled” for (Media:131).  
 
Similarly, other environmental factors such as subjects’ familial parenting style and social 
background could be responsible for such a pattern. Indeed, the researchers conducting 
Milavsky’s multi-wave study found that “controlling for socioeconomic status reduced the 
plurality of positive effects for boys, and that controlling for school, SES (socio-economic 
status), and gender had the same effect for boys and girls combined” (Media:131), 
although in each case there was still a lingering positive correlation between exposure and 
later aggression. Freedman argues that focusing upon factors associated with 
socioeconomic status represents a fruitful angle of inquiry into this residual effect. He 
points out that poor parents (and particularly single parents, with their accompanying 
single-incomes and necessarily arduous lifestyles) tend also to be time-poor, forced to 
spend less time with their children. As a result of this relative lack of parental supervision, 
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poorer children are, on average, likely to spend more time watching television in general  
(and thus, violent television, in particular), particularly given their lack of access to other 
recreational activities. He suggests that this hidden factor of amount of time spent un- or 
under-supervised (and, therefore, being the recipients of less socialisation against 
committing aggressive acts) could cause both an increased average exposure to violent 
media and an increase in aggressive traits and behaviours. 
 
There is evidence to support Freedman’s ‘hidden third factor’ hypothesis. Despite the 
positive association between increased exposure to violent media and aggressive 
behaviours, several studies directly investigating the leisure habits of offenders found that, 
when “like [was matched] with like” (Cumberbatch, 2004:17) – comparing the viewing 
habits of violent offenders with those of a law-abiding control group from a similar socio-
economic background – there were no significant differences between “the delinquent 
sample and the working class controls” (Cumberbatch, 2004:15), while “middle class 
controls were much less likely to prefer aggressive programmes than the other two groups” 
(Halloran, Brown and Cheney 1970). Similar later studies (Kruttschnitt, Heath and Ward 
1986) also found no disparity between the viewing habits of offenders and non-offenders 
from shared backgrounds.  
 
One investigation mentioned in the previous chapter (Hagell and Newburn 1994), 
undertaken by The Policy Studies Institute in response to wide scale public concern about 
violent media, in fact found that habitual offenders had “less access to television, video and 
other [media] equipment” (Cumberbatch, 2004:16) than the control group, “had more 
difficulty in thinking of anyone on television they identified with [...] were less able to 
name any favourite television programme [...and] went to the cinema less  often (50% said 
they rarely or never went compared with only a quarter of the control group)” 
(Cumberbatch, 2004:16). Similarly, when the ‘1998-1999 Youth Lifestyles Survey’ 
presented a list of risk factors for serious and persistent offending in adolescents and young 
adults, violent media went completely unmentioned while other pastimes – such as drug 
use, regular alcohol consumption and frequently hanging “around in public places [...] 
because there was nowhere better to go or nothing better to do” (Campbell & Harrington, 
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2000:5) – were argued to have  a “cumulative [adverse] effect” (Campbell & Harrington, 
2000:5). In other words, rather than being the product of particularly high exposure to 
violent media, regular and violent young offenders are more likely to spend large amounts 
of time unsupervised (with parents who “rarely or never know their whereabouts” 
(Campbell & Harrington, 2000:5) and unoccupied, resorting to criminal acts out of a sense 
of boredom, frustration and “disaffect[ion]” (Campbell & Harrington, 2000:4) from 
mainstream society. 
 
It is possible that the critical meta-analyses and reviews I have discussed throughout this 
chapter contain statistical irregularities and errors of their own, or that other, equally 
careful, theorists might well come to quite different conclusions about this body of 
research. My aim throughout this review of investigations of the effects model has not 
necessarily been to offer conclusive arguments or evidence against the causal hypothesis, 
but to demonstrate that there exists no unanimity, no ‘smoking gun’ or single, irrefutable 
conclusion about the public health risks of media violence to which we must defer before 
offering timorous defences of culturally-abject genres such as horror. I also sought to 
problematise this research’s disproportionate role in public discourse (and even 
governmental policies) by pointing out its more evident flaws and inconsistencies, without 
suggesting that such problems should foreclose or invalidate future inquiry. 
 
In his generally critical review of effects research Richard Felson concedes that media 
violence can alert unstable, dispositionally aggressive individuals to novel forms of 
violence of which they might not otherwise have been aware. In other words, as the pop-
culturally savvy killers of the post-modern slasher Scream argue, “movies don't create 
psychos. Movies make psychos more creative”. While exposure to violent media is highly 
unlikely to exert any significant or long-term behavioural effects on the general population, 
it is probable, even demonstrable, that aggressive/violent individuals may react in unusual 
and aberrant ways, taking cues from narratives that speak to their already aberrant urges. 
As Felson states, “the anecdotal evidence is convincing in this area. There appear to be 
documented cases in which bizarre events on television are followed by similar events in 
the real world” where the similarities are simply too pronounced to be coincidental. 
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Notably, however, the most influential form of media in this sort of copycat event is not 
necessarily the more demonised, such as horror films, violent comics or death metal music, 
but the news itself.
40
 While our emotional and cognitive responses to fictions may in some 
ways parallel our responses to narratives about real life events, even morally-aberrant 
individuals are more likely to take their behavioural cues from factual media than fictive 
ones. Fictions can certainly broaden our imaginative horizons, expanding the realm of the 
conceivable by exposing us to novel concepts, characters and situations and inducing us to 
inspect and reconsider our unexamined assumptions. Yet where criminal ‘inspiration’ is 
concerned, it is arguably entirely predictable that individuals with villainous ambitions are 
more likely to model themselves on their real life peers: consuming a fictional narrative in 
which the protagonist enacts an enviable feat may kindle in me some vague aspiration to 
do the same, but is surely less encouraging, less concretely helpful, than exposure to 
factual accounts of other people undertaking such actions.  
 
Indeed, would-be criminals are perhaps more likely to be emboldened by real life reports 
than popular crime dramas, which are, after all, generally designed to provide emotional 
satisfaction and narrative closure for a general audience: many crime fictions present law 
enforcement as near-infallible, detecting and despatching even the most ingenious of 
villains within a single episode. In contrast, some of the more quotidian forms of 
interpersonal violence face notoriously low conviction rates; only 4% of reported domestic 
violence incidents result in conviction, and in 30% of reported cases no action is taken by 
                                                 
40
 In fact, prominent criminal profilers such as Park Dietz suggest that the news media’s obsessive, round the 
clock coverage following high profile acts of violence such as school or workplace shootings or other spree 
killings, particularly those reports that highlight and foreground the body count, depict the killer/s as 
powerful, ingenious or as anti-heroes, and/or scrutinise and publicise details of the killer/s’ life, has a visible, 
predictable short-term effect on levels of similar crimes. Dietz’s research indicates that  “in a country the size 
of the US, "saturation-level news coverage of mass murder causes, on average, one more mass murder in the 
next two weeks". In particular, he alleged that hysterical media coverage led to a “copycat epidemic” 
following the infamous product-tampering ‘Tylenol’ poisonings of 1982: “Seven people died. It became the 
most covered story since the Kennedy assassination – and there were suddenly thousands of copycat cases or 
threats. By 1986, there were more than 4,000 a year. Each new case made the hysteria balloon further. Dr 
Dietz suggested the media coverage had created an epidemic of copycatting. He implored journalists to 
restrict their coverage of product-tampering to the local area in which it occurred, where it would be 
presented in a more sober, restrained tone. They finally agreed. Within months, the cases of product-
tampering were in dramatic decline” (Hari, 2010). 
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the police (Women’s Aid, 2012). Similarly, while fictional rapists are likely to be vilified 
and punished, research suggests that in actuality “between 75 and 95 per cent of rape 
crimes are never reported to the police” (HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, 
2007:35), and that a third of people surveyed believe that a woman was partially or totally 
responsible for being raped if she was drunk at the time (Amnesty International UK, 2005).  
 
Furthermore, due to the nature of those individuals who tend to commit impulsive, media-
inspired acts of (self) violence, the impetus for such acts can seem tenuous and 
unpredictable to an outsider: at around the period during which ‘video nasties’ were being 
(as it turned out, erroneously) linked to the murder of James Bulger, a fourteen year old 
boy hanged himself citing the Disney film The Lion King as his inspiration for the act in 
his suicide note. More recently, the horrific murder of a seventeen year old was linked to 
otherwise blandly inoffensive comedy-horror film Severance. Although the killing was 
motivated by “sexual jealousy” (Child, 2009) (the murderers had been having a sexual 
relationship with the same woman as the victim) the murderers decided to kill him in the 
manner they chose after viewing the film, at the time apparently remarking “Wouldn’t it be 
wicked if you could actually do that to someone in real life?” (Child, 2009) Such reactions 
are, mercifully, as anomalous as they are unaccountable; to take such horrendous, outlying 
examples as being generally representative of the effects of media violence upon its 
audience is akin to taking Mark Chapman’s assassination of John Lennon as being 
representative of the effects of reading reclusive American authors. 
 
2.4 What are the Real Perils of Violent Media? 
 
In The Myth of Media Violence David  Trend argues that we should “extend the 
conversation about media violence beyond simple [assertions] of condemnation or 
support” (Myth:2), rejecting both the unwarrantedly damning conclusions of effects 
researchers and the loftily dismissive polemic of theorists like Martin Barker and Julian 
Petley. 
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Like many of the other theorists whose reviews and meta-analyses I discuss throughout 
this chapter, Trend is deeply sceptical of the version of the causal hypothesis promoted by 
mainstream effects researchers. However, unlike those such as Barker, Petley, Gauntlett, 
Freedman and Rhodes, Trend criticises the methodology, reasoning and presuppositions 
underlying much effects research without altogether rejecting the central premise that 
certain kinds of violent/distressing media could exert morally or socially deleterious 
effects. 
 
In order to sidestep the unproductive “standoff” (Myth:47) between proponents of the 
causal hypothesis and fiercely-opposed theorists like Barker and Petley, Trend proposes 
that we adopt some of the critical techniques developed in film, media and cultural studies. 
If the scrupulously scientistic media effects community often ignore context altogether, 
parcelling out carefully controlled doses of televisual/cinematic violence, he argues that an 
awareness of genre could prove immensely helpful in understanding the pleasures, and 
perils, of violent media. 
 
As Trend reminds us, narratives do not “occur in a social vacuum” (Myth:51): the ever-
popular genre of crime films/television programmes remains so prevalent because it serves, 
in many ways, to provide viewers with widely-resonant fables of “good against evil”, 
staging “eternal conflicts” that, some theorists argue, become particularly relevant during 
“time[s] of distress” (Myth:51) and conflict. These broad-strokes modern “morality tales” 
(Myth:51) offer succour by providing viewers with the gratifying sense that justice has, at 
least in this instance, been served. Trend points out that, during television crime dramas, 
when the “good-guy police or detectives use violence against criminals” audience 
members – who are almost invariably emotionally aligned with the heroic detective rather 
than her villainous quarry – experience some measure of vicarious satisfaction owing to 
their sense that the protagonists’ violent acts are both “necessary and justified” (Myth:52). 
Trend argues that such narratives, while understandably pleasurable for viewers living in 
an often unjust world, could also work to reinforce “the broader social endorsement of 
aggression by those it sanctions to commit violence on its behalf [my italics]” (Myth:52).  
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Importantly, Trend is not arguing that exposure to crime narratives will spur viewers to 
commit acts of imitative violence; as he asserts, the research investigating this possibility 
remains unconvincing (and often deeply flawed in theory and in execution). Rather, his 
concern is with what could be termed the ideological effects of certain forms of media 
violence. If crime dramas (and, surely to a far greater extent, news media) constantly 
confront audiences with context-less, alarmist and stereotyped visions of criminality – 
motivelessly malicious serial killers, inscrutable terrorist Others, faceless, unreasoningly 
thuggish ‘chavs’ – then we, as a society, will be more likely to excuse and normalise police 
brutality and incursions on our civil liberties. Concomitantly, as David Gauntlett notes 
(though not specifically in support of the notion that depictions of just police/state violence 
legitimise the use of force), defining violence is in itself far from an apolitical exercise. He 
argues that mainstream effects-researchers have too often 
 
taken for granted the definitions of media material, such as ‘antisocial’ and ‘prosocial’ 
programming, as well as characterisations of behaviour in the real world, such as 
‘antisocial’ and ‘prosocial’ action [...] These can be ideological value judgements; throwing 
down a book in disgust, sabotaging a nuclear missile, or smashing cages to set animals free, 
will always be interpreted in effects studies as ‘antisocial’ not ‘prosocial’ (Gauntlett, 
2005:59). 
 
In a society that readily condemns protesters’ destruction of property as inexcusable – 
while collectively turning a blind eye to the violence everyday enacted on the bodies of 
workers in the developing world (whose labours provide its material comforts in the first 
place) – Gauntlett’s point is certainly worth consideration. 
 
Similarly, Trend criticises the elision and misrepresentation of marginalised people that 
typified the unreconstructed/traditional Western, as well as their role in sculpting (rigid and 
often pernicious) cultural ideals about how ‘real men’ behave. In such films, the American 
frontier was “depicted as a colonial wilderness of utopian promise and anarchistic 
lawlessness [...in need of forceful] taming” by ruggedly individualistic “white-skinned 
good guys” (Myth:52). 
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I would argue that while the ideological defects and dangers Trend ascribes to certain 
types/sub-genres of violent media are highly plausible, such problems, although genuinely 
worrisome, are hardly unique, or inherent, to violent narratives. In fact, as Trend himself 
notes, while the much-vilified slasher film revels in depicting the stalking, mutilation and 
murder of young women, they usually also inject “an element of subversion” (Myth:64) by 
featuring unusually active, plot-driving female leads who vanquish the monsters quite 
without the aid of a passing ‘woodsman’. In contrast, the more mainstream genre of ‘chick 
flicks’ often reifies dubious and essentialist notions of gender, uncritically endorses 
superficiality and consumerism, and romanticises behaviours like stalking and sexual 
harassment that are, in real life, perturbing to say the least. Equally, the recent boom in 
Apatow-esque comedies depicting slobbish, immature and often sexually predatory ‘man-
children’ as the masculine norm presents a similarly dispiriting, and unrealistic, worldview. 
 
More pertinently, Trend also argues that media violence contributes to people’s fear that 
“they live in a violent world” (Myth:58), casting an all-pervading cloud of anxiety over our 
everyday lives. Trend asserts that this “culture of fear” (Myth:59) is not an inevitable 
consequence of being human; while some awareness of the dangers potentially lurking 
nearby is natural, he attributes much of the paradoxical hypervigilance attending our 
(unprecedentedly safe and palatial) modern existence to our bombardment with media 
images of violence. He cites George Gerbner’s concept of the ‘Mean World Syndrome’: a 
malaise developed by frequent television viewers, whose sufferers acquire an amplified 
perception of risk and an exaggeratedly pessimistic, fearful worldview. As Trend argues, 
news media, which are often tactfully exempted from mainstream discussion of the 
dangers of media violence, are inherently “driven by stories that produce fear” (Myth:59) 
operating according to a strict economy of urgency – notoriously governed by the dictum 
that ‘if it bleeds, it leads’. Equally, advertising works by feeding, and then exploiting, 
“various insecurities and anxieties” (Myth:59) (inner peace being insufficiently profitable). 
 
Once again, I raise these comparisons not in order to (fallaciously) grant violent media 
immunity from criticism since other types of media can also be subject to charges of 
negative influence, but to problematise the repetitive, alarmist and unproductive nature of 
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much mainstream discourse about media effects. As Trend, Buckingham and many others 
argue, it would be ludicrous to deny that violent media exert any effects on their audience 
(such stolidity and emotional imperviousness would surely negate the point of engaging 
with fictions in the first place), but they aim to challenge the artificially narrow conception 
of which responses are relevant to public inquiry. Rather than trying to suppress debate 
about media effects, these theorists in fact advocate for a broader and more nuanced 
dialogue, arguing that the historical focus on imitative violence and aggression has in fact 
served to obscure equally interesting and important issues. 
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Chapter 3: From Perils to Pleasures 
 
Introduction 
 
In my last chapter I disputed the claim – widely disseminated by effects theorists, public 
figures and a significant proportion of the mainstream press – that exposure to violent 
media reliably depraves and corrupts audience members, inflaming nascent aggressive 
drives and spurring acts of imitative violence. In this section I will begin to examine the 
less obviously contentious question of why horror is experienced (by some people, at least) 
as pleasurable. As I have noted previously, horror is a genre that, by definition, depicts 
frightening and at times repulsive events and beings, a genre whose very purpose is to 
incite traditionally aversive emotions. The common-sense critique of horror and similarly 
violent/negative low-brow genres discussed in my introductory chapter presupposes that, 
because such works seem unambiguously displeasurable from a ‘reasonable person’ 
standpoint, the key to their appeal must therefore lie in the atypicality, the 
unreasonableness, of their target audience. That material which repels the morally- and 
affectively – normal viewer, provoking thoroughly unpleasant emotions, can only, through 
a process of elimination, be attractive to those who are too callous or sadistic to form a 
more appropriate response.  
 
The assumption that narrative’s pleasures characteristically lie in its provision of 
unadulteratedly positive emotions and desirable simulated experiences renders horror 
doubly problematic, casting either its audience, or its appeal, as aberrant. Accepting this 
premise logically entails that one must either concede that horror, and related genres are 
‘traditionally’ if not widely enjoyable, providing the anomalous few with illicit thrills, or 
present genres with negative content as exceptional and somehow paradoxical, explicable 
only through appeals to unconscious drives or favourable meta-responses. Throughout this 
thesis I will criticise the fantasy model, offering a radically different account of narrative 
pleasure which focuses on the role of attentional and affective engagement. 
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As in my last chapter, there is one potentially damaging objection to my account of the 
pleasures of violent and distressing media: the suggestion that the empirical data available 
clearly supports the dominant conception of horror and related genres. After all, it may be 
that horror’s fans are atypical in some way – overwhelmingly composed of adolescents 
struggling with their burgeoning sexuality, or aggressive, misogynistic ‘rogue males’ – or 
that horror narratives are indeed, as many of its most vehement critics argue, commonly 
structured so as to entice viewers into identifying with the killer, disproportionately 
targeting female victims and invariably including scenes of sexual violence. If textual 
analyses and research into the composition and preferences of audience members bear out 
these assumptions, then it would severely weaken my argument. 
 
Many theories of horror and similarly agonistic genres such as tragedy dispel such genres’ 
morally and philosophically problematic status by appealing to events that occur ‘behind 
the curtain’, as it were, attributing their pleasures to unconscious/subjectively inaccessible 
mental events. Theorists such as Lucretius, Kant, Schiller and Susan Feagin resolve the 
paradoxes of the sublime and tragedy by ascribing their appeal to gratifying meta-
responses or reflections upon the self. Proponents of the purgation model of catharsis argue 
that violent narratives are attractive because they allow us pleasurably to unburden 
ourselves of fear, sadness and/or aggressive impulses. The psychoanalytic accounts 
formulated by critics like James Twitchell, Barbara Creed, Robin Wood and Carol Clover 
contend that horror is compelling because it invokes, in safely encoded form, our most 
deeply-buried fears and fantasies. In contrast to these models, I will argue that narrative 
genres with affectively-negative content do not need to be rendered explicable by any 
extraordinary underlying mechanisms of this sort. Rather, I aim to demonstrate that the 
descriptive and predictive failures of the fantasy model are clearly discernible in 
mainstream, as well as genre, narrative conventions, as well as in audience members’ and 
critics’ characterisation of their experiences.  
 
In fact, there is little data to support the view that horror’s pleasures reside in its ability to 
allow viewers to wreak vicariously those sadistic acts that they cannot commit in real life. 
In contrast to many philosophical solutions to the paradox, the studies and content analyses 
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I will next discuss are not, for the most part, intended as totalising models of how horror 
‘works’. Indeed, the works I will discuss in this section are purposely limited in scope, 
concentrating on particular audiences or sub-generic norms and employing close textual 
readings of horror narratives or detailed analyses of interviews with audience members. 
Rather, I have chosen to examine the following  theorists’ work in depth because their 
research into critically-neglected topics and audiences seriously problematises the 
dominant view of horror’s appeal and effects that I explored throughout the previous two 
chapters. The fantasy model – like many influential philosophical  explorations of the 
paradox – is largely bereft of empirical support, grounded in folk-psychology, armchair 
theorising and seductively plausible intuitions. Focused research into more concrete 
questions not only serves as a valuable corrective to this abstracting tendency but also 
demonstrates where and how the fantasy model fails:  it is harder to assert that horror films 
must appeal to some sort of primordial bloodlust in child viewers when there is research 
available showing that most children report empathising with fictional victims rather than 
villains
41
.   
 
3.1 She who refuses to ‘refuse to look’ – A profile of the female horror fan 
 
In ‘The Female Horror Film Audience’, Brigid Cherry examines the pleasures of horror for 
the spectatrix, questioning problematic mainstream assumptions about the female ‘refusal 
to look’ (or characteristic displeasure in response to horrific spectacle). Cherry interrogates 
the popularly-accepted notion that women comprise, at best, a small, reluctant, and 
                                                 
41
 At times these theorists employ the (elsewhere often nebulous and imprecisely-defined) concept of 
‘identification’. Without uncritically accepting the notion that we must identify or empathise with 
protagonists in order to be imaginatively or emotionally invested in a narrative, or that our thoughts and 
feelings routinely align exactly with those of fictional characters, I would defend Buckingham and Clover’s 
particular application of the concept as enlightening. Even if one views our characteristic mode of 
engagement with fictions as more akin to that of an interested and sympathetic observer – feeling for 
characters without necessarily replicating their depicted emotions or somehow taking on their plight as our 
own – Clover’s textual analyses nonetheless complicate the traditional view of the slasher or rape-revenge 
film as systematically prioritising, or encouraging viewers to adopt, the aggressor’s point of view and to revel 
in his violent acts. Equally, Buckingham’s investigation of children’s responses to horrific and violent 
narratives – and his discovery that child audience members who enjoyed horror commonly reported feeling 
fear and indignation in response to violent predatory acts rather than vicarious glee – usefully undermines the 
common-sense view that horror narratives are only pleasurable because they slake anomalous individuals’ 
aggressive appetites.  
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generically-incompetent segment of the audience for horror films by conducting qualitative 
research designed to present a profile of avowed female horror fans and followers.  
 
It is as if a rhetorical “female exclusion zone”(‘Audience’:1) has been erected around 
horror as a genre, with criticisms and acclamations of the genre alike tending to construct 
its audience as overwhelmingly young and  male, implicitly positioning post-adolescent 
and female fandom as aberrant. As Jean Auerbach notes, “the most sophisticated and best-
known experts on American popular horror insist that it is and always has been a boy's 
game. Twitchell, Skal and Kendrick construct a compelling paradigm of adolescent boys 
chafing against the smug domestication of the 1950s, but this paradigm assumes by 
definition that girls were contented domesticators” (‘Audience’:18). Women constitute an 
“invisible” (‘Audience’:vi) – or invisibilised – audience for horror: even when (as semi-
regularly occurs via various pieces of consumer research) it is found that women constitute 
a non-trivial share of the audience for horror, it is “appear[s] to be a constant [and ever-
renewed] source of amazement, however frequently research reveals it” (‘Audience’:24).  
 
There is a striking disparity between women’s presumed lack of interest in or outright 
aversion to horrific filmic images and their response to other forms of horror, since 
“contemporary surveys of computer game players, visitors to Madame Tussaud’s Chamber 
of Horrors and readers of Goosebumps and Point Horror pre-adolescent’s and young 
adult’s horror fiction have revealed that women continue to be as, if not more, attracted to 
[non-cinematic] horrific entertainment than men” (‘Audience’:5) 
 
In fact, Cherry argues, “demographic profiles of contemporary cinema audiences suggest 
that women can comprise up to 50% of horror film audiences” (‘Audience’:1). For 
example, the Cinema Advertising Association estimates that female viewers comprised 
around 50 per cent of the audience for (then-recent) horror and ‘new brutalist’ films such 
as Man Bites Dog, Silence of the Lambs and Scream, and up to 40 per cent of the audience 
for Alien
3
, Reservoir Dogs and Natural Born Killers. Scream 2 even averaged 55 per cent 
female and 45 per cent male attendance. Certainly, there is much evidence to suggest that 
pre-pubescent and pubescent girls’ appetite for non-cinematic horror fictions matches or 
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even outstrips that of boys. For example, it is known that girls “make up a large proportion 
of the readership of the young adult Point Horror books and Goosebumps horror fiction 
aimed at pre-teens” (‘Audience’:20). Cherry also cites a piece of market research 
commissioned by computer games company Sierra On-Line (Cumberbatch and Wood, 
1995). The researchers conducting this survey interviewed 305 teenagers (195 male and 
110 female) regarding their hobbies and interests. Among other questions, participants 
were asked to rank their favourite film genres. As Cherry points out, despite the common 
conception that horror is an overwhelmingly masculine genre, completely orthogonal to 
female tastes and attitudes, 27 per cent of the survey’s female respondents claimed that 
horror was their favourite film genre, in contrast to only 14 per cent of boys. The boys 
involved in this survey in fact “much prefer[red] Action films [to horror films] ([with] 44 
per cent selecting it as their favourite type against 14 per cent of girls)” (‘Audience’:17).  
 
Horror in literary form is also known to appeal “across the sex and age ranges” 
(‘Audience’:1), with women historically being regarded as the primary audience for the 
“gothic horror literature of the past centuries” (‘Audience’:14). Perhaps because horror is 
so unignorably a ‘body’ genre (to employ Linda Williams’ term), exacting unpredictable 
physical effects upon the vulnerable, compliant bodies of audience members, in the past it 
was associated with female audiences; as Jean Auerbach points out in Our Vampires, 
Ourselves, “Jane Austen's Northanger Abbey reminds us that in the eighteenth century, 
horror was by definition a woman's genre” (‘Audience’:18), a peculiarly feminine folly or 
diversion.  
 
Equally, there is widespread recognition that one related genre addressing horrific and 
aversive content – that of true-life crime books – “have a majority female readership and 
[that] there are large numbers of women who read magazines such as True Life Crimes 
(see Smith, 1994, p.25), indicating that women in particular might be fascinated by violent 
events or psychopathologies” (‘Audience’:24).  
 
However, whatever the veracity of this association, “since the rise of the slasher film in the 
late 70s, the horror fan has been regarded as consisting primarily of adolescent boys and 
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men under the age of twenty-five” (‘Audience’:4), and, as such, has been subject to a great 
deal of psychoanalytic textual analyses aimed at uncovering its relation to “adolescent 
male psychosexual processes” (‘Audience’:4). Since such analyses tend to position horror 
as “a problematical genre for female spectators” (‘Audience’:41), female viewers are, in 
popular discourse, presented as either “reluctant or immasculated” (‘Audience’:41) – 
shrinking from horrific spectacle in proper, feminine revulsion or able to derive pleasure 
from onscreen violence and terror because they are in some way anomalous, gender traitors 
complicit with a sadistic male gaze. Cherry argues that both mainstream and feminist 
models of horror cinema have historically proven inadequate at decoding the pleasures the 
genre holds for the spectatrix, and suggests constructing “alternative models of generic and 
gendered spectatorship” (‘Audience’:41).  
 
She asserts that “there is evidence to suggest that, firstly, women have always enjoyed 
horror and continue to do so and, secondly, that women's consumption of horror may have 
been [suppressed or] forced ‘underground’” (‘Audience’:19), with female viewers 
constituting a ‘hidden audience’. Even many of the confessed horror followers to whom 
she spoke denied being ‘fans’ and consumed horror fictions in isolation (a common 
practice with other “despised genres” (‘Audience’:65) such as romances and soap operas). 
Most were eager to distance themselves from mainstream perceptions of horror fans as 
depraved and/or dangerous. As Cherry points out, declaring oneself to be a female horror 
fan is triply transgressive of mainstream norms – as “fans they are geeks or nerds, as horror 
fans they are depraved, and as female horror fans they are unfeminine”     
(‘Audience’:174). Relatedly, some of her participants communicated a “dislike of watching 
horror films in a cinema because of the behavior of other viewers” (‘Audience’:70), as well 
as being disinclined to participate in mainstream fan culture due to marginalization and 
endemic sexism. 
 
Cherry recruited avowed female horror fans and followers by placing advertisements in 
horror magazines, as well as by soliciting participants through fan societies and online 
discussion groups/mailing lists. After an initial questionnaire she invited subjects to 
participate in open-ended group interviews, discussing a wide range of topics including 
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their histories as horror fans or followers, their cinematic preferences and viewing habits, 
their own thoughts on the appeal horror holds for viewers in general (and for themselves in 
particular) and their thoughts on mainstream perceptions of the genre and its devotees. 
 
The participants typically dated their burgeoning taste for horror to a very young age, their 
accounts diverging markedly from those of well-known theorists like Twitchell (in whose 
model horror appeals because it caters to the psychosexual drives of – implicitly male – 
adolescents, its allure originating with the emergence of such drives during pubescence and 
palling at the onset of adulthood). Because the subjects’ interest “almost always predate[d] 
the accepted age” (‘Audience’:96) for actually viewing horror films, the films or 
programmes they cited as the catalyst for their induction into the genre were rarely 
“hardcore, graphic or violent […] or even films classified as horror” (‘Audience’:97). 
Typically, Cherry’s respondents traced their first memorable experiences with ‘horror’ to 
being severely frightened by (relatively innocuous) materials such as  “Disney films, 
children’s science fiction serials, or adult science fiction films or television programmes” 
(‘Audience’:98) and then becoming aware of a paradoxical desire to repeat this experience.   
 
Perhaps problematically for those analyses of the genre that attribute its pleasures to 
thematic or structural elements unique to horror narratives, after reviewing her subjects’ 
responses Cherry concludes that a predilection for certain kinds of emotional affect – 
morbid fascination, curiosity about the unknown/attraction to the fantastic, and, above all, 
fear – is in fact central to female fans’ attraction to horror. As she argues, this would 
explain why the women to whom she spoke employed such catholic definitions of the 
genre, and why, when describing their formative experiences with horror, they were often 
unable to remember anything specific about the film or programme that had scared them, 
while able to recount how this stimulus made them feel in great detail.   
 
The female horror viewers Cherry interviewed evinced “a strong attraction to […] 
frightening and horrific material” (‘Audience’:94), with most professing to “enjoy […] 
being scared” (‘Audience’:71). Notably, many claimed always to have been gripped by a 
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“strong fascination” (‘Audience’:98) with the characters that frightened them as children, 
simultaneously repulsed and transfixed by the macabre and the monstrous.  
 
These respondents’ descriptions of their reasons for liking horror lend qualified support to 
Noël Carroll’s contention that art-horror is pleasurable because it appeals to our native 
curiosity about interstitial beings. In Carroll’s model, the somehow enjoyable affective 
ambivalence that characterizes our engagement with art-horror derives from the genre’s 
ability to simultaneously attract and repulse viewers with its depiction of categorically-
subversive (and thus monstrous) beings.  
 
However, as I discuss in further detail in chapter 6, there is one crucial and frequently-
noted problem with Carroll’s theory that the testimony of Cherry’s subjects does nothing to 
alleviate. Carroll asserts that we enjoy horror in spite of, rather than because of, the fear 
and disgust it excites, tolerating these genuinely displeasurable emotions solely in order to 
satisfy our curiosity about monstrous beings. According to Carroll, such negative feelings 
are the inevitable by-product of our fascination-born desire to study ontologically 
transgressive creatures. The curiosity and fear monsters inspire in us are inextricably 
linked; both derive from their flagrant violation of our categorial schemes. 
 
 Problematically, as many theorists have pointed out, there are numerous other genres that 
cater to this same interest in biologically impossible beings without eliciting the 
traditionally negative emotions in which horror traffics. Fantasy, science fiction, fairy tales 
and magical realism all depict similarly impossible beings and situations without 
(necessarily) evoking fear and disgust. In fact, Cherry’s research shows that many female 
horror fans also follow these related genres. If, as in Carroll’s hypothesis, we experience 
the emotions associated with the horror genre as an undesirable side-effect, then surely 
genres, like fantasy and science fiction, that depict benign, attractive and  non-threatening 
preternatural creatures (e.g. mermaids, phoenixes, glamorous ‘gynoids’ etc) should 
supplant horror altogether?  Therefore, while Cherry’s research suggests that there is 
indeed a  link of some sort between fascination, fear and the allure of the horrific, I would 
argue that Carroll’s theory is marred by its failure adequately to account for the co-
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existence of horror with such related genres (as well as only encompassing supernatural 
horror).  
 
Cherry also discusses prior studies into the nature of horror’s appeal which link an 
attraction for violent, frightening and macabre material to certain personality traits. In his 
research on the topic Zuckerman characterizes sensation seeking as “a trait defined by the 
seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences” 
(‘Audience’:111). While women tend to score lower than men on some measures on the 
sensation seeking scale (SSS), including thrill and adventure seeking, susceptibility to 
boredom and disinhibition, they exhibit similar levels of experience seeking (defined as the 
desire to seek novel experiences “through the mind and senses” (‘Audience’:111) Female 
horror fans’ attraction to the genre may originate in such a drive to seek out new or intense 
experiences, a need to interrogate, “confront and explore [that which most] frightens them” 
(‘Audience’:112), investigating their own responses to the strange and the horrifying. 
Cherry posits that curiosity of this sort “might be a foundation of the profile of horror film 
fans and followers” (‘Audience’:114), with the majority of her participants reporting a 
“strong fascination with images of monstrosity” (‘Audience’:117). In fact, in a related 
study, Zuckerman and Litle (1986) found that curiosity about morbid experiences (CAME) 
was positively correlated with horror film attendance among women.  
 
As I argue in later sections, particularly during my analysis in the penultimate chapter, 
there is evidence to suggest that all narrative genres rely upon agonistic curiosity to 
varying extents to attract and retain audience members’ attention. Violent and distressing 
fictions differ from more comprehensibly pleasurable genres in degree rather than in kind: 
while lighter-hearted genres may not employ equally intense and/or physical conflict in 
order to secure our attention, stories overwhelmingly focus upon problematic situations 
and goal-oriented activity. In other words, the fantasy model not only fails to capture the 
piquant pleasures of horror or tragedy, but lacks explanatory power even when it comes to 
narrative sub-genres that are typically viewed as low-brow and nakedly aspirational, such 
as the romance. 
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Conversely, many of Cherry’s participants described undergoing a paradoxical process of 
“reversal” (‘Audience’:101) whereby an initially displeasurable sensation of fright or 
aversion was later converted into an at least ambivalently pleasurable sense of attraction 
and mastery. Unlike the first group of respondents, whose immediate enjoyment of 
apparently aversive stimuli is consistent with integrationist or coexistentialist models like 
Gaut’s and Carroll’s, these women’s experience appears to support the control thesis. 
According to this view, horror is enjoyable – in spite of its negative content and the 
traditionally unpleasant emotions it excites – because it affords audience members a 
gratifying sense of self-mastery. Only by first exposing oneself to emotionally-challenging 
stimuli can one experience the subsequent satisfaction of learning to manage and subdue 
the negative feelings they evoke. Indeed, one of Cherry’s participants explicitly identified 
the consciousness that she was “getting inured to the goriness […] and toughening up” 
(‘Audience’:110) as one of the pleasures of horror fandom.  
 
Such accounts of horror’s appeal are thematically aligned with venerable philosophical 
theses including Kant’s model of the sublime and Lucretius’ solution to the paradox of 
tragedy. In my later discussion of the topic I will argue that this group of theories serves 
simultaneously to complicate and neaten our relationship to seemingly displeasurable 
aesthetic stimuli – rendering our pain-inflected pleasures more circuitous, more self-
reflexive and thereby defusing any perturbing or paradoxical implications. Although such 
theories are often positioned as an alternative to ‘one stage’ or integrationist accounts, I 
will argue that the control thesis can in fact complement and coexist with the theory that 
horror and related genres are attractive precisely because they excite strong emotions and 
address negative subjects.  
  
3.2 Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing: Identification and Exploitation Horror 
 
In Men, Women and Chainsaws Carol Clover offers a compelling, if at times counter-
intuitive, account of the pleasures that exploitation horror affords the male viewer. 
Mainstream (and particularly feminist) analyses of horror often remain transfixed by the 
genre’s grimy trappings, its butchered women and predatory males,  insisting that audience 
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members’ identification with a sadistic or ‘assaultive’ gaze must therefore be “its cause, its 
effect, its point” (Chainsaws:182) However, Clover argues that sub-genres  like the rape-
revenge or slasher movie, which are typically construed as unambiguously misogynistic, in 
fact serve to engage male viewers’ masochistic fantasies, indulging their (unspeakable and 
thoroughly sublimated) desire to occupy a passive or ‘feminised’ position.  
 
For example, Clover argues that comments Stephen King makes while analyzing the 
success of his debut novel Carrie are inadvertently revealing, affording us a glimpse of this 
implicit substitution in progress:     
 
For me, Carrie White [the novel’s eponymous monster-victim] is a sadly misused teenager, 
an example of the sort of person whose spirit is so often broken for good in that pit of man- 
and woman-eaters that is your normal suburban high school […] and one reason for the 
success of the story in both print and film, I think, lies in this: Carrie’s revenge is 
something that any student who has ever had his gym shorts pulled down in Phys Ed or his 
glasses thumb-rubbed in study hall could approve of” (King, 1993 [1981]:171-172). 
 
Clover notes that “although the ‘his’ [in King’s examples] may in principle refer to the 
universal subject, the ‘any student’ in question here looks a lot like an adolescent boy [with 
the forms of bullying noticeably characteristic of, and limited to,] things boys do to each 
other” (Chainsaws:4). Through some sleight of hand, King’s putative ‘everyperson’ Carrie 
White comes to stand in for every boy. She argues that this unconscious slippage between 
female victim and male audience member suggests an intriguing possibility: the notion that 
“male viewers are quite prepared to identify not just with screen females [but (perhaps 
especially) with] screen females in fear and pain” (Chainsaws:5). Along with some 
proponents of the catharsis-through-clarification model, Clover argues that horror is 
appealing because it speaks to (male) viewers’ innermost “fears and desires [reigniting] the 
residual conflict surrounding those feelings” (Chainsaws:11). 
 
Clover cites the ubiquitous ‘Final Girl’42 survivor of slasher movies as evidence of this 
persistent cross-gender identification. Clover argues that the Final Girl is archetypically 
                                                 
42
 So called because she is the lone/last survivor of the villain’s murderous attentions.  
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“boyish” (Chainsaws:40), an interstitial, boundary-straddling figure, who eschews the 
pneumatic, over-the-top femininity of her (soon-to-be-felled) friends and so escapes their 
fate . Her gender is “compromised from the outset” (Chainsaws:48) and,  owing to her 
possession of certain qualities – such as “smartness, gravity […] sexual reluctance […and 
ability to fight with the killer] energetically and convincingly” (Chainsaws:40) – she is 
implicitly allied with “the very boys she fears or rejects, not to speak of the killer himself” 
(Chainsaws:40). Indeed, as Clover points out, the Final Girl’s very name is often gender-
ambiguous, citing a list of prominent examples of this trend: “Stevie, Marti, Terry, Laurie, 
Stretch, Will, Joey, Max” (Chainsaws:40). Equally, her unladylike assumption of the 
interrogative gaze – a function often reserved for male heroes in traditional horror 
narratives – further signals her androgynous status. 
 
Many theorists critical of the horror genre argue that filmmakers’s frequent use of the “I-
camera” (Chainsaws:45) (which allows viewers to see events through the villain’s eyes) 
forces audience members to identify with the killer, implying that the pleasures of such 
films must therefore reside in their ability to provide viewers with the vicarious experience 
of terrorizing and murdering women. Clover argues that this leap in reasoning is far more 
problematic than it might first appear; in fact, she asserts, “the relationship between camera 
point of view and the processes of viewer identification [are] poorly understood” 
(Chainsaws:45), and it is common for filmmakers to deploy I-camera shots even under 
circumstances in which viewers are highly unlikely to empathise with  the point of view 
represented. For example, Steven Spielberg “stage[s] an attack in Jaws from the shark’s 
point of view […while Hitchcock presents] an attack in The Birds from the bird-eye 
perspective […with] the locus classicus in this connection [being] the view-from-the-coffin 
shot in Carl Th. Dreyer’s Vampyr, in which the I-camera sees through the eyes of a dead 
man” (Chainsaws:45). Such instances suggest either that viewers’ identificatory capacity is 
improbably elastic, or, more realistically, that “point-of-view shots can sometimes be pro 
forma” (Chainsaws:45). Even if one uncritically accepts this conflation of point of view 
shots with ‘intended’ identification, Clover notes that we tend only to be linked to the killer 
in this manner early on in the film. By the latter stages “our closeness to him wanes as our 
closeness to the Final Girl waxes” (Chainsaws:45). By the end, viewers are firmly aligned 
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with victim-hero rather than villain, viewing the killer through her eyes, cowering with her 
in her hiding space while he attempts to find her.  
  
Clover’s (and others’) observation of audience responses seems to bear out this textual 
reading. Observers collectively attest to the ability of the “‘live’ audience to switch 
sympathies in midstream” (Chainsaws:46), readily alternating between cheering on the 
killer and his victims, empathizing now with predator and now with prey.  
 
While the films she analyses encourage the viewer to occupy “a variety of positions and 
character sympathies” (Chainsaws:8) in their preliminary stages,  the viewpoint of the 
victim-hero prevails during the climactic phase. As Clover points out, the slasher films she 
analyses are typically bereft of any focal male characters with whom viewers could 
realistically identify; “on the good side, the only viable candidates are the boyfriends or 
schoolmates of the girls [who tend for the most part to be] marginal, undeveloped 
characters [who] die early in the film” (Chainsaws:44). Meanwhile, the rarely-glimpsed 
killers present similarly uncongenial targets for viewer-identification. Even “when we 
finally get a good look [at these masked, shambling and wheezing figures, they] hardly 
invite immediate or conscious empathy” (Chainsaws:44) or admiration. In contrast, the 
Final Girl is introduced at or near the beginning of the story, and the initially multi-
perspectival narrative coalesces decisively around her viewpoint by the film’s end-game. 
She is “intelligent, watchful and levelheaded […] the only one whose perspective 
approaches our own privileged understanding of the situation” (Chainsaws:44)  Because of 
the ways in which her experience duplicates the viewers’ own – her vigilance, her active, 
inquisitive ‘gaze’, her superior knowledge in contrast to other characters – she must be 
considered the “undisputed ‘I’”(Chainsaws:43) of the slasher genre. 
 
The victim-identified nature of slasher and rape-revenge movies belies the frequently-
levelled charge that they serve as misogynistic fantasies. Clover argues that there is 
something suspicious, something obfuscatory, about mainstream critics’ refusal to 
countenance the possibility that a mostly male audience could identify with a female 
victim, suggesting that this reticence is in itself “evidence that something crucial to the 
112 
 
system of cultural representation is at stake” (Chainsaws:227). The notion that horror is 
pleasurable because it caters to male sadism is more consonant with mainstream gender 
roles – and therefore, in an important sense, more palatable – than the suggestion that, as 
Clover asserts, that which masquerades as “male-on-female violence […might in reality be 
standing in for] male-on-male sex” (Chainsaws:52).  
 
Clover also challenges the view that slasher narratives are pleasurable insofar as they act as 
a form of misogynist wish-fulfillment by suggesting alternative explanations for the 
increased focus on female victims. She emphasises the role that cinematic conventions 
play in perpetuating the ‘femaleness’ of victimhood. Because, (per Laura Mulvey) the 
cinematic gaze is implicitly masculine, “just as that gaze [automatically] ‘knows’ how to 
fetishise the female [but not the male] form” (Chainsaws:50), so it ‘knows’,  in the same 
way, how to depict female but not male terror. Filmmakers are the inheritors of a pre-
established visual shorthand for evoking feminine fear, with a set of cinematic 
customs/clichés we no longer even notice that “simply ‘see’[…and accustom viewers to 
seeing] males and females differently” (Chainsaws:51). 
  
An even more significant contributory factor to this disparity is the “broader [or different] 
range of emotional expression traditionally allowed women […] crying, cowering, 
screaming, fainting trembling [and] begging for mercy belong to the female” 
(Chainsaws:51),  gendered feminine just as displays of overt hostility, anger and strength 
are implicitly coded as masculine. Female characters’ greater lassitude to portray helpless, 
unrestrained fear (without uncomfortably transgressing and upsetting culturally-ingrained 
notions of gender) is responsible for at least part of this pervasive filmic “double standard” 
(Chainsaws:51).  
 
Textual analyses carried out by other theorists support Clover’s hypothesis. In ‘Content 
Trends in Contemporary Horror Films’, Barry Sapolsky and Fred Molitor investigated the 
frequently-levelled charges that slasher or “exploitation” films (Sapolsky & Molitor, 
1996:33) “disproportionately portray vicious attacks on women and tie images of extreme 
violence to scenes of sexual titillation and precoital behaviour” (Sapolski & Molitor, 
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1996:33). During their analysis of 83 films from this sub-genre they found no significant 
differences between the mean number of male versus female victims per film. 
Significantly, they also argued that, contrary to mainstream critiques of the genre, “direct 
acts of sexual aggression are not commonly portrayed in slasher films” (Sapolsky & 
Molitor, 1996:41). Only “between one-sixth and one-third of the murdered females were 
presented in a sexual or erotic situation before or at the time of the attack”, with the three 
content analyses they employed finding that the slasher film’s notorious and allegedly 
constant “juxtapositions of sex and violence” (Sapolsky & Molitor, 1996:41) occurred only 
about one time per film, on average. However, while gender did not affect characters’ 
probability of being victimised, “females were shown in fear significantly longer than were 
males […and] the average number of seconds of threats directed at males was significantly 
shorter than the threats directed at females” (Sapolsky & Molitor, 1996:45). Having 
demonstrated that certain basic and oft-repeated assumptions about the slasher film are 
false, Molitor and Sapolsky hypothesise that these misconceptions live on because “those 
scenes that dwell on the woman’s terror [are more effectively unsettling and] offensive to 
many viewers than are more direct acts of physical violence” (Sapolsky & Molitor, 
1996:46).   
 
At times, Clover’s generally deft analysis of horror characterization and tropes lapses into 
tautology. For example, her broad and textually unsubstantiated assertion that “male 
victims are shown in feminine postures at the moment of their extremity” (Chainsaws:12) 
can only be interpreted to suggest that being prone, terrorised or victimised is in itself 
somehow quintessentially (rather than merely culturally and generically-coded as) 
feminine. In fact, as Sapolsky and Molitor (and Clover herself elsewhere in the text
43
) note 
in their discussion of the sub-genre, although male deaths in the slasher film tend to rival 
female deaths in quantity, there have historically been marked differences in their quality. 
While female victims are almost invariably allowed a moment to appreciate the mortal 
danger they are in, the camera lingering pointedly on their tearstained faces and wide, 
fearful eyes, male characters are often taken completely unawares or killed in a brief, 
                                                 
43
 “The death of a male is nearly always swift; even if the victim grasps what is happening to him, he has no 
time to react or register terror [...] the death of a male is moreover  more likely to be viewed from a distance, 
or viewed only dimly” (Chainsaws:35) or to occur entirely offscreen.  
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anticlimactic struggle
44
. It is as if the camera itself shies away from portraying male 
characters undergoing the kind of protracted, helpless terror and vulnerability through 
which the Final Girl must, by definition, pass and surmount – the “screaming, crying, 
fleeing, cringing and [for the Final Girl’s less fortunate female cohorts] dying” 
(Chainsaws:18) constitutive of the slasher sub-genre.  
 
Clover’s central thesis – that certain types of horror enact a “politics of displacement 
[…with female victims’ mutilated, multiply-penetrated bodies serving as a proxy] through 
which the boy can simultaneously experience [and disavow his] forbidden desires” 
(Chainsaws:18) – requires that this transposition is in fact legible in the texts she analyses. 
While she imputes this overdetermined “one-sex logic” (Chainsaws:16) to horror films 
themselves, arguing that horror is a realm in which gender necessarily “inheres in 
[character functions like victim or villain] – that there is something about the victim 
function that wants manifestation in a female, and something about the monster and hero 
functions that wants expression in a male” (Chainsaws:12), in some cases Clover enforces 
this reading even in the absence of clear textual evidence. As Cherry argues in her critique 
of Clover’s analysis, her insistent assumption that “those who save themselves are 
[incontrovertibly] male” (Chainsaws:59) “leave[s] unquestioned a gender order that 
assigns activity to males and passivity to females” (‘Audience’:47), recreating, rather than 
merely exposing, the stale binary in which “active female desire [and power] can only be 
defined as […] masculinised” (‘Audience’:47). 
 
However, while I would dispute Clover’s central thesis – that certain sub-genres of horror 
are pleasurable for male viewers insofar as they “trade […] in incest” (Chainsaws: 217), 
allowing them to explore their masochistic desire to be “humiliatingly and violently 
penetrated” (Chainsaws:217) or impregnated by a dominant paternal figure – Clover 
makes many valuable and incisive ancillary points that are well-rooted in the texts she 
examines. Her analyses constitute a powerful rebuttal to many frequently-levelled 
criticisms, and assumptions, about the pleasures, of ‘low’ or exploitation horror. In 
                                                 
44
 This trend is notably absent from the video nasties du jour – ‘torture porn’ films including Saw, Hostel and 
(proto/ur-example) Cube, which tend either to terrorise both male and female victims in equal measure or 
even to visit the worst torments on male characters. 
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particular, I would endorse her claims that male viewers are not simply capable of, but 
encouraged to, identify with victimised female characters, that this tendency to identify 
with the Final Girl/victim-hero is the generic norm, rather than the exception, and that the 
frequency with which female rather than male characters are protractedly stalked, 
terrorised and murdered is due primarily to a profound cultural discomfort with male 
expressions of fear and vulnerability.  
 
As Cherry argues, there is much textual evidence to suggest that audience sympathies 
readily cross gender lines, that (the assumed-to-be-predominantly male) viewers’ 
enjoyment is not predicated upon a sadistic identification with the killer, and that while, 
like many genres, horror’s gender politics are imperfect to say the least, it contains notable 
subversive elements.  
    
3.3 David Buckingham on children’s responses to negative content 
 
Like many of the theorists I discussed in the previous two chapters, David Buckingham 
argues that the dominant effects research model is fatally limited, not just by the “many 
inadequacies” (Moving:5) of methodology and analysis identified by effects sceptics, but 
by its narrowness of focus, its fixation with one sort of effect. He suggests that the 
“concern with imitative behavioural effects which has dominated the debate [about the 
moral status of violent media] for so long has proven to be profoundly unproductive” 
(Moving:8). In Moving Images, Buckingham adopts a different angle of approach, 
investigating the emotional impact of media depicting violence (and other negative 
content) on children, addressing how the painful responses elicited by such narratives – 
fictional and factual – are often inextricably entangled with their pleasures. He also 
examines the ways in which “‘negative’ emotions may have positive consequences” 
(Moving:2), arguing that children are often drawn to precisely those narratives that most 
effectively dramatise their concerns, “provid[ing] comparatively ‘safe’ opportunities […] 
to learn to cope with them” (Moving:3). 
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Buckingham spoke to both children and their parents throughout 1993-4, initially 
conducting “a series of small, group-focused interviews with a total of 72 children in four 
age groups: 6-7, 9-10, 12-13 and 15-16” (Moving:8). During the first set of interviews, the 
researchers allowed children to steer the conversation, asking open-ended questions about 
“the kind of things they found […] frightening, sad, disgusting and worrying” (Moving:9) 
on video and television, and encouraging them to discuss specific examples in greater 
detail. After this followed a second phase, in which the researchers re-interviewed groups 
of children about particular programmes or genres that had, during the first round of 
interviews, been identified as “rais[ing] interesting questions about [children’s 
understanding of] the relationship between television and reality” (Moving:9). While 
conducting these more focused interviews with the children, the researchers also 
interviewed a (demographically-balanced/representative) sample of their parents, asking 
about how they monitored and regulated their children’s access and responses to television.  
 
Although the researchers did not introduce the issue of imitative violence themselves, 
owing to its then-prominence in the news (in connection with the alleged link between 
Child’s Play 3 and the murder of James Bulger) concerns about media violence arose 
frequently. Interestingly, while “parents [interviewed for Buckingham’s research…] 
occasionally expressed the belief that other people’s children might be led to copy what 
they watched, their concerns for their own children were primarily to do with them being 
disturbed or upset” (Moving:6), particularly by factual accounts of violence or distressing 
events. Equally, many of the children to whom he and his co-researcher spoke discussed 
imitative violence only in the context of what younger children might do, displacing 
concerns about the corrupting effects of violent media onto others, “expressing [their] 
concern about such matters [and by so doing,] implicitly positioning themselves as 
somehow immune” (Moving:77). As Buckingham notes, it seems that the dangerous others 
who might fall prey to the moral perils of violent fictions are “by definition, always 
elsewhere” (Moving:78): “ten year olds will say, we aren’t influenced by what we watch: 
it’s only little kids who copy what they see […] and yet, when you talk to those little kids, 
the story is the same” (Moving:80)  Children and parents alike readily admitted that they/ 
their offspring sometimes incorporated things they saw in violent media into their play but 
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emphasized their awareness of the all-important distinction between ‘real’ violence and 
play-fighting.  
 
In stark contrast to the prescriptive account of the pleasures of violent and horrific 
narratives offered by their critics – who posit that viewers must identify with the predator 
rather than his prey in order to engage with and enjoy such narratives – Buckingham found 
that in most cases, far from adopting the “masterful, sadistic ‘male [/monstrous] gaze’”, the 
children to whom he spoke assumed “the position of the victim rather than the ‘monster’” 
(Moving:106). When watching horror films, his subjects identified with “the experience of 
victimization” (Moving:107), instinctively relating the harrowing events onscreen to their 
own bodies, their own lives: “Jenny (15) [reported thinking after watching Hellraiser]  
“imagine if this happened, imagine if your skin got ripped off” (Moving:107)  Equally, 
when children incorporated aspects of violent narratives into their play, (a subject of 
particular concern to many of those opposed to media violence)  play-acted “revenge on 
the monster was often the central aim” (Moving:107).  
 
Despite this uncomfortable identification with onscreen victims, Buckingham stresses the 
paradoxical eagerness with which child viewers engage with frightening or disturbing 
narratives, describing how, “while many of [his subjects] had been scared and given 
nightmares as a result of watching horror, their prime motivation for doing so was clearly 
to do with pleasure” (Moving:112) While, like Cherry, Buckingham notes the role that 
more comprehensibly pleasurable meta-responses clearly play in viewers’ enjoyment of 
violent/horrific narratives, he also observes that, in many instances, a film’s scariness was 
”seen to be synonymous with [its] pleasure[s]” (Moving:112). For example, his subjects 
repeatedly expressed the desire to revisit precisely those parts of films and television 
programmes that had frightened them most: “many children claimed to have seen favourite 
horror films ‘over and over again’; while others described how they would use the video to 
fast-forward to the ‘best bits’ – that is, the scary bits – or to watch those parts again” 
(Moving:113). As Buckingham points out, part of this compulsion to repeat that which was 
once experienced as frightening,  even traumatic, can be attributed to the desire for mastery 
– increased familiarity dulling the feelings that were at first unbearably intense. However, 
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while the desire for pleasurable meta-responses (i.e. feelings of bravery, generic-
competence and maturity) clearly played a role in the children’s desire to engage with 
horrific narratives – with many of Buckingham’s participants describing how they learnt to 
cope with negative emotions and conquer their fear through repeat viewing – ineffectual 
horror films that failed to inspire an appropriate amount of fear were also experienced as 
lacklustre and “frustrating” (Moving:115). As Buckingham points out, even for avowed 
fans of the genre, “the pleasure[s] [of horror were] seen to be inextricably tied up with the 
possibility of pain” (Moving:115), with viewers always experiencing some measure of 
cognitive and affective ambivalence.  
 
For example, numerous subjects recounted how they were able to manage their fear while 
viewing a frightening film or programme by employing a coping strategy Buckingham 
refers to as ‘modality judgements’, consciously reminding themselves of the unreality and 
improbability of the events depicted. However, among Buckingham’s subjects “the 
experience of fear […] frequently appear[ed] to intensify” (Moving:104) after viewing, 
with many participants describing how they acquired “bizarre” (Moving:104) quasi-phobic 
avoidant behaviours in response to things they had seen on television or video despite their 
awareness of their fictive nature: “as Angela said , in relation to her fears of walking over 
drains [after viewing the film IT, in which an evil, sewer-dwelling clown menaces and 
devours children] ‘I know that it’s not real but at the back of my mind I think I may as well 
not chance it’” (Moving:106). Buckingham suggests that horror often works by exploiting 
this chink of uncertainty. What frightened the subjects to whom he spoke was not the 
thought that “’they’ will actually come out of the television and ambush [viewers]” 
(Moving:106) – nothing so affirmative – but a lingering, paradoxical “doubt” (Moving:106) 
that somehow coexists with their knowledge that such things are impossible.  
 
As I discuss in the fourth chapter, it is arguable that any emotional engagement with fiction 
implies some degree of cognitive dissonance. Just as optical illusions are generated by 
certain inbuilt biases of human perception and cognition, fictional narratives seem to act as 
a kind of emotional trompe l’oeil; we often respond to fictions as if we are reading about 
(or watching) real, if geographically/temporally distant, events, with narratives that we 
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know to be entirely false nonetheless serving to compel our attention and emotional 
engagement if they are sufficiently vivid and well-executed.  
 
Buckingham likens this contradictory epistemological stance to Noël Carroll’s ‘thought 
theory’ (formulated in response to the paradox of fiction). Just as, in Carroll’s view, 
emotional responses to horror fictions do not require that “we ever give up our belief that 
the monster is fictional” (Moving:106), but only that we entertain the thought of what 
might happen if they were (and how we would feel about it), Buckingham attributes 
viewers’ fear to “a general doubt about the supernatural” (Moving:106).  
 
This cognitive dissonance is complemented by an equally “fundamental [affective] 
ambivalence” (Moving:115) Participants reported feeling compelled to view/re-view horror 
films or programmes, attraction and fascination mingling with fear and even repulsion:  
 
Stella described a scene from The Fog  [as] ‘disgusting’, even though she had seen it 
several times: ‘I just had to, I didn’t want to go back and watch it, but I wanted to see it 
again, so I just went and watched it’. Likewise, Jane (15) said of horror films in general: 
‘They all scare me. I don’t like them, they scare me too much. I like to watch them though’ 
(Moving:115).  
 
Significantly, Buckingham’s research seems to contradict one persuasive and influential 
hypothesis as to why many of us derive pleasure from engaging with distressing narratives 
– the clarificationist model of catharsis. It is often postulated that tragedy and other 
similarly ‘paradoxical’ genres may be experienced as gratifying, despite their apparently 
displeasurable content, because they offer either a just resolution or some degree of 
narrative “closure” (Moving:115) (however bleak) that is unavailable in real life. However, 
he notes, while many children attributed their compulsion to continue viewing to a desire 
to know the outcome of the story, a surprising proportion of them in fact “appeared to be 
unable to recall the endings of films, even when they had described the films themselves in 
considerable detail” (Moving:115). While the most frightening, macabre and transgressive 
scenes from favoured horror films retain something of their original charge, lingering in 
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the memory due to their residual capacity to evoke a thrill of fear or disgust, it seems that 
happy endings do not make a similar impression.  
 
For this reason, Buckingham suggests that “much of the appeal of horror must surely lie 
not only in the pleasure of watching evil destroyed or controlled, but also in watching it 
triumph” (Moving:116). Although, as I discuss in my concluding chapter, this is a 
reasonable contention, and certainly represents a valid interpretation of his subjects’ 
remarks, I would argue that this phenomenon also reflects an important facet of the 
psychology of storytelling. While ambiguous, unresolved or otherwise unsatisfying 
narratives pluck at the imagination, seeming to demand some sort of redress, in an 
important sense the very aspect of happy (or at least narratively ‘tidy’) endings that renders 
them satiating also often ensures that they do not snare in the memory – too smooth, too 
completed, to retain our attention for long
45
.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As I will argue in greater depth in my penultimate chapter (‘The Problem with Pleasure’), 
genres such as horror and tragedy intrinsically pose a challenge to  commonly-held 
theories about why we engage with and enjoy fictional narratives, in addition to 
problematising otherwise reasonable assumptions about our desires and emotional 
responses. The divided or ambivalent character of these genres’ pleasures, the 
contradictory desires they evoke (we both do, and do not, want Desdemona or Marilyn 
Crane to die, our sense of narrative necessity or logic warring with our attachment to 
fictional characters), our simultaneous knowledge of a narrative’s unreality with our 
emotional ‘knowledge’ that its outcome matters deeply to us, all contribute to a perturbing 
sense of paradoxicality, of estrangement from our own motivations and affective 
responses. 
 
                                                 
45
 Perhaps relatedly, many of Buckingham’s subjects reported that they found horror novels more effectively, 
and lastingly, frightening than films “precisely because the books were less explicit, and hence left more to 
the imagination” (Moving:106)  
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The theorists whose work I discussed in this last section offer nuanced accounts of the 
pleasures of horror, acknowledging the contrarieties at the heart of our experiences with 
such genres. As Cherry, Clover and Buckingham argue, we evince a counter-intuitive 
attraction to what might be termed confrontational narratives: we are drawn to fictions that 
dramatise our worst fears, our uncomfortable certainties, our most shameful, conflicted 
desires. Just as Cherry’s subjects emphasise the role that fascination or ‘morbid curiosity’ 
plays in their affection for the genre, so Clover’s male viewers are attracted and repulsed in 
equal measure by the encoded representations of their fearful fantasies (or rather, by 
depictions of the unrestrained emotionality and passivity that they usually disavow), and 
Buckingham’s child participants are driven to re-view and re-enact precisely those scenes 
that most terrified them. I would argue that genres, like horror, that specialise in arousing 
traditionally-aversive feelings and depicting negative content thrive despite their genuinely 
unpleasant aspects  because they fulfil the telos central to all storytelling – compelling our 
curiosity and emotional engagement.  
 
122 
 
Chapter 4: Special Affects 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous three chapters I investigated how horror and similarly low-brow narrative 
genres with aversive content remain culturally reviled, a perpetual source of societal 
concern and disparagement, despite the lack of any compelling evidence that they really 
serve to deprave and corrupt the populace. I argued that such genres are so often viewed as 
morally dubious because of the ways in which they are philosophically problematic, the 
occasion of “unaccountable [and therefore alarming] pleasure[s]” (Hume, 2004 [1742]:25), 
and suggested that these genres’ alleged paradoxicality is, in actuality, the artefact of  a 
particular model of narrative pleasure. These chapters were broadly empirical in nature, 
dedicated to exposing how certain misconceptions about fictions’ allure generate (and 
sustain) the alarm that surrounds violent and/or negative genres despite the paucity of 
evidence that such narratives are criminogenic or morally corrosive. Having deconstructed 
the prevailing model of horror’s appeal throughout the previous sections I will now begin 
to assemble an alternative account, laying the theoretical foundations for my own theory.  
 
Philosophical solutions to the alleged paradox posed by genres such as horror and tragedy 
often seek to dispel their problematic implications by emphasising the ways in which our 
interactions with these genres are atypical, strictly insulated from our responses to real life 
tragedies and horrors. So, for example, Robert Solomon suggests that we can enjoy art-
horror “precisely because it is not [authentic] horror [...which axiomatically precludes] the 
very possibility of pleasure” (Solomon, 2003:234), while Susan Feagin and many 
proponents of the Lucretian return argue that fictional tragedies please because they afford 
us gratifying meta-responses about our comparative status or moral character that are 
unavailable to us in everyday life.  
 
In contrast to such theories I will highlight  the commonalities between our affective 
engagement with fictional and  factual narratives, the suggestive overlap between the 
‘rules’ for creating compelling fictions and compelling news stories, memoirs and 
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documentaries. I will argue that we seek out stories with distressing subject matter because 
of the ways in which our emotional responses to known fictions mimic our responses to 
factual accounts, postulating that fabricated narratives work by exploiting our desire to 
keep abreast of certain kinds of information. In order to assert this position, it is necessary 
to explain how my theory fits into prevailing philosophical theories of the emotions, and to 
defend it against obvious objections. Many cognitivist-inflected responses to the paradox 
of fiction categorically reject the notion that we can experience genuine affective responses 
to known fictions, and while others contend that fictions may prompt emotional reactions 
they rationalise such responses by arguing that, despite appearances, these emotions are not 
directed at fictional characters or events but at some hypothetical real-world analogue. I 
will reject such answers to the paradox, and argue that traditional cognitivist models have 
been superseded by recent accounts of the emotions which build on judgement theorists’ 
insights while accommodating the discoveries of researchers such as Ekman, Zajonc and 
LeDoux.  
 
In this chapter I will discuss two competing theories of the emotions: the first, known as 
cognitivism, conceives of emotions as judgements, rational (if not always conscious) 
evaluations that necessarily engage our desires, beliefs and values. The second, held by 
theorists such as Robinson and Prinz, retains the judgmentalist claim that emotions act as 
some sort of (provisional and pre-reflective) appraisal of significance rather than 
representing mindless feelings, while denying that they necessitate belief or constitute 
judgements as such. They also emphasise the primacy of affect and the centrality of 
patterned physiological changes in our experience of the emotions. 
 
I will first discuss the theories of two prominent cognitivists, Robert Solomon (The 
Passions) and Martha Nussbaum (Upheavals of Thought), summarising their views of how 
our emotional evaluations function. I will next look at the implications this view of the 
emotions has when considering our emotional responses to fictions, arguing that, while the 
theories of many avowed cognitivists explicitly make room for fictive emotions, their 
putative paradoxicality is nonetheless contingent upon the (often implicitly assumed, rather 
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than theoretically-justified) equation of emotions with judgements/beliefs. I will delineate 
four major problems with the cognitivist model.  
  
Proponents of the cognitivist model often appeal to folk-psychological observations about 
human behaviour or invoke our subjective experience of various emotional states in order 
to persuade us that emotions are more than irrational, semantically-empty bodily 
perturbations. However, while such arguments successfully discredit this reductive view 
and lend the judgement theory a certain intuitive plausibility, cognitivism’s reliance upon 
this form of argumentation renders it vulnerable to objections drawn from the same pool of 
knowledge-by-acquaintance. I will first discuss the various ‘armchair’ objections to the 
cognitivist model, arguing that, while cognitivism succeeds in sketching a broadly accurate 
outline of our consciously-accessible emotional experience, there are nonetheless a 
plethora of needling counter-examples that illustrate the sometime separability or non-
identity of our evaluations and emotions and the divergence between our conscious and 
affective appraisals in many circumstances.  
 
I will next criticise cognitivism’s concerted minimisation of the embodied aspect of 
emotional experience, and its implications, discussing thought experiments by ‘feeling’ 
theorists such as William James, research by those who posit that different emotions 
exhibit distinct patterns of physiological activity and, most significantly, the work of Paul 
Ekman, who identifies “universal facial expressions” (Deeper:33) that recur across 
cultures.  
 
Thirdly, I will address the empirical research undertaken by psychologists and 
neuroscientists such as Robert Zajonc and Joseph LeDoux which indicates that the sort of 
appraisals that initiate emotional episodes occur “prior to and independently of any 
cognitive evaluation” (Deeper:42). Experiments devised by these researchers studying 
various emotion-related phenomena suggest that affect actually antecedes cognition. 
Theorists like Robinson and Prinz argue that this corpus of research, and its demonstration 
of the important differences between judgements and affective appraisals, in fact elucidates 
exactly why the emotions are so crucial to human survival and flourishing.  
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Finally I will discuss research that supports the facial feedback hypothesis i.e. the claim 
that one can induce a particular emotional response in subjects by manipulating their facial 
musculature into the configuration associated with the desired state. If such research is 
correct, this phenomenon holds perhaps the most damaging implications of all for the 
judgement model, since it appears to demonstrate that emotion can be manufactured in the 
absence of any evaluations – that the physiological changes previously thought to be the 
result or byproduct of our cognitive judgements are, in some circumstances at least, 
sufficient cause for an affective appraisal to be made. 
    
After advancing these objections to the judgement model, I will explain why the embodied 
appraisal theory promoted by Robinson and Prinz not only has the potential to defuse the 
paradox of fiction (or rather, since according to this model our emotional responses do not 
inherently involve belief, illustrates that no contradiction is entailed in the first place), but 
offers important insights into the nature of our emotional engagement with fictions with 
aversive subject matter. 
 
4.1.1 Emotions as Acts: Solomon’s The Passions  
 
Cognitive or judgement theories of emotion are predicated upon a rejection of any 
reductive identification of emotions with mere feelings or physiological symptoms, instead 
positioning them as judgements, inherently valenced evaluations of aspects of one’s 
environment salient to one’s wellbeing. While proponents of the cognitive theory differ in 
the details of their criteria for what constitutes such judgements, the central features remain 
relatively constant: emotions possess an inherent ‘aboutness’. If I am angry it is in 
response to a particularly aggravating stimulus, not due to some ineffable internal tempest.  
 
Cognitivist theories of emotion are attractive for several reasons. They present emotions as 
intelligent responses to our environment rather than blind internal forces. Emotions arise in 
response to, and encompass beliefs about, intentional objects, objects which I take to be in 
some way relevant to my personal flourishing. Unlike behaviourist views which identify 
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emotions with action-tendencies, the judgement theory is capable of distinguishing 
between fine gradations of emotion (as in Jenefer Robinson’s example, the related 
sensations of “shame and embarrassment” (Deeper:6)) that may appear externally 
identical, and they recognise the significance of internal motivations/subjective experience 
– for example, diligently caring for a loved one versus diligently caring for someone to 
whom one is indifferent out of duty. Furthermore, they account for the way in which we 
expect emotions to be responsive to new evidence. My anger at what I perceive to be an 
offensive comment dissipates if it emerges that I misheard a perfectly innocuous remark – 
if it does not many would say my anger was unwarranted and irrational, suggesting that the 
passions are not entirely orthogonal to reason. Emotions are thus tacitly considered to be 
within the realm of argument, distinct from unthinking physical phenomena: one “would 
not try to argue someone out of a twinge, a pain, or an accelerated heart-rate” (Deeper:12). 
Most importantly, cognitivist theories recognise and justify the centrality of the passions in 
our lives – because emotions constitute evaluations they are ideologically eloquent and 
ethically important insofar as they reflect, and even disclose to us, our most foundational 
goals and values. 
 
Central to Solomon's version of cognitivism is the assertion that emotions are intentional, 
and, in some sense, rational, evaluations concerning "our selves and our place in the world" 
(Passions:187). Emotions constitute judgements, appraisals of how their objects impinge 
upon one's interests and desires, one's sense of self. They interpret and structure our 
experience, imbuing the otherwise drab facts of "anonymous and scientifically 
ascertainable Reality" with personal significance, rendering them vivid. These affective 
appraisals are constitutive of each individual's personal 'surreality', and as such are 
inherently self-involved and partial – the "Self is an essential pole of emotional judgement" 
(Passions:189). In fact, Solomon goes so far as to state that "the ultimate object of our 
emotional judgement is always our own sense of personal dignity and self esteem" 
(Passions:190). Emotions both embody, and are formed within the context of, a dense 
evaluative framework; they are performative, ideological, daily acts of self-creation. My 
anger asserts that within my system of values such-and-such is unacceptable, that I, or 
another, have in fact been wronged. Furthermore, it is inherently motivating. Within most 
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emotions lie action-tendencies, demands for specific actions that logically follow from 
one’s affective evaluation. Anger is “essentially a judgement of condemnation, setting up a 
judicial mythology in which one is both judge and jury” (Passions:215), a judgement to 
which the demand for retribution is implicit. 
 
According to Solomon, emotions are not happenings but self-constitutive acts – contrary to 
the traditional view whereby during an emotional episode our ‘higher’ rational side is 
assailed (as if from without) by blind [and] stupid forces” (Passions:87), Solomon argues 
that we are in a crucial sense “responsible” (Passions:133), culpable, for our emotions. As 
judgements (albeit heated and pre-reflective ones) our emotions can be categorised as well- 
or ill-founded, apposite or unfair. For this reason, Solomon rejects what he terms the 
“Myth of the Passions” (Passions:132) – the notion that our emotions simply represent 
unpredictable and uncontrollable bodily perturbations, “secretions of the autonomic 
nervous system” (Passions:131). Solomon argues that this common view of the emotions 
amounts to a “strategic confusion of cause and effect” (Passions:130): we mistakenly 
identify the involuntary “feelings and flushings” (Passions:131) that herald, and are caused 
by, an affective evaluation with the emotion itself. It is because the judgements that 
precipitate our physical turmoil are often “undeliberated, unarticulated, and unreflective” 
(Passions:131) that they appear to us as pre-established facts, imposed upon us rather than 
being the result of any volitional activity. He argues that that this belief serves as a means 
of absolving ourselves from assuming responsibility, conveniently preventing us from 
recognising that “we make ourselves angry, make ourselves depressed, make ourselves fall 
in love” (Passions:132). Indeed, Solomon asserts that “there is no Reality so degrading that 
a man cannot mythologise himself as a martyr [...] there is no loss that cannot be used as a 
cause for mourning, a celebration of the transience of happiness [...] no person whom we 
cannot love” (Passions:151). 
 
Solomon argues for a defiantly subjective view of emotions: while he concedes that 
subjectively inaccessible or contingent external factors may make us more likely to 
experience certain emotions or make certain ‘judgements’ – over-ingestion of stimulants 
such as caffeine might predispose me to evaluate minor problems or unintentional slights 
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as outrageous offences – he argues that such causes are not particularly relevant to our 
experience of emotions, the role they play in our personal ‘surreality’. Although, he 
asserts, it may be true that my unusual quickness of temper can be attributed to the 
physiological changes wrought by three cups of coffee, caffeine is not the object of my ire, 
rather, I am annoyed by (what I perceive as) the flagrant malice or incompetence of those I 
encounter. Yet for all his emphasis on the primacy of subjective experience, I would argue 
that Solomon’s theory crucially fails to capture an important aspect of our emotional lives. 
Solomon’s determination to interpret emotions as acts, his Sartrean insistence that external 
circumstances cannot compel us to any emotional ‘conclusion’ belies the sense most of us 
have at times of being passive before, or surprised by, our emotional reactions. In the same 
way that we can – paradoxically but not unintelligibly – experience our bodies as 
something other, some obtuse and frustrating appendage to which we are irremediably 
anchored, we can, without rejecting the insights of the judgement theorists, sometimes 
experience our emotions as unpredictable and counter-productive impositions, the result of 
shadowy and ungovernable subterranean forces. While, as Solomon argues, the appraisals 
such emotions reflect do not originate from outside the self neither are they precisely 
within our conscious control, and they are certainly not always amenable to rational 
correction or adjustments. If Solomon’s version of cognitivism is notable for its depiction 
of the passions as being, in some sense, volitional, creations or affirmations of self, the 
next theory I will discuss shares this view of the emotions as being ideological, while 
highlighting the ways in which they disturb and subvert the apparently stable patterns of 
our ‘rational’ thoughts and judgements. 
 
4.1.2 Emotion as an ‘Assent to an Appearance’: Nussbaum’s Neo-Stoic Model 
 
In Upheavals of Thought, Martha Nussbaum describes emotions as “intelligent responses 
to the perception of value” (Upheavals:1), eudaimonistic judgements which by their nature 
“ascribe to things and persons outside the person’s own control great importance for that 
person’s own flourishing” (Upheavals:4). Like Solomon, she perceives the emotions as 
inherently self-involved and partial. My grief does not simply assert the tragedy of a loved 
one dying, but of my loved one in particular. “Even when [my emotions] are concerned 
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with events that take place at a distance, or events in the past [or, even more pertinently, 
fictional events]” it is because I have managed to implicate these events in my own 
“scheme of ends and goals” (Upheavals:31), investing them with the sense of personal 
significance and urgency necessary to elicit emotion. 
 
Nussbaum acknowledges the apparent incongruity of describing emotions as judgements, 
which we tend to envision as coolly deliberate and self-reflexive calculations. Indeed, she 
accords the emotions great ethical importance precisely because of their propensity to 
surprise and besiege us, to make us feel invaded by the world: emotions act as ‘upheavals 
of thought’, making us aware of the ways in which our flourishing, our very existence, is 
conditioned by unpredictable and often uncontrollable external objects and agents. 
Nussbaum argues that the emotions – and their prompting of this recognition of our frailty, 
our vulnerability to chance and reversal – act as a salutary check to our (misguided) 
aspirations to Stoical self-sufficiency and imperviousness. My emotional response to an 
object or situation is predicated upon the (not necessarily consciously accessible) belief 
that certain externalities are in some way relevant to my scheme of goals and values, that 
such objects have the power to either help me to attain, or dislodge me from, a state of 
eudaimonia.  
 
In contrast to Solomon’s strikingly existentialist account – in which he argues that our 
emotions serve as everyday acts of self-fashioning, that, in a crucial sense, we choose to 
respond to situations in a fearful or loving or wrathful way and can be held culpable for our 
choices – Nussbaum holds that our sense of at times being assailed by our emotions, our 
feelings of helplessness or passivity before their tumultuous onslaught, is far from being in 
bad faith. Although the emotions are, in Nussbaum’s view, intelligent and discriminating, 
the ‘judgements’ they represent can and do contradict our reasoned evaluations of a 
situation or object’s significance, can be based upon  beliefs we no longer consciously hold 
and reflect archaic or conflicting values. Our emotional responses often stem from the 
“evaluative beliefs that we lay down in childhood, frequently in connection with 
attachment relations of deep intensity” (Upheavals:36), explaining both their intractability 
and their ability to contradict our reasoned evaluations of a situation. Indeed their ethical 
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importance derives from their power to surprise us, urging us to confront our “neediness 
before the world” (Upheavals:90), and compromising the self-protective (but ultimately 
pernicious) ambition to close ourselves off from the vulnerability of being attached to, and 
affected by, external objects. So, while one might, like Proust’s Marcel when 
contemplating his relationship with Albertine, complacently conclude that a loved one is 
easily replaceable, the unexpected and devastating pain one experiences upon their 
departure represents a deeper recognition of their indispensability and vital importance to 
one’s life. 
 
Nonetheless, like Solomon, Nussbaum also views the emotions as being in some sense 
voluntaristic and self-defining, actions or processes over which we have a measure of 
control rather than passive states: according to the Stoics, on whose theory of the emotions 
Nussbaum’s is closely modelled, a judgement represents an “assent to an appearance [my 
italics]” (Upheavals:37). The emotions evidence and embody our implicit recognition of 
the ways in which our wellbeing hinges upon external objects, therefore, Nussbaum 
argues, “the acceptance of such propositions says something about the person 
[experiencing the emotion]: that she allows herself and her good to depend upon things 
beyond her control. That she acknowledges a certain passivity before the world” 
(Upheavals:43). Emotions are our weakness and our strength, both “record[ing] that sense 
of vulnerability and imperfect control” (Upheavals:43) central to being human, and by 
doing so imbuing our lives with richness and significance. 
 
It is clear that the main claim of the judgement theory – that emotions represent not 
“unthinking [bodily] movements” (Upheavals:35) or “objectless feelings of pain or 
pleasure” (Upheavals:35) but some form of appraisal, marking or identifying aspects of 
our environment as potentially significant to our flourishing – is essentially valid. 
However, while the advantages of the various formulations of the judgement theory are 
obvious, less glaring are the problems that are nonetheless implicit in this model of the 
emotions. Before assessing these flaws in depth, I will first look at one area of human 
response in which cognitivism notably lacks explanatory power, giving rise to a much-
discussed paradox. 
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4.2 The paradox of fiction (and its relationship to judgementalism) 
 
If one takes the accounts of theorists like Solomon and Nussbaum to be true, it poses 
problems when considering the apparent human propensity to respond emotionally to 
known fictions. If emotions are merely sensations, opaque and unreasoning bodily forces, 
the question of how fictional narratives can inspire certain emotional responses is not 
particularly compelling, since the passions are already held to be unaccountable to any of 
our ‘higher’ faculties. If however, emotions necessarily engage our beliefs, if they indicate 
that an object or situation is significant to me, that it impinges upon my wants and needs, 
my view of the world, our emotional responses to fiction are rendered either illusory or 
perturbingly irrational. The paradox of fiction is inarguably contingent upon a 
judgementalist view of the emotions, generated by the tension between certain assumed 
facts: 
 
1. We experience what seem to be emotions in response to fictional stimuli.  
2. We realise that that portrayed in fictions is not factual.  
3. We can only experience genuine emotions in response to factual, or, at the very least, 
hypothetically possible, events. 
 
Despite the origin of this paradox, it does not follow that all cognitivists deny the 
possibility or coherence of fictive emotions. In fact, cognitivists often defuse the paradox 
by reframing, rather than refuting, proposition number 1: according to such theorists, while 
it is true that fictional narratives evoke genuine emotions in their readers/viewers, the 
objects of our emotions are not the imaginary characters or situations at which they appear 
to be aimed, but their real life analogues. Indeed, Nussbaum accords great value to 
literature (and tragedy in particular) precisely because it “invites spectators [... to] have 
emotions of various types toward the possibilities of their own lives” (Upheavals:241) and 
others’, prompting us to consider “the vulnerability of human beings to reversals and 
sufferings” (Upheavals:240).  
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Others such as Noël Carroll or Peter Lamarque contend that the paradox of fiction only 
arises when one insists upon a “strong cognitivist commitment to belief as the cognitive 
component of an emotional state, [whereas if one subscribes to] weaker cognitive theories 
of emotion that maintain that the cognitive component of an emotional state may be less 
than a belief (a thought imagined rather than asserted, a construal, or a pattern of 
attention)” (Carroll, 2003:521), the conundrum can be dispelled. However, while many 
avowed judgementalists deny that our emotional responses to fictions entail any kind of 
paradox, the arguments of those like Radford and Walton who argue to the contrary are, 
explicitly or implicitly, indebted to cognitivist ideas about the emotions. 
 
4.3.1 Radford on the irrationality, and incorrigibility, of fictive emotions 
 
In ‘How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina?’ Radford assesses, and rejects, 
various postulated explanations as to how it is that we can feel genuine emotions in 
response to fictional situations. Unlike Kendall Walton, Radford does not resolve the 
paradox by denying the reality of fictive emotions; he holds that it is both a “brute fact” 
(‘Karenina’:172) of human psychology that we can be moved by known fictions and that 
this phenomenon is inescapably paradoxical, utterly contradicting our behaviour in other 
contexts. 
 
In order to highlight the peculiarity, the exceptional nature, of our emotional responses to 
(known) fictions, Radford presents readers with a hypothetical scenario in which we “read 
an account of the terrible sufferings of a group of people” (‘Karenina’:170), experiencing 
the appropriate negative affective responses to their plight, only to find out that the account 
is false. Surely, he argues, this newfound knowledge would harden our hearts, our pity 
perhaps curdling into indignation at having been so duped. Equally, Radford argues, if an 
acquaintance regaled us with a harrowing story about his sister then, after enjoying 
witnessing its effects upon us, revealed that the tale was a complete fiction, our sympathy 
would evaporate along with our belief in the story’s events. Typically, then, sorrow 
requires the belief that someone has suffered. 
 
133 
 
Radford’s choice of examples here is somewhat eccentric (a more apt analogy would be 
cases in which we mistakenly conclude that some catastrophe has occurred only to 
discover that we were wrong), since he introduces an unnecessary additional variable – in 
the type of situation he describes, it is not simply a lack of belief that nullifies our pity, but 
also the perception that we have been manipulated. The perceived intention of the 
storyteller, whether he means to beguile or inform us, or humiliate and deceive, is not a 
trivial detail, but is in fact central to our emotional responses – in Radford’s examples the 
narrative to which we thought we were responding is replaced by one in which we star as 
the over-trusting dupe, our sorrow not just extinguished but very probably supplanted by 
anger or shame at being fooled. The cases Radford describes are therefore utterly 
disanalogous to the practice of engaging with known fictions, and do not effectively 
demonstrate his thesis (that our emotional responses to fictions are exceptional and 
unaccountably divergent from our usual emotional behaviours). Just as we might be 
swayed by the persuasive power of a fable, if it is presented as such, while angrily rejecting 
the conclusions to which a carefully manufactured ‘history’ has steered us, we are in fact 
readily capable of responding emotionally to, and even being impelled to action by, similar 
fabricated ‘hard luck’ stories: the kind of miniature composite narratives presented in 
charity advertisements. Such narratives, while false in their particulars, aim at a kind of 
Aristotelian necessity, representing ‘things as they might happen’. Of course, one could 
argue that such narratives derive much of their emotional power from the fact that we 
know very well that they do happen, in the general if not the particulars. But the same is 
arguably true of the stories related by Radford’s plausible liars (depending upon the 
outrageousness of the torments they visit upon their fictive victims) – human suffering 
exists, and it is probable that someone somewhere is undergoing similar difficulties, thus 
the requirement that one must “believe someone suffered” (‘Karenina’:171) is as much met 
in this expanded sense as in the case of the described advertisements. In such cases, then, 
the sense of being manipulated (and, if so, whether to a nefarious or noble end) is 
important to our emotional responses, making the difference as to whether we choose to 
suppress our emotional responses or attend to/allow ourselves to experience them. 
(Curiously, this seems to apply to fictional narratives too: one can become disgruntled by 
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narratives whose authorial manipulations are too overt or intrusive, obviously intended to 
induce ‘unearned’ or sentimental emotional responses.) 
 
Since Radford concedes that some might view the preceding examples as somewhat 
“handpicked” (‘Karenina’:171), contrived specifically to cast our fictive emotions as 
puzzling and anomalous, he goes on to address our responses to counterfactual scenarios. 
Again moving through a series of examples, Radford strives to demonstrate that, were 
people to respond, in their daily lives, to the hypothetical situations they conjure for 
themselves as they readily do to fictions, we should regard it as excessive, aberrant and 
illogical except in those cases in which the imagined scenario was both personally relevant 
and probable. For instance, if “a mother hears that one of her friend’s children has been 
killed in a street accident” (‘Karenina’:172), her relieved embrace of her own offspring 
when they return home seems to indicate that the death of her friend’s child has not only 
saddened but also frightened her, somehow “bring[ing] home” and “mak[ing] real” 
(‘Karenina’:173) the possibility of her own children’s death by forcing her to imaginatively 
confront it. Radford argues that this scenario is not problematic (and not analogous to our 
responses to fictions), since the mother’s fearful feelings are in response to a realistic, 
although not particularly likely, threat, rather than a fantastical narrative with little 
relevance to her own life. Similarly, if a man (who is himself terrified of travelling by air) 
is provoked to tears when he imagines his sister’s upcoming flight crashing and killing her, 
his sorrowful reaction, while “silly and maudlin” (‘Karenina’:173) is not paradoxical, since 
his admittedly hyperbolic response is due to the fact that (in the moment at least) he 
regards this as a likely scenario. 
 
Radford acknowledges that such cases seem to demonstrate that we routinely respond 
emotionally to anticipated, as well as actual, suffering and death, but crucially, he insists, 
the less likely the outcomes of our imaginary disasters, the less reasonable and sympathetic 
are our responses. Other than in those cases where our conjectures have a reasonable 
chance of coming to pass, we do not tend to weep over imaginary events, and would, he 
argues, view others unfavourably for doing so. Radford’s point here is implicitly 
cognitivist: embedded in his argument is the normative assumption that emotions are, as a 
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general rule, rationally-governed, proportionate and congruent with our beliefs and 
judgements about what is the case. From such a perspective, pronounced emotional 
responses to outlandish and unlikely counterfactuals, (and so, by analogy, to most fictions) 
represent strikingly “divergent behaviour” (‘Karenina’:173), explicable only through 
reference to the exceptional characteristics of the feeling individual – a man who regularly 
moves himself to tears by inventing elaborate and improbable scenarios must be a “sort of 
Walter Mitty, a man whose imagination is so powerful and vivid that, for a moment 
anyway, what he imagines seems real […rendering his tears] intelligible, though not of 
course excusable” (‘Karenina’:173) – or, in the case of fictions, through the anomalousness 
of the situation as a whole. 
 
Having made the case for the peculiarity of our emotional responses to fictions, Radford 
considers the possibility that theorists such as Walton are correct in surmising that such 
stirrings represent something lesser (or different) than our workaday emotions, a new 
category of feeling. While he rejects this solution to the paradox, he discusses the 
experiential differences between our factive and fictive emotions, emphasising how these 
distinctions further mark such responses as anomalous and paradoxical, markedly insulated 
from our real lives and values. For, he asserts, fictive emotions do appear to differ from 
factive emotions in both duration and intensity – while I may appear to be weeping 
inconsolably for Mercutio in his death throes, there is a part of me that stands aside, 
savouring the sublimity of his dying words, and my distress begins to dissipate at the 
falling of the final curtain. 
 
Certainly, we would regard someone who entered a lengthy grieving process every time 
they read of the death of a fictional hero as a self-indulgent sentimentalist (and, conversely, 
view as callous one who shrugged off the death of a real-life friend as quickly and easily as 
that of even a beloved character). However, while the comparative mutedness and 
transience of fictive emotions may indeed distinguish them from our emotional reactions to 
personally significant and proximate events, I would argue that our emotional responses to 
true accounts of historical or physically distant events have something of the same misty, 
faraway, and crucially, often temporally limited, character. If, as cognitivists would have it, 
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any emotional episode represents an urgent, embodied judgement to the effect that the 
object or event to which one is responding is significant to one’s goals, values and 
flourishing, it follows that our emotional responses to those objects that are usually far 
from our experience, with little to no effect upon our personal wellbeing, will often be less 
intense or less long-lived. While there are exceptions, cases in which a documented event 
or situation is so far contrary to one’s values or previous knowledge that it compels a 
significant reorganisation of one’s life and/or worldview involving sustained emotional 
commitment, or cases which, despite first appearances, somehow touch one personally (if, 
for example, an account of the subjugation of Afghan women provokes strong and lasting 
emotions in me partially because I too am a woman, and imagine myself in a similar 
situation), in many cases one’s emotional responses to such true accounts recede markedly 
once one is no longer engaging with them, much in the manner that Radford describes 
happening with fictive  emotions. 
 
In Upheavals of Thought, Martha Nussbaum argues that we are capable of having 
emotional responses to fictions because the simulated proximity to fictional characters that 
narratives entail makes us perceive them as momentarily important to our flourishing. I 
feel sorrow and frustration when Emma Bovary’s stultifying life and romantic delusions 
lead her to commit (an unintentionally grisly) suicide, or fear for Offred when she decides 
to entrust her fate to her possible betrayers because I temporarily take their goals and 
flourishing to be linked to my own. Other problems with Nussbaum’s theory aside, it is 
evident that, as she notes, our emotions tend to ebb after the closure of a narrative 
(although they may well be reawakened if we later contemplate its events in detail or 
read/view the narrative again). Again, while our fictive emotions may well be typically 
weaker or at least less enduring than our emotional responses to personally significant 
events, there are also cases in which fictions can assume deep personal significance or 
move us such a way as to force us to re-examine or even lastingly reorganise our views and 
values. I would argue that in this respect, rather than being exceptional, far removed from 
our emotional responses to non-fictional stimuli – as Radford or Walton would contend – 
our fictive emotions strongly resemble at least some of our factive emotions: those evoked 
by hypothetical scenarios and accounts of (non-personally significant) true events. 
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Radford ultimately concludes that our emotional responses to fictional narratives “though 
very ‘natural’ to us and in that way only too intelligible involve us in inconsistency and so 
incoherence” (‘Karenina’:175). He compares such responses to a dread of oblivion; an 
emotion which is similarly incoherent since there is, quite literally, “nothing to fear” 
(‘Karenina’:175). When one regards the prospect of one’s future non-existence with fear 
one commits a logical error, thinking one could somehow be aware of one’s very lack of 
awareness, conscious of all that one is missing. Radford’s analogy here is, I would argue, 
telling, since it highlights the ways in which the emotions quite productively depart from 
considered judgements. The fear of death that most of us harbour to some degree may, like 
our emotional engagement with fiction, be illogical or incoherent in a sense but it is, more 
importantly, conducive to our survival as individuals and as a species. If one expects 
emotions to behave like conscious evaluations then such phenomena remain problematic, 
baffling in their resistance to facts or counter-arguments. The version of the judgement 
theory upon which theories like Radford and Walton’s are implicitly reliant is inadequate 
in this respect, unable to convincingly account for the experience of emotionally engaging 
with fictional narratives. In order to dissolve the ‘paradox’ of fiction one must therefore 
look to alternative models of emotion. 
 
If one truly views the emotions solely as declarative judgements, assertions with a truth-
value about aspects of my environment that I perceive to be important to my flourishing 
(as both Solomon and Nussbaum do), emotional responses to fiction are rendered 
bewildering or even pathological, explicable only by arguing that when one engages with 
fiction one invariably extrapolates from the particular fiction universal values pertinent to 
oneself, and that it is always these to which one responds emotionally. In fairness, 
Nussbaum’s theory may be applicable in many cases, however as Radford himself points 
out, to argue that when I cry for Anna Karenina I am really crying for the fate of all women 
in her situation and how their tragic fate conflicts with my personal values, elides the 
particularity of my response: I may cry in part for her real-world analogues but the more 
significant bulk of my sadness is for her, the individual character whom I have followed 
through the narrative. In contrast, the theories I will later discuss explain why the capacity 
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to respond emotionally to fictional narratives is adaptively intelligible if not logical in the 
narrower sense. As Patricia Greenspan notes, the ways in which emotions differ from  
evidentially-“warranted” beliefs or judgements is precisely what renders them so 
instrumentally useful (Greenspan, (1988) :6-7). Their unabashed partiality, ability to impel 
us to action and sometimes divergence from our ‘all things considered’ view make them 
adaptively rational. By redefining emotions, moving away from a cognitive view of them 
as either appropriate or mistaken judgements to looking at them as provisional, embodied 
appraisals of significance one can better understand how it is that one can engage 
emotionally with fictions. 
 
4.3.2 Accommodating Irrationality: Walton’s ‘make-believe’ theory 
 
In Kendall Walton’s ‘Fearing Fictions’, he advances the view that our apparent emotional 
responses to fictions in fact represent ‘quasi’ or make-believe emotions. Walton describes 
a case in which, ordinarily, one might be tempted to refer to one’s psychological 
involvement with a fiction in emotional terms: “Charles is watching a horror movie about a 
terrible green slime. He cringes in his seat as the slime oozes slowly but relentlessly over 
the earth, destroying everything in its path. Soon a greasy head emerges from the 
undulating mass, and two beady eyes fix on the camera. The slime, picking up speed, 
oozes on a new course straight towards the viewers.” (‘Fearing’:5) Charles’ ensuing shriek 
and “desperate” (‘Fearing’:5) clutching at his chair may appear to mimic genuine fear, 
Walton argues, but, despite Charles’ shaken testimony to the contrary, he was never really 
frightened. His reaction may, in certain physiological respects, resemble genuine fear, he 
may protest that he was terrified and believe that he is telling the truth, yet Walton 
maintains that in fact “Charles is not really afraid” (‘Fearing’:9). While inducing some of 
the physical symptoms of fear (or pity, or wrath etc), fictions cannot provoke real fright. In 
order to be afraid of the slime, Charles would have to believe that he was actually 
imperilled by it; it is “a principle of common sense [...that fear is necessarily] accompanied 
by, or must involve, a belief that one is in danger” (‘Fearing’:7). 
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Genuine fear is also inherently motivating – rather than being transfixed by the gelatinous 
monstrosity onscreen, if his protestations that he was “really terrified” (‘Fearing’:7) were 
true he would surely run from the room, or at least attempt to warn others of the oozing 
threat to their safety. In Walton’s view, actions speak louder than words, and Charles’ 
placid inactivity in the face of the ostensibly menacing slime overrides any assertions he 
makes about his fear. In the absence of these constitutive beliefs and action tendencies, the 
thrills and fibrillations Charles takes to be full-blown terror amount to a kind of “quasi-
fear” (‘Fearing’:13). Like a child who “flees, screaming, into the next room” (‘Fearing’:13) 
in gleeful terror when his father pretends to be an attacking monster, Charles’ sweaty 
palms and shudders are performative, essentially all part of the fun. By enacting terror, by 
speaking as if he is really frightened of the slime, Charles is participating in his own “game 
of make-believe”(‘Fearing’:13). It is not true but fictional that he fears the slime: like an 
actor portraying himself in some imaginary realm, Charles “generates make-believe truths” 
(‘Fearing’:16) about himself. However, in order for it to be fictional that Charles is afraid it 
is nonetheless necessary for him to undergo some approximation of the physical changes 
that he presents as real fear, to feel “his heart racing [and] his muscles tensed” 
(‘Fearing’:16). This stipulation raises questions. If my ‘fear’ is make-believe or 
performative in any non-trivial/meaningful sense – rather than, as I would suggest, simply 
falling foul of Walton’s question-beggingly stringent normative definition of fear – why, as 
Noël Carroll inquires, should I not simply be able to choose to feel quasi-fear in order to 
enliven a dull viewing experience? Equally, could those who claim to find horror films too 
frightening, or tragedies too upsetting, not take their performances down a notch so as to 
be able to sit comfortably through the rest of the narrative? 
 
Walton claims that while fictions can in fact invoke real emotions, they are distinct from 
the make-believe emotions that take fictional characters or situations as their objects. 
Walton’s argument mirrors those cognitivists who argue that some or all of the apparent 
emotional power of fictional narratives is derivative, the product of our awareness that, 
even if the particular characters and events about which we are reading are false, there are 
similar people and events in real life. If I appear to cry for Anna Karenina, I am really 
crying for those actual women whose predicaments and sufferings happen to resemble 
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hers. Any emotional lustre that fictions possess is essentially borrowed, reflecting the glare 
of our real life preoccupations (although such explanations do not so easily account for our 
responses to utterly fantastic narratives of the sort Charles is watching). However, unlike 
such theorists, Walton does not attribute Charles’ seeming fear in the cinema to the film’s 
evocation of any antecedent terror of real life slimy objects ravaging the world. Any real 
emotions that fictions happen to spark are essentially tangential to Walton’s account. 
Rather than experiencing real (but derivative) terror, Charles is simply not frightened 
according to any usual sense of the word. 
 
Since Walton’s argument hinges, to a large extent, upon certain contested definitions, one 
might well apply to his own theory the criticism he levels at thought-theorists such as Noël 
Carroll: that of circularity. Since, in his view, it is “dangerously presumptive” 
(‘Fictionally’:179) to take Charles at his word, subjective experience cannot serve as any 
form of counter-argument or counter-example: if Charles says that he is indeed afraid his 
protestation “no more establishes that he [really thinks this] than the fact that children 
playing a game of make-believe say ‘There is a monster in the basement!’ shows them to 
believe that a monster is in the basement” (‘Fictionally’:180). While Walton’s reluctance 
to accept Charles as the ultimate arbiter of his own psychological attitudes may be prudent 
(after all, as the studies I discuss later demonstrate, people can and do misinterpret the 
nature or origin of their emotions), it is unclear why Walton should assume that it is 
“pretheoretically more plausible” (‘Fictionally’:179) to assume that every ‘Charles’ is 
inevitably mistaken about his feelings or playing at being afraid than that his own theory of 
the emotions may be too prescriptive if it excludes such cases wholesale. By defining 
emotions in such a way that the feelings aroused by fictions cannot possibly meet the 
criteria for inclusion, Walton is as guilty of question-begging as those theorists who, he 
argues, incautiously assume that such feelings must be emotions, and adjust their theories 
accordingly, without properly interrogating this assumption. 
 
Furthermore, I would argue that at least one of Walton’s justifications for recategorising 
fictive emotions is inconsistent with his explicit appeals to cognitivism. In his view, fictive 
emotions are immediately rendered shadowy and suspect by the elusiveness of their object:  
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“to allow that mere fictions are objects of our psychological attitudes while disallowing the 
possibility of physical interaction severs the normal links between the physical and the 
psychological. What is pity or anger which is never to be acted on? What is love that 
cannot be expressed to its object and is logically or metaphysically incapable of 
consummation?” (‘Fictionally’:177) Walton’s apparent equation here of ‘genuine’ 
emotions with the (at least possible) fulfilment of action-tendencies ill-befits his otherwise 
cognitivist emphasis  on the primacy of belief – one of the main strengths of the judgement 
theory as compared to behaviourist views is, as Robinson argues, its ability to account for 
the distinction we instinctively draw between externally similar but subjectively 
discriminable emotional states, to explain how we can be said to be having or experiencing 
an emotion without it being evident in our outward expressions and behaviour. 
 
Equally, the parameters he sets here for non-paradoxical emotions seem unfeasibly 
restrictive, denying the existence not only of fictive emotions but of emotions evoked by 
any remote or (no longer) existent situation. After all, one can, with varying degrees of 
reasonableness, experience a chill of fear when considering the heat death of the universe, 
feel a surge of pity or indignation upon reading about the activities of the Spanish 
Inquisition, fall in love with dashing historical figures such as a long-dead Lord Byron or 
feel angry with a God in whom one has ceased to believe. To identify emotions with 
action, or the possibility of action, dispenses with all such cases, as well as with our fictive 
emotions. 
 
4.4 Problems with the Judgement Model: Untidy emotions, Facial Feedback and the 
Primacy of Affect 
 
Cognitivists adduce the emotions’ expected responsiveness to new information as evidence 
of the intuitive correctness of their thesis: we at least treat emotions as if they should be 
governed by our rational beliefs and knowledge. However, as Robinson points out, while 
this normative view of the emotions is indeed widely-held, we also understand that the 
reality may depart from this ideal. Without subscribing to the reductive ‘hydraulic’ theory 
of the emotions that Solomon and Nussbaum deride, we know that anger about a certain 
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situation, or directed at one person, can often linger and spill over into the subject’s other 
interactions, that phobias are often better dispelled by gradual desensitisation and 
habituation rather than logical argument, that one can fall in love with someone because 
one perceives him or her to embody certain traits without falling out of love if it becomes 
apparent that he or she no longer possesses these traits (or never did in the first place). I 
would argue that while judgementalism succeeds at sketching a broad outline of our 
emotional responses, there are lingering questions about its predictive power, messy loose 
ends for which it seems unable to account. If the judgement theory acts as a reasonable 
broad-brush description of the emotions it is because, as Jenefer Robinson points out, 
cognitivist analyses  often employ “ the resources of ordinary language and the terms of 
folk psychology” (Deeper:98) in order to arrive at plausible “after-the-fact 
classification[s]” (Deeper:98). Conversely, while much of the empirical research that I will 
later discuss yields utterly counterintuitive results, it sheds light upon those murky recesses 
of emotional experience that still elude the explanatory efforts of the judgement theorists. 
However, I will first discuss the ways in which cognitivism falters even in its generally 
convincing characterisation of our conscious emotional experience.  
  
4.4.1 Recalcitrant Emotion and Fictional Fears 
 
Quasi-cognitivist Patricia Greenspan offers one incisive theoretical objection to the 
standard judgement model, delineating how our emotions seem to depart significantly from 
workaday judgements. She raises the spectre of recalcitrant or ‘outlaw’ emotions – a term 
denoting those instances in which our emotions seem to be at odds with our reasoned 
judgements – presenting us with the example of an agent gripped by a self-consciously 
irrational, yet intractable, phobia of dogs. After being attacked by a vicious dog, this 
individual becomes terrified of all dogs, including those he knows very well to be friendly, 
like placid, “harmless old” Fido (Greenspan, 1993 [1988]:17). Every time he sees Fido he 
experiences “characteristic sensations of agitated discomfort” (Greenspan, 1993 
[1988]:18), his heart beating wildly, gripped by the urge to flee and with thoughts of a 
possible attack clamouring in his head. Contrary to the cognitivist model, this unhappy 
cynophobe does not judge dogs as a species to be dangerous; his behaviour fails to support 
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such a reading since even when Fido approaches others he cares about he feels no urge to 
alert “others to the object of [his] phobic fear” (Greenspan,1993 [1988]:162). 
 
Many cognitivists dismiss as counter-evidence those occasions on which our affective 
evaluations – and sometimes our resulting behaviours – seem to conflict with our 
rational/conscious judgements, framing this phenomenon as the result of “contradictory 
beliefs” (Upheavals:35). Nussbaum likens such emotions to the after-effects of her own 
childhood misapprehension that the U.S. Supreme Court is based in California: “I have 
known for about 45 years that this is a false belief, and yet I still retain the belief in some 
form. I find myself using it to make inferences about how far colleagues will be travelling 
when they go there, and what sort of weather they are likely to encounter” (Upheavals:36). 
Such rationally outgrown beliefs, often deeply ingrained in our infant psyches, can linger 
at an unconscious level, influencing both our emotional responses to those objects that 
engage or ‘activate’ the relevant belief and our resulting behaviours. However, Greenspan 
argues, there are times when our emotions appear to be based on something considerably 
more tentative than judgements, occasions on which – rather than engaging even archaic or 
unconscious beliefs – our emotional responses seem to function more as a kind of construal 
or ‘seeing as if’.  
 
In fact, our ongoing emotional responses to certain kinds of fictions represents one instance 
where the cognitivist equation of emotions with affirmative, rational judgements breaks 
down. As Kendall Walton notes in ‘Fearing Fictionally’ “Jaws caused a lot of people to 
fear sharks” (‘Fictionally’:180), even prompting some people to avoid swimming in the 
ocean (Walton of course distinguishes any genuine fear resulting from exposure to fictional 
narratives such as Jaws from the emotions directly elicited by the narratives themselves, 
which, he assures us, are entirely ‘make believe’). Walton suggests that this newfound fear 
differs from any fright viewers might claim to feel when viewing the film itself since it 
appears to stem from the belief that they might be preyed upon by real sharks like ‘Jaws’, 
rather than believing that they are somehow in danger from the titular shark itself. I would 
dispute his characterisation of such responses as judgements – ‘anthropophagous sharks 
pose a real and significant threat to my safety’ – again arguing that our emotional 
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responses can in some cases act more as a kind of ‘seeing as’, a sensitisation to certain (in 
this case alarming) possibilities of particular objects/environments. As Robinson asserts, it 
may be helpful to think of emotions not as judgements or thoughts directed towards 
propositions but as a way of interacting with our surroundings, “provoked by the 
environment [...] viewed under a particular aspect” (Deeper:19). 
 
Given that many such people report a frisson of fear upon entering – or even avoid 
altogether – any large body of water after viewing Jaws (including entirely 
landlocked/indoor ones such as lakes and swimming pools) it seems unlikely that even an 
illogical or excessive acquired terror of sharks (as they exist in the real world) can always 
be responsible. Rather, it seems more likely that many of those afflicted by such fears 
experience intrusive and qualitatively unpleasant feelings and mental images triggered by 
those aspects of their current environment (a large, possibly murky body of water) that 
evoke the sequences from Jaws that frightened them. The searingly embedded emotional 
memory of these frightening scenes cues them to respond to large bodies of water as if they 
represent a potential threat, initiating the physical changes associated with fear. While the 
lack of any belief that they are really in danger may well allow them to suppress or manage 
this initial fearful response, it could still render the experience of swimming sufficiently 
stressful that they subsequently choose to avoid it, without their modified behaviour 
necessarily being predicated upon the judgement that they are imperilled. In accordance 
with Jenefer Robinson’s thesis that emotions are rarely describable in terms of discrete, 
easily definable states but in fact represent ever-shifting processes, consisting of pre-
cognitive, hair-trigger affective appraisals that are only subsequently monitored and 
modulated, I would suggest that such illogical or unfounded fears can exist in the absence 
of (even unconscious) beliefs. If our emotional responses necessitated belief it might well 
bring them more into conformity with our reasoned judgements about a situation or object, 
but would be considerably less adaptive than the coarse-grained, often over-reactive 
appraisals that in fact initiate an emotional episode. If the threshold of certainty sufficient 
to induce an emotional response were raised, the incidence of irrational ‘false positive’ 
reactions like those of the Jaws-influenced hydrophobes would decrease, but there would 
also be a resulting increase in more devastating ‘false negatives’ – situations that in fact 
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urgently warrant a fearful response, and are time-sensitive enough that rational deliberation 
could prove deleterious. 
 
4.4.2 The Case for Basic Emotions 
 
According to the judgement model, emotions are defined by the evaluative cognitions that 
instigate/instantiate them, rather than any of the accompanying physical upheavals. This 
hypothesis suggests not only that emotions can be expressed in somewhat culturally-
inflected ways or directed towards culturally- and individually-variable material objects 
(claims to which most non-cognitivists would assent) but surely also implies that our basic 
emotional repertoire, attendant physical symptoms and expressions should be amenable to 
the forces of socialisation, emerging in distinct, conventionalised forms determined by our 
particular cultural milieu.  
 
One venerable, non-empirical objection to the judgement model is a thought-experiment 
formulated by William James, an early proponent of the view that “physiological change is 
essential to emotion” (Deeper:28). By way of argument James invites his readers to 
imagine themselves in a state of strong emotion, and then to mentally divest this emotion 
of each of its “characteristic bodily symptoms” (James, 1884:193). He anticipates that 
when we have stripped our imaginary emotions of their physical accoutrements we will 
come to intuit that “there is nothing left behind” (James, 1884:193), that there is no 
defining, intangible “mind stuff” (James, 1884:193) beneath our frowns or shivers or 
laughter. In short, because “emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable 
[my italics]” (James, 1884:194), James argues that the substance, the emotionality, of the 
passions must inhere in what are typically thought of as their mere accompaniments. 
Significantly, James does not seek to deny emotion’s semantic nature – he posits that, in 
the absence of its physical manifestations, anger would amount to no more than a     
“feelingless cognition” (James, 1884:194) that “a certain person or persons merit 
chastisement for their sins” (James, 1884:194) – but maintains that such dispassionate 
judgements cannot in themselves be equated with emotions.  
 
146 
 
Given that cognitivists themselves often seek to command our assent by appealing to our 
intuitions, our conscious experience of emotional states, James’ point here is problematic 
for proponents of the judgement model. Interoception tells us that our blood boils when we 
are angry and runs cold when we are afraid, that different emotional states feel different. 
As James’ thought-experiment suggests, it is near impossible to imagine being gripped by 
a feeling of petrification, despair or exultation while remaining physically cool and 
unruffled. The judgementalist determination to minimise (or elide altogether) the role that 
physiological changes play in our emotions is itself as contrary to human experience as the 
notion that the passions are merely aimless bodily sensations.  
 
Neo-Jamesians build upon James’ compelling, but empirically-ungrounded, assertion of 
the centrality of bodily sensations, positing that the character or “feeling component” 
(Kreibig, 2010:396) of various emotions derives from our perception of the associated 
“pattern[s] of somatovisceral activation” (Kreibig, 2010:396). If, as such theorists argue, 
this hypothesis is borne out by research demonstrating that emotions exhibit distinct 
physiological ‘signatures’, it would serve to undermine the judgement model by illustrating 
that emotions are defined and differentiated by something other than evaluative cognitions. 
Recent reviews of the body of research into emotions’ autonomic profiles suggest that 
there is evidence of “a number of notable differences between emotions” (Kreibig, 
2010:408), with different emotions displaying distinct patterns of effects across various 
dimensions including the cardiovascular, respiratory and electrodermal systems. For 
example, Robert Levenson reports discovering several reliable autonomic differences 
between anger, disgust, fear and sadness during his research into facial feedback, 
summarising his results as follows: “a) anger produces a larger increase in heart rate than 
disgust; b) fear produces a larger increase in heart rate than disgust; c) sadness produces a 
larger increase in heart rate than disgust; and d) anger produces a larger increase in finger 
temperature than fear” (Deeper:31).  
 
However, as Jenefer Robinson points out, while such findings may be promising they are 
also decidedly preliminary. Although the research into autonomic specificity disproves the 
strong counter-position popularised by an early critic of James, Walter Cannon, (according 
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to whom all emotions involve the same, undifferentiated form of bodily arousal), it has yet 
satisfactorily to demonstrate that “each emotion has a uniquely identifying physiological 
profile” (Deeper:31). Notably, even in those reviews which argue that the research 
supports the notion of autonomic specificity, the reported physiological patterns do not 
necessarily align neatly with our existent folk-psychological emotional categories. In her 
analysis, Sylvia D. Kreibig differentiates between “contamination-related” and 
“mutilation-related” (Kreibig, 2010:16) disgust, a sub-categorisation that emerged from the 
fact that data demonstrated that these eliciting-events produce distinct patterns of response 
(for example, “contamination-related disgust is associated with HR [heart rate] 
acceleration” (Kreibig, 2010:403), while mutilation-related disgust “was characterised by 
HR deceleration” (Kreibig, 2010:404).  
 
More encouragingly, during the course of his research into basic emotions Paul Ekman 
claims to have uncovered “robust, consistent evidence of a distinctive, universal facial 
expression for anger, fear, enjoyment, sadness, and disgust [...This evidence ranges from] 
high agreement across literate and pre-literate cultures in the labelling of what these 
expressions signal [to] studies of the actual expression of emotions, both deliberate and 
spontaneous” (Ekman, 1992:175-176). Ekman argues that there are “a number of separate, 
discrete emotional” (Ekman, 1992:170) ‘families’ with accompanying, cross-culturally 
recognisable facial expressions. Members of each of these distinct families share definitive 
“commonalities in expression, in physiological activity [and] in nature of the antecedent 
events which call them forth” (Ekman, 1992:170). While, during the course of their 
research, Ekman and Friesen uncovered over sixty anger expressions, each of these 
individual expressions acted as “variations [on an underlying] theme” (Ekman, 1992:173),  
sharing certain central “configurational (muscular patterns) features” (Ekman, 1992:172) – 
such as lowered brows, raised upper eyelids and tightened lips – that served to reliably 
differentiate them from expressions signalling other emotions.  
 
Ekman’s research undermines the judgement model since it seems to indicate that certain 
physiological changes are spontaneously, rather than merely conventionally, associated 
with certain emotions, that humans are ‘hardwired’ for some kinds of emotional 
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experience. Our emotional repertoires are thus defined, and, to a certain extent, 
constrained, by the ancestral “fundamental life tasks” (Ekman, 1992:169) in response to 
which they evolved.  
 
4.4.3 Bypassing the High Road: When Affect Precedes Cognition 
 
The central cognitivist claim that emotions constitute judgements or propositional attitudes 
is problematised by the fact that evidence increasingly suggests that “there are certain 
emotional states that are inbuilt in human beings [...and other species that] do not appear to 
require cognition” (Deeper:38). For example, LeDoux notes that Neil Schneidermann and 
Phil McCabe’s research into conditioned fear in rabbits demonstrates that “emotional 
responses can occur without the involvement of the higher processing systems of the 
brain” (Emotional:104). These researchers’ leporine subjects were repeatedly played two 
similar tones, only one of which was paired with a shock. After regular exposure to these 
stimuli, “the rabbits eventually only expressed heart rate responses to the sound that had 
been associated with the shock” (Emotional:104), indicating that they had learnt to 
discriminate between the shock-paired and ‘harmless’ tones. However, when the auditory 
cortex was lesioned the subjects began to respond fearfully/with an elevated heart rate to 
both stimuli. This is because the neurons in the thalamic areas that project to the amygdala 
are more “broadly-tuned” (Emotional:104) than those that project to the auditory cortex, 
communicating “essentially the same information” (Emotional:104) in response to similar 
but (cortically-)discriminable sounds.  
 
LeDoux argues that in humans the subcortical paths to the amygdala facilitate the kind of 
rapid, apparently instinctual fearful reactions we experience in response to paradigmatic 
fear elicitors like snakes (and other ancestrally-programmed fears including “sudden 
noises, angry faces, sudden loss of support, creeping bugs, looming objects and total 
darkness” (Prinz, 2003:77). LeDoux suggests that these thalamo-amygdala pathways 
survive not as some vestigial “relic” of our evolutionary forebears but because they confer 
an adaptive benefit. He argues that the “lowly thalamic road” (Emotional:105) acts as a 
“quick and dirty” (Emotional:106) shortcut. Owing to the fact that the thalamo-amygdala 
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pathway bypasses the cortex it is almost twice as fast as the ponderous-but-particular 
cortical route. In other words, its apparently deleterious inability to convey fine distinctions 
is linked to its adaptive utility: because “the information from the thalamus is unfiltered 
and biased towards evoking responses” (Emotional:106-107) it readies us to act quickly in 
ambiguous situations. Inappropriate affective/autonomic responses can be subsequently 
managed and suppressed by the cortex as necessary. 
 
Similarly, Robinson and other critics of judgementalism cite the ‘mere exposure effect’ 
experiments conducted by Zajonc as further evidence of the primacy of affect. These 
experiments appear to demonstrate that subjects “prefer stimuli to which they have been 
exposed more often, even when the stimuli are presented so fast that the subjects cannot 
consciously recognise what they are seeing” (Deeper:39). Zajonc and his colleague Kunst-
Wilson argue that, since subjects evince definite preferences for familiar “objects in the in 
the absence of conscious recognition and with [limited] access to information” 
(Deeper:39), the experiments suggest that we are capable of making affective ‘appraisals’ 
“without extensive participation of the cognitive system” (Deeper:39). Zajonc 
subsequently conducted related experiments designed to study the effects of ‘nonconscious 
affective priming’. In these experiments Zajonc and his colleagues exposed non-Chinese 
speaking subjects to neutral stimuli – various Chinese ideographs – ‘priming’ the 
ideographs by preceding each with either a positive or negative affective picture, such as a 
smiling or frowning face. When these affective primes were exhibited for a suboptimal 
period (i.e. when the duration of exposure was beneath the threshold of conscious 
perception) they “generated significant shifts in subjects’ preferences for the target 
ideographs” (Deeper:41), influencing subjects to prefer those ideographs preceded by 
positive pictures. 
  
I would argue that the cognitivist conception of emotions as judgements is fatally 
undermined by the abundant experimental data demonstrating that affect can antecede 
cognition. Cognitivists like Nussbaum dispute the notion that such research undermines 
their position, maintaining that pre-conscious, rough and ready appraisals of this sort can 
nonetheless be classified as “cognitive” (Upheavals:115) in nature since they involve some 
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rudimentary “processing of information” (Upheavals:115). However, Zajonc rejects such 
attempts to cast these empirically-grounded objections to the judgement model as mere 
semantic quibbling, asserting that  while “cognitions need not be deliberate, rational or 
conscious  [they] must involve some minimum ‘mental work’” (Zajonc,1984:118). As this 
body of research shows, emotional responses can be elicited by essentially raw, unfiltered 
perceptual input, subverting the cognitivist claim that our emotions act as rational and 
even, at some level, volitional judgements, necessarily implicating our deepest beliefs and 
desires.  
  
4.4.4 Facial Feedback  
 
Finally, multiple experiments conducted by researchers including Zajonc and Ekman seem 
to demonstrate that emotions can be induced in the absence of either conscious or 
unconscious judgements simply via the “reconfiguration of [unwitting subjects’] facial 
muscles” (Prinz, 2003:75) into expressions associated with various emotions. For example, 
in one 1988 study conducted by Fritz Strack and Leonard Martin subjects were asked to fill 
out a questionnaire while holding a pen between their lips or teeth. One group of subjects 
were asked to hold the pen between their puckered lips while others held it between their 
teeth with parted lips, “conforming to a sour grimace and a smile-like facial configuration, 
respectively” (Prinz, 2003:75). In one part of the questionnaire the respondents were asked 
to rate the amusement level of comic strips. ‘Smiling’ subjects, or those who were holding 
the pen between their teeth, consistently “rated the comics as more amusing” (Prinz, 
2003:75). A similar experiment conducted by Paul Ekman (1990) suggests that the 
assumption of different emotional facial expressions also results in appropriately 
differentiated patterns of autonomic activity; so, for example, subjects adopting ‘angry’ 
expressions evinced larger increases in finger temperature than those simulating ‘fearful’ 
expressions.   
 
The apparent causal relationship between (unwittingly adopted) facial expressions, 
concomitant physiological changes and self-reported emotional state represents a 
significant threat to the cognitivist model; while cognitivists can engage in post hoc 
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semantic wrangling when presented with evidence of recalcitrant emotions or non-
cognitive emotional responses such as the startle reflex, there seems to be no plausible way 
in which facial feedback can be cast as involving any sort of judgement. Rather, this 
phenomenon seems to indicate that, in some cases at least, our emotional reactions are 
elicited by physiological factors rather than even unconscious or rudimentary appraisals. 
Long promoted by non-cognitivists such as William James, the hypothesis that purely 
physiological changes or manipulations can meaningfully effect our emotional responses 
has clear implications for those cognitivists, like Nussbaum, who seek to minimise or 
negate the role of affect/feelings. 
 
Like the existence of recalcitrant emotions this phenomenon seems to controvert the 
voluntarist and belief-oriented aspects of the judgement theory. Theorists such as Solomon 
and Nussbaum argue that the emotions are not only rational (in the sense of embodying 
intentional, though not necessarily conscious/reflective, responses to our environment) but 
in some sense chosen, at the very least deeply reflective of our personal desires and values. 
If subceptive stimuli and covert physiological manipulations are capable of modifying our 
responses entirely unbeknownst to us, if judgements are utterly superfluous to some types 
of emotion, then cognitivism of the sort espoused by Solomon and Nussbaum cannot be 
valid. 
 
4.5 The Advantages of Embodied Appraisal Theories  
 
While the aforementioned experiments and phenomena render many cognitivist arguments 
problematic, embodied appraisal theorists such as Robinson and Prinz draw upon the 
information yielded by such studies to devise and strengthen their own models of the 
emotions. Both retain one central judgementalist claim, maintaining that the emotions are 
in fact bearers of a semantic content rather than merely constituting empty feelings of pain 
or pleasure, while nonetheless rejecting several of its other important theses.  
 
Prinz criticises cognitive theorists’ failure to account for the ever-burgeoning empirical 
evidence that emotions can exist even in the absence of any judgements. He also condemns 
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non-cognitive theories of the emotions for being ultimately “explanatorily anaemic” (Prinz, 
2003:77), dismally incapable of capturing the ways in which “emotions are meaningful” 
(Prinz, 2003:77). As he asserts, it is evident that the emotions are, as cognitivists would 
have it, “meaningful, reason sensitive and intentional” (Prinz, 2003:78). However, such 
theorists’ emphasis on beliefs and judgements, the conceptual content they assign to the 
most basic of emotional episodes, belies the fact that since some (fairly paradigmatic) 
emotional responses “arise without the intervention of the neocortex” (Prinz, 2003:78) the 
emotions cannot necessitate cognitions of that sort. Like Robinson, Prinz argues that 
emotions act as embodied appraisals, that they are (per James) “internal states that register 
bodily changes” (Prinz, 2003:79), intrinsically both somatic and semantic. Emotions 
“represent” (Prinz, 2003:80) the core relational themes discussed by judgementalists 
without describing them, reliably initiated or ‘tokened’ by the “patterned changes in the 
body” (Prinz, 2003:79) that occur in response to danger, loss, offence etc. The emotions 
are “semantically primitive” (Prinz, 2003:80) in that they predictably herald various kinds 
of “organism-environment relations” (Prinz, 2003:80) without involving concepts or 
judgements.  
 
Robinson’s conception of the emotions also preserves the insights originally attributable to 
judgement theorists such as Solomon and Nussbaum – that emotions are, in a broad sense, 
evaluative, priming us to focus upon and respond appropriately to significant features of 
our environment – while rejecting other of their claims, elaborating an understanding of the 
emotions that is more congruent with the discoveries made by experimenters such as 
LeDoux, Zajonc and Ekman. Like Solomon and Nussbaum, Robinson sees emotions as a 
means of “tun[ing] us in’ […] or ‘turn[ing] us off’” (Passions:132) to significant facets of 
our environments, unlike them, however, she emphasises the processual, ad hoc nature of 
affective evaluations. 
 
In Deeper than Reason, Robinson plots the progression of the physiological and mental 
changes that constitute even the simplest of emotional “episodes” (Deeper:59), a process 
that begins with a “rough and ready” (Deeper:58) precognitive affective appraisal that 
serves chiefly to focus the subject’s attention on potentially significant features of her 
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surroundings. In contrast to judgement theorists who conceptualise emotion as “mental 
states directed at propositions” (Deeper:17), Robinson sees emotion as a process, a way 
(not unique to humans) in which “organisms interact with their environments” 
(Deeper:18). Affective appraisals are cued automatically by “events in the environment 
(either internal or external) [...] set[ting] off physiological changes that register the event in 
a bodily way” (Deeper:89). These initial appraisals serve to draw attention to stimuli that 
are potentially “significant to me or mine and get [...] my body ready for appropriate 
action” (Deeper:59). So, if I glimpse a black, coiled shape on the ground through my 
peripheral vision I am able affectively to appraise it as a potential threat before I 
consciously register what it is I am looking at. It is this initial, automatic appraisal that 
prompts me to freeze, catch my breath and, most importantly, visually to ascertain whether 
or not this snake-like object is in fact a snake by forcefully directing my attention to it.  
 
Building on the work of ‘basic emotion’ theorists such as Ekman, Robinson hypothesises 
that there are “a limited number of basic emotion systems each identified by a specific 
non-cognitive appraisal and the particular suite of behaviour[s]” (Deeper:89) it urges and 
facilitates. Different affective appraisals trigger different physiological changes, which 
contribute to the varying action tendencies and phenomenological feelings that distinguish 
the emotions from one another. Although these non-cognitive appraisals evolved as a 
‘quick and dirty’ means of readying us for recurrent human challenges, the kind of 
“important situations of loss, danger, threat etc” (Deeper:94) that we would have 
confronted in our ancestral environment,  because humans are more cognitively 
sophisticated than other organisms we are able to experience emotions in response to 
thoughts and beliefs as well as simple perceptions. I am as capable of experiencing an 
overpowering fear response in reaction to words printed on a page or to a “quiet 
ultimatum” from my boss as I am to occurrent perceptual stimuli such as a “large hairy 
bear” (Deeper:94) advancing upon me. However, whether my fear is triggered by an 
immediate physical threat or a complex cognitive judgement, its emotionality – the 
characteristic ‘heatedness’ or internal upheaval that differentiates it from a dispassionate 
evaluation – is “always caused by a particular kind of non-cognitive affective appraisal” 
(Deeper:94) and its associated physiological changes.  
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When I feel a bolt of fear or a rush of indignation after reading a newspaper article, the 
emotional process begins with an affective appraisal, “a kind of ‘meta-response’ evaluating 
in a rough and ready way [...my] already existing cognitive calculation” (Deeper:62) 
Equally, while subsequent cognitive monitoring can override or adjust this preliminary 
‘rough and ready’ appraisal, the distinctive quality that renders it an emotion rather than an 
affectively-neutral judgement derives from this initial phase rather than from the higher 
cognitive activity that follows: indeed, the reason we sometimes experience emotions as 
passive, almost weather-like phenomena rather than Solomon’s performative acts is that 
“we are never fully in control of our emotions: once an affective appraisal occurs, the 
response occurs too” (Deeper:97) and can only indirectly be managed through 
postliminary cognitive monitoring . For this reason, it can be nearly impossible to 
extinguish ingrained inappropriate or illogical emotional responses completely. While, to 
borrow Greenspan’s example, a severe cynophobe’s knowledge that ‘Fido’ is friendly and 
harmless might help him to modulate his fearful behaviours, allowing him to suppress his 
urge to shriek or run from the room, he is unlikely to be able simply to reason away his 
fright: even as he manages to smile and chat with Fido’s owners, his heart rate may 
continue to be elevated and his palms clammy, in spite of his rational appreciation that 
there is nothing to fear. 
 
In fact, such scenarios are not particularly uncommon. The affective appraisals that serve 
to focus our attention upon potentially important stimuli, to prime our bodies for 
appropriate action, are in many ways a blunt instrument, prone to overreaction rather than 
underreaction. These responses err on the side of caution, as it were, initiated prior to the 
conscious cognitions that could process the finer details of the situation. For this reason, it 
is not necessary that I believe or judge myself to be under threat in order to experience a 
fearful response, it is only necessary that I make a rough, non-cognitive appraisal of my 
situation that, as a precautionary measure, induces in me the physiological changes 
appropriate to the stimulus (which on this occasion happen to be those approximating a 
fear response). While some recent defenders of the cognitive theory have argued, in light 
of these discoveries, for a more capacious definition of the term ‘judgement’ that would 
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encompass such rough and ready affective appraisals I would argue that Robinson’s 
distinction between the affirmative ‘beliefs’ and ‘judgements’ described by the cognitive 
theorists and her own emphasis on emotions as a process initiated by non-cognitive, hair 
trigger appraisals better accounts for both the evidence of psychological research on the 
emotions and for the human propensity to emotionally engage with hypothetical scenarios 
and known fictions. 
 
Although Robinson subscribes to the theory that there are a finite set of basic emotions, 
and that higher cognitions can be surprisingly ineffective at checking or moderating these 
emotions once they have been initiated by an affective appraisal, she maintains that 
cognitive monitoring plays a vital role in our emotional lives. After all, we reflect on our 
emotions and catalogue them in accordance with “the words available to [us] in [our] 
language and culture” (Deeper:89).  The English language has no name for the blend of 
“compassion/love/sorrow” (Deeper:80) that residents of one South Pacific island call fago, 
and while such a mixture of emotions is far from ‘untranslatable’ in affective terms, its 
absence from English-speakers’ emotional vocabulary is likely to affect how we 
experience and discuss this blend when it arises, the importance we attach to it and the 
mental prominence we grant it when ruminating about relevant events and individuals.  
 
Equally, there are closely-related emotions such as guilt and shame that we commonly 
view as distinct, despite the fact that any differences between the two are probably 
physiologically-imperceptible: people who are archetypically ashamed- or guilty-looking 
appear functionally identical, blushing and hanging their heads, and there may well be no 
detectable differences in typical ANS activity. Robinson suggests that we differentiate 
between emotions within a given basic emotional ‘family’ by means of introspection, with 
“cognitively-complex emotions [being] triggered by the same non-cognitive appraisals as 
‘primitive’ emotions [...but] succeeded by complex cognitive activity” (Deeper:89). My 
after-the-fact classification of an emotional episode hinges upon multiple factors, such as 
my appreciation of the broader context, my current view of the eliciting stimulus and the 
way I see myself as a social and moral agent. Equally, my understanding of my emotional 
responses changes over time: if my “husband were to abandon me for a younger woman 
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[...] my emotions are [initially] likely to be in turmoil”, a nauseous mixture of “grief, 
anger, shame, and despair” (Deeper:81). I might at the time choose to interpret this blend 
of emotions as indignation, a variation of anger which is culturally viewed as a 
“‘powerful’” (Deeper:82) and socially-acceptable emotion, however, I later realise that my 
behaviour and physiological responses were more characteristic of “shame and grief” 
(Deeper:81).    
 
If cognitivists like Solomon and Nussbaum conceive of emotions as something we do, 
decisive, declarative judgements we make about the world and our place in it, proponents 
of the embodied appraisal model stress their temporal/dynamic nature, describing them in 
terms of the multiple, interacting processes that make up each emotional episode and ready 
us for “adaptive agent performance” across various “agent-environment” (Lowe et al, 
2007:1) situations. In Robinson’s words, while “the beliefs or thoughts or wants 
[cognitivists] posit as crucial to some particular emotion may well figure in the causal 
chain eventuating in an affective appraisal [my italics]”, the firm propositional attitudes 
they anatomise are by no means identical with, nor alone sufficient to initiate, the 
“emotional process” (Deeper:98) as a whole. In fact, it is precisely the ways in which 
emotions tend to depart from our considered judgements that render them so invaluable 
and betray their adaptive functionality. As I suggested earlier, the charge that our affective 
responses to fictions are somehow paradoxical, wildly irrational or out of place amongst 
our typical emotional behaviours, presupposes that ‘strong’ construals of the cognitivist 
model are correct and that one’s ability to experience a fictive emotion such as terror of a 
mythical monster implies that one has made a definitive, emphatic judgement to the effect 
that that one is in imminent danger. However, if, as embodied appraisal theorists assert, 
emotions operate according to a much less exacting standard of proof than the sort of 
cognitions discussed by Solomon and Nussbaum, the paradox of fiction can be dissolved.  
 
Emotions serve to bias our “attention to the processing of particular survival-relevant 
stimuli” (Lowe et al, 2007:1), inducing us to attend preferentially to the sort of information 
that has historically been most salient to our continued wellbeing. Significantly, this 
intensification or re-focusing of concentration precedes any conscious appraisal of 
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significance: the “amygdala responds to the emotional content of a situation rapidly [...] 
and prior to awareness” (Phelps et al, 2006:1). In other words, emotions contrive to 
magnetise one’s attention to potentially important stimuli before one could consciously 
register their presence, let alone evaluate their relevance to one’s values and flourishing. I 
would argue that this view of the emotions elucidates the allure of fictions, and especially 
fictions with aversive subject matter. 
 
As I discuss in further detail in my chapter on naturalistic and adaptationist analyses of 
fiction, theorists such as Steven Pinker suggest that we find fictions attractive because they 
act as ‘supernormal’ stimuli, compelling our attention by titillating our appetite for certain 
kinds of information. Successful fictions are calculated to appeal to our cognitive and 
aesthetic biases, exploiting our propensity to attend to those aspects of our environment 
that are anomalous, threatening and/or potentially relevant to our interests. Fictional 
narratives do not simply share a cross-cultural preoccupation with conflict but are as a 
class defined by it: as Denis Dutton notes, when distilled to their barest essence the 
overwhelming majority of stories amount to dramatisations of “1. A human will and 2. 
Some kind of resistance to it” (Instinct:118). 
 
4.6 Fictive Feelings as ‘Emotional Illusions’ 
 
In ‘Emotions, Perceptions and Emotional Illusions’, Christine Tappolet argues that we can 
view perceptual illusions and counter-rational emotions as analogous instances in which 
our “non-conceptual” (Tappolet, forthcoming:13) perception or evaluation of a situation 
clashes with, and often overrides, our conscious appraisal. Neither “emotions nor sensory 
perceptions are directly subject to the will” (Tappolet, forthcoming:8): even when our 
cognitive appraisal of a situation is utterly at odds with our emotional reaction, we are 
often incapable of completely suppressing our affective response. Just as one cannot 
choose to ‘see through’ an optical illusion, even when one has been forewarned about its 
precise nature, it is possible to believe, with complete sincerity, that house spiders are 
harmless and hygienic creatures, yet simultaneously to be overwhelmed by a sense of 
loathing and disgust every time one encounters one. Such examples are far from 
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unrecognisable or divorced from our everyday emotional lives. Although emotions are by 
no means as cognitively impenetrable or impervious to reason as the perceptual biases that 
render us vulnerable to optical illusions, they are far from synonymous with the 
judgements invoked by theorists such as Walton. Our emotional perceptions and cognitive 
judgements sometimes diverge because they are the product of “distinct [if often 
harmonious/synchronous] evaluative systems” (Tappolet, forthcoming:12) or modules. 
While Tappolet did not develop her analogy specifically in response to the paradox of 
fiction, or extend her analysis to fictive emotions, I would argue that viewing some kinds 
of recalcitrant emotion as akin to perceptual illusions helps to shed light both on our 
paradoxical propensity to feel for fictional characters, and certain widely observable – yet 
initially counter-intuitive – structural traits of narratives designed to compel human 
interest.   
 
Some theorists who by and large assent to the Waltonian definition of emotion – a 
definition that axiomatically excludes any feelings aroused by known nonexistents – 
maintain that in some cases we can experience real (i.e. belief-engaging) emotions in 
response to fictions. Jerrold Levinson suggests we may be particularly likely to evince 
these atypical, genuine reactions to certain media. It is perfectly logical that media, like 
horror films, which employ “vivid and lifelike images” (Levinson, 1996:302) of fearful 
events and objects should characteristically elicit primitive or 'Darwinian’ affective 
responses because of their perceptual immediacy, momentarily overwhelming our 
conscious awareness that the events we are viewing are fictional. Levinson argues that we 
may experience flickers of genuine fear in response to filmed horror narratives because 
they exploit our inability to completely suppress or neutralise our instinctual reactions to 
perceptual stimuli, effectively ambushing viewers into having real, albeit brief, episodes of 
fright or startlement. Cinematic depictions of fearsome creatures achieve their emotional 
effect by exploiting the “disjunction” (Levinson, 1996:302) or temporal delay between our 
‘rough and ready’ emotional appraisal of a potentially threatening stimulus – one based on 
the sensory evidence available to us, and engaging corporeal “protobeliefs or propositions 
our evolutionarily based visual system automatically gives credence to on the basis of 
[perceptual] data (Levinson, 1996:302) – and our rational recognition that we are watching 
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a film, once our “beliefs proper” (Levinson, 1996:302)  override our initial alarm. In other 
words, Charles reflexively shrinks from the suddenly lunging slime before he can – 
sheepishly – remind himself of its nonexistence.  
 
Psychologists such as Joanne Cantor and Mary Beth Oliver propose a similar mechanism 
for fictional fear, asserting that, according to the principle of stimulus generalisation,   “if a 
[real life stimulus commonly] evokes either an unconditioned or a conditioned emotional 
response, other stimuli that are similar to the eliciting stimulus will evoke similar, but less 
intense emotional responses” (Cantor & Oliver, 1996:65). Mediated images of universally 
fear-inspiring events are central to the horror genre, which is defined by its insistent focus 
on the threat of injury or violent death, and film’s “visual realism [enhances our pre-
existing tendency emotionally to] generalise from the real to the mediated stimulus” 
(Cantor & Oliver, 1996:65). These accounts are initially persuasive. Anyone who has 
viewed a horror film in a crowded theatre can testify to the wave of shrieks and quickly 
ensuing laughter that immediately follows a jump scare. Our initial response when 
confronted with sudden, loud noises or unexpected and apparently threatening visual 
stimuli seems to be both uncontrollable and rapidly superseded by our conscious 
recognition that we are viewing a fiction; we jump and immediately laugh at ourselves for 
being taken in by a mere fiction.  
 
However, I would reject any solution to the paradox of fiction which takes such responses 
to be the only genuine or non-make-believe fictive emotions, or, more pertinently to my 
thesis, which presents them as central to the appeal of any narrative genre. While modern 
horror may be primarily associated with visually-realistic, flinch-inducing films, to identify 
such narratives with horror as a whole can only offer a blinkered and historically-limited 
perspective of the pleasures of a diverse genre, which encompasses Gothic novels and 
spectral short stories, grisly Grand Guignol plays and gore films and subtle, suggestive 
works like Shirley Jackson’s The Haunting of Hill House.   
 
Furthermore, even within the context of contemporary, cinematic horror, jump scares of 
the sort identified by Levinson are widely disvalued, viewed as hackneyed and ephemeral 
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in contrast to more enduring ‘cognitive’ scares which derive additional power from calling 
on audience members’ own imaginative resources. In fact, I would argue that Levinson’s 
characterisation of our engagement with fearful fictions as an audio-visual “roller-coaster” 
(Levinson, 1996:302) in service of his argument highlights one reason why this often-
employed analogy misses the mark. Roller-coasters have no conceptual content – in 
contrast to our “terror-reaction to the sights and kinaesthetic sensations occurring when on 
a roller-coaster” (Levinson, 1996:302), which dissolves as soon as we disembark the ride, 
at their most effective, at their most pleasurable, fictions stay with us. To deem a narrative 
forgettable, or even to dismiss it as serviceable, but ultimately disposable, entertainment, is 
generally seen as a negative evaluation. While we might, at a stretch, look to a rollercoaster 
to learn about ourselves, hoping to elicit the meta-responses many view as central to the 
appeal of paradoxical genres – pleasantly surprised by one’s own mettle, or ashamed of 
one’s unexpected faintheartedness – I would argue that we value fictions at least in part 
because they promise us a window into other people’s minds and lives, affording us 
varying perspectives of the world in which we live.  
 
In short, Levinson’s model of ‘Darwinian’ or reflexive emotional responses is flawed not 
in concept but in application. Just as most of us are irresistibly prone to seeing the Müller-
Lyer arrows as different lengths, even after verifying for ourselves that they are in fact the 
same, so we may be inclined to experience emotional responses to some kinds of pseudo-
information, even when we are quite aware of their fictive status. According to such a 
model, all of our emotional responses to fictions could be classified as ‘Darwinian’ ones. 
 
In his inquiry into The Origin of Stories the adaptationist theorist Brian Boyd suggests that, 
because “emotional responses to events evolved long before representations of events, and 
therefore before the representation of untrue or unreal events, our emotional systems did 
not evolve to be activated only on condition of belief”. Rather we are predisposed to “have 
an ‘interested party response’” (Origin:173) to certain kinds of narrative. Detailed, 
emotionally-salient accounts of human activity behave very much like Tappolet’s 
‘emotional illusions’, reliably inducing certain responses in us even in the face of our 
conscious knowledge that the characters whose actions we are following do not exist. 
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While, as I previously noted during my discussion of the paradox of fiction, our fictive 
emotions tend to be less forceful and enduring than our emotional reactions to occurrent 
and personally-relevant situations, this fact in itself does not significantly distinguish them 
from the majority of our affective responses to mediated accounts of the activities of 
unknown others.   
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Chapter 5:  Truth, Lies and Pleasure 
 
Introduction 
 
In the introductory chapter of this thesis I examined how the pleasures of horror and 
related narrative genres are culturally coded as illicit and morally dubious, founded in an 
unwholesome desire to revel in others’ suffering. During my analysis of the genre’s 
cultural disrepute, I suggested that the popular conflation of narrative pleasure and real life 
desire, emotionally-ambivalent compulsion and avid complicity, belies the appeal not just 
of genres with obviously aversive content but the nature of our engagement with fiction as 
a whole. I would dispute the problematic assumption that we are characteristically attracted 
to, and motivated to consume, fictions (particularly low-brow, genre and populist fictions) 
because they provide us with desirable simulated experiences. However, by contesting this 
view of the allure of fiction in general, and ‘paradoxical’ genres such as horror in 
particular, I do not mean to imply that no works (or parts of works) act as vehicles for this 
kind of fantasy fulfilment, or that our engagement with fictions is anhedonic, motivated 
principally by a conscious desire to learn and broaden our experiences. Rather, I would 
suggest that the pleasures of fiction are contingent upon, and often inextricable from, its 
pains; and that those fictional situations that most excite our curiosity and engage our 
emotions are, in many cases, in direct opposition to our real-life wishes and worldview. 
 
In place of this account of fiction’s pleasures (which, for the sake of brevity, I will from 
now on refer to as the fantasy model), I will advance the view that fictions are attractive 
insofar as they compel our attention and ensnare our emotions. In fact, I argue that the 
narrative centrality of conflict – the striking (and cross-cultural/historical) ubiquity of 
fictional situations that seem specifically calculated to frustrate our desires, thwart our 
expectations and transgress our values – suggests that we typically enjoy fictions that 
provoke, stimulate and challenge us rather than those which cater to our real life 
predilections. 
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In the next two chapters I will defend two theoretical positions that undermine the fantasy 
model and lend support to this view of fiction’s appeal. First, I will discuss the notion that 
fictional works can communicate truths or inspire insights about the human situation. In 
opposition to the claims of ‘no truth’ theorists such as Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen I 
will argue that fictions are not only cognitively valuable, capable of embodying truths and 
eliciting valuable shifts in our thinking about various topics, but, more centrally to my 
main thesis, that appraisals of fictional works in terms of truth and falsity are both 
commonplace and aesthetically relevant. In other words, many writers, readers and critics’ 
documented responses to fictional narratives contradict ‘no truth’-theorists’ contention that 
we characteristically perceive fictions to be  innocent of any social, moral or philosophical 
significance, undercutting the notion that our enjoyment of fiction is essentially idle, our 
emotional, intellectual and evaluative responses to fabricated narratives completely 
insulated  from our responses to other (potentially educative) forms of discourse. In the 
second of these interrelated chapters, I will assess the validity of the adaptationist theory of 
fiction espoused by Denis Dutton and Brian Boyd, who posit that fictions are attractive 
because they act as a form of cognitive play, pleasurably honing our social cognition and 
problem-solving skills. I will argue that – even if one rejects their contention that the 
human propensity for storytelling represents an adaptive and selected-for trait, viewing it 
instead as an exaptation or spandrel – their analysis of salient, apparently universal features 
of fictional narratives nonetheless subverts the claim that fictions serve primarily as a form 
of ‘mental cheesecake’, a consequence-free means of gratifying our more impractical or 
socially unacceptable appetites. 
 
The theory that fictional narratives can divulge truths, enrich moral and social perception 
or bring about epiphanies is an instinctively appealing, if somewhat paradoxical, idea, and 
a venerable defence against historic characterisations of fiction as intrinsically escapist or 
deceptive. In the ‘ancient quarrel’ between literature and its detractors, the claim that that 
which is axiomatically false in its particulars can, on some level, impart a more 
encompassing truth (and perhaps even that it can serve as a superior vehicle for 
transmitting some types of truth than other, more factually constrained, disciplines) 
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represents the most powerful argument in fiction’s favour, inverting those ontological 
hierarchies that position mimemata as inherently trivial, derivative and hollow. 
 
In order to assess the validity of this claim I will examine the various theories on how it is 
that fictional works enlighten us, and what sort of truths or principles literature can convey, 
addressing the arguments for and against these conceptions of literary truth. Are literary 
‘truths’ confined to propositions, whether stated directly or implied thematically? Or are 
we to assess works for their verisimilitude, their ability to provide us with accurately-
rendered simulated experiences? Perhaps, as Noël Carroll suggests, fictional narratives act 
as thought-experiments, literary analogues to the ship of Theseus or Descartes’ malevolent 
deceiver, not necessarily making novel assertions but facilitating a reorganisation, 
reassessment and refinement of our existing knowledge that allows us to see that which, 
figuratively speaking, has been under our noses all along. Finally, as in one interpretation 
of Aristotle’s remarks on mimesis, it may be that literary works allow us to appreciate or 
assimilate knowledge emotionally, making us feel moral truths more keenly by garbing 
them in fictional details. After all, one can understand something at a conscious level 
without fully registering its emotional significance, and there are some truths that one 
cannot properly be said to comprehend without appropriately responding to them 
emotionally. 
 
5.1 Addressing Lamarque and Olsen’s Critique of Truth Theories 
 
In Truth, Fiction and Literature, Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen espouse a ‘no-truth’ 
theory of literature. In their particular formulation of the theory this means that, while they 
defend a humanistic view of literature (one that locates the value of the medium in its 
capacity to serve as a vehicle for the exploration of “humanly interesting content” 
(Truth:288), and accept as unproblematic the notion that literature can contain minor, 
incidental truths about the world, they reject the notion that literary works can properly be 
said to yield non-trivial truths about their content, or that any assessment of the truth-value 
of statements contained or implied within a work is relevant to our aesthetic appraisal of it. 
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Lamarque and Olsen divide theories arguing for the existence of literary truths into two 
camps: the ‘Theory of Novelistic Truth’ and the ‘Propositional Theory of Literary Truth’. 
They first examine various iterations of the former theory, the most convincing of which is 
the version concerning literary realism. Proponents of this theory argue that literature, or 
rather, certain modes of literary writing that can be broadly characterised by a shared 
commitment to depicting the sort of situations that arise in reality and to describing these 
happenings in a faithful, ‘true to life’ manner, bears a positive relation to the real world. 
Realist literature, even when false in its particulars, truthfully depicts kinds or universals, 
faithfully depicting the type of person, the type of relationship or situation or conflict, that 
abounds in reality, representing even if it does not refer. 
 
The subjective knowledge  or ‘acquaintance’ theory of literary truth can be summarised as 
the argument that while fictional narratives are, by their very nature, not reliable sources of 
facts or ‘knowledge that’ (although narratives set in a realistic world will contingently 
contain and refer to many such facts) they are uniquely suited to conveying ‘knowledge of 
what it is like’. There are several forms of non-propositional knowledge or knowledge by 
acquaintance that are at least glancingly relevant to any discussion of literature and truth: 
writers often evoke perceptual information during descriptive passages, attempting to 
communicate ‘what it is like’ to view a Gothic, crumbling castle by candlelight or to enjoy 
a sumptuous feast amidst fantastical surroundings; narratives might serve as a form of 
surrogate social/moral experience or practical knowledge, broadening one’s pool of 
(salutary and cautionary) examples and thereby helping one to choose well; some stories 
attempt to communicate what it is like to possess various forms of ‘know how’, following 
the activities of a skilled chef or an intuitive detective; and many fictions seem designed to 
impart empathetic or subjective knowledge, prompting us to consider how it might feel to 
be placed in some moral quandary, to grow suddenly disillusioned with one’s life work or 
to toil hopelessly under a ruthless and oppressive regime.   
 
Proponents of the novelistic theory of literary truth suggest that socially realistic fictional 
narratives  are cognitively valuable because of their ability to instil this latter category of 
non-propositional knowledge, allowing readers to simulate, or envision themselves 
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undergoing, unfamiliar experiences, to occupy viewpoints that would ordinarily be 
unavailable to them, and extend “the range of [their] humanistic understanding” (Truth: 
371). The immersive, richly-detailed nature of literary narratives ensures that fiction is an 
ideal medium for the transmission of this sort of knowledge, enabling fictional narratives 
to convey those aspects of a situation that are not easily codified or expressed in 
conventional propositional form (or that, once distilled to such forms, cannot be as readily 
assimilated or ‘known’ in an emotional sense). 
 
Literature’s alleged ability to facilitate ‘second-hand’ experiences in this way  is of moral 
as well as cognitive worth, confronting readers with vividly-realised instantiations of 
unpalatable truths (as in Dickens’ depiction of the dehumanised urban poor in Hard 
Times), bridging socially-determined failures of empathy by disclosing the ‘Other’s’ 
common humanity (as in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s historically formative Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin) and allowing us to contemplate the moral significance and status of unfamiliar 
experiences and situations (as in the case I will now  discuss). So, for example, one might 
already be cognisant of the fact that medical experts in the late nineteenth century believed 
that excessive mental exertion was psychologically harmful to women, and that they 
customarily prescribed ‘rest cures’ for depressed or ‘neurasthenic’ female patients 
(inducing them to lie in bed all day, forbidding them from any “brain work” (Martin, 
2007:737), and keeping them in near-total seclusion). However,  as Noël Carroll puts it, 
one can know the “fact” of such a situation while remaining ignorant of the “flavour” 
(‘Wheel, 2000:362): reading a cursory description of the rest cure provides one with only a 
dim sense of what it was like to undergo such a treatment. 
 
Conversely, Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s ‘The Yellow Wall-Paper’, written as a 
fictionalised account of her own experience of the rest cure (which, she claimed, drove her 
“so near the borderline of utter mental ruin that [she] could see over”) vividly evokes the 
horrifying and complete infantilisation inherent to the process: the protagonist is installed 
in a nursery that has its windows “barred for little children” (Perkins Gilman, 1995 
[1890]:5) and rarely permitted to leave, her weight and sleeping habits are monitored and 
conferred about by her husband and sister-in-law, their smothering solicitousness to her 
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bodily needs combined with a repressive attitude towards any and all mental activity. The 
narrative itself is circling and repetitious, the lack of external events or markers of time 
passing combining with the protagonist’s obsessive reiteration of certain points – her 
increasing “nervousness”, the oppressive, somehow repugnant character of the repeating, 
bar-like pattern of the wall-paper, her husband’s warnings against giving in to “fanc[y]” 
(Perkins Gilman, 1995 [1890]:6) – giving the reader a visceral sense of the suffocating 
(and, in some cases, literally maddening)  tedium of living in an environment where time 
passes without incident or progression. As Martha Nussbaum argues throughout Love’s 
Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature, the form and style in which information 
is conveyed are not neutral, incidental nuances of presentation that have no effect upon 
meaning: one ‘knows’ an experience differently, arguably less completely, if one is 
provided with a sparsely written, though factually correct, summary about it than with a 
richly particular, vividly realised narrative built around the same basic facts.
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As I will address further in my later discussion of literature’s capacity to facilitate 
emotional epiphanies, the immediacy, the fine-grained particularity, of literary narratives 
may be conducive to the apprehension of certain, important forms of knowledge because of 
the way fiction is able to engage our emotions (one of the very traits that renders fiction so 
morally dubious according to Plato). There are certain truths – those concerning what 
might loosely be called the ‘human situation’, those in which literature is primarily 
interested – that one can both ‘know’ in a blandly abstract, propositional sense without 
comprehending at a more intimate level. To know such truths in the former way without 
registering their moral and emotional significance is, in a sense, not to know them at all.  
 
Lamarque and Olsen reject the notion that the vicarious subjective experiences afforded by 
fictional narratives can constitute knowledge, arguing that, while knowledge might result 
from such experiences, the experiences themselves cannot properly be categorised as 
knowledge. They also argue that, even if one concedes that fictional approximations of 
                                                 
46
 Importantly, while some proponents of  the notion of literary truth argue that fictional narratives are 
uniquely suited to imparting certain kinds of knowledge, throughout this thesis I will maintain that non-
fictional narratives of comparable detail and emotional  resonance are equally qualified to transmit those 
truths that are inexpressible through conventional prose or argument. 
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subjective experiences do constitute some sort of knowledge, the fact that there appears to 
be no clear mechanism by which ‘true’ or authentic experiences can be distinguished from 
‘false’ or inauthentic ones is problematic. This worrisome latter objection evokes Plato’s 
criticisms of poetry in The Republic: given that authors of fictional texts are under no 
obligation to offer accurate renderings of the experiences they describe (aiming at 
credibility or “lifelikeness” (Truth:294) rather than strict verisimilitude), perhaps at worst 
fictions can act as a kind of corrupt or counter-philosophy, their illicit powers of emotional 
persuasion leading us to believe we have learned something whereas in reality we have 
merely blundered further from the truth. 
 
In “Simulation, Subjective Knowledge and the Cognitive Value of Literary Narrative”, 
Scott Stroud defends the subjective knowledge theory against these objections, arguing that 
Lamarque and Olsen’s critique of the subjective knowledge theory rests largely upon a 
wrongful conflation of two interrelated, but distinct, types of knowledge linked to 
consuming fictional narratives: the direct ‘knowledge’ or experience afforded by the 
fictional narrative, and any subsequent changes in values or beliefs instigated, although not 
necessitated, by this initial experience. By outlining a (more cautious) variant of the theory 
that more clearly delineates these two types of knowledge Stroud aims to defuse Lamarque 
and Olsen’s criticisms. 
 
First, Stroud makes the case for subjective experiences constituting a sort of knowledge, 
stating that the theorists’ insistence that an experience cannot constitute knowledge is 
predicated upon the assumption that “knowledge must be able to be stated in determinant 
propositional form. Thus, an experience of a situation may give rise to knowledge (“This 
fire hurts when one touches it”), but the experience itself does not count as knowledge.” 
(Stroud, 2008:27) However, as he argues, the “propositional accounts that some take as the 
only candidates for ‘knowledge’ could actually be effects [or indicators] of the sort of 
experiential knowledge one has” (Stroud, 2008:27): someone who has actually been to a 
beach will probably be able to give a more detailed account of its features than someone 
who has merely been told about it, her access to the memory, the knowledge, of what it was 
like at that particular beach translating into an increased ability to provide details about it 
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when questioned. As Stroud argues, “If one cannot answer such questions, one surely 
cannot say she ‘knows’ about the experience of the blinding sun on that beach. Being able 
to reflectively think about and discuss a certain topic is due to that experience, and thus the 
experience is integrally bound up with the issue of knowledge of some aspect of the 
world.” (Stroud, 2008:28) 
 
Stroud also disputes Lamarque and Olsen’s second main objection to the subjective 
knowledge theory: the lack of supporting evidence as to the authenticity or verisimilitude 
of fictional subjective experiences. Without a means of separating “genuine” and “merely 
putative” (Truth:371) knowledge, all subjective experiences are rendered epistemologically 
dubious. Stroud argues that when engaging with any argumentative texts one must check 
the internal assertions against external sources and one’s own experience. This defence 
initially seems somewhat glib and unconvincing – the other texts to which Stroud alludes 
are explicitly making truth-claims and usually cite supportive references whereas fictional 
narratives, by their very nature, make no such claims, and often present anomalous rather 
than representative circumstances in the service of plot (a narrative might detail a 
bootstrapping protagonist’s rise from rags to riches while neglecting accurately to depict 
the factors inherent in poverty that prevent most people from doing the same). 
Nonetheless, as Stroud states, we “detect mistakes and deception primarily through 
communal and experiential efforts” (Stroud, 2008:30): after we read a text our engagement 
with it continues. Fictions enjoy a kind of interpretive ‘afterlife’ during which we reflect 
upon what we have read, comparing it against our own experience, assessing its 
authenticity, and looking at the author’s ‘credentials’ in the relevant topic before deciding 
whether the subjective ‘knowledge’ it imparts is accurate, generalisable and personally 
relevant. Whether or not we conclude this process by integrating any insights generated by 
our engagement with the narrative into our values as a whole, the primary knowledge 
afforded by fictional experiences (‘what it is like’ for person x to lose a child) retains a 
value independent of any secondary insights it yields (that social standards about how long 
it is appropriate to openly grieve are damaging or misguided). 
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Lamarque and Olsen raise a further objection to the novelistic or subjective theory of 
fictional truth, suggesting that factoring a work’s realism into one’s evaluation of its 
aesthetic status is “logical[ly] strange” to say the least, for, they argue, “it is not part of the 
literary stance to construe literary works in terms of their probability” (Truth:318). 
Although they concede that readers may in fact adopt  “the vocabulary of probability” in 
their appraisal of literary works by criticising incidents as being “‘highly improbable’” 
(Truth:318), they argue that this term is ill-chosen and readers in fact mean to impugn a 
work’s lack of credibility. While it is true that readers will usually accept improbable 
events or situations with equanimity as long as they are presented in an engaging manner, I 
would argue that a lack of psychological and/or social verisimilitude can indeed be 
sufficiently glaring as to impact negatively one’s aesthetic evaluation of a literary work. If 
characters behave in improbable ways or display improbable or anomalous responses to 
events – behaviour and/or reactions that we would regard as extremely unlikely to occur in 
real life – unless the author justifies it by appealing to explanatory events or tendencies in 
the character’s past that would believably effect the necessary changes in the character, 
many readers will adjust their estimation of the work in its disfavour.  
 
As readers, we often tend to evaluate fictional works’ psychological acuity – at least those 
works we regard as serious, as ‘literary’ in the evaluative sense – praising those whose 
characters and interactions feel ‘thick’, textured and believable and criticising those that 
we perceive as flat, laboured and false – stereotypes are aesthetically, as well as politically, 
galling, offensive, at least in part, because they are untrue, falsifying or at best simplifying 
what is really there. Although I would agree with Lamarque and Olsen that ‘truth’ or 
verisimilitude is here, as elsewhere, not necessarily a deciding or essential factor in our 
appraisal of a work, to deny that some kinds of improbability or too-evident unreality may 
be detrimental to a work’s aesthetic status seems unnecessarily sweeping. If works advance 
generalisations about the human situation that are wildly divergent from reality, they may 
well still succeed due to other outstanding attributes, but it is in spite of their theses. 
Additionally, here, as elsewhere, their claims about what characterises the ‘literary stance’ 
are reductive, failing to acknowledge how many readers do indeed couch their responses to 
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works in terms of truth and falsity. While they might feel that such readers are mistaken, it 
is untrue that discussion of works in these terms is entirely divorced from existing practice. 
 
Lamarque and Olsen next address the Propositional Theory of Literary Truth, which they 
summarise as the belief that, while “literature at the ‘literal level’ is for the most part 
fictive i.e. that characteristically its content is fictional and its mode of presentation is not 
that of fact stating”, on another level, “literary works do, perhaps must, imply or suggest 
general propositions about human life which have to be assessed as true or false.” 
(Truth:321) They append to this basic formula the additional stipulation that the general 
statements about life must be ‘non-trivial’ in order to qualify, since while “it is implied in 
Middlemarch that people walk on the ground and do not fly when they move from place to 
place” this type of truth is “of no interest to the reader” (Truth:326). Thematic statements 
may be explicit, as in the case of philosophical asides made by a narrator, or implicit, in 
cases where readers extract meaning from a work based on their interpretation of it. They 
also claim that, if this theory is taken to be true, it follows that “the absolute value of the 
single literary work, and the comparative value of different literary works” (Truth:325), 
rest upon the truths they convey, meaning that works that “state trivial truths, falsehoods or 
do not imply any statements about the human situation” (Truth:325-326) are inherently 
inferior. As they note, this theory accounts tidily for the fact that the bulk of literary works 
are manifestly false by “identifying two levels of description, the subject level and the 
thematic level” (Truth:325), and secures literature’s cultural value alongside other truth-
seeking activities like science and philosophy. 
 
Lamarque and Olsen’s criticisms of this theory target what they perceive as its central 
flaw: that, by conflating “judgements about content” with “judgements about truth” 
(Truth:330), those who subscribe to the Propositional Theory make an unwarranted 
interpretative leap, misconstruing themes as theses. First, they argue, while literary works 
may explore “humanly interesting concerns” (Truth: 330), as readers we confer value upon 
works’ exploration of such themes based upon how interesting we find them, rather than 
by determining their truth-value. The purpose of general themes is not to impart truths to 
the reader but to organise and enrich narratives, lending a pleasing coherence to the text as 
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a whole. Truth-assessment is thus utterly superfluous to an aesthetic appraisal of a text, 
since, while such judgements may be of contingent interest, they have no bearing on how 
successful a work is fulfilling its telos. In order to demonstrate the irrelevance of such 
thematic statements’ truth-value to our appraisal of a literary work, they ask us to envision, 
and acknowledge the plausibility of, the existence of an equally aesthetically valuable 
novel embodying the “precise negation” (Truth:330) of Middlemarch’s purported thesis 
that human desires and aspirations are always thwarted by forces outside of an individual’s 
control. If, as they interpret proponents of the Propositional Theory as asserting, a literary 
work’s aesthetic value were inextricable from its truth-value, this equivalency would be 
inconceivable. 
 
Yet I would argue that their thought experiment here is hardly as uncontentious as they 
take it to be. As M.W. Rowe points out in his essay “Lamarque and Olsen on Literature 
and Truth”, the very scenario they confidently cite as paradigmatic of the irrelevance of 
truth-assessment to one’s appraisal of a literary work – the possibility that a novel implying 
that “‘The best human hopes and aspirations are never thwarted by forces beyond human 
control’” (Truth:338) could, hypothetically, be as aesthetically valuable as Middlemarch – 
fails to convince. While one can imagine, or bring to mind, cases of equally valuable works 
expressing implacably opposed theses, it is generally in instances where the truth is harder 
to discern and more nuanced – such as the question of whether and when violent political 
action can be advisable or legitimate – than in the caricatured antitheses they suggest in 
this example (in addition to which it seems obvious that human aspirations are neither 
always thwarted nor never thwarted, and indeed, their distillation of Middlemarch’s themes 
to the former statement is in itself questionable). 
 
Additionally, as Rowe notes, it is easy to imagine thesis statements sufficiently “vicious 
and implausible” (Rowe, 1997:337) that it would be impossible for a work endorsing them 
to succeed on aesthetic grounds: “If someone wrote a novel showing that nudism makes 
you intelligent, or that cruelty to children makes them outgoing and well adjusted, then it is 
unlikely to be published, let alone read or remembered. How could the people in such 
novels possibly feel or be motivated by anything remotely human? How could their 
173 
 
behaviour be coherent? How could we possibly be interested in seeing such ideas enacted, 
explored, developed and imaginatively entertained?” (Rowe, 1997:337) In order to 
advance such a proposition a work would, by necessity, have to sacrifice convincing 
characterisation, plausible plotting and psychological insight, rendering it unlikely to 
appeal to any but the most partisan. While it is true that one can admire a literary work 
whose thematic statements about the world one judges to be false, and that there are works 
which, while implying significant human truths, leave one cold aesthetically speaking due 
to their failure to satisfy other aesthetic criteria, I would maintain that a work implying or 
asserting a true statement is inherently more valuable than a work of otherwise identical 
aesthetic quality implying or asserting a falsehood. In contrast to Lamarque and Olsen’s 
‘strong’ formulation of the Propositional Theory of Literary Truth, I would argue that it is 
possible to ascribe some value to the veracity of thematic statements implied by literary 
works without locating a work’s value solely or primarily in its ‘truthfulness’. Although 
truth may be “neither necessary nor sufficient for literary merit” (Rowe, 1997:335), as 
Rowe argues, it does not follow that it must not be a factor at all. 
 
Furthermore, Rowe argues, the terms used to express the “general vices” we attribute to 
authors implicitly appeal to notions of truth and falsity: when we deride a work for its 
saccharine sentimentality, or label it “improbable” or “adolescent”(Rowe, 1997: 338), we 
in fact accuse it of being epistemically corrupt, promoting a distorted and 
misrepresentative view of the world. Lamarque and Olsen acknowledge the presence of 
such terms in discussion of literary works, but reiterate their earlier claim that aesthetic 
appraisal of a work’s thematically implied statements should be contingent upon how 
interesting and well-developed they are rather than upon their substance. They view the use 
of such terms as indicative of either imprecise language on the user’s part (meaning that a 
theme is poorly realised and unconvincingly portrayed) or of a lapse from the correct 
critical stance (meaning that the user has exhausted their supply of aesthetic criticisms and 
is embarking on an extra-literary, and therefore irrelevant, discussion). However, I would 
dispute this characterisation of readers’/critics’ appeals to truth or the lack thereof in 
aesthetic appraisals of literary works, and would instead argue that such comments about 
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literary works can reflect aesthetically-relevant judgements about the epistemic 
shortcomings of texts. 
 
As Nada Gatalo argues in her essay “The Problem with Sentimental Art”, in which she 
uses the Socialist Realist painting ‘Roses for Stalin’ as an “exceptional example” (Gatalo, 
2008:22) of the maligned category, certain types of artistic dishonesty are inherently 
aesthetically corrupt because they aim to entangle the reader/viewer in “morally 
misleading” and “superficial” (Gatalo, 2008:26) emotional responses. With sentimental 
works that are designed chiefly to entertain this is not as much of a defect: we can still 
enjoy films, such as Rocky, that are flimsily implausible and that obfuscate, rather than 
elucidate, our moral commitments in order to provide us with emotional gratification, since 
they do not ever “purport to moral seriousness” (Gatalo, 2008:28) in the first place. On the 
other hand, in works, such as “Roses for Stalin” that aspire to, but do not attain, moral 
significance, it amounts to aesthetic failure insofar as it draws audience members’ attention 
to severe limitations in the author’s perception and/or skill. When we surrender our 
attention to a fictional narrative, we do with the understanding that we are allowing our 
consciousness, our emotions, to be manipulated by another, temporarily entrusting our 
imaginations to the direction of an implied author. However, our readiness to engage with 
fictive texts (at least according to the terms which the author lays out, as opposed to 
undertaking ‘resistant’, purposely against-the-grain readings) is far from unconditional; 
given the extent to which a narrative is informed by an author’s sense of the world, 
inflected by his or her understanding of human existence, it is difficult to imagine how one 
could, as Lamarque and Olsen advocate, utterly decouple one’s evaluation of a work’s 
aesthetic status from an intrusive awareness of its moral or social impercipience. In other 
words, flagrant errors in perception are simply distracting, striking a discordant note and 
so jarring readers from the aimed-at state of absorption. 
 
I would argue that Lamarque and Olsen’s criticisms of the Novelistic and Propositional 
Theories of Literary Truth fail to undermine the notion of truth in fictional narratives for 
several reasons. First, they construe the theories they criticise too narrowly, creating a false 
dichotomy whereby works advance humanly significant truths, and are therefore valuable, 
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or advance only trivial truths or falsehoods, in which case they are inferior, regardless of 
their other merits. However, there exist many permutations of the ‘truth’ theories they 
describe, most of which exhibit more nuanced views of value than those Lamarque and 
Olsen attribute to them. Secondly, they argue that debate about literary themes’ truth-value 
is not part of literary practice, which, they assert, demonstrates that truth-assessments are 
irrelevant when judging a work’s aesthetic status. However, as I argued earlier, while 
explicit appeals to truth and falsity may not constitute a major part of the critical 
vocabulary, it is certainly an established part of current literary practice to charge works (at 
least those purporting to moral seriousness) with promoting a distorted, ‘unrealistic’ view 
of the world or with advancing implausible theses. In the next section, I will discuss 
several examples of how writers and critics assess fictional texts in terms of their 
humanistic truthfulness, going so far as to pen novelistic rejoinders to those works they 
regard as especially epistemically corrupt, or writing texts with the aim of exploring or 
discrediting a specific hypothesis. 
 
Equally, I would argue that some types of ‘truth’ or verisimilitude do generally enrich a 
work’s aesthetic status: even in genres, like fantasy and science fiction, where we largely 
dispense with the usual standards of plausibility, underneath the outwardly fantastical 
generic trappings psychological realism remains important, at least in narratives that aspire 
to be evaluated as literary works, rather than as throwaway entertainment. As Lamarque 
and Olsen themselves argue, we value works for their development of themes dealing with 
humanly interesting content. Works that falsify or distort important aspects of human 
experience are therefore aesthetically, as well as epistemically (and oftentimes ethically) 
flawed, because their falsity renders them uninvolving at the most crucial level. 
 
In summation, I would dispute Lamarque and Olsen’s unforgivingly narrow 
characterisation of the ‘truth’ theories they assess. In particular, their consideration of the 
notion of literary truth seem largely to hinge upon the question of how one is to extract 
theses from narratives, and, once one has wrested them from their proper context, of 
whether it is appropriate to apply transplanted ‘truths’ about fictional worlds to the real 
world. However, I would argue that this model misses the point of literary truth, eliding the 
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importance of the ‘journey’ – imaginatively and emotionally engaging with a vividly 
particularised fictional scenario – in favour of prematurely arriving at the ‘destination’. It is 
easy to dismiss baldly stated, decontextualised literary truths as banal or lacking in 
evidential support because, as the next theory I will discuss asserts, literary works are not 
intended to dispense neatly-packaged truths so much as elicit insights on the part of the 
reader. Rather than serving as the vehicle for the transmission of universal principles, 
literary narratives are epistemically and/or ethically valuable because they involve the 
reader in an active process, helping them to reassess and refine existing knowledge, honing 
their ability to apply universal principles to diverse situations and to attend to particulars 
with appropriate discernment, sensitivity and emotional recognition. 
 
5.2 Fictions as Thought-Experiments 
 
In “The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature and Moral Knowledge”, Noël Carroll defends the 
view that literature can act as a source of moral education, outlining what he identifies as 
several of the most compelling criticisms of the ‘truth’ theory before unveiling a model of 
literary truth that, he believes, defuses each of the objections. The first of these objections, 
often referred to as the ‘banality’ argument, rests upon the assertion that the ostensibly 
valuable, revelatory theses disclosed by literary works are all too often, when denuded of 
their surrounding finery, platitudinous and trivial, amounting to little more than 
unchallenging, well-worn clichés (such as “patricide is wrong” or “power corrupts” 
(‘Wheel’:4). This argument allows that literary works may imply general truths (or, more 
aptly, truisms) while denying that the thematic advancement of such truths is remotely 
instructive, since one cannot learn what one already knows. The second line of objection, 
known as the ‘no evidence’ argument, disputes the idea that the theses literary works 
advance can be viewed as true knowledge, since while works may make or imply 
statements about the human situation they do not demonstrate them, and “knowledge, 
properly so-called, must not only be true, but warranted” (‘Wheel’:5). The alleged ‘truths’ 
imparted by literary works lack supportive evidence because, unlike those disciplines more 
traditionally associated with the search for truth such as science or philosophy, literature 
does not, by definition, deal with facts. Literary works implying, through the experiences 
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of their characters, generalisations about human conduct essentially argue from anecdote, 
and concocted anecdotes at that, rendering any conclusions they afford epistemically 
suspect at best, “cooked from the get-go” (‘Wheel’:5). As Carroll comments, “thus, by a 
different epistemological route, the contemporary philosopher of literature arrives at the 
same conclusion Plato reached in Book X of his Republic” (‘Wheel’:5). The third and final 
objection, termed the ‘no argument’ argument, puts forth two claims: first, that literary 
works may imply or assert generalisations, but that they do not argue for them, and 
secondly that the critical discourse around literary works tends not to devote much 
discussion to the truth-value of hypotheses contained within texts. Like the no-evidence 
objection, this problematises the concept of literary truth by pointing out an endemic lack 
of justification, as well as by suggesting that notions of truth and falsity are not relevant to 
critical analyses of literary works (and, by implication, that they cannot therefore be 
particularly relevant to readers’ evaluation of them). 
 
In order simultaneously to counter each of these three challenges to the notion of literature 
as a source of moral instruction Carroll devises an artful common solution, arguing that the 
literary method of ‘argumentation’ is, far from being non-existent, actually distinctively 
philosophical. For, he states, philosophers themselves “employ a gamut of techniques to 
produce knowledge and learning that are analogous to those found in literature” 
(‘Wheel’:7). The use of “thought-experiments, examples, and counter-examples that are 
often narrative and generally fictional in nature” (‘Wheel’:7) as heuristic devices is, Carroll 
argues, both common and uncontroversial, and, if such narratives are to be considered 
valid sources of knowledge and insight, so too should their literary analogues. 
 
If sound, this model is, Carroll argues, resistant to all three of the arguments that, in his 
assessment, constitute the most damaging objections to the notion of literature as 
productive of knowledge. First, it quells the banality argument: thought-experiments may 
invoke ‘obvious’ concepts, or ones that are long known to us, but they induce us to look at 
them from a different angle, enabling us to discern facets that were previously hidden from 
view, to perceive unsuspected connections between it and other concepts and to detect 
formerly unnoticed lacunae in reasoning. Equally, Carroll avers, it is not vulnerable to 
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charges of a lack of evidence, since the concepts thought-experiments put into play are 
already familiar to the reader. As Carroll states, thought-experiments are not tools for 
“reaching empirical discoveries but for excavating conceptual refinements and 
relationships” (‘Wheel’:7). As such, they are not reliant upon evidential support: because 
they aim at “mobilising” (‘Wheel’:7) concepts or knowledge we already possess rather 
than at disclosing new facts, thought experiments, and literary narratives, if one accepts 
Carroll’s characterisation, require no external guarantors. Rather, their persuasive power, 
their ‘argument’, derives from their ability to activate, problematise, refine and/or clarify 
our “antecedent knowledge” by forcing us to apply it in a novel way, which, if successful, 
can result in a significant shift in our “conceptual map” (‘Wheel’:7). Finally, Carroll 
argues, the model evades the ‘no argument’ criticism. While thought-experiments are 
“incomplete” (‘Wheel’:9), requiring readers to make certain interpretative leaps, they still 
function as arguments in all but the most stringent sense. 
 
Like informal syllogisms, thought-experiments meet us halfway, figuratively speaking: 
“The analysis occurs […in the reader’s] own mind, operating on her or his antecedent 
conceptual stock, and need not be spelled out on the page.” (‘Wheel’:9) They act 
“maieutically” (‘Wheel’:9), eliciting epiphanies by forcing the reader to think about 
familiar concepts in a new light, as when, in Plato’s Meno, Socrates teaches a slave 
geometry by questioning him. 
 
Having demonstrated philosophical thought-experiments’ imperviousness to the three 
arguments he identifies as most dangerous to ‘truth’ theories of literature, Carroll goes on 
to explain why we should view literary narratives endorsing general themes as analogous 
to this form of argument. Carroll immediately acknowledges one of the most obvious 
objections to his claim: that when philosophers devise (or appropriate portions of other) 
fictional narratives their intent is clear, whereas in the case of literary works the author 
may just have set out to entertain. In response to this criticism, Carroll concedes that of 
course there are many such cases; however, he argues, in individual instances one should 
be able to determine into which category a literary work falls through assiduous 
examination of the text in question – “where a convincing interpretation of the text renders 
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that interpretation plausible, there should be no reason, in principle, to treat the artist's 
thought-experiments – with respect to conceptual knowledge – differently than the 
philosopher's” (‘Wheel’:9). 
 
Carroll details several ways in which literary works can fulfil similar functions to 
philosophical thought-experiments – “defeating alethic claims concerning possibility or 
necessity or deontic claims of what ought or ought not be done, or of what is or is not 
obligated; advancing modal claims about what is possible; and, finally, motivating 
conceptual distinctions – that is, refining conceptual space, rendering what was vague more 
precise” (‘Wheel’:9). In particular, he examines how some literary works instantiate 
subversive counter-examples to universal maxims such as E.M. Forster’s assertion that it is 
better to betray one’s country than one’s friend, analysing how Graham Greene’s 
screenplay for The Third Man hinges around this question. That Harry Lime, and his 
criminal activities, are non-existent, is irrelevant: it is enough that the viewer realises that 
the scenario depicted is possible that renders Forster’s assertion “untenable” (‘Wheel’:9). 
     
5.2.1 Examples of Fictions Employed as a Mode of Argumentation 
 
There are numerous other examples of cases in which authors consciously set out to 
‘argue’ a certain point, incorporating strategies similar to those used in philosophical 
thought-experiments. William Golding’s Lord of the Flies was explicitly written as a 
rebuttal of Ballantyne’s Coral Island, appropriating the premise of the original (a group of 
boys stranded on an island sans adult supervision) in order to correct what he saw as 
Ballantyne’s ‘errors’ – his racism and idealised presentation of his (white, ‘civilised’) 
protagonists. The enthymematic mode of ‘reasoning’ employed by Golding hinges largely 
upon how convincing, how familiar, one finds the earlier scenes: the verisimilitude of the 
boys’ early interactions, the careful depiction of the simmering social tensions and petty 
power plays (familiar to most of us from that age) are sufficiently convincing that many 
readers are persuaded to follow Golding’s ‘logic’ to its grim conclusion. It is because, 
towards the beginning of the novel, many of us recognise Jack’s thoughtless, mundane 
cruelty towards Piggy and the littl’uns, recognise the temptation to unite in a pleasurable 
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“closed circuit of sympathy” (Golding, 1997 [1954]:18) against a lone, reviled outsider, 
that we are persuaded to reassess our current beliefs in light of Golding’s emerging thesis 
statement: that humans are, if not inherently evil, at least in possession of a powerful and 
disturbing capacity for evil. 
 
Parodies often perform a similar function, their calculated mimicry designed to 
problematise, as well as burlesque, elements of the source material. The Marquis de Sade’s 
Justine is, along with other derivative works such as Shamela, clearly positioned as a 
critique or refutation of Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, deftly satirising the implied values 
or worldview of Richardson’s original text as well as its formal/stylistic features. Like 
Pamela, the eponymous Justine is beautiful, ‘poor but honest’, pious, obedient and fiercely 
protective of her perpetually assailed virginity. Following the bankruptcy and death of her 
parents, she embarks upon a nightmarish picaresque, beset at every turn by the monstrous 
appetites of the rogues and libertines she encounters. Just as Richardson’s heroine 
famously safeguards her virtue through argument and sermonising, frequently declaring 
that she would rather perish than surrender her chastity outside of the religiously-
sanctioned bounds of wedlock, so Justine attempts to wring pity from the flinty hearts of 
her captors by appealing to their compassion, their religious sentiments. However, while in 
Pamela such dedication to virtue is rewarded (insofar as one can regard the prospect of 
marrying one’s would-be rapist as a happy ending), Justine’s protestations only serve to 
inflame and enrage her attackers further, while her conscience prevents her from making 
her fortune/escape on numerous occasions. 
 
Indeed, on numerous occasions throughout the text Nature is pointedly allied with, and 
invoked in defence of, acts of gratuitous and meaningless cruelty. Although the violence to 
which Justine is exposed is outlandish in method and extreme in degree, it is not, crucially, 
presented as exceptional that she is subject to violence in the first place. On the contrary, 
Sade belabours the ubiquity, the unremarkability, of her exploitation. Justine’s sufferings 
are to no avail, part of no overarching, redemptive pattern. She is a superfluous martyr, 
deprived even of the consolatory gravitas of the tragic hero. While the worldview implied 
by Justine is ultimately even more skewed and unpalatable than that offered by Pamela, as 
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Angela Carter argues in The Sadeian Woman, Sade’s work powerfully documents the 
futility, the absolute waste of trying to ameliorate one’s circumstances, as Pamela does, by 
being “a good woman in a man’s world” (Carter, 2000 [1979]:38); Justine abides by the 
“rules laid down by men and her reward is rape, humiliation and excessive beatings” 
(Carter, 2000 [1979]:38). Her adoption of the “cringe as a means of self defence” (Carter, 
2000 [1979]:47) only serves to worsen her sufferings, which, Carter points out, are as 
“gratuitous” (Carter, 2000 [1979]:39), as cosmically insignificant, as they are unceasing. 
Sade emphasises time and again throughout the text that it is inevitable – indeed 
“natur[al]” (Carter, 2000 [1979]:92) – for socially disempowered groups like women and 
those living in poverty to be tormented.  
 
As Ralph Ellison puts it in The Invisible Man, one cannot, however one tries, “grin” and 
“agree [one’s oppressors] to death” (Ellison, 2001 [1952]:16). Striving for exemplary 
conduct according to the self-serving rules set out by the powerful often simply makes it 
easier for them to more thoroughly oppress one; the notion that the meek inherit the earth 
serves a useful function for those who wish to possess it in the meantime. Justine’s 
principled refusal to answer violence with violence and her unthinking subservience to her 
‘masters’ are surely, as Carter and several other characters argue, partly motivated by the 
hope that, on this occasion, her behaviour will cause her antagonists to relent, that it will 
ensure some earthly, as well as celestial, reward. Justine herself laments the unfairness of 
her fate by appealing to providence in transactional terms – “I [...] thought that, provided I 
remained well-behaved at all times, I could be consoled for all fortune’s ills” (Sade, 2012 
[1791]:71). 
 
Like Pamela, Justine regularly invokes the existence of “an omnipotent God Who shields 
the [weak] and Who never abandons them” (Sade, 2012 [1791]:119), but her faith in a just 
world is brutally subverted. In contrast to the panglossian worldview of Pamela, 
Richardson’s underlying thesis that “virtue is rewarded in this world and that a scoundrel 
may be reformed by a virtuous example” (Bullitt, 1980:9), Sade implies that women and 
the poor will never be able to compel their oppressors to treat them justly no matter how 
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virtuous or conciliatory their behaviour.
47
 Rather, without equality, there can be no 
meaningful social contract, rendering the poor and disempowered subject to the whims of 
the wealthy few. 
 
Sade invites us to contemplate how inequalities and injustices of the sort depicted in 
Justine problematise Richardson’s account of a morally-orderly world ruled over by an 
omnibenevolent deity, in its place offering an alternative metaphysical model: that of an 
arbitrary, indifferent (or even positively malevolent) Nature, red in tooth and claw. 
Justine’s narrative logic leads the reader inexorably toward this conclusion, with Sade 
consistently emphasising the inevitability – the naturalness – of human violence and 
cruelty, at least under current social conditions, and so implicitly critiquing the worldview 
espoused throughout Pamela. 
 
Similarly, many satires and dystopias act as a kind of reductio ad absurdum, exaggerating 
an existing situation or viewpoint in order to expose inconsistencies and problems inherent 
to the original. In Margaret Atwood’s meticulously researched feminist dystopia The 
Handmaid’s Tale, she set out to depict what would happen if “certain casually held 
attitudes about women [were] taken to their logical conclusions”(Random House, 1998), 
amassing, during her research, a “large clippings file of stories supporting the contentions 
in the book” (Random House, 1998). Atwood, like Golding, characterises her novel as a 
sort of thought-experiment, stressing its relationship to reality and strongly disputing those 
who would categorise it as ‘mere’ science fiction: “No, it certainly isn't science fiction. 
Science fiction is filled with Martians and space travel to other planets […] The 
Handmaid's Tale is speculative fiction in the genre of Brave New World and Nineteen 
Eighty-Four. Nineteen Eighty-Four was written not as science fiction but as an 
                                                 
47
 Given these groups’ inability to access traditional channels of power, Dubois, the robber who befriends 
Justine toward the beginning of her travels, suggests that “the callousness of the Rich legitimates the bad 
conduct of the poor”, their refusal to “open their purse[s]” (Sade, 2012 [1791]:17) voluntarily licensing more 
coercive means of gaining alms. Similarly, when Justine attempts to dissuade the villainous Count Gernande 
from exsanguinating his wife in service of his perverse bloodlust, he reasons that women cannot expect fair 
treatment from men since there is no “mutuality” between the sexes: “I can agree not to employ force against 
him whose own strength makes him to be feared; but what could motivate me to moderate the effects of my 
strength upon the being Nature subordinates to me?”  (Sade, 2012 [1791]:114) 
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extrapolation of life in 1948. So, too, The Handmaid's Tale is a slight twist on the society 
we have now”. (Random House, 1998) 
 
Indeed, Atwood asserts, all of the practices included in her theocratic society are plucked 
from real life, based on something that is believed or “something that has already happened 
in history or in another country” (Random House, 1998), with many of the attendant 
attitudes still persisting in muted forms in the contemporary West – patronymic naming 
systems, the synonymity of female virtue with sexual chastity, extreme natalism, 
compulsorily ‘modest’ attire, religiously endorsed polygamy/concubinage and the belief 
that men are inherently sexually predacious and that women must, in order to gain 
protection from the rapacious masses, attach themselves to, and serve, an individual male. 
Atwood’s work presents us with a fairground mirror version of the world as it is, 
extrapolating from and commingling the views of reactionary forces genuinely active in 
US culture at the time (religious fundamentalists promoting the view of men as head of the 
family, an obsessive focus on sexual purity, the call for women to desert the workforce and 
return to the kitchen), historical events (Ceauşescu’s disastrous pro-natalist policies), and 
ongoing practices (Saudi Arabia’s gender apartheid, the Taliban’s brutally enforced 
modesty laws and prohibitions against female education). In the tradition of earlier 
dystopias – particularly the aforementioned Nineteen Eighty-Four – Atwood’s novel 
functions as both a dire warning of what could come to be and a fierce critique of what 
already is, implicitly encouraging the reader to see the subtle affinities, as well as the stark 
differences, between The Republic of Gilead and the society in which they live. 
 
Finally, Jonathan Littell’s ‘hard’ historical novel48 The Kindly Ones confronts readers with 
a fictionalised (but scrupulously researched/accurate) first-person account of genuine 
events and phenomena  (the Babi Yar massacre; the death march from Auschitz; the 
legalistic wrangling, monstrous, mechanised efficiency and  murder-through-bureaucracy 
that differentiated the Holocaust from previous genocides) in order to lead us to the 
conclusion that, if placed under similar conditions, we too could be capable of committing 
                                                 
48
 To appropriate  a term generally used in reference to another genre – ‘hard’ science fiction is defined by its 
adherence to the laws of physics as we currently understand them – historical fictions like Littell’s conform 
as closely as possible to what is known  about their chosen period/milieu 
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such atrocities. Littell advances his thesis in several ways. First, he relentlessly emphasises 
the importance of chance, undermining our too-ready distinction between those, like his 
protagonist Maximilian Aue, whose decisions cumulatively lead him into moral darkness, 
and those who are never forced to make such choices in the first place. At the beginning of 
the novel Aue salutes readers as his “brothers” (Littell, 2009 [2006]:4), boldly asserting 
our shared humanity. Anticipating our likely desire to repudiate  any possible commonality 
or connection with an avowed SS officer and murderer, he constantly reminds us 
throughout the novel that  “in most cases the man standing above the mass grave no more 
asked to be there than the one lying, dead or dying, at the bottom of the pit” (Littell, 2009 
[2006]:17). Like the “good Germans” (Littell, 2009 [2006]:816) whose hands are clean of 
any direct involvement in the forced labour and death camps but who nonetheless 
unwittingly benefit from the prisoners’ unceasing labours, their expropriated goods, Littell 
induces readers to consider the extent to which our comparatively blemishless consciences 
are a luxury of prosperity and peacetime, highly contingent upon the time and place in 
which we live. 
 
He attempts also to undermine any perception of the Holocaust as an exceptional and 
historically aberrant event perpetrated by uniquely evil individuals, questioning the stark 
line we draw between regrettable, but essentially unremarkable, wartime casualties and 
incomprehensible horrors, and reminding us that the massacres and pogroms in which he 
has Aue participate had innumerable historical antecedents. Littell refuses to allow the evil 
he depicts to remain safely unintelligible, to permit readers to make monsters of his 
perpetrators. Rather, he insists that, however inhumane Aue and others’ actions, however 
‘senseless’ in the colloquial/pejorative sense of the word, they were nonetheless motivated 
by “human reasons” (Littell, 2009 [2006]:24). As Aue (and, thereby, Littell) 
acknowledges, his account, and interpretation, of his experiences offers readers no 
shocking new information; Hannah Arendt’s comments on the banality of evil have 
themselves been rendered banal, so frequently are they invoked. The image of the Nazi as 
a bland ‘salaryman’ ploddingly following orders is by now an archetype in its own right. 
Rather, Littell’s novel vivifies or reawakens our antecedent knowledge about the Holocaust 
in order to compel us to recognise the disquieting role that chance plays in our moral lives. 
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Notably, it is not only the authors cited here who treat their works as being, in some sense, 
arguments against (or in favour of) which evidence might be levelled, of embodying a 
thesis whose validity is not irrelevant to their aesthetic status; many critics object to the 
novels discussed in this chapter on the grounds that they imply falsehoods, act as ‘intuition 
pumps’, shamelessly manipulating readers’ emotions in order to drive them to the desired 
conclusion, or that they simply adduce insufficient evidence for their claims. For example, 
numerous theorists including Terry Eagleton criticise Lord of the Flies precisely because 
they take its central claim – that humans are irredeemably sinful – to be inadequately 
supported by the textual evidence. It may be all too conceivable that a group of public 
schoolboys stranded on a desert island might “slaughter each other before the week was 
out” (Eagleton, 2010) but, such critics argue, Golding’s chosen  population – exclusively 
male, almost solely upper-class children – is hardly representative of all humanity. In fact, 
given that humans are differentiated from most other animals exactly by virtue of our 
remarkable plasticity, characterised by our ability to modify our behaviour in response to 
our culture and environment, Eagleton criticises Golding’s efforts to advance any claim 
about human ‘nature’ by appealing to the likely actions of an isolated and only “semi-
socialised” (Eagleton, 2010) group of boys.  
 
Similarly, if critics offering positive evaluations of The Kindly Ones cite Littell’s five years 
of diligent research, the work’s impressive factual accuracy and attention to detail, others 
justify their negative appraisal of the work by suggesting that his argument fails in one 
crucial respect. While Littell seeks to remind the reader that mobs are composed of 
“ordinary men” (Littell, 2009 [2006]:23), that “those who kill are humans, just like those 
who are killed” (Littell, 2009 [2006]:24), his thesis is, they argue, undercut by the fact that 
his protagonist is so glaringly atypical. Aue compulsively solicits men for sex while 
remaining erotically obsessed with his sister, is strongly implied to have murdered his 
mother and stepfather, and is a more than dutiful participant in the horrors his job demands 
of him, enthusiastically committing atrocities of his own volition and on his own behalf. 
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In summation, I would argue that Carroll’s characterisation of literary narratives as 
thought-experiments serves as an ingenious riposte to theorists such as Lamarque and 
Olsen, effectively undermining their claims that, because of the customary lack of 
substantiating evidence, literary works cannot facilitate understanding. I will now discuss 
another theory (also devised by Carroll) that suggests a similar mechanism, but with a 
more pronounced emphasis on literary narratives’ capacity to enrich one’s moral 
reasoning. 
 
5.3 Clarificationism and the Search for Emotional Truth 
 
In his Poetics, Aristotle describes mimesis as an “instinct of our nature” (Poetics:6), an 
innate human faculty intimately connected to the desire to learn: “through imitation [man] 
learns his earliest lessons” (Poetics:5). Mimesis is pleasurable precisely because it is 
instructive – “men enjoy seeing a likeness [because] in contemplating it they find 
themselves learning or inferring” (Poetics:6). Tragedy in particular is “a more 
philosophical and higher thing than history” (Poetics:17) since it ideally expresses the 
universal rather than the specific, the necessary rather than the contingent. While histories 
will often be episodic, recounting a sequence of events that may have no clear causal 
connection, tragedies order experience, omitting the merely incidental and foregrounding 
the causal connections between depicted events. The fact that fiction is selective – a trait 
that renders it immediately suspect to Plato, in whose metaphysics mimetic art represents 
the imperfect reproduction of an already derivative tangible realm – is, in Aristotle’s view, 
what enables it to express truths better, filtering out the quotidian irrelevancies, the 
sediment of the everyday, in order to distil that which is of wider relevance.  
 
By clothing abstract principles with fictional details, tragic narratives are able to convey 
universal truths while at the same time “eliciting [the type of] emotional response normally 
reserved for the experience of particular events” (Woodruff, 1992:86). As P. G. Woodruff 
points out, it is impossible to respond with the same level of emotion to abstract ideas as 
one would to a specific, personally experienced instantiation of the same idea. So, for 
example, simply entertaining the idea of death as an abstract entity probably will not 
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“leave a vivid enough impression” (Woodruff, 1992:86) to inspire a fearful response; if 
“the fear of death makes your blood run cold, it is the fear of a particular death – your own, 
or perhaps of someone near to you” (Woodruff, 1992:86). Perhaps there are some truths 
that are simply too immense to grasp without exposure to the sort of vivid, particularised 
scenarios literature can provide us with, and it may be that this type of truth is the most 
important of all. 
 
One morally relevant example of our inability emotionally to comprehend truths of a 
certain magnitude or those at a certain level of remove from our concrete experience is our 
counterintuitive response to widescale atrocities, particularly those that occur in faraway 
countries. Our emotional response to an account or depiction of one hundred imperilled or 
dying people is not only not one hundred times greater than our emotional response to an 
account of an imperilled or dying individual, but is typically significantly less powerful. 
Above a certain order of magnitude most of us become so desensitised as to be essentially 
numb, with very large figures literally growing inconceivable, seeming stupefyingly distant 
and unreal. Indeed, guided by research into how the “psychology of numeracy”(Thompson, 
2007) affects our responses to those in need, charities soliciting donations increasingly set 
out to combat this distancing effect, humanising large-scale problems by depicting a 
named individual in the relevant predicament, often fleshed out with biographical 
remarks.
49
 I would posit that superficially false narratives’ ability to provide us with 
vividly rendered fictional instantiations of universal principles could possibly represent a 
similar mechanism. Because such narratives are capable of arousing the passions in a way 
that fact alone cannot they may help to bridge the failure of imagination that prevents us 
from grasping the emotional import of, and dealing appropriately with, some otherwise 
indigestible truths of which we are already aware on a cognitive level. This reading may be 
understood as a variation of the clarification interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of 
                                                 
49
 Studies of this phenomenon show that even small increases in the number of individuals depicted in 
simulated adverts for charities can result in large differences in behaviour on the part of study participants: 
“In one recent experiment, Slovic presented subjects with a picture of ‘Rokia,’ a starving child in Mali, and 
asked them how much they'd be willing to give to help feed her. Then he showed a different group photo of 
two Malinese children – ‘Rokia and Moussa.’ The group presented with two kids gave 15 percent less than 
those shown just one child. In a related experiment, people were asked to donate money to help a dying child. 
When a second set of subjects was asked to donate to a group of eight children dying of the same cause, the 
average donation was 50 percent lower.” (Thompson, 2007) 
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catharsis; well-executed narratives can train or refine our emotional responses, helping to 
orient them to their appropriate objects (such an interpretation, though less popularly 
adopted than the ‘purgation’ variant, is, I would argue, rather more psychologically 
perspicacious.) 
 
Noël Carroll’s ‘clarificationist’ theory of literary truth builds upon this basic reading of 
Aristotle’s comments on catharsis while emphasising its ethical dimension, focusing upon 
literature’s capacity to allow us to emotionally engage with “moral knowledge” (Carroll, 
2000:362). Literature’s ability to provide us with “richly particularised” (Carroll, 
2000:362) instantiations or examples of universal principles or truths is, Carroll asserts, 
especially useful for moral reasoning:  the vivid fictional scenarios depicted in literature 
elicit emotional responses from audiences, and because, in many cases, “the appropriate 
criteria for having the emotion are moral (perceived justice with respect to anger; 
perceived undeservedness with respect to pity)” (Carroll, 2000:367). Carroll hypothesises 
that “exposure to certain art can sensitize us to, as Aristotle would say, the right reasons 
and objects for the emotions in question” (Carroll, 2000:367). 
 
In some cases perhaps literary narratives can even “expand our emotional powers of 
discrimination by appealing to our imagination in such a way that we come to apprehend 
some objects, say AIDS victims, as worthy of emotions such as sorrow, where previously 
we had been oblivious or even hostile toward them” (Carroll, 2000:367), subverting 
morally unjust but socially entrenched attitudes by using fictional details to humanise a 
previously faceless minority group. Essentially, narratives allow us to apply and assess 
abstract moral principles against specific fictional situations, “help[ing] us evolve a sense 
of how to employ these abstractions intelligibly and appropriately” (Carroll, 2000:368).  In 
this way, Carroll argues, literature, and art in general, can enhance and cultivate our moral 
understanding. 
 
Like Carroll, I would argue that the emotions play a central role in the apprehension of 
certain forms of knowledge. As I explained in my discussion of the “psychology of 
numeracy” (Thompson, 2007), in some cases, when the appropriate emotional responses to 
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a situation are inhibited by factors such as distance, abstractness or magnitude, cognition is 
demonstrably impeded, rather than sharpened, by a lack of emotion. Individuals often 
respond with greater urgency to small-scale, discrete and  ultimately lower risk threats than 
to more statistically significant,  but amorphous, ones, fearing terrorist attacks more than 
pollution, serial killers more than global warming. Paradoxically, the lethal scale of such 
threats renders them abstract, and therefore emotionally numbing; our inability to conceive 
of them in concrete terms preventing us from feeling, and therefore fully comprehending, 
their significance, from recognising what they portend for us as individuals and as a 
society. I would argue that this equation holds true for our moral impulses as well as our 
precautionary deliberations. Vivid, detailed depictions of individuals in distress elicit more 
compassionate, more apt responses than abstract accounts of large numbers of people in 
similar situations. Emotions are not simply a response to significant information about 
human suffering and relationships; it is they that imbue the facts themselves with personal 
significance, since the content, the import, of certain kinds of knowledge is emotional. One 
could dispassionately know of any number of suffering individuals without comprehending 
what their suffering meant, without being moved to alleviate their pain, because without its 
emotional resonance such information would have no meaning, rendered as flat and as 
drably devoid of significance as a map divested of its topographical features. 
 
In Love’s Knowledge Martha Nussbaum also argues that literature is a more appropriate 
vehicle than philosophy for certain kinds of knowledge. However, in contrast to Carroll’s 
variant of clarificationism – according to which fictions act as a heuristic tool that can help 
us to come to appreciate truths that are, in principle, graspable through other means – 
Nussbaum views fictions as uniquely cognitively valuable. She suggests  that “there may 
be some views of the world and how one should live in it […] that cannot be fully and 
adequately stated in the language of conventional philosophical prose […] but only in a 
language and in forms themselves more complex, more allusive, more attentive to 
particulars” (Nussbaum, 1990:3). In opposition to what she presents as the prevailing 
tendency in moral philosophy: the attempt to adopt a ‘god’s eye viewpoint’, standing apart 
from the messy details of human existence  and disdaining particulars in favour of general 
rules , Nussbaum extols certain literary narratives as embodying – “and setting up in the 
190 
 
reader” (Nussbaum, 1990:6) – an ethical attitude, a kind of compassionate, finely 
discerning, attention to particulars, a responsiveness to unforeseen events and complicating 
factors. 
 
As with the subjective knowledge theory, Nussbaum’s conception of the relationship 
between philosophy and literature hinges upon the notion that there are certain kinds of 
knowledge that are either more readily expressible or only expressible through select 
literary narratives, by virtue of their stylistic features as well as due to their length and 
complexity: “Style itself makes its claims, expresses its own sense of what matters. 
Literary form is not separable from philosophical content, but is itself part of content – an 
integral part, then, of the search for and the statement of truth” (Nussbaum, 1990:3). 
Fictional narratives – or at least those, like Henry James’, that succeed in capturing through 
their precision of indefiniteness, those aspects of life that elude the blunt, ‘neutral’ prose of 
conventional philosophical enquiry – convey the difficulty, and the importance, of 
‘choosing well’. Unlike those philosophical texts that proceed “without surprise, without 
incident” (Nussbaum, 1990:3), literary narratives like The Golden Bowl embody the subtle, 
shifting complexities of moral deliberation, replicate the atmospheric conditions that cloud 
our perception ‘on the ground’, rather than adopting the lofty position of many theoretical 
accounts. 
 
Lamarque and Olsen’s criticisms of Nussbaum’s conception of literary knowledge echo 
their chief arguments against other ‘truth theories’: they deny that imparting this sort of 
knowledge is either an intrinsic or universal feature of literary narratives, reject the notion 
that judgements of truth or falsity (or lucidity and perception) are part of the proper 
‘literary stance’, and object to what they perceive as the misguided attempt to appropriate 
philosophical functions and attribute them to literature. They present those, like Nussbaum, 
who seek to blur or problematise the traditional boundaries between philosophy and 
literature as espousing “philosophers’ theories of literature […theories that are] ultimately 
about the nature of philosophy and not about the nature of literature” (Truth:397). Citing 
Nussbaum’s description of certain literary narratives as exemplary cases of practical and 
moral deliberation, they argue that theories like hers, while seeking to secure literature’s 
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place as a source of cognitive value, in fact subordinate literature to philosophy, demoting 
it to a repository of convenient philosophical examples rather than treating it as an 
autonomous discipline with its own distinct functions and values: “if [such works] are 
‘exemplary’, ‘paradigmatic’, ‘patterns for public life’, then they are in need of a 
generalising commentary to elicit their exemplary value”, and such commentaries are, like 
any interpretation of a fictional narrative, “challengeable” (Truth:396), not an inherent part 
of a work.  
 
I would argue that Lamarque and Olsen’s objection here misses the mark. While 
Nussbaum does argue that some literary narratives should be seen as paradigms of moral 
insight, a central part of her theory seems to be that “correct perception” (Nussbaum, 
1990:93) is not readily codifiable or extricable from its context. Her assertion that “only 
the style of a certain sort of narrative artist (and not, for example, the style associated with 
the abstract theoretical treatise) can adequately state certain important truths about the 
world, embodying them in its shape and setting up in the reader the activities that are 
appropriate for grasping them” (Nussbaum, 1990:6) makes it clear that, in Nussbaum’s 
account, literature does not merely serve an instrumental role by helping to convey truths 
that are in principle expressible through more conventional means. Although she suggests 
that literary narratives show us that “much of moral relevance is universalisable” 
(Nussbaum, 1990:95) helping readers to recognise recurring, as well as novel, facets of 
human experience, to discern rules as well as isolated or unexpected occurrences, she also 
suggests elsewhere that the focused, sympathetic, disinterested attention such works 
command in committed readers trains and clarifies their moral perception, evoking the 
“interplay between the evolving general conception and the rich perception of the 
particular” and helping readers learn to “navigate resourcefully between these levels” 
(Nussbaum, 1990:96). This honing of perception would not be obtainable through reading 
the insights of the ‘generalising commentaries’ alone. Rather, it is sharpened through the 
reader’s imaginative and emotional engagement with vivid fictional evocations of morally 
fraught situations. General rules are not the only, or even the most valuable, means of 
acquiring knowledge about a given subject – as in Noël Carroll’s analogy of the chess 
player who studies the course and outcome of notable past games to improve her own 
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playing, there are distinct cognitive benefits to examining particular instances of, as well as 
broader trends in, moral deliberation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, I would argue that, if literature can be said to be epistemically valuable, its 
significance derives from its ability to allow us imaginatively to engage with truths from 
which we would otherwise remain emotionally remote, to hone our moral deliberation and 
perception and to induce us to re-examine and reorganise our existing beliefs. Even if one 
accepts no-truth theorists’ contention that – when stripped from their context – the vast 
preponderance of literary truths are familiar and banal, literary truths’ lack of resilience to 
being uprooted in this way does not mean that literature is devoid of any epistemic value. 
Attempting to abstract, and apply, literary truths may often result in banality because 
literary narratives are not designed to serve as vehicles for dressed-up principles; medium 
and message are not so easily extricated. As Scott Stroud argues during his defence of the 
concept of subjective knowledge, experiences cannot always be distilled into propositional 
form without leaving any significant remainder. Expecting to extract a neat, 
comprehensible and universally-persuasive thesis from a rich, morally-complex fictional 
work may be akin to attempting to summarise the ‘meaning’ of one’s personal experiences 
of a particular place or time. While it might be possible to generate loosely-accurate 
statements based upon one’s impressions, such propositions are hardly identical with the 
subjective knowledge one gained from undergoing the experiences themselves. 
 
However, it is important to note that, as Noël Carroll states in his essay “Art and Ethical 
Criticism”, criticising or commending artworks on the basis of their putative effects on 
people’s behaviour is far from uncontroversial, given the inconclusive nature of empirical 
research into the subject. To suggest, as the preceding theorists do, that fictional narratives 
may be instrumental in the apprehension of emotional/moral knowledge is, therefore, 
potentially contentious. There are certainly compelling historical cases where literary 
works appear to have been catalysts for social change: novels such as Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle famously caught the public  
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imagination, humanising ‘issues’ of the era and provoking widespread debate and shifts in 
attitude. Similarly, some studies appear to demonstrate that our emotional responses to 
vivid, detailed and individualised depictions of human suffering are more comprehending, 
more proportionate, than our dulled reactions to abstract, yet equally or more factually-
faithful, accounts, and that this may result in a greater appreciation, and assumption, of our 
moral obligations. While the generalisability of such cases currently remains unclear, I 
would argue that fictional narratives are, by virtue of certain inherent features, uniquely 
suited to facilitating the apprehension of subjective, moral and emotional ‘truths’50, and 
that these forms of knowledge are cognitively valuable even if they do not effect changes 
in our outward behaviour. This assertion does not require that the transmission of such 
knowledge is an essential or universal trait of fictional (or even, in the evaluative sense, 
‘literary’) narratives, or that it is the sole criterion of literary value, however, I would 
contend that the explication of a moral worldview, the eliciting of emotional and moral 
insights, is a non-incidental and critically-relevant feature of many fictional narratives that 
aspire to ‘literariness’. 
 
Finally, even if one rejects the claim that some fictions are capable of imparting theses or 
subjective knowledge, eliciting insights or facilitating our emotional recognition of 
otherwise inassimilable truths, Lamarque and Olsen’s corresponding assertions about the 
literary stance are both separable from this contention and, I would argue, clearly 
normative rather than descriptive. Whether or not one views the practice of appealing to 
notions of truth and falsity, discernment and myopia, as aesthetically-relevant, one cannot 
deny that authors, audience members and critics alike frequently invoke, and accord great 
importance to, such concepts as evaluative criteria. I will discuss this final point in depth 
throughout the next chapter, which delves further into the ways in which we commonly 
engage with, and construe fictions. I will argue that Boyd and Dutton’s identification of 
certain central, cross-cultural hallmarks of stories should act to dispel the haze of 
                                                 
50
 That is, I would argue that detailed, emotionally saturated, morally/socially perceptive narratives – whether 
true or false in their particulars – can educate us by providing us with varied and shifting perspectives; as I 
assert in the next chapter, I reject the claim put forth by some ‘truth-theorists’ that only fictional narratives 
are capable of enlightening us in such a manner. 
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assumptions that generate the fantasy model (and so render our attraction to genres with 
aversive content problematic or paradoxical). 
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Chapter 6: What is Fiction For? 
 
Introduction 
 
As Denis Dutton notes, while philosophical theories of art aim at universality, they are 
unavoidably “conditioned by the aesthetic issues and debates of their own time” (Dutton, 
2006:367), often concerning themselves with contentious and “boundary testing” (Dutton, 
2006:368) works like Duchamp’s Fountain or Warhol’s Brillo boxes. Adaptationists 
charge prominent theorists such as Danto and Dickie with according disproportionate focus 
to avant garde art works in their efforts to arrive at a sufficiently inclusive definition, 
constructing their theories around the hard cases to the extent that they neglect the 
“uncontroversial” (Dutton, 2006:368) core that renders more liminal works interesting or 
even comprehensible. Brian Boyd also questions philosophers’ perceived emphasis on a 
limited category of art works, arguing that that by concentrating “on High Art – on classic 
works of literature, music and visual art, or on modernist challenges to classical modes – 
[they] begin near the end of the story of art” (Origin:80).  
 
Those, like Boyd and Joseph Carroll, who argue for ‘consilience’ or the integration of 
aesthetics with Darwinian social science assert that only naturalistic or adaptationist 
theories of the arts can correct the arcane excesses of philosophical discourse and literary 
theory, illuminating the “biologically constrained set of cognitive and motivational 
characteristics [that are both] the source and subject of literature” (Carroll, J., 2004:vii). 
Castigating mainstream literary theorists for their outmoded attachment to discredited 
theoretical models like Freudianism and Marxism, Carroll argues that academic resistance 
to literary Darwinism arises from an ill-founded fear that adaptationist analyses of fiction 
will result in an arid reductionism or from an ideological opposition to the very notion of 
human nature. He asserts that by identifying the foundational dispositions and tendencies 
from which all cultures arise, adaptationists can shed light on central questions about the 
origin, appeal and meaning of fictional narratives that could never be satisfactorily 
resolved solely through traditional, humanistic  forms of enquiry, giving a unified picture 
of what art means, and has meant, to us as a species. 
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In this chapter I will assess two competing naturalistic models of the origins, and appeal, of 
fiction, assessing the merits of Steven Pinker’s byproduct hypothesis and Denis Dutton, 
Noël Carroll and Brian Boyd’s overlapping theories of fiction as a form of cognitive play 
that serves to refine mentalisation and problem-solving abilities. I will argue that, although 
Boyd in particular offers compelling analyses of certain cross-cultural features of narrative,  
making a strong case for his claim that fictions act pleasurably to hone social cognition, 
that this view is not incompatible with Pinker and others’ assertions that the arts might well 
represent an opportunistic ‘pleasure technology’ rather than a selected-for trait.  
 
6.1 The Byproduct Hypothesis 
 
Evolutionary or naturalistic theories about the near universal appeal of fiction (and art in 
general) are not synonymous with adaptationist ones. In fact, Steven Pinker rejects the 
notion that our predilection for creating and consuming art arose because it afforded any 
kind of survival advantage in our environment of evolutionary adaptedness, instead 
arguing that it represents the fortuitous, but useless, byproduct of an evolved function. 
Pinker famously likens our appetite for art to our craving for foods like strawberry 
cheesecake. In the same way that cheesecake (and similarly nutritionally dubious yet 
highly palatable foods) serves as an exaggerated or ‘supernormal’ cocktail of stimuli we 
evolved to find agreeable – simultaneously evoking “the sweet taste of ripe fruit, the 
creamy mouth feel of fats and oils from nuts and meat, and the coolness of fresh water” 
(Pinker, 1997:525) – the arts function primarily as pleasure technologies, creatively 
devised short cuts to gratifying certain evolved preferences. While Pinker regards the arts 
as a whole as selectively neutral or non-adaptive, he postulates that, as well allowing us to 
access pleasurable experiences (or a convincing simulacrum thereof) without exerting 
ourselves, fictions might also confer some cognitive benefit. Exciting our attention by 
appealing to our ingrained curiosity about the activities of our conspecifics, fictional 
narratives not only push the same ‘pleasure buttons’ as gossip about real life acquaintances 
but act like thought-experiments in which “the author places a fictitious character in a 
hypothetical situation […] and allows the reader to explore the consequences” (Pinker, 
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1997:541). Our fascination with the activities and conflicts of fictive characters is 
instructive because fictional narratives “supply us with a mental catalogue of the fatal 
conundrums we might face some day and the outcomes of strategies we could deploy in 
them” (Pinker, 1997:543). To employ Pinker’s own analogy, like chess players who 
ponder and pore over past games rather than just relying on general rules like ‘get your 
queen out early’, imaginatively and emotionally engaging with the travails of fictional 
others better equips us to take on real life situations than simply relying on (true but banal 
and over-general) aphorisms. 
Jerry Fodor rejects Pinker’s hypothesis in no uncertain terms, caricaturing his argument 
with this caustic reductio ad absurdum:  
 
What if it turns out that, having just used the ring that I got by kidnapping a dwarf to pay 
off the giants who built me my new castle, I should discover that it is the very ring that I 
need in order to continue to be immortal and rule the world? It's important to think out the 
options betimes, because a thing like that could happen to anyone and you can never have 
too much insurance (Fodor, 1998). 
 
I would argue that Fodor’s criticism here fails to refute Pinker’s claim unless one interprets 
his comments in the narrowest sense – if, as Fodor implies, Pinker is simultaneously 
arguing that mentally engaging with fictions is both always educative and that it is 
instructive only in cases where there exists a one to one correspondence between depicted 
events and future real-life events, providing audience members with a blueprint for future 
courses of action. However, one could more charitably interpret Pinker’s comments to 
suggest either that a)  some fictional narratives educate as well as delight (presumably 
those narratives whose events most closely resemble those likely to occur in real life) or b) 
that some narratives serve as literal guides to action while others merely act to cultivate 
and sharpen our deliberative and mindreading skills by immersing us in detailed and 
emotionally compelling situations that we would not otherwise encounter from such a 
privileged perspective. Dutton and Boyd’s adaptationist theories of fiction as cognitive 
play also promote this latter thesis. 
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Fodor’s purposely reductive or literalist account of fantastic fictions is also particularly 
salient because it reflects one criticism that is frequently employed against the horror genre 
– the charge that non-realist fictions are by definition escapist and frivolously irrelevant to 
real life situations, and therefore categorically devoid of any epistemological or artistic 
value. It is in part the persistent conflation of fantastical narratives with fantasies that 
renders horror problematic. While I would reject thematic and/or psychoanalytic readings 
of horror as a comprehensive solution to the genre’s appeal51, there is one obvious 
objection to Fodor’s peremptory dismissal of the notion that fantastic fictions could in any 
way serve to educate or enlighten:  specific fictional events, however improbable, can 
correspond to more mundane concerns at a metaphorical level. So, in its early seasons 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer was acclaimed for its witty translation of widely-resonant 
adolescent emotional ‘truths’ – “high school is hell”, “I slept with my boyfriend and he 
turned into a monster”, “if I can’t go out tonight it’s the end of the world” – into 
literal/physically-manifest supernatural dilemmas. Furthermore, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, although speculative fiction deals with what-ifs – often set in temporally 
or geographically remote societies, or peopled by unearthly and impossible beings – it 
cannot help but to comment on what-is, the horizons of possibility inevitably constrained 
by writers’ cultural and technological realities.  
 
For example, Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s first-wave feminist utopia Herland describes an 
idealised society solely populated by women who have, for thousands of years, reproduced 
through parthenogensis. Although the work was obviously intended to function as a radical 
critique and reimagining of dominant social norms – presenting a matriarchal, socialist and 
exclusively vegetarian nation as an exemplary society distinguished by its “perfect 
cleanness” (Perkins Gilman (1998 [1915]:16), order and abundance – the text in many 
ways uncritically reflects then-prevalent assumptions about gender, race, class and 
sexuality. The nation is surrounded by “dangerous [and technologically-naive] savages” 
(Perkins Gilman, 1998 [1915]:122) but itself populated by impeccably-civilised women of 
“Aryan stock” (Perkins Gilman, 1998 [1915]:46), whose advancement in contrast to 
neighbouring areas is strongly implied to be the result of their race and carefully-instituted 
                                                 
51
 As I discuss in further detail during my concluding chapter. 
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programme of “negative eugenics” (for generations those young women who are “held to 
be unfit” (Perkins Gilman, 1998 [1915]:59) have been discouraged from childbearing). 
Equally, although Herland’s occupants live in sisterly harmony, a “multitude activated by a 
common impulse” (Perkins Gilman, 1998 [1915]:36), they have “no sex-feeling” (Perkins 
Gilman, 1998 [1915]:78), and greet the unfamiliar notion of recreational (as opposed to 
purely procreative) sex with incomprehension and repugnance. 
 
In the last chapter I defended the interrelated claims that: 1) fictional narratives can 
embody truths, refine social and moral reasoning and/or elicit valuable shifts in thinking, 
and 2) we commonly respond to fictions as if they represent potential sources of 
information, critically assessing them in terms of their veracity and humanistic perception. 
In this section I will not address the former claim in further detail, but explore how our 
engagement with fictions as consumers as well as critics supports my second assertion. I 
will examine how, even in those cases when fictions arguably lack any wider applicability 
or resonance, our interactions with them nonetheless belie the fantasy model. In other 
words, even if, for the sake of argument,  one accepts Fodor’s (and other critics’) 
characterisation of some specimens and/or categories of fiction as epistemologically 
worthless, such narratives still seem to be shaped by our attentional biases rather than our 
real life preferences.  
 
In elaborating his own theory Brian Boyd makes two pertinent criticisms of Pinker’s 
description of the arts as, variously, “cheesecake, pleasure buttons [...and] ‘a cocktail of 
recreational drugs’” (Origin:82). First, he argues that Pinker’s array of metaphors only 
make sense if one examines the pleasures of art solely from the perspective of a consumer. 
His characterisation of aesthetic experience as a quick fix, an inventive means of snatching 
unearned pleasure, cannot be applied to those who invest considerable amounts of effort in 
producing art. Any evolutionary explanation of art is incomplete unless it can also account 
for the – surely more puzzling – corresponding phenomenon of those who are motivated to 
create art. 
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Relatedly, Boyd’s second objection is founded upon a line of reasoning central to 
adaptationist theories of art – the argument from costliness. Boyd argues that Pinker’s 
baldly stated rejection of the notion that the arts evolved in response to any selective 
pressures in fact “does the evolutionary explanation of art a great service”, clarifying why 
the byproduct hypothesis fails, for, he argues: 
 
If art involved no benefit, if it only mimicked biological advantage, as drugs do [...] yet it 
had high costs in time, energy and resources, then a predisposition to art would be a 
weakness that would long ago have been weeded out by the intensity of evolutionary 
competition (Origin:83). 
 
Since “nature selects against a cost without a benefit” (Origin:64), adaptationists like Boyd 
argue that the arts’ very omnipresence points towards some underlying function.52 While I 
will return to Boyd’s – problematic – critique of the byproduct hypothesis later, I will first 
examine two adaptationist theories of fiction (and art in general) that proceed according to 
this line of reasoning. 
 
6.2 The ‘Fiction Instinct’: Story as Cognitive Play 
 
Theorists such as Brian Boyd, Denis Dutton and Noël Carroll postulate that our 
predilection for creating and consuming fiction is “an evolved adaptation” (Instinct:105) 
rather than a (puzzlingly costly) indulgence, that, far from being irrational or unintelligible, 
the pleasures of fiction are in fact purposive. According to such theorists, narrative art 
represents an “intensified, functionally adaptive extension of [distinctively human] mental 
qualities” (Instinct:105). 
 
As Noël Carroll argues in “Narrative and the Ethical Life”, simulation, or the propensity 
imaginatively to project oneself into hypothetical scenarios, is a deep-rooted cognitive 
instrument  vital to everyday deliberation, a potent and pervasive tool enabling humans to 
                                                 
52
 Boyd’s counter-argument here is undermined by the fact that – contrary to his assertions about the 
benevolent hand of natural selection judiciously pruning out extraneous or counter-productive traits – 
recreational drug-taking in fact flourishes throughout many cultures, despite potentially incurring significant 
physical, mental and social costs and affording no obvious benefits other than pleasure. 
201 
 
“think about and communicate information about absent situations” (Carroll, 2010:50-51). 
Carroll discusses how as we habitually utilise these self-authored narratives as a kind of 
“cost-free trial run” (Carroll, 2010:51), an “awesomely adaptive” (Carroll, 2010:50) 
faculty that helps us to mentally navigate, and extricate ourselves from, high risk 
situations. The human ability to construct and entertain counterfactual scenarios exploring 
likely outcomes, to, for example, tell oneself a story about “what would happen if one 
stumbled into the lair of a predator” (Carroll, 2010:51), envision the probable 
consequences and modify one’s future behaviours accordingly, is central to our 
deliberative process. As well as arguing that narratives of this sort are indispensable to 
human decision-making, Carroll suggests that ‘cultivated’ literary narratives can “exercise 
and sharpen the talent for projecting future possibilities” (Carroll, 2010:51). The situations 
in fictional narratives tend to “call forth a matrix of future possibilities” (Carroll, 2010:52) 
about which the reader hypothesises and uses to “organise the incoming story stream” 
(Carroll, 2010:52) until the suspended possibilities collapse into one actual outcome, 
thereby, Carroll argues, honing a skill “necessary for practical deliberation of any sort” 
(Carroll, 2010:52), refining our abilities at connecting past and future events and mentally 
juggling potential outcomes. 
 
Those who subscribe to the adaptationist view argue that there are several indications that 
the human propensity for storytelling might, despite appearances, be evolutionarily 
advantageous, not least being the “brute fact of [its] pleasure and universality” 
(Instinct:105). The fact that fiction is a cross-cultural phenomenon (that is not explicable 
solely in terms of cultural transmission) is, they argue, in itself highly suggestive: while the 
norms and mores that shape a historically or geographically remote society’s fictions might 
baffle or even repel me, I am nonetheless able to comprehend how its members can find 
factually false narratives emotionally engaging and compelling in the first place. Globally, 
humans “expend staggering amounts of time and resources on creating and experiencing 
fantasies and fictions” (Instinct:109), with storytelling in various forms arising 
independently in all known cultures. Given the extent to which the production of art “taxes 
human resources”, the presence of fiction and other forms of art even in hunter-gatherer 
societies in which daily living is already rife with challenges strongly suggests that fiction 
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may confer some kind of survival advantage, somehow serving “the exigencies of human 
nature” (Carroll, 2004:101). Art production is effortful and costly, apparently squandering 
valuable time, energy and resources that could otherwise be spent in a more obviously 
utilitarian fashion, and, as Boyd argued in his critique of Pinker, nature selects against a 
cost without a benefit. Fictions are experienced as pleasurable, and “pleasure is an 
evolutionary hallmark of psychological adaptation” (Miller, 2001:21). Finally, children 
master art-like behaviours with relative ease and in a predictable trajectory (with particular 
application to the evolutionary status of fictions, evincing gradually increasing competence 
in imaginative ‘decoupling’ and pretend play). 
 
Yet, as Carroll and Dutton note, the near universal appeal of fictional narratives is initially 
problematic when viewed from an evolutionary perspective. After all, in addition to being 
(apparently) non-instrumental like other art forms, fictions in particular are, at face value, a 
source of corrupt or deceptive information; instead of consuming them with pleasure we 
could equally plausibly regard them as uninterestingly useless or even repellent, like “dull 
knives [or] the smell of rotting meat” (Instinct:109). Dutton posits three interrelated 
adaptive functions that fiction could fulfil. First, he (along with others such as Boyd, 
Carroll and Stephen Pinker) argues that our desire to engage imaginatively and emotionally 
with fictions prompts us to undertake what essentially amount to problem-oriented thought 
experiments, providing us with “low-cost, low-risk surrogate experience” (Instinct:110). 
By allowing us mentally to rehearse possible scenarios relevant to our continued 
flourishing fictional narratives act as “preparations for life and its surprises” (Instinct:110). 
As in Martha Nussbaum’s essay on the morally educative properties of fiction, “Finely 
Aware and Richly Responsible,” Dutton locates the epistemological value of fictional 
narratives not in their putative generation of maxims but in the way they hone and refine 
our cognitive faculties, allowing us to “build a store of experience in terms of individual, 
concrete cases” (Instinct:113). 
 
Secondly, Dutton cites those theorists such as Michelle Scalise Sugiyama who argue that, 
contrary to appearances, the transmission of information and inculcation of problem-
solving skills are central to fiction as it was and is practised in many societies. For 
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example, in hunter-gatherer cultures like that of the Yanomamo, Scalise Sugiyama notes 
that fiction often serves as a repository of vividly encoded information: she describes a 
Yanomamo folktale in which “Jaguar is chided by Millipede for walking so noisily through 
the jungle. Millipede rounds and softens the soles of Jaguar’s paws and teaches him to 
walk softly, without breaking branches” (Instinct:117). Scalise Sugiyama argues that this 
deceptively simple narrative is saturated with facts vital for navigating the local 
environment, covering the activities of “jaguars (predators of humans), the importance (for 
humans) of walking quietly when far from a village or camp, and by analogy also about 
strategies for ambush and measures to avoid attack by other tribes” (Instinct:117). The 
didactic features Scalise Sugiyama discerns in Yanomamo storytelling are, Dutton argues, 
equally present in fictions (oral and recorded) from other cultures, which convey 
knowledge in the form of (seemingly) incidental, background information about social 
values and customs, and even technical knowledge. Indeed, he asserts, vast quantities of 
novels and stories “particularly in the nineteenth century and up to the present, are in fact 
essentially travelogues or tales of exploration […] dramatic and memorable ways to 
present exotic information about the South Seas, darkest Africa, or the Wild West” 
(Instinct:115). 
 
Finally, and most importantly, fictions serve to “portray and examine inner experience” 
(Instinct:117), allowing audience members to navigate the mental worlds of others and 
cultivating our ability to occupy others’ perspectives. Adaptationists like Boyd and Dutton 
cite autistic individuals’ difficulties in story comprehension and lack of interest in pretend 
play as evidence that literary competence might be the result of “specialised cognitive 
subroutines”, since functional dissociability (or the predictable breakdown of a particular 
mental activity “as a result of genetic defect, disease, or accident” (Origin:190) is a 
hallmark of cognitive adaptation. 
 
As Dutton asserts, pretend play reliably emerges among children of all cultures at around 
eighteen months to two years – “about the time that they begin to talk and engage socially” 
(Instinct:108). Dutton argues that imaginative play represents a developmental landmark in 
children’s cumulative acquisition of a theory of mind/simulation abilities, illustrating their 
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growing ability to imaginatively emulate the thoughts and behaviours of others (although 
one must exercise caution when speculating about this apparent relationship, since, as 
critics of this theory note, children consistently fail false belief tests until considerably after 
this point). Our attraction to such imaginative pursuits is adaptive, he suggests, because our 
desire to engage in pretend play and with fictional narratives allows us pleasurably to 
investigate the inner lives of others, honing our predictive and ‘mind-reading’ skills. 
Notably, autistic children do not typically display the same interest or proficiency in 
pretend play as neurotypical children, indicating that an attraction to fiction-making and 
consuming and (eventual) competence in mentalising may well be linked.  
 
Certain notable features of fictional narratives buttress the claims of adaptationists: stories 
are, with vanishingly few exceptions, about persons
53
 and their actions, thoughts and 
feelings, rather than physical objects or natural events. In addition to focusing upon human 
agency, fictions turn on problems and conflict. Boiled down to their barest essence, stories 
involve “1. A human will and 2. some kind of resistance to it” (Instinct:118). While the 
problematic events around which a narrative revolves may be purely internal or 
remembered, fictions require conflict of some sort to compel audience members’ attention; 
as Dutton argues “‘Mary was hungry, Mary ate dinner’ narrates a sequence of events” 
rather than a story, flat and replete where stories should tantalise, whereas “‘John was 
starving but the pantry was empty’” (Instinct:118) at least hints at the beginning of one. 
Finally, fictions are emotionally engaging as well as imaginatively compelling, affectively 
“saturated” (Instinct:122) from start to finish. By allowing audience members to explore 
varied and shifting emotions in response to the travails of characters, fictions provide us 
with “templates” for emotional life, helping readers to “navigate life in control of their 
emotions rather than being controlled by them” (Instinct:123). 
 
                                                 
53
 I use the term persons rather than people since stories centring on the activities of nonhuman animals, 
spectres, gods, demons, aliens or robots are relatively common, particularly in fables, genre fiction and 
children’s literature. However, as Dutton remarks, in those instances where narratives follow animals etc, 
they are nonetheless viewed through an anthropomorphising lens, acting very much like humans in furry 
coats– Hans Christian Andersen’s romantically-inclined tin soldier and Richard Adam’s questing rabbits burn 
with familiar desires and aspirations, and display decidedly human characteristics. Even in those rarer cases 
where genuinely ‘alien’ aliens appear in a fiction, the narrative usually focuses on the implications the 
existence of these ineffable creatures pose for humans. 
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Each of these features is cross-culturally characteristic of fictional narratives. If fictions 
function solely as a pleasure technology, servings of ‘mental cheesecake’, it seems  hard to 
explain why conflict is an indispensable narrative ingredient, why stories so often focus 
upon elements of life that afford us discomfort and evoke a spectrum of (not always 
pleasurable) emotions. As Joseph Carroll argues in Literary Darwinism such persistent 
features of fictional narratives should make it clear that “the pleasure specific to literature 
does not limit itself to vicarious participation in fantasy fulfilments” (Carroll, J., 
2004:133). It is important to reiterate at this point that by invoking such claims I do not 
mean to suggest that we do not derive some form of pleasure from engaging with 
narratives with painful subject matter, or that we choose to read them with a higher, 
educative purpose in mind. Similarly, some fictions might be particularly pleasurable 
because they confront us with enduring problems – exploiting our interest in certain 
especially common or intractable predicaments because they reliably provoke intense 
attentional and emotional engagement – only to provide us with illusorily neat and 
satisfactory resolutions of the sort that are rarely available in real life, thereby acting as a 
more complicated form of wish-fulfilment. Rather, I would argue that the fact that conflict 
is unquestioningly acknowledged as  the starting point of any fictional narrative, the 
necessary ‘hook’ for securing readers’ attention,  demands that we re-examine the implicit 
assumptions about the nature of fiction’s pleasures that underlie the fantasy model. 
 
If, as adaptationists argue, we possess an innate, evolved “storytelling instinct” 
(Instinct:127), if creating and consuming fictions somehow increases our fitness (or did so 
in our ‘environment of evolutionary adaptedness’), acting as a more sophisticated, ongoing 
form of pretend play that sharpens our problem-solving abilities and encourages us to 
adopt others’ perspectives, then these requirements make considerably more sense. Rather 
than living, as the majority of non-human animals are currently believed to, as “naïve 
realists” (Instinct:106) residing, and responding, wholly in the moment, humans’ 
distinguishing feature is our ability to ruminate about past and future, to strategise and 
engage (imaginatively and emotionally) with hypothetical scenarios. Many adaptationists 
argue that “fictional storytelling [...] does not function separately from this faculty [for 
supposition] but is an enhancement and extension of counterfactual thinking into more 
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possible worlds with more possible experiences than real life could ever offer up to an 
individual” (Instinct:114). 
 
6.3 Boyd’s On the Origin of Stories 
 
Brian Boyd defines art as “a kind of cognitive play, the set of activities designed to engage 
human attention through their appeal to our preference for inferentially rich and therefore 
patterned information” (Origin:85). He argues that our predilection for engaging in, and 
with, various art forms serves to train and stimulate our minds, just as physical play 
conditions the body. 
 
As humans, we inhabit a unique “cognitive niche [...] gain[ing] most of our advantages 
from [our] intelligence” (Origin:89). Boyd argues that certain species-wide aesthetic 
preferences (like our inbuilt affinity for symmetry, our fascination with ‘open ended’ 
pattern) reflect an evolved craving for information. We are attracted to particular kinds of 
stimuli because they help us to make sense of the world. In those cases where “information  
[...] lacks meaningful pattern” (Origin:89) we are unable to glean anything useful from  it, 
whereas completely predictable patterns do not compel our attention for long because we 
have nothing further to learn from them. An “unpredictable combination of patterns” 
(Origin:90), however, rewards scrutiny, yielding potentially important information upon 
further consideration. Art, like other forms of play, is both intrinsically pleasurable or 
“self-rewarding” (Origin:92) and beneficial, arresting enough to capture our attention and 
information-rich in ways that help to hone vital human skills and capacities. As Boyd 
argues, “the more pleasure that creatures  have in play in safe contexts, the more they will 
happily expend energy in mastering skills needed in urgent or volatile situations” 
(Origin:92), refining key competencies. Fictional narratives pleasurably train our “social 
cognition, [rendering it] faster, more efficient, and more accurate” (Origin:191), improving 
our capacity to recognise “social and agential patterns” (Origin:192). 
 
Boyd argues that fiction also “increases the range of our vicarious experience and 
behavioural options [exposing us to] possible opportunities and risks” (Origin:193) without 
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incurring any of the penalties associated with real-life risk-taking. Anticipating criticisms 
such as Fodor’s acerbic reductio, he argues that it is not necessary for fictional situations to 
precisely mirror real life in order to act as a guide for action – like thought-experiments, 
narratives can prompt us to reflect upon reality even when they invoke improbable or 
impossible situations. 
 
Equally, Boyd contends, an “evolutionary appreciation of [human nature] and social 
behaviour […] helps us to highlight authors […] as strategists” (Origin:233), identifying 
the ways in which narratives are constructed to earn and retain our attention. As in Pinker’s 
cheesecake example, Boyd asserts that fiction is so successful at compelling our attention, 
at effecting our emotional entanglement, because it acts as “a superstimulus […] focusing 
on intense experience and concentrated change” (Origin:193). Acting as a distillation of 
the arresting, information-rich and/or atypical aspects of human existence, stories fascinate 
us because of the ways in which they diverge from, as well as correspond to, our 
experience and even our desires. As the cross-cultural appeal of the surprising, the 
innovative, the taboo and the ontologically-transgressive in fictional narratives illustrates, 
while we engage with fictions because they afford us pleasure, they do not function as an 
uncomplicated ‘pleasure technology’ that simply allows us to access gratifying 
experiences. According to Horace’s dictum, fictions please and educate; as Boyd’s cross-
cultural analysis of fictional narratives illustrates, fictions most often please by fascinating, 
moving and enthralling us rather than by satisfying our real life desires, confronting us 
with the provocative, disquieting and fearful aspects of life as often as they present us with 
aspirational and uplifting fantasies. Whatever the origins and educative status of art, I 
would argue that Boyd’s central insight – that narratives are, first and foremost, designed 
to capture and retain attention, and that we find them so attractive because of the ways in 
which they excite our curiosity – is itself compelling. 
 
Like many other theorists addressing the appeal and cultural purpose of fictional 
narratives, Boyd makes some rather exalted claims on fiction’s behalf, favourably 
comparing the cognitive, social, and moral effects of fictional narratives with those of 
factual ones. According to Boyd, “another feature of fiction – but not of fact – also 
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encourages the development of a moral sense […because] story by its nature invites us to 
shift from our own perspective to that of another” (Origin:197), allowing us access to 
characters’ very thoughts. Although it is true that fictional narratives can provoke moral 
reflection, it is unclear why theorists such as Boyd are unwilling to extend this property to 
factual narratives of equivalent depth and thoughtfulness. Given that fictions are written by 
individuals, the multiple perspectives Boyd invokes in fiction’s favour are no more likely 
adequately to reflect real life qualities of character and opinion than, for example, a 
writer’s painstaking attempt accurately to convey the thoughts and experiences of 
another/others whose life they wish to convert into a fully-realized narrative. I would argue 
that Boyd’s desire to demarcate factive from fictive narratives, and to secure for the latter 
an autonomous status and value, leads him to exaggerate the uniqueness of fictions. 
 
It is certainly conceivable that there are ideas, experiences and phenomena that fictions are 
uniquely suited to exploring: from novels examining the possible repercussions of minor or 
major deviations in world history or the invention of fantastical new technologies, to works 
set in a desolate post-apocalyptic or prehistoric environment, narrated by a lone 
survivor/inhabitant. It is also highly plausible that, as Boyd et al argue, fictional narratives 
are morally enriching, enhance social cognition, hone our deliberative skills and widen our 
repertoire of possible responses to challenging or novel situations. However, it is unclear 
why factual narratives are categorically unsuitable for fulfilling these same purposes. I 
would argue that Boyd and others’ determination to deny similar powers to factual 
narratives betrays an understandable defensiveness:  because fictions have, for a long time, 
been viewed as suspiciously akin to falsehoods, or equated with indulgent, escapist 
fantasies, it is tempting for their defenders to accord them not just equal but greater value 
than fact (for some purposes at least). However, in the case of adaptationist accounts of 
fiction, this insistent differentiation also serves to underline their opposition to the notion 
that fiction might act primarily as a pleasure technology; if fictions push quite different 
‘buttons’, if they serve some utterly distinct set of functions, it renders it less thinkable that 
they were devised simply as an opportunistic means of gratifying our desire for social 
information and engaging with challenging counterfactual scenarios. I would argue that it 
is simultaneously possible that fictions act as a form of information-rich cognitive play in 
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the ways that Boyd argues, fine-tuning various mental faculties, and that they are merely 
the fortuitous byproduct of some other selected-for trait. 
 
As Katja Mellmann points out in her critique of Boyd’s work (which I will discuss in detail 
in the next section of this chapter), Pinker’s description of the arts as mental cheesecake is 
in fact perfectly reconcilable with Boyd’s vision of fictional narratives as 
‘superstimulating’, information-rich play. Although Pinker’s description of art in terms of 
consumerism obscures the costly, effortful nature of art production, the byproduct 
hypothesis itself does not require such a (mis)emphasis, as Stephen Jay Gould and 
Mellmann make clear. 
 
6.4 Can the Byproduct Model Coexist with Boyd’s Vision of Fictions as Cognitive 
Play? 
 
As I briefly discussed earlier, Boyd attacks the byproduct hypothesis on the grounds that 
“nature selects against a cost without a benefit” (Origin:83), arguing that the very 
costliness and cultural ubiquity of art-making serves as evidence for its status as an 
adaptation. I will now address this line of reasoning in greater depth, assessing the counter-
arguments of Gould and Mellmann and explaining why Boyd’s argument fails to refute – 
or even contradict – Pinker’s assertion that many of the arts may serve no particular 
adaptive function, however many genuinely beneficial post hoc uses they fulfil. 
 
In ‘The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm’, Gould famously criticises 
adaptationists’ quixotic faith in “the near omnipotence of natural selection in forging 
organic design and fashioning the best of all possible worlds” (Gould & Lewontin, 
1979:150), arguing that the adaptationist programme is marred by an over-reliance on 
reverse engineering and a lack of consideration of how developmental constraints affect 
phenotype. Gould charges adaptationists and evolutionary psychologists in general with an 
endemic failure adequately to distinguish between “current utility […and] reasons for 
origin”, noting that “male tyrannosaurs may have used their diminutive front legs to 
titillate their female partners, but this will not explain why they got so small” (Gould & 
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Lewontin, 1979:147). In other words, byproducts of selected-for traits may be selectively 
neutral or even beneficial, despite their lack of functional design (even if, as in the case of 
art, the byproducts exert costs in time and energy the coincidental benefits they confer may 
still balance or outweigh the negatives). 
 
Although less sceptical about the adaptationist field of inquiry than Gould, Mellmann, in 
‘The Multifunctionality of Idle Afternoons. Art and Fiction in Boyd’s Vision of 
Evolution’, echoes many of his criticisms when addressing the flaws of Boyd’s theory in 
particular (as well as identifying further deep-rooted problems with Boyd’s model54). 
Mellmann states that the adaptive purposes Boyd attributes to the arts could equally be 
interpreted as fortuitous effects: art may well serve to fine-tune essentially human skills, 
increase social cohesion through fostering shared attention and engender more creative 
problem-solving without having evolved to acquit these functions. For, she argues, “If a 
trait which is selected as a successful reply to a specific selective pressure also proves 
beneficial in many other contexts, this does not make that trait an adaptation to those 
contexts […] although  behaviours involving that trait might unsolicitedly occur in these 
contexts very frequently” (Mellman, 2009:4). 
 
Boyd ascribes a multitude of functions to our love of fiction (although he maintains that its 
chief purpose is the training of social cognition), optimistically asserting that it  “may offer 
one advantage, like echolocation in bats, or many, like an elephant’s trunk, which evolved 
to sniff, dislodge, grasp, pull, deliver, push, twist, caress, siphon, and squirt” (Origin:81). 
Mellman criticises Boyd’s claims, arguing that Boyd’s identified functions represent 
different uses of the trunk as a whole, the result of myriad smaller specialised 
mechanisms/adaptations including “an entire olfactory system in its perceptual apparatus 
[…and]a sophisticated muscular system at the end of the trunk”(Mellman, 2009:5). 
 
Mellmann contends that Boyd’s linguistic imprecision, his persistent conflation of uses 
with functions, reflects pervasive “deficiencies in [his] evolutionary-theoretical 
framework” (Mellman, 2009:6): “although Boyd […] seems to employ [the] strictly 
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analytical concept of adaptation [as it is used in evolutionary biology] in actual fact, he 
departs significantly from it. The concept he actually employs is a made-up notion of 
‘adaptation’, idiosyncratically extended to include multifunctionality.”(Mellman, 2009:6) 
 
In contrast to Boyd, she argues that it is perfectly plausible that art could be both “an 
eminently cultural behaviour” (Mellman, 2009:3) yet cross-culturally ubiquitous. Rather 
than positing any crude, binary nature-culture divide, Mellmann means to suggest that the 
arts could be the inevitable behavioural byproduct of certain indispensable “biological 
substrates”, repeatedly emerging in varying “conventionalised form[s]” despite their lack 
of functionality simply because “in order to eliminate those behaviours from the human 
genetic program” (Mellman, 2009:3), natural selection would have to eliminate the 
underlying substrates. Boyd’s insistent focus upon the costliness of art-making valuably 
counters Pinker’s over-emphasis on the purely hedonistic aspects of aesthetic experience 
but does not address the substance of the byproduct/spandrel  hypothesis. In fact, like 
Gould, Mellmann argues that evolution is rather more forgiving (or less efficient at 
eliminating maladaptive traits) than many adaptationists would have it, “simply 
tolerat[ing] a lot of potential behaviours that are not themselves adaptive” (Mellman, 
2009:3). Byproducts of selected-for traits may be selectively neutral or even beneficial, 
despite their lack of functional design (even if, as in the case of art, the byproducts exert 
costs in time and energy the coincidental benefits they confer may still balance or outweigh 
the negatives). 
 
Costly but instrumentally useless behaviours like art-making may be tolerable, from an 
evolutionary point of view, solely because they are the unavoidable concomitant to more 
desirable traits. If humans are designed to crave potentially useful information about those 
we know (particularly powerful or socially-esteemed others), we may also be predisposed, 
under certain circumstances,  enjoyably to fritter away time reading magazines filled with 
salacious gossip about faraway celebrities, but it does not follow that we have a ‘celebrity 
gossip instinct’. While it might be protested that the art forms that Boyd and Miller discuss 
are cross-cultural, whereas gossip magazines are a more recent and culturally-limited 
phenomenon, one could argue that adaptationists like Boyd extend their conclusions to a 
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wide spectrum of related phenomena – conclusions which may well be true of the 
spontaneous, art-like play behaviours in which even young children and some animals 
engage, such as pretend play or deriving pleasure from ornamenting themselves/their 
environments – thus drawing faulty, and falsely generalising, inferences about the adaptive 
functions of more conventionalised and culturally inflected art forms. 
 
This may seem like a purely semantic dispute; Boyd’s theory of art, and narrative in 
particular, as a form of selected-for cognitive play, is both seductive and intuitively 
plausible. His argument that art should be regarded as a natural kind because the same 
approximate forms of art consistently appear across various cultures and throughout 
history is also persuasive. However, one could argue that, just as a genuinely selected-for 
and adaptive desire to engage in various forms of physical play – rough-and-tumble games 
of pretended aggression, games in which players alternate between fleeing or giving chase, 
games of targeted throwing and catching – can find expression in both ancestrally-
programmed, adaptive forms and equally pleasurable but more codified, culturally 
extrapolated, and no-longer-adaptive iterations, so too could  different forms and variations 
of art differ in origin and adaptive value.  
 
For example, the fact that humans cross-culturally enjoy engaging in games, like football, 
that serve to improve co-ordination and general fitness, may well indicate that such forms 
of play fulfil an adaptive purpose in the same way that animal play serves to prepare 
players for future activities and  problem-solving, honing and fine-tuning their natural 
capacities. However, it remains unclear to what extent football as a modern cultural entity 
can be considered an adaptation or adaptive, particularly given the ways in which fans 
demonstrate their fervour for the game, with many lavishing time, energy and money on 
following a purely recreational pursuit which is not fine-tuning their skills and fitness 
levels. While, as with the arts, it may well be the case that following a particular team 
fosters in-group cohesion through promoting shared attention, the ways in which people 
engage with football (as a cultural phenomenon) might be quite dissimilar to the ways that 
people participate in informal, football-like games across various cultures, flexing different 
physical and mental muscles and affording entirely different benefits. 
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As prominent evolutionary psychologists stress, the proximal mechanisms that prompt us 
to act in species-typical ways – the love we feel for our close genetic relations, our appetite 
for sweet, fatty foods, our attraction to facially symmetrical members of our preferred sex  
and, most relevantly to this chapter, our putative ‘fiction instinct’ or “compulsive delight in 
fictional representations” (Origin:72) – evolved to enhance our fitness not in our current 
environment, but in our ‘environment of evolutionary adaptedness’ (or EEA): as members 
of small hunter-gatherer bands in the Pleisticine-era. To quote Leda Cosmides’ and John 
Tooby’s pithy summation of the concept, according to evolutionary psychologists “our 
modern skulls house a stone-age mind” (Cosmides & Tooby, 2012 [1997]). Boyd and 
Dutton criticise contemporary philosophers of art for placing undue emphasis on liminal 
and meta art, leaving the uncontested majority of art works to languish in a state of critical 
neglect, whereas, they suggest, definitions and “explanations need to start much further 
back: […] with a timeless scene like a father playfully distracting his child by miming an 
ape [...and] choosing to play up to a few onlookers” (Origin:80). Yet one could argue that 
it is equally questionable as to how far adaptationists can profitably generalise from proto-
fiction/art-like behaviours of this sort to their cultural extrapolations. As in Stephen 
Pinker’s view of humans as canny pleasure-maximisers, gratifying our evolved preferences 
in an opportunistic fashion, the love of fictional story(telling) that arises in all human 
cultures could simply represent the inevitable, but unselected-for, byproduct of a genuinely 
adapted avidity for social information and/or propensity for imaginatively and emotionally 
engaging with counterfactual scenarios. 
 
While  I argue that Boyd and Dutton’s description of fiction’s pleasures and (cultural) 
purposes does not necessarily entail, or supply sufficient evidence for, the view that 
fictions represent an adaptation, I would contend that Boyd and Dutton’s account of fiction 
as a form of cognitive play – attractive because of the ways in which it appeals to our 
craving for information and pattern – is both intuitively appealing and supported by their 
incisive analyses of cross-cultural features of narratives. As I argue in my introductory 
chapter, much of the perturbation and puzzlement aroused by genres that depict violent or 
distressing content stems from the perception that we value narratives insofar as they allow 
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us to access gratifying experiences, that we find stories pleasurable only if they remain 
adequately servile to our real life desires. Boyd and Dutton’s identification of ubiquitous 
and foundational fictional tropes – such as the universal narrative preoccupation with 
conflict – fatally undermines this viewpoint by presenting a more plausible, and 
evidentially-grounded, alternative to the fantasy model. 
 
These theorists’ work supports my contention – developed in further detail in my 
discussion of the paradox of fiction and the appeal of the sublime, tragedy and horror – that 
our responses to fictions are neither strictly insulated, nor wildly divergent, from our 
reactions to vividly-realised accounts of real or possible events. In other words, although 
our fascination with fictional representations of violence and suffering is not the product of 
some perverse predilection for real life cruelty nor yet is this type of curiosity neatly 
confined to fictions (as many theorists argue when discussing the allure of tragedy). 
Rather, I would suggest that fictions are pleasurable because of the ways in which they are 
calculated to stimulate our appetite for certain kinds of knowledge: fictions follow the 
actions of persons, dwell upon conflict, peril and misfortune and foreground anomalous 
beings and events (including many cases when such creatures and happenings are depicted 
as obstructing human interests and flouting aesthetic or moral values) because such 
features reliably excite feelings of urgency and suspense in audience members. I would 
argue that this striking correspondence between fictive strife and narrative pleasure 
suggests a competing model of fiction’s appeal – in which fictions excite our curiosity by 
acting as pseudo-factual accounts of potentially relevant situations and actors, exploiting 
our desire to keep abreast of novel and pertinent information. 
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Chapter 7: The Problem with Pleasure 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout this thesis I have suggested that the alleged paradox constituted by our 
enjoyment of sad or fearful fictions, and, by extension, the view that an attraction to such 
genres must imply some worrisome want of compassion, is generated by an unduly 
restrictive notion of pleasure. While this conception of narrative enjoyment is seldom 
explicitly articulated, I have argued that this tacitly-held definition becomes evident both in 
the sporadic moral panics about violent and distressing media and, more subtly, in the 
theories of those seeking to explain their perplexing pleasures.  
 
The theory I advance in this chapter developed in opposition to a theoretical background 
shaped by two central disavowals: the denial that our direct responses to genres with 
negative subject matter can ever, in themselves, be pleasurable, and the concomitant 
refusal to concede any kinship between high narrative forms such as tragedy and the lowly 
and traditionally disreputable horror genre.   
 
Meta-responses, favourable and otherwise, undoubtedly play a recognisable and important 
role in numerous kinds of aesthetic experiences: one might feel pride at being the sort of 
person who is able to decipher and enjoy an allusive, densely written highbrow novel; feel 
ashamed at one’s queasy fascination with a grisly true crime documentary; preen oneself 
upon one’s ability to guess ‘whodunnit’ or to unflinchingly withstand a frightening scene 
in a film. However, I would argue that many theorists overstate meta-responses’ role in the 
pleasures of tragedy and related genres while concomitantly neglecting to note the ways in 
which our direct responses to works involving even emotionally painful subject matter can 
be experienced as at least ambivalently pleasurable, compelling and/or valuable. If we 
often use art as mirror of sorts, scrutinising our responses to various stimuli, comparing our 
situation to that of a fictional character’s, I would argue that a more fundamental impulse 
in our engagement with art is the desire to look outside of ourselves, to experience the 
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momentary eclipse of self-consciousness that Burke identifies as paradigmatic of the 
sublime. 
 
Similarly, many prominent theories of tragedy purposefully reiterate and invoke the divide 
between high and low genres featuring unpleasant content. By explicitly defining its allure 
in highly genre-specific ways, arguing that tragedy appeals because it offers us otherwise 
inaccessible insights, consolations or intimations of our own transcendence, such theorists 
forestall any identification of its pleasures with the tawdry thrills commonly ascribed to 
other, ‘lower’ genres that share similarly aversive subject matter. For example, while Flint 
Schier endorses an epistemological solution to the paradox of tragedy – denying that our 
attraction to tragic fictions is rooted in any traditionally pleasurable feelings, attributing it 
instead to agonised fascination – he likens any pleasure afforded by the horror genre to the 
frisson felt by those watching an execution: a sort of “terror tinged with self-
congratulation” (Schier, 2004 [1983]:199). We only feel compelled to bear witness to the 
suffering of tragic protagonists because the type of “moral enormities [depicted by 
tragedies] are a part of our lives [my italics]” (Schier, 2004 [1983]:202). One can infer 
that, for Schier, the distinction – the justification – lies in the fact that “things are actually 
like that”( Schier,  2004 [1983]:202). In contrast, there can be no equivalent drive to view 
“fantasies of torture and mass murder” (Schier, 2004 [1983]:202); we cannot feel ourselves 
to be under any similar duty to attend to the kind of violent acts depicted in horror because 
they wear their fictionality on their sleeve, bearing no clear relevance to real life suffering. 
Therefore, those who nonetheless choose to consume such narratives can safely be 
assumed to be indulging baser appetites.  
 
Those resistant to comprehensive solutions also choose to emphasise another distinction 
between high narrative genres that deal in human suffering  (such as tragedy)  and low 
ones  (such as melodrama, horror and the kind of commercially-targeted factual accounts 
found in misery memoirs, women’s magazines and true crime documentaries). While they 
undeniably share a common substance – similarly preoccupied with the less savoury 
aspects of human existence, addressing subjects such as incest, murder, madness and 
mayhem – such theorists argue against any relaxation of generic boundaries on the grounds 
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of style. A venerable solution to the alleged paradox (and one that defends against any 
disquieting implications) is the claim that tragedy’s bittersweet pleasure derives not from 
its content, but the artistry with which it is presented. When viewing a tragedy our pleasure 
may coincide with our pain, but each originate from quite different sources. Our pleasure 
in a tragedy’s eloquence and our pained response to its subject matter do not ‘mix’ or form 
a single, hedonically-altered, solution, but coexist in an uneasy suspension. However, the 
eloquence explanation is, for obvious reasons, rarely extended to despised and low-brow 
genres like horror. 
 
In contrast to these views, I will present a comprehensive solution to the apparent paradox 
posed by our enjoyment of narratives designed to provoke negative emotions, rejecting 
those solutions that attribute the allure of the sublime, tragedy and horror to more 
straightforwardly pleasurable meta-responses or reflections. Instead, I argue that the 
pleasures of such narrative genres demonstrably reside in the very intensity of our direct 
responses, the cognitive and emotional absorption that well-crafted fictions can inspire. I 
also suggest that, while our emotional responses to ‘paradoxical’ genres such as horror are 
genuinely negative, integrally rather than merely typically/conventionally unpleasant, they 
are far from incidental to such genres’ appeal.  
 
Tragedy, the sublime and horror only become problematic if one assumes that that which 
affords us pleasure is, or should be, coextensive with that which is pleasant. While many 
prominent accounts of these genres strive to translate their bittersweet pleasures into more 
readily comprehensible terms – hypothesising that immense and terrifying natural objects 
allow us to appreciate our supersensible essence, that tragedy speaks to our longing for 
order or transcendence, that horror grants us a pleasurable pang of schadenfreude – I will 
argue that these genres do not constitute a paradox in the first place. In contrast to those 
theorists who position these genres as anomalies in need of further explanation, wildly 
divergent from other narrative forms, I would argue that the allure of tragedy and horror is, 
in actuality, paradigmatic of the appeal of fiction as a whole. In fact, any general theory of 
fiction’s pleasures that fails to account or must make special provision for the appeal of 
these genres is fatally inadequate.  
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7.1 Reviving the Boredom Model 
 
My account of the pleasures of apparently painful genres builds upon one influential, but 
deeply flawed, theory known as the boredom model. The Abbé Du Bos advances one 
among many iterations of this model, arguing that tragedy pleases because it rouses its 
audience from that most insufferable of states – the torpor that engulfs us when we are 
deprived of “all passion and occupation” (Hume, 2004 [1742]:25). In Baxter Hathaway’s 
words, Du Bos’ thesis is predicated upon the notion “that man's most urgent need is for 
activity, not serenity […for] more life, not less” (Hathaway, 1947:678). However 
unpleasant the emotions that tragedy elicits, Du Bos argues, they are preferable to the 
oppressive tedium of the unstimulated mind. In frantic search of diversion, we seize more 
or less indiscriminatingly upon any means of respite. 
 
Du Bos’ theory has its latter day proponents. In A Philosophy of Pain, Arne Johan Vetlesen 
argues that even if it is true that 
 
all human beings and all known societies [avoid and abhor pain] – it is far from being the 
whole story. For while it is true that we shun pain, it is equally true that it turns us on, it 
excites us, and we actively seek it. In short pain is not something neutral: we are not 
indifferent to it […] In line with what I have said above, pain, then, is charged. What we 
need to realise is that the chargedness of pain [is in certain contexts experienced as] 
fascinating, attractive and in that sense positive (Vetlesen, 2009: 11). 
 
While Du Bos’ theory is crudely over-encompassing, failing to discriminate between the 
desire to engage with painful fictional narratives, to observe or contemplate calamitous and 
distressing events from a safe vantage point and/or to deliberately expose oneself to 
emotional or physical pain, it is, with obvious caveats, psychologically perceptive. Equally, 
although Du Bos fails to offer any convincing explanation as to the particular appeal of the 
genres in relation to which his model is invoked – elucidating why we might prefer 
viewing a tragedy to, for example, staring at a blank wall, while failing to shed any light 
upon the question of why we would ever actively choose to consume such narratives when 
other genres were also available – it nonetheless possesses an important kernel of insight. 
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Edmund Burke’s account of the pleasures of tragedy and the sublime represents a vital 
fortification of the suggestive, but in itself plainly inadequate, boredom model. As he 
notes, there is something inherently attention-provoking, some peculiar charge or 
fascination, about the kind of objects we associate with the sublime and tragedy. Burke 
characterises our experience of the sublime and tragedy as Janus-faced, reflexive and 
overwhelming, simultaneously intensely pleasurable and alarming. We are instinctively 
captivated by scenes of human suffering and held in thrall by objects that evoke thoughts 
of danger because it is adaptively advantageous for us to be so. Burke advances the view 
that we were divinely fashioned to derive some measure of delight from scenes of 
suffering, our pleasure “hinder[ing] us from shunning” (Enquiry:46) those in need. Our 
attraction to fictional (and factual) destruction is thus not due to sadism, but its very 
opposite; like recent theorist Flint Schier, Burke stresses that our appetite for tragedy stems 
from a compulsion to attend to those elements of existence that are most hostile. 
 
I would argue that this hypothesis also has the potential to elucidate our relationship with 
fiction as a whole. As I note during my discussion of adaptationist analyses of fictions, the 
striking synonymity of narrative and conflict suggests that the pleasures of fiction typically 
reside in fascination rather than fantasy-fulfilment: we seem to engage with stories as a 
kind of cognitive play, with narratives gratifying our innate hunger for experience, our 
appetite for knowledge. Just as many common human amusements contrive to elicit our 
interest by (at least initially) thwarting or frustrating us, exciting our desire to learn and 
master new skills – the computer game pitched at purposely rising levels of difficulty, the 
fiendish crossword or intricate jigsaw puzzle – so we find the mental and emotional 
‘exertion’ of consuming narratives focusing on problematic situations stimulating.   
 
If the fantasy model ascribes us a certain imaginative indolence or timidity – assuming that 
we consume fictions solely in order to be cosseted, to realise our more impractical or 
unacceptable desires – I would argue that, to the contrary, we enjoy engaging with fictions 
exactly because we are predisposed to enjoy certain kinds of mental effort. We are 
compelled by fictional narratives because, as the boredom model suggests, we crave “more 
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life, not less”. Insofar as stories mimic accounts of potentially relevant events, they 
tantalise our native desire to acquire knowledge and broaden our store of experiences 
(which in themselves represent a specific kind of knowledge). As previously stated, by 
rejecting the pleasure model I do not mean to imply that we do not enjoy stories, or that we 
consume fictions as part of any conscious effort to improve ourselves; rather, I wish to 
question the unfeasibly restrictive definition of pleasure employed by those who present 
the allure of tragedy, the sublime and horror as genuinely inscrutable or alarming. The 
compulsion to rescue such genres from paradoxicality by attributing their appeal to 
unambivalently agreeable meta-responses illustrates the extent to which this narrow 
conception of pleasure shapes discourse about our relationship with fictions. 
 
7.2 The Necessity of Narrative Conflict: Pleasure and Attention 
 
As Hume points out in his consideration of tragedy’s pleasures, fictive strife has always 
served as the antidote to narrative ennui and the facilitator of the eloquence many theorists 
posit as central to tragedy’s appeal. Like the irritant grain of sand that allows a pearl to 
cohere, subject matter that would seem, on the face of it, to command straightforwardly 
aversive responses serves as a sort of narrative engine, preventing things from stuttering to 
an uneventful standstill. Stories emerge from the gap between that which is and that which 
is desirable; while not all fictions require the high-stakes conflict characteristic of the 
tragedy and horror genres, narrative tension inheres in goal-oriented activity, in striving if 
not always in strife. While high narrative genres such as tragedy may afford us additional 
or richer pleasures because of their formal qualities, as Hume observes, their content is far 
from incidental to their appeal: when “employed on an uninteresting subject, [eloquence 
alone] would not please half so much [...], or rather would appear altogether ridiculous; 
and the mind, being left in absolute calmness and indifference, would relish none of those 
beauties of imagination or expression which, if joined to passion, give it such exquisite 
entertainment” (Hume, 2004 [1742]:26).  
 
Interpreting the ubiquity, the indispensability, of narrative conflict is pivotal to 
understanding the nature of our engagement with fiction as a whole. After all, although 
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more comprehensibly pleasurable narrative genres escape equivalent levels of scrutiny, 
they employ similar methods to elicit audience members’ attention. While characters from 
lighter hearted genres may enjoy happy endings, we are obliged to leave them soon 
afterwards; serenity quickly slides into stasis, incapable of sustaining the interest that 
struggle awakens. If our enjoyment of tragedy or horror is judged to be morally 
problematic because of the genres’ distressing content, then the existence of any fiction 
must imply some degree of (albeit more muted) sadism, since stories require conflict for 
their very continuance. In contrast to such a view, I would argue that our attraction to 
fictional narratives resides in curiosity rather than complacency. We do not engage with 
stories primarily in order to access gratifying feelings and experiences but to acquaint 
ourselves with a variety of situations and emotions, pleasant and otherwise.  
 
If fictional narratives are indeed designed with the end of pleasurably diverting us from the 
travails of real life, tailored to grant us access to desirable scenarios and appetising mental 
imagery, and to provoke unadulteratedly agreeable emotions, then the overwhelming 
majority of stories are astonishingly poorly executed.  Even those genres that frankly aim 
at certain ‘pleasure buttons’ – the aspirational tale of the pauper who becomes a prince, the 
swooning romance – include a measure of adversity. Rags remain the narrative prerequisite 
for riches and the artful deferral of gratification is the essence of formulaic romantic 
fictions’ appeal. If, however, attracting and retaining attention is of primary importance 
then one could make certain predictions about narrative structure and focus: while fictions 
might begin and/or end in relative serenity, such moments would necessarily be fleeting 
and the story proper would be coterminous with its central conflict; narratives would 
foreground arresting, anomalous and emotionally-significant events, calculated at times to 
arouse (attention-magnetising) negative emotions such as pity, fear, indignation and 
disgust. Similarly, because emotions, and the affective appraisals that they instantiate, 
generally serve to attune us to potentially important stimuli, to focus our attention on 
possibly problematic objects or situations, it follows that it is those fictions that speak to 
our most essential anxieties, that compel negative judgements and excite urgent (if 
unpleasant) feelings that most effectively command our attention. 
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While I dispute the fantasy model’s account of fiction’s appeal, this does not imply some 
wholesale rejection of the hedonistic nature of our engagement with fictions. Rather, to 
paraphrase Horace, I mean to suggest that fictions please because they instruct. In his 
Poetics Aristotle prefigures similar adaptationist accounts of the pleasures of fiction, 
suggesting that we are captivated by artistic ‘likenesses’ because they are informative: “the 
instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood [...] he is the most imitative of 
living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons” (Poetics:5-6) We relish 
depictions even of those objects which we would, in real life, abhor, because we derive our 
“liveliest pleasure” from learning. Significantly, Aristotle attributes our appetite for 
mimesis to “instinct” rather than some conscious drive to amass knowledge: we are 
reflexively attracted by artistic representations. I would underscore this point since to do 
otherwise leaves any epistemological theory of fiction’s appeal open to a cascade of 
objections and counter-examples. As Fodor notes when criticising adaptationist theories of 
fiction’s appeal, many stories follow the improbable activities of impossible beings, and 
detail events that – superficially at least – bear little relevance to audience members’ 
everyday lives. For this reason it is important to emphasise the uncalculated and 
spontaneous nature of our attraction to fictions.  Fictions are pleasurable insofar as they 
compel our attention and emotional engagement, calculated to appeal to our craving for 
pertinent information and experiences.   
 
The fantasy model is inadequate because it crucially mischaracterises our engagement with 
fictions. Consuming (or finding oneself consumed by) narratives with aversive content is 
fundamentally unlike fantasising – daydreams characteristically require no central conflict, 
and soon dissipate when one loses interest, remaining lodged in the consciousness only for 
as long as they continue to afford pleasure. While our engagement with stories is also 
participatory, inherently drawing upon certain imaginative resources – written narratives 
inevitably requiring us to ‘connect the dots’, all fictions inviting us to make certain 
inferential leaps – I would suggest that our experience with fictions is more akin to another 
form of rumination. Most humans already spontaneously construct, and respond to, 
hypothetical scenarios; we are compulsive catastrophisers, forecasters and strategists, ever-
preoccupied by the many possible future situations with which we might be confronted 
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(and particularly by threatening ones). I would argue that our emotional reactions to these 
self-authored narratives closely parallel our responses to known fictions. Although there is 
an obvious sense in which we allow ourselves to envision, and therefore react emotionally 
to, imaginary events, there is something darkly compelling about the disasters we conjure 
for ourselves, a wrenching urgency that is altogether lacking from our more pleasant 
fantasies.   
 
Similarly, we often most value those aesthetic experiences that seem almost to wrest our 
attention, our emotional energies, towards themselves, praising books we ‘couldn’t put 
down’, commending particularly affecting dramas for their ‘tear jerking’ properties. There 
are moments during our emotional and attentional engagement with fictions when the only 
prospect more unbearable than remaining in one’s current state of suspense, terror, or 
indignation is that of having it abruptly dispelled without any form of narrative resolution. 
We might protest that we ‘cannot watch’ while viewing a particularly tense and nail-biting 
scene, but would likely take umbrage if a literal-minded passerby simply turned off the 
television before it had finished. Although one could defend the fantasy model by arguing 
that such instances represent insignificant outliers in our overall experience with narratives, 
afforded only by certain, elevated genres or available only to unusually sensitive audience 
members, I would contend that these moments are far more central to, and paradigmatic of, 
the appeal of fictional narratives than the often invoked model of fiction-as-daydream.   
 
As Gilbert Ryle notes in his discussion of pleasure, attention is not always describable in 
terms of a volitional act: we do not coolly bestow our attention upon those narratives we 
enjoy the most, but feel ourselves to be taken up, engrossed and absorbed, our experience 
at times more analogous to becoming entangled on a piece of “barbed wire” than to 
picking out objects with a purposeful “torch-beam” (Ryle, 1964 [1954]:199). The 
“spectator at an exciting football match does not have to try to fasten or canalise his 
attention” (Ryle, 1964 [1954]:200), rather, it is precisely the fact that he cannot take his 
eyes off the on field events that signals, and constitutes, his enjoyment. Attention is 
“sometimes attracted, sometimes lent, sometimes paid and sometimes exacted [...and] 
sometimes [it is] impossible not to attend” (Ryle, 1964 [1954]:200). Ryle suggests that 
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pleasure represents a particular variety of attending or “giving one’s mind to” (Ryle, 1964 
[1954]:202), one that most closely conforms to this latter category. We speak of being 
absorbed, immersed, compelled, captivated or occupied by especially involving activities, 
the “partly metaphorical force” (Ryle, 1964 [1954]:203) of these phrases surely deriving 
from the fact that participants in such activities feel themselves to have been “sucked up, 
for the moment, without resistance, every drop of [themselves that might have been 
expended] on other business, or on no business at all” (Ryle, 1964 [1954]:203).  
 
Ryle’s argument echoes one interpretation of Aristotle’s account of pleasure in the 
Nicomachean Ethics – according to which enjoyment is not reducible to any accompanying 
bodily sensation or “separate sensory effect of our doings” (Brewer, 2009:108) but is a 
species of attention or wholehearted immersion in one’s activity. In Aristotle’s discussion 
attention emerges as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of pleasure: it is for this 
reason that “some things please us while they are novelties, but not so much afterwards” 
(Aristotle, 1976:321). Such activities are initially immensely pleasing because “at first the 
mind is stimulated and exercises itself vigorously” (Aristotle, 1976:321) upon them; our 
enjoyment dwindles as they grow more familiar, our original single-minded concentration 
unsustainable in the long term. Certainly, ordinarily anhedonic objects or states can afford 
us pleasure when circumstances cause us to attend to them in a particular way, to view 
them as noteworthy: when recovering from illness the mere absence of pain or nausea 
temporarily becomes the occasion of pleasurable reflection, just as the provision of even 
dull or unpalatable food initially delights us when we had anticipated going hungry. In 
such instances mindfulness transforms and revivifies otherwise prosaic situations and 
activities. (Significantly, as Aristotle points out, one cannot purposely enact this kind of 
fervent attention as a calculated means of maximising one’s pleasure.) 
 
In his analysis of Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure Talbot Brewer accepts Ryle’s 
contention that to enjoy an activity requires that one “be absorbed or unreservedly engaged 
in it” (Brewer, 2009:115),  but stresses that “pleasant activities [by definition] attract or 
draw our attention, while unpleasant activities arrest or extort our attention” (Brewer, 
2009:117). After all, he notes, one can find oneself “unable to keep [...] from listening to 
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loud music that [one] finds entirely appalling” (Brewer, 2009:117), or have one’s attention 
“captured quite against [one’s] will [by some particularly intrusive or jarring stimulus] 
without giving rise to anything remotely resembling pleasure” (Brewer, 2009:117). For this 
reason Brewer stipulates that to take pleasure in an activity requires not only that one “be 
vividly aware of what is good about what [one is] doing [...but that one] must also lack 
vivid awareness of what is bad about it [my italics]” (Brewer, 2009:117).  If, as I have 
suggested, our fascination with distressing media is emotionally ambivalent and at times 
genuinely painful – our fervent desire to read on intermingled with an equally acute 
aversion to the events depicted – then it clearly fails to meet Brewer’s dual criteria.  
 
Fearful fictions obviously differ from Brewer’s examples in that we voluntarily expose 
ourselves to potentially painful narratives: while we may be suddenly assailed by a 
clamorous din or a noxious odour many of us choose to consume fictions which we already 
know to have distressing subject matter or unhappy endings. However, I would nonetheless 
take issue with Brewer’s characterisation of the relationship between pleasure and 
attention, at least as regards our engagement with distressing narratives. As I argued during 
the previous chapter, there are consistent trends in fictional narratives’ structure and 
content which indicate that, in many cases, our pleasure is inextricably bound up with our 
pain, our sense of fascination or urgency inarguably hinging upon our vivid appreciation of 
the depicted situation’s undesirability and our concomitant desire to find out whether 
things will worsen or be remedied during the course of the story.  
 
As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, fearful or sorrow-inducing fictions have 
historically been viewed as problematic or paradoxical in some way precisely because of 
the culturally-embedded assumption that that which grants us pleasure must, by definition, 
be “pleasant [my italics]” (Brewer, 2009:117), that to enjoy an activity logically entails 
purposely overlooking, or failing to focus upon, its negative qualities. Such views shape 
both the widespread moral condemnation of ‘low’ genres such as horror – critiques of 
which are often predicated on the assumption that horror’s aficionados must find its 
morally-troubling subject matter agreeable – and the variety of theories which attribute 
tragedy’s allure solely to its more traditionally pleasurable features somehow 
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overwhelming or mollifying its negative subject matter – such as its eloquence or ability to 
provide us with pleasurable meta-responses. Without necessarily endorsing the 
Aristotelian/Rylian view of pleasure in general, I would suggest that narrative pleasure at 
least can most aptly be described as a particular kind of attention or fascination, better 
captured by Ryle’s description of the engrossed and self-forgetful spectator than by those 
accounts which construe fictions as consumables, appealing to the extent that they remain 
subservient to our real life desires.  
 
Repudiating the fantasy model does not entail rejecting the notion that fictions engage our 
real life desires. However, as I have argued it is the deferral of gratification that is 
demonstrably central to most storytelling. In a narrative context at least, wanting is often 
more compelling than having. Because our appetite for narrative originates in an 
essentially epistemological drive – our hunger for certain kinds of knowledge, our 
propensity to attend to information about potentially harmful objects or situations – we are 
more likely to be drawn in by those works that dramatise our fears than those that depict 
our fantasies.  
 
In Aristotle’s words, humans “enjoy seeing a likeness [...because] in contemplating it they 
find themselves learning [...] saying perhaps, ‘Ah, that is he’” (Poetics:6) Importantly, 
however, he does not attribute the instructive  properties of mimesis  primarily to its 
capacity to acquaint us  with entirely novel situations or objects – in fact, he suggests that 
if one is not familiar with the ‘original’ on which a mimema is based then one’s pleasure is 
not founded in imitation as such, but in some incidental or technical property of the 
artwork. This statement might initially seem contradictory. Generally speaking, when we 
hear someone describe something as edifying or enlightening the first interpretation to 
suggest itself is that it has introduced them to some new piece of information
55
. As I 
discussed in further detail in chapter 5, the banality objection to truth theories of fiction 
stems from precisely this assumption; although literary works may advance or embody 
weighty human truths, their theses are usually sufficiently uncontentious that they cannot 
                                                 
55
 Equally, such a claim initially seems to controvert our known, apparently cross-cultural/trans-historical 
aesthetic bias for the novel, anomalous and ontologically-transgressive; few of us clamour  for ‘tales of the 
expected’, or thrill at viewing protagonists’ brushes with ‘normal activity’.   
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be classified as educational. However, as I argued, even if one accepts the (far from self-
evident) claim that literary works can only impart stale truisms of this sort, there are 
several senses in which fiction’s exploration of familiar themes can nonetheless enrich our 
understanding of various subjects, helping us to appreciate the emotional import of an 
already-known fact. For example, while emotion has historically been viewed as 
orthogonal to reason and decidedly perilous to wise decision-making, I would argue that, 
because the significance of certain kinds of information is essentially emotional, one can 
be at once familiar with the bald facts of a situation while remaining profoundly ignorant 
of their meaning
56
 
 
Fiction can help us to accumulate practical wisdom, to practise ‘choosing well’, because it 
has the capacity to address enduring human questions while remaining evocatively 
particular.  If, as I suggest, fictions are potentially educative, and therefore compelling, in 
those cases where they prompt some sort of recognition in audience members, it also helps 
to explain their curiously bounded subject matter. By encouraging us to immerse ourselves 
in vivid accounts and examinations of those recurrent, humanly-significant events and 
themes that are the stuff of stories – births, deaths, romantic bliss and betrayals, moral 
quandaries, the perversity of fate, fractured alliances and newly-formed friendships – 
stories help us to form, and explore, apt emotional responses to possible events, broadening 
our repertoire of the kind of projected or secondary affective reactions that are 
indispensable to practical reason. In other words, well-observed fictions act as a kind of 
surrogate experience, helping us to rehearse or relive particularly probable or meaningful 
human occurrences, to realise the emotional import of previously unsuspected situations
57
.   
 
                                                 
56
 There are, in fact, people who go about their lives largely untroubled by the emotional perturbations that 
many see as intrusive, irrational and detrimental to decision-making. As I will discuss, such individuals 
behave nothing like the cool-headed, logical paragons one might suppose.  
57
 This latter claim is apparently vulnerable to recursion: if we emotionally ‘recognise’, or react with 
appropriate sorrow to, the depicted sufferings of a traditionally-despised Other, surely this implies that we 
already view such events as pitiable? However, I would contend that such fictions can be at once educative 
and familiar. In much the same way that analogies aim to persuade by showing us that superficially dissimilar 
objects possess some salient underlying alikeness, fictions can only prompt emotional recognition of this sort 
if they are first affectively intelligible, affording us some clear emotional foothold – e.g. highlighting that 
their protagonists are suffering as a result of some loss that is narratively presented as unjust – in order to 
persuade us that these new subjects are suitable candidates for the elicited response. 
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Equally, as discussed during my examination of the thought-experiment hypothesis in 
Chapter 5, fictions often serve to estrange us from the banal, affording us fresh 
perspectives of already-familiar terrains and allowing us to reconsider entrenched positions 
and attitudes.  
 
7.3 Always Look on the Dark Side: Automatic Vigilance and Attentional Biases 
 
If one subscribes to the fantasy model, our cultural preoccupation with aversive genres 
such as tragedy and horror can only appear problematic, flouting its most foundational 
assumptions. However if, as I have suggested, narratives chiefly function as a means of 
compelling our attention, mimicking those kinds of information to which we are strongly 
predisposed to respond, then the “highlighting” (Error:174) properties of emotions help to 
dispel the alleged paradox posed by painful fictions. There is empirical evidence to suggest 
that humans are instinctively inclined to register (and thereby react to) potentially 
threatening stimuli more swiftly than affectively neutral ones. We immediately and 
reflexively classify stimuli as either positive or negative, “facilitating rapid avoidance and 
approach behaviours” (Estes & Adelman, 2008:4). However, attending to and identifying 
the appropriate response to negative stimuli is particularly important. It is known that 
“negative information is more easily and quickly learned than other types of information” 
(Estes & Adelman, 2008:3). Recalling Dawkins’ ‘life-dinner principle’, this is because we 
can recover from missed opportunities (failing to pursue a suitable quarry as it escapes 
down a treacherous trail, altering one’s path to avoid danger and thereby reducing one’s 
chances to gather food)  more easily than we can recover from missing limbs. Excessive 
watchfulness is preferable, from an evolutionary standpoint, to insufficient vigilance. 
There is considerable experimental evidence to suggest that our performance in certain 
tasks reflects this dichotomy. 
 
Proponents of the automatic vigilance theory hypothesis claim that we preferentially attend 
to, and look for longer at, words and images which are negatively affectively-valenced. For 
example, in one study exploring how affective social information (or gossip) influences 
conscious visual experience experimenters repeatedly exposed subjects to structurally 
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neutral
58
  human faces paired with descriptions of their subjects’ engaging in positive, 
neutral or negative social behaviour. Researchers then presented each subject with two 
competing images (one in front of each eye)
59
, selecting pictures both from the pool of pre-
‘learned’ faces and other completely novel/unseen ones. They found that “structurally 
neutral faces previously paired with gossip of negative behaviours were selected for 
consciousness and dominated in visual awareness significantly longer than did all other 
neutral faces”(Anderson et al, 2011:1447). The researchers hypothesised that this disparity 
is due to an essentially protective epistemological drive: we are especially likely to 
scrutinise those individuals who may pose a risk to us, because our vigilance might help to 
safeguard us from harm. It is better to be unnecessarily wary of such individuals than to be 
incautiously oblivious to their nefarious activities. Saints are less compelling than sinners 
because it is more important to keep our eyes on the latter, both literally and figuratively-
speaking.   
 
Similarly, it has been noted that “the human visual system [automatically] gives priority to 
stimuli that represented recurrent and widespread threat throughout the course of 
evolution”, consistently enabling us to detect, and track the movements of,  affectively-
significant stimuli such as hostile human faces, snakes and spiders with greater rapidity 
than we can neutral/unthreatening objects
60
. We linger when examining emotionally-
charged pictures or describing affectively negative words because we are predisposed to 
engage in “prolonged attentional monitoring” (Estes & Adelman, 2008:4) of those stimuli 
we view as negative.  
 
                                                 
58
 Earlier research had already demonstrated that images with overtly negative affective value such as fearful 
faces or disgust-evoking pictures prevailed over affectively neutral stimuli. 
59
 Owing to a phenomenon known as binocular rivalry, when we are confronted with contrasting stimuli in 
this way we alternate between seeing each image, with “visual input from one eye [being] consciously 
experienced (and seen) while the visual input from the other eye is suppressed (and [therefore] remains 
unseen)” (Anderson et al, 2011:1446-1447). 
60
 Even five-month-old infants (who obviously lack either firsthand experience or prior awareness of any 
dangers such stimuli might portend) have been observed to look longer at pictures of “schematic” spiders 
than scrambled ones, while displaying no such preference with respect to neutral images. Similarly, slightly 
older subjects (aged between 7-9 and 14-18 months) were found to orient more quickly to films featuring 
snakes than those showing an assortment of other animals. 
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Affective valence has also been demonstrated to increase the duration of subjects’ 
deliberations when engaging in “lexical decisions and naming” (Estes & Adelman, 
2008:2). Notably, subjects exhibited no linear trend relative to how negative individual 
words were. Rather, appraisals of whether words were positively- or negatively-charged 
appeared to be categorical, meaning that response times varied significantly between 
affective categories while remaining relatively uniform within each category. This means 
that “extremely negative (e.g., “poison”) and slightly negative stimuli (e.g., “needle”) 
[...can be predicted to] elicit responses that are equally slow [...while] slightly positive 
(e.g., “candy”) and extremely positive stimuli (e.g., “passion”) [...tend to] elicit responses 
that are equally fast” (Estes & Adelman, 2008:6). The experimenters argue that the marked 
disparity they found between inter-category and intra-category variation (both in their own 
study and during their meta-analysis of previous research) reflects an ingrained – and 
adaptive – tendency. By instinctively erring on the side of caution, as it were,  we minimise 
our possibility of making truly dangerous mistakes, since “the benefit of quickly averting 
an extremely dangerous stimulus outweighs the cost of overreacting to a mildly threatening 
stimulus” (Estes & Adelman, 2008:4).  
 
Throughout this thesis I suggest that, while our emotional responses to ‘paradoxical’ 
genres such as horror are genuinely negative, integrally rather than merely typically or 
conventionally unpleasant, they are far from incidental to such genres’ appeal.  As Joseph 
LeDoux notes, our working memory is what defines our ‘here and now’, the window 
through which we catch glimpses of the mind’s total contents. In other words, 
consciousness itself is “the awareness of what is in working memory” (Emotional:278). 
When we undergo an emotional episode, our thoughts are not merely inflected or overlain 
by the feeling in question; rather, emotions act as invasions of consciousness. Connections 
from the amygdala to the cortex exert powerful effects on cortical processing, forcefully 
directing our attention to those events and objects the amygdala marks as significant, 
activating memories linked to “the emotional implications of currently present stimuli” 
(Emotional:285). It is the passions that endow plain facts with their sense of urgency, of 
personal salience, and it is for this reason that we can be attracted by narratives that elicit 
negative emotional responses. 
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However, integrationist or ‘enjoyment’ theorists such as Berys Gaut argue that we can 
derive pleasure from experiencing negative fictive emotions because the feelings 
associated with these emotions are not intrinsically unpleasant.  Gaut contests the notion 
that emotions can be identified with “phenomenologically characterised feelings” 
(‘Horror’:340) or physiological states, instead affirming the cognitivist view that they 
constitute judgements, cognitive evaluations about an object or state of affairs. I generally 
dislike being frightened because of what my goose bumps and fearful trembling signify – 
imminent danger to me and mine – rather than the sensations caused by my shivering and 
horripilation. When these feelings are experienced in situations where they are divorced 
from their usual implications – as when we are engaging with a fictional narrative – our 
enjoying them constitutes no paradox. 
 
 As such, it is possible to enjoy an emotion while simultaneously experiencing it as a 
‘negative’ one, for “what makes negative emotions negative is not the painfulness of either 
the emotional response or of the object. Rather, it consists in the fact that objects to which 
these emotions are directed are brought under negative evaluative concepts […] Since we 
can disvalue something without finding it unpleasant, it follows that it is possible to find 
both negative emotional responses and their objects pleasant” (‘Horror’:341). While Gaut 
concedes that the conceptual connection between negative affective evaluations and 
qualitatively unpleasant feelings/physiological states is non-contingent, i.e. that for most 
people and in most contexts it holds true, he argues that in certain, atypical contexts this 
causal link can be severed, explaining how we are able to enjoy negative emotions and 
dissolving the paradoxes of tragedy and horror (and related genres). 
 
I would argue that Damasio’s research into certain types of brain damage and its effects on 
practical reasoning seriously problematises such claims. People with damage to the 
ventromedial sector of the frontal lobe often exhibit strikingly poor decision-making in 
their everyday lives, despite retaining “a normal social knowledge base […and] higher 
neuropsychological functions such as conventional memory, language, basic attention, 
basic working memory and basic reasoning” (Error:51)  
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Damasio argues that secondary or anticipatory emotions are indispensable to everyday 
decision-making because they function as visceral warning beacons: once we have learned 
to associate certain stimuli or situations with negative emotions “re-exposure to option x, 
or thoughts about outcome y, will now have the power to re-enact the painful body state 
[undergone at the time of the original emotional episode] and thus serve as an automated 
reminder of bad consequences to come” (Error:180). Individuals who have experienced 
damage to their somatosensory cortices – those regions of the brain in which “past and 
current body states are represented” (Error:180) – have reduced access to these 
communiqués from the body proper. This interoceptive impairment, and accompanying 
flattening of affect, is associated with severe social and personal problems. 
 
Significantly, people with this type of brain damage exhibit some fairly typical reactive or 
‘primary’ emotional responses, as capable as anyone else of showing fear if “someone 
screamed unexpectedly right behind them, or if their house shook in an 
earthquake”(Error:139). This was demonstrated under experimental conditions when, 
during Damasio’s gambling study, both frontally damaged and ‘normal’ subjects generated 
appropriate skin conductance responses immediately after receiving a monetary reward or 
penalty. However, while most of us lead emotional lives that refer to both internal and 
external stimuli, present and imagined events, Damasio’s subjects evinced what some 
characterise as a kind of affective myopia. As other subjects learned through experience to 
associate the higher-risk decks of cards with financial losses, on those occasions when they 
decided, nonetheless, to pick from these packs, they generated a skin conductance response 
“in the period immediately preceding their selection”(Error:220). As the experiment went 
on, these anticipatory responses became more pronounced, serving as warning bells that 
urged subjects away from the bad decks. Meanwhile, frontally damaged individuals 
showed no equivalent reaction and continued to pick from the tainted decks for far longer 
than normal subjects, despite incurring heavy losses. Even in cases when these subjects 
knew cognitively which decks were high- and low-risk, they seemed unable to implement 
or act upon this knowledge. 
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Damasio hypothesises that patients with damage to this area of the brain experience 
personal and social problems not because of any impairment in their reasoning skills as 
such but because the observed levelling of their affective landscape results in an attendant 
flattening  of values, a diminishment of their ability to concentrate and prioritise 
effectively. Emotions play an indispensable role in motivating our decisions – essentially 
spotlighting that which matters most to us and enabling us to focus upon it for long enough 
to achieve our objectives. Damasio summarises the problems with the traditional, ‘high 
reason’ concept of practical wisdom in terms evocative of the frame problem. As his 
patients’ inability to ‘know when to stop thinking’ suggests, abstract knowledge and 
cost/benefit analyses are in themselves insufficient for choosing well in the personal and 
social realms. 
 
In fact, Damasio argues that such individuals display deficits in decision-making because 
they are too exhaustive, too purely rational in their calculations. He suggests that 
secondary or anticipatory emotions serve to streamline this process for neurotypical 
individuals, acting as ‘somatic markers’ that forcefully direct our attention towards an 
option’s possible negative outcome. These “automated alarm signal[s]” (Error:173) help 
us immediately to discount those options which harbour unacceptable risks.  Lacking the 
emotional biases that usually help draw our attention to, and arrest our progress towards, 
predictably negative outcomes it is as if they are confronted by a sea of greyly-
indistinguishable alternatives, consequently becoming mired in fruitless, ever-proliferating 
deliberations. In summation, “the apparatus of rationality, traditionally supposed to be 
neocortical, does not seem to work without that of biological regulation, traditionally 
presumed to be subcortical”(Error:128). Acting in a judicious and timely manner is as 
much about knowing which options one can (or should) exclude without hesitation as 
which to act upon.  
 
As his subjects’ personal difficulties attest, negative evaluations/cognitions lack the 
motivational impact characteristic to negative emotions. Humans possess a finely 
calibrated “internal preference system” (Error:179), experiencing certain bodily states as 
disagreeable because they contravene the “innate regulatory dispositions” (Error:179) 
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designed to safeguard us from harmful stimuli. Unless potentially harmful stimuli are 
‘marked out’ for us by somatic states which we are predisposed to find qualitatively 
displeasurable, attended by intrusive physiological symptoms that trip the homeostatic 
mechanisms set up to ensure our organismic survival, is all too easy for them to escape our 
attention. That the behaviourally aversive effects of these physical profiles do not extend to 
negative evaluations alone suggests that, contra Gaut’s solution to the paradox of horror, 
there is something intrinsically painful about such states. As the experience of Damasio’s 
patients suggests, the kind of cognitive evaluations judgement theorists equate with 
emotions fall flat when unaccompanied by any physiological upheaval. In other words, I 
can disvalue a hypothetical state of affairs yet fail to move to avert it because ‘cold’ 
evaluations or pure cognitions lack the powerful inciting effects of the emotions. It is the 
passions themselves that exhort us to action; for most neurotypical individuals the mere 
anticipation of future emotional pain is sufficiently painful to act as a spur, warding us 
away from self-destructive paths.  
 
Even so, I would argue that is no more incoherent to hold simultaneously that negative 
emotions are intrinsically aversive and psychically painful and that we can nonetheless, 
under some conditions, derive pleasure from experiencing them than it is to assert that 
physical pain axiomatically hurts even while acknowledging the fairly quotidian fact that 
most humans are capable of enjoying some types of physical pain (whether it be scratching 
an itch with more than necessary vigour, eating capsaicin-spiked foods or exercising to the 
limit of one’s endurance). We can enjoy certain kinds of ‘good’ pain – generally those that 
do not signal any serious threat or bodily damage – despite the fact that they remain, by 
definition, painful, rather than somehow being transfigured into unqualified physical 
pleasure. Analogously, in opposition to theorists such as Gaut and, according to many 
readings, Hume, I would contend that the ordinarily painful emotions elicited by 
distressing fictions do not afford us pleasure in a narrative context because they have been 
converted into wholly pleasant ones. Indeed, I would go so far as to suggest that 
identifying such emotions as in themselves pleasurable might often be an overstatement. 
Negative emotions serve to sharpen and fix our attention, drawing us into a narrative by 
making it, if only for a short time, feel as though its outcome matters to us. Such emotions 
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are, as Gaut points out, clearly far from tangential to our experience and enjoyment of 
aversive genres. As Hathaway notes in his analysis of the boredom model, humans often 
seem to crave stimulation rather than serenity; many of us value the kind of information-
rich, affectively-saturated surrogate experiences fictions can provide, even when the 
experiences on offer are unpleasant ones.  
 
7.4 Dissolving the Paradox of Horror    
 
Like Noël Carroll, I would argue that the allure of the horror genre, and of narrative in 
general, resides in its ability to fascinate rather than to fulfil fantasies, its activation of our 
appetite for certain kinds of information and our aesthetic and attentional biases. Theorists 
such as Berys Gaut reject epistemological theories of horror’s appeal, objecting that most 
horror plots and monsters are sufficiently stereotypical that they would fail to arouse a 
flicker of curiosity, let alone the mesmerising, ‘can’t look away’, attraction/repulsion 
complex coexistentialists like Carroll attribute to them. In my discussion elsewhere of the 
paradox of horror I criticise such assertions, arguing that they misconstrue the pleasures of 
many narrative genres besides horror (one might well argue that most whodunits are 
variations on a well worn theme, or that soap opera plots revolve around a limited set of 
basic events shuffled around various characters and locations).  
 
Contra Gaut, I would argue that novelty is in fact a desirable component of horror (as it is 
of the sublime) and that a certain degree of newness and obscurity is linked to both fear 
and fascination. Certainly, in horror, the tantalisingly unseen is generally more effective 
than the merely visible, exciting both fascination and a nebulous terror that are eased or 
evaporate entirely once the prosaically embodied threat is itself revealed. As Stephen King 
remarks in Danse Macabre, the “ten-foot-tall bug” (King, 1993 [1981]:132) behind the 
door is never as frightening (or as compelling) as the prospect of what might be behind the 
door. The horror genre is, like any other, susceptible to the law of diminishing returns: 
sequels are rarely as frightening as their forebears, and many of the most effective horror 
films are successful precisely because they judiciously ration the appearances of their 
antagonists, subscribing to the axiom that less is more. While there are acclaimed horror 
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narratives that glory in excess, such as ‘splatterpunk’ hit The Evil Dead or John 
Carpenter’s The Thing, they are not usually those renowned for being particularly 
unsettling, aiming for laughs or nauseated groans rather than shivers. 
 
As I noted in the previous chapter, the reflexive, automatically vigilant nature of our 
emotional responses to certain kinds of narratives is in fact clearly evident in the aesthetic 
preferences that shape fictions across cultures. Cross-cultural analyses of storytelling 
indicate that fictions across genres tend to be problem-oriented – far from merely enacting 
our fantasies stories most often dwell upon protagonists’ efforts to navigate obstacles and 
surmount personal difficulties. If disturbance denotes upheaval, it also implies movement: 
narrative itself seems to inhere in conflict, however contrived or perfunctory, with even the 
flimsiest of fictions featuring an actor, an ambition and some impediment to that ambition. 
I would contend that fiction’s chronic preoccupation with discord – its tendency to deal in 
those elements of existence that, one would assume, the uncomplicated pleasure-seeker 
would most wish to evade – is due to the fact that our appetite for narrative is rooted in an 
essentially epistemological drive to attend to precisely that which perturbs our sense of 
what is expected, what is desirable and what is possible.  
 
The desire to demarcate tragedy’s appeal from the ignoble or trivial pleasures afforded by 
lesser genres causes many theorists to over-emphasise its anomalousness. In contrast, I 
would suggest that our emotional involvement with tragedy represents part of a continuum 
of experiences whose appeal derives from their confrontation with, or depiction of, those 
aspects of our (social and natural) environment that are precisely the most fraught, the 
most perilous or antagonistic. In order to demonstrate this point one has only to note the 
striking commonalities between our affective engagement with fictional and factual 
narratives. Many solutions to the problem of genres which characteristically provoke 
negative emotions attempt to dissolve their  putative paradoxicality by emphasising the 
differences between our fictive and factive emotions – ascribing their pleasures to 
eloquence, fiction’s capacity to impose order and sense upon that which is ordinarily 
experienced as chaotic and meaningless, to our very recognition that the characters whose 
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travails we are witnessing are not real (or that their troubles at least are incontestably not 
our problem).  
 
However, there are theories within the philosophical canon of answers to the paradox that 
depart from this prevailing view. For example, in his analysis of tragedy’s allure Burke 
argues that tragedy pleases us more “the nearer it approaches the reality and the farther it 
removes from us all idea of fiction” (Enquiry:48). Indeed, he suggests that dramatic 
tragedy, however eloquent, “never approaches [in power and allure] to what it represents” 
(Enquiry:47) if one were to “choose a day on which to represent the most sublime and 
affecting tragedy” and in the middle of a performance informed the audience that “a state 
criminal of high rank is on the point of being executed” in a nearby square, in a moment 
“the emptiness of the theatre would demonstrate the comparative weakness of the imitative 
arts” (Enquiry:47). Yet Burke distinguishes strongly between the desire to see an event or 
the depiction of an event and any implied endorsement of, or callousness towards, its 
unhappy effects. We can delight in seeing things whose existence we abhor, capable of 
both dreading or ruing an occurrence while “eager enough to see […it once it is] done” 
(Enquiry:47). Our fascination with sublime and tragic objects is reflexive, deeply-ingrained 
and essentially epistemological: we are compelled by conflict, fictive and factive alike, 
because it is advantageous for us to be so.    
 
Like Burke, I would maintain that we evince remarkably similar preferences and reactions 
when selecting and consuming fictional and factual narratives.  In my discussion of the 
paradox of fiction I argue that our emotional responses to fictional narratives represent a 
significant subset of what are commonly termed recalcitrant or ‘outlaw’ emotions. Our 
mounting concern for Desdemona somehow manages to coexist with our conscious 
foreknowledge that she is a fictional character, that her plight is already fixed and 
impervious to human intervention. In other words, our rational awareness that a narrative is 
fictional seems to be at odds with our affective appraisal that its characters matter to us. 
Although, as theorists such as Colin Radford note, our fictive emotions are more limited in 
depth and duration than our responses to immediate and personally relevant events, I 
would suggest that we respond to fictional narratives in much the same way we respond to 
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similarly detailed factual accounts of the affairs of unknown, absent persons. Humans are 
unique in our capacity to transcend the present, to project ourselves into hypothetical 
situations and, crucially, to experience the ‘appropriate’ emotions in response to our 
imaginings: my ability to envision the possible consequences of passing a tiger’s lair and to 
experience a corresponding quiver of fear is advantageous because it motivates me to find 
another route. This ingrained, and adaptive, propensity to react emotionally to imagined 
scenarios extends to known fictions.  
 
Equally, there are striking and suggestive parallels between that which ‘sells’ in fictional 
and factual narratives: as newsroom dictums
61
 indicate, writers in both categories appeal to 
similar cognitive biases in order to secure our attention, seeking to exploit our native 
propensity to concentrate on novel, potentially dangerous/relevant or unusual stimuli. For 
this reason I would challenge many theorists’ insistence upon completely distinguishing 
the pleasures of tragedy from the allure of factual accounts of human suffering, instead 
espousing my own, comprehensive solution. Further, while it may be true that we value 
fictional narratives’ capacity to grant us privileged access to the thoughts and feelings of 
another, it does not follow that non-fictional narratives are by definition unsuited to 
perform a similar function. Owing to the constraints of mainstream reportage it is certainly 
true that most newspaper articles/television news segments do not encourage audience 
members to delve into the subjective experiences ‘behind’ the stories. However, the 
popularity of the more in-depth explorations undertaken by documentarians and 
memoirists suggests that we can be as compelled by equivalently well-rendered factual 
narratives that focus upon human suffering.
62
 
 
                                                 
61
 Most notoriously, stories covering anomalous or violent events predictably attract more attention and are 
thus given greater prominence, leading to the journalistic axioms “if it bleeds, it leads” and “man bites dog”.  
62
 There are in fact an abundance of factual narrative genres purporting to grant us unfiltered access to 
situations of human extremity: misery memoirs, ‘shock docs’ (documentaries usually detailing the 
suffering/difficulties of people diagnosed with various unusual medical conditions) and true crime 
documentaries. One could protest that such accounts are still mediated, still shaped into an overarching 
narrative that ‘aestheticises’ the experience. This is undoubtedly true; however, (as Burke argues with regard 
to tragedy) the selling point of such genres tends to lie in their viscerality and immediacy, the illusion that 
one is seeing things as they happen. Although a degree of distance or evident artifactuality is perhaps 
necessary to render the experience pleasurable/tolerable, I would argue that what renders such experiences 
compelling is, fundamentally, the same drive to attend, to bear witness. 
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Finally, as I argued in greater depth during my discussion of truth in fiction, the terms in 
which we couch our evaluations of fictional narratives also lend weight to the notion that 
narrative’s pleasures are, in a sense, epistemological. We praise those works we judge to 
be perceptive or truthful – to enrich our understanding of the world – while criticising 
those that we deem to be impercipient or emotionally false. Narratives that drip with 
sentimentality or serve too transparently as vehicles for our wish-fulfilment are in fact 
frequently derided because, contrary to the pleasure model, we do not necessarily want to 
encounter fictive situations via a Vaseline-coated lens. Rather, a craving to inhabit 
imaginatively a broad spectrum of experiences and emotions is just as central to our 
engagement with fictions as the desire for escapist fantasy. 
 
Much of the discourse on tragedy, the sublime and horror is, subtly and at times overtly, 
pervaded by the theme of knowledge: of the quintessentially human craving to know, even 
if it means to know the worst, of our desire for experience (which represents a kind of 
knowledge) and intensity, our determination to know ourselves through testing and 
reflecting upon our limits. Like Noël Carroll, I would maintain that the ambivalent 
pleasures of the sublime, of horror and of the tragic can often be characterised as a charged 
state of fascination that is often neither uncomplicatedly enjoyable or straightforwardly 
aversive but intensely, almost irresistibly, attractive or compelling. However, as I have 
argued, I would strongly dispute his claim that the negative emotions occasioned by 
fictions are tangential or merely detrimental to our fascination.  
 
240 
 
Chapter 8: No One Gets Out of Here Alive: Reading Horror 
 
Introduction 
 
While the pleasures afforded by other genres such as the western or the romance are 
relatively transparent, graspable in principle even to those who do not personally enjoy 
them, the pleasures of horror seem, by contrast, murky and complex, in need of 
explanation. As a genre that is, prima facie, characterised largely by a commitment to 
confronting its audience with what we would customarily regard as aversive images, to 
eliciting negative emotions such as fear and disgust, horror seems to invite non-literal 
readings and evocations of deeper meanings. Accordingly, many of the most popularly-
acclaimed and influential solutions to the paradox of horror are those that appeal to buried 
motivations and veiled portents, ascribing audience members’ attraction to fearful fictions 
to a compulsion to revisit repressed incestuous fantasies (Clover), manage their burgeoning 
sexuality (Twitchell) or reaffirm their sense of self through confrontation with a coded, 
culturally-reviled Other (King, Halberstam). Equally, although Carroll and Gaut’s models 
superficially bear little resemblance to such theories – given their explicit disavowal of 
psychoanalytic, expressivist and/or symbolic accounts of horror’s appeal – I would argue 
that their own theories too rely upon a selective focus, a similar excision of theoretically-
problematic aspects of our encounters with fearful narratives.  
 
During the previous chapter I detailed my own, comprehensive solution to the paradox of 
negative genres such as horror and tragedy. In this section I will explain why the thematic 
and ideological readings of horror customarily offered in explanation of its otherwise 
perplexing allure are, in themselves, inadequate. Although such accounts often yield 
insights about the pleasures of specific narratives or sub-genres, I argue that they fail to 
elucidate the pleasures of horror as a whole. Indeed, insofar as these theories succeed in 
capturing appealing themes or plot elements native to certain horror sub-genres they 
merely shift the paradox to those narratives which do not share these features.  
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I will anatomise the problems with two influential, and, in many ways, persuasive, 
accounts of horror’s allure which, like my own, minimise the role of more comprehensibly 
pleasurably meta-responses, unconscious drives or appetites and symbolic textual analyses. 
Noël Carroll and Berys Gaut both reject the expressivist and psychoanalytic theories of 
horror that locate its pleasures in its thematic exploration of submerged or archaic wishes 
and anxieties, arguing that, while such analyses may yield useful insights about individual 
works, they cannot be said to offer a general or comprehensive solution to the paradox of 
horror. I will discuss Carroll and Gaut’s shared justifications for their dismissal of the 
majority of such theories in depth, explaining my (qualified) agreement with their 
criticisms of many influential attempts to isolate and decode the genre’s perplexing 
pleasures. I will additionally argue that, like the totalising analyses they reject, Carroll and 
Gaut’s own theories break down in the face of horror’s heterogeneity, only selectively 
applicable to our experiences with horrifying narratives. 
 
First, I will discuss Carroll’s coexistentialist model. I will endorse his central theses – that 
our enjoyment of distressing fictions is mingled with genuine pain due to their content, and 
that narrative pleasure is inextricably linked to curiosity – while rejecting his 
reclassification of non-supernatural and uncanny horror fictions and minimisation of the 
role negative emotions play in horror’s appeal.  
 
 I will next look at Gaut’s integrationist model. I will argue that, while his economical 
account of horror’s pleasures renders it less vulnerable to textual counter-examples of the 
sort that undermine Carroll’s theory, his model nonetheless elides significant aspects of our 
engagement with distressing narratives. As I suggested during chapter 7, the reason genres 
such as tragedy and horror have historically been viewed as paradoxical is the popular 
conflation of that which is pleasurable with that which is pleasant. Gaut resolves the 
paradox by suggesting that, despite initial appearances, our emotional responses to 
narratives with negative content are not intrinsically painful: it is possible, under certain 
circumstances, to find fear, sorrow or disgust purely and unambivalently “pleasant” 
(‘Horror’:341). I previously explained why I reject the cognitivist underpinnings of Gaut’s 
theory, and why empirical research conducted by theorists such as Damasio seems to 
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contradict Gaut’s claim that negative emotions are only contingently displeasurable. In this 
section I will argue that his theory fails on a more concrete level, crucially 
mischaracterising our emotional engagement not only with horror fictions, but with 
narratives in general.  
  
Finally, I will discuss influential expressivist and/or symbolic accounts of horror’s appeal, 
arguing that such models do not provide an adequate comprehensive solution to the 
paradox. However, I will also examine the ways in which thematic readings do succeed, 
whether by acting to further our understanding of particular works, elucidating the 
pleasures of horror as a whole, or, as counter-examples, in revealing the flaws of existing 
theories purporting to dissolve the paradox of horror.  
 
8.1 Fear and Fascination: Carroll’s Solution to the Paradox 
 
In The Philosophy of Horror Carroll develops an entity-based definition of horror in which 
the textual presence of a monster – defined by Carroll as a threatening, categorially-
transgressive and impure being – is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for 
membership of the genre. While, Carroll notes, it is initially tempting to rely upon the 
presence of monsters as the sole or chief criterion for a work’s inclusion in the horror 
genre, their not infrequent appearances in fictions from other genres – most notably in 
science fiction, fairy tales and fantasy – illustrates the untenability of such an approach. 
Such narratives cannot properly be categorised as horror narratives because, Carroll 
argues, unlike in works of horror where “the humans regard  the monsters they meet as 
abnormal, as disturbances of the natural order” (Philosophy:16), in many fairytales, 
monsters – while potentially threatening – “are part of the everyday furniture of the 
universe” (Philosophy:16).Since the horror genre is named after the affect it arouses (or is 
intended to arouse), Carroll argues that this “suggests[s] a particularly tantalising strategy” 
(Philosophy:15) through which to “isolate the ingredients of art-horror” (Philosophy:30), 
both in terms of arriving at an accurate definition and in discerning  the origin of its appeal. 
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The compound emotion Carroll dubs ‘art-horror’ (composed of mingled fear and disgust) 
is, he argues, depicted again and again in horror fictions as the appropriate , the natural, 
response to monsters, with characters’ affective reactions acting as cues to how we, the 
audience, should react and perceive the monster:  “this shudder, this recoil at the vampire’s 
[, or werewolf’s, or mummy’s,] touch, this feeling of nausea all structure our emotional 
reception” (Philosophy:17) of a work. The persistent foregrounding of a certain type of 
emotional response in horror fictions (lingering close-ups of screaming, wide-eyed 
heroines, detailed reports of  how unutterably frightening and loathsome the protagonist 
finds the monster)  is central to distinguishing it from related genres, because, Carroll 
asserts, it provides us with an “objective, as opposed to an introspective, picture of the 
emotion of art-horror” (Philosophy:18), allowing us to ground our conjectures about the 
nature and allure of horror in terms of objectively-occurring features of the works in 
question. Carroll argues that the persistent presentation of horror’s monsters as noxious, 
impure and repugnant as well as merely dangerous is significant because of “the kinds of 
objects that standardly give rise to or cause reactions of impurity” (Philosophy:31). 
Drawing upon Mary Douglas’ influential study Purity and Danger, Carroll notes that 
judgements of impurity are most often levelled at those beings or things that “are 
interstitial, that cross the boundaries of [a culture’s] deep categories” (Philosophy:32). 
 
That which cannot firmly be defined as one thing or the other, that which confounds our 
conceptual schemes, that which appears “incomplete or formless” (Philosophy:32), elicits 
the “categorical misgivings” (Philosophy:32) that underlie cultural notions of impurity. 
Carroll suggests that Douglas’ analysis might usefully be applied to horror, since, he 
argues, horror monsters are often “interstitial and/or contradictory” (Philosophy:32), 
promiscuously mingling the living with the dead (ghosts, zombies, vampires et al), the 
animate with the inanimate (haunted houses, dolls and cars) and the human with the 
inhuman (werewolves, cat people, humanoid insects). “Categorical incompleteness” 
(Philosophy:33) and disintegration is also a constituent feature of many monsters; 
“zombies frequently come without eyes, arms, legs or skin” (Philosophy:33) and may be in 
an advanced state of deterioration. Equally, disembodied appendages (most frequently 
heads, eyes or especially hands) can serve as monsters, while “the rate of recurrence with 
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which the biologies of monsters are vaporous or gelatinous attests to the applicability of 
the notion of formlessness to horrific impurity” (Philosophy:33). 
 
Having arrived at his definition of what it is that individuates horror from related genres, 
Carroll develops his related solution to the paradox of horror. Carroll’s theory is 
coexistentialist in nature; in contrast to Gaut, he argues that we do not enjoy our fearful 
reaction to horror fictions but that our pleasure and our fear are crucially entangled. Those 
features of horror fictions that elicit qualitatively unpleasant feelings of fear and disgust – 
the fantastic, categorially transgressive biology of their monsters (and later, in a more 
encompassing version of his theory, their fantastic psychology) – also draw our attention, 
fascinating precisely because of their revolting divergence from the norm. Because 
monsters are anomalous, walking (or oozing) perversions of everything we formerly knew 
about the laws of nature, they fascinate as well as frighten. Horror’s pleasures are 
inextricable from, although not identical with, its pains. We do not, Carroll maintains, 
enjoy being frightened or disgusted (as integrationists would suggest), rather, our 
fascination with interstitial, category-defying creatures, our desire to learn more about 
them, overwhelms our fright and revulsion, transfixing us even as we may wish to look 
away. This double movement of attraction and repulsion characterises the (ambivalent) 
pleasures of horror. 
 
Equally important to horror’s allure is the way in which its distinctive plot structures serve 
to tantalise and exploit this innate curiosity. Carroll presents the pleasures of horror as 
peculiarly philosophical in nature, residing, “first and foremost, in the processes of 
discovery, proof and confirmation” (Philosophy:184) that, he argues, structure most horror 
fictions. He identifies two main “deep narrative structures” (Philosophy:97) or master plots 
that recur across the various subgenres of horror. The first of these, which Carroll terms the 
“complex discovery plot”, consists of four basic stages or “movements” (Philosophy:99) – 
onset, discovery, confirmation and confrontation. In the initial stage, a monster is 
introduced, either directly or through the aftermath of its villainous activities (in those 
cases where the audience learns about its identity along with the characters). Next, one or 
more of the human characters learns of the monster’s existence, a discovery which is often 
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resisted by other characters whose scepticism precipitates the confirmation stage. In this 
third  movement the ‘believers’ somehow eventually manage to convince the sceptics of 
the creature’s existence, before preparing for the fourth stage in which the human 
characters must confront, and either vanquish or be vanquished by, the creature.  
 
The second underlying structure, the ‘overreacher plot’, is equally concerned with 
knowledge – specifically, the forbidden sort. If the discovery plot implicitly “chide[s] 
humanity for being too complacent about the unknown” (Philosophy:125), endorsing an 
attitude of paranoiac hyper-vigilance, the overreacher plot condemns humanity’s greedy 
and hubristic desire to pursue Nature to her (ever-shrinking) hiding places. Like the 
discovery plot type, this second structure comprises four basic movements. In the first act, 
a scientist or would-be necromancer prepares for an upcoming experiment or incantation, 
readying his materials and developing his moral/philosophical justification for venturing 
beyond the ‘proper’ borders of human knowledge. This stage is followed by the 
experiment itself, which, when apparently successful, leads inexorably into the third stage 
as it grows apparent that the experiment has had unintended consequences. As Carroll 
points out, in many iterations of the plot, these repercussions will fall upon the family 
members or loved ones of the experimenter/necromancer, serving as a stimulus for the 
final confrontation stage, in which the overreacher himself must take on his abominable 
creation. As with the discovery plot, each of the stages up to, and possibly including, 
confrontation are structured by questions of gathering evidence and argumentation.  
 
Carroll’s identification of these two plot types (and particularly his analysis of their shared 
underlying themes of knowledge, rationality, ignorance and humility) is well-observed.  As 
I will argue later, while analysing Isabel Pinedo’s account of horror’s allure, many of the 
pleasures of horror are, in a sense, ‘epistemological’, with audience members deriving 
gratification from having their hypotheses or predictions confirmed, from affirming their 
expertise in generic conventions and from ‘getting’ intertextual allusions. Although, given 
Carroll’s stringent definition of the genre, he would presumably only apply these two 
models to a limited subsection of (what I would term) horror, they are applicable to a 
surprising number of horror narratives, across various subgenres. If much horror deals, as I 
246 
 
will argue, with ‘real life’ anxieties about death, human frailty, the meaning (or lack 
thereof) of evil/violence and the uncertainty of our place in the universe, Carroll’s 
characterisation of horror as a genre preoccupied with rationality and (pseudo-) 
philosophising makes great sense. The two plot-types Carroll identifies present the 
catastrophic as at least in some way predictable or linked to human agency; the result of a 
surfeit or lack of rationality, of either an impertinent desire to treat ‘mysteries’ beyond 
human comprehension as mere, solvable ‘problems’ or a misplaced complacency in the all-
knowing, all-conquering status of modern science. While the causality implied by such 
texts obviously does not hold true in real life, one can understand how fictional plots 
upholding the idea that life is in some way orderly, meaningful and just – if harshly 
punitive to those who do not abide by certain rules, or maintain a properly reverent attitude 
before the unknown – might be emotionally attractive. (As I will discuss later, if many 
‘classic’ horror fictions offer stern-yet-consolatory visions of this sort, then the typical 
‘postmodern’ horror narrative, as identified by Isabel Pinedo, propagates a much bleaker 
view of the universe.)  
 
While Carroll’s analysis of how horror plot structures whet and exploit our fascination 
with the monstrous is textually well-grounded and intriguing, there are several problems 
with Carroll’s solution to the paradox of horror. In Carroll’s view, we are riveted, aghast 
yet unable to look away, by the monsters of horror fictions because of their utter 
divergence from the real: Carroll’s monsters are physically impossible anomalies, beings 
that are, by definition, far removed from our day to day existence. One just, and oft-
repeated, criticism of Carroll’s cognitivist theory of horror’s appeal is that, by excluding 
non-supernatural and non-explicit forms of horror from the genre (relegating them, 
respectively, to the related genres of ‘art-terror’ and ‘art-dread’), he elevates his own 
aesthetic preferences to the level of an objective definition. After all, famous yet non-
supernaturally horrifying films such as Silence of the Lambs fail to meet Carroll’s original 
criteria for inclusion in the genre while seemingly occupying a fairly central and 
uncontested position in ordinary language definitions of horror (this and other, similarly 
non-spectral titles regularly emerge in polls of ‘scariest horror films’). 
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In response to persistent critiques of his original formulation of the entity-theory, Carroll 
subsequently conceded that some slasher films might be included as borderline instances of 
the horror genre if the human killers exhibit traits that, while not attributed to any 
supernatural force or agency, are de facto superhuman (such as an incredible ability to 
rebound from usually-mortal injuries, or an uncanny way of catching up to its victims 
without seeming to move fast). However, this adjustment of criteria is clearly insufficient, 
still excluding seminal horror films such as Psycho, The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, Black 
Christmas, and Peeping Tom. Carroll’s reluctance to entertain the notion that texts 
featuring unambiguously non-supernatural antagonists (or indeed, texts which have no 
clear villain at all, such as The Innocents, The Haunting, The Fly or Session 9) could elicit 
the compound emotion he terms ‘art-horror’ is, I would argue, the central weakness of his 
solution to the paradox of horror. I would assert this both because, as Gaut notes, it merely 
shifts the paradox to those related genres that do not contain monsters, and because by 
locating the emotions horror fictions seek to elicit within the body of a monster Carroll 
remains curiously insensible of the ways in which numerous texts his definition excludes 
contrive to elicit the same mingling of fear, disgust and horrified fascination.
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Certainly, I would argue that Carroll’s aesthetic biases prevent him from acknowledging 
the importance of the ways in which successful horror fictions serve as thematic 
explorations of that which is already horrifying within the everyday, transfixing because of 
their salience, their thematic resonance, as well as their anomalousness. Because Carroll 
departs so radically from ordinary language conceptions of horror, discounting vast 
swathes of works that are customarily considered to be part of the genre (or, when 
challenged, devising ad hoc justifications for their inclusion that stretch his definition of 
categorial transgression to the point of vacuity) his solution to the paradox of horror only 
accounts for a subsection of the genre as a whole. Like the ideological and expressivist 
theories he critiques, I would contend that Carroll’s cognitivist theory fails as a general 
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 A good example of an utterly non-supernatural tale which induces a state approximating Carroll’s 
definition of art-horror is the classic urban legend which, with slight variations,  proceeds as follows:  
A young lady is alone in her apartment. She goes to bed with her dog on the floor beside her. In the middle of 
the night, she is woken up by a strange sound. She is alarmed, but reaches down to the dog, who licks her 
hand. She is reassured and goes back to sleep. 
In the morning she finds the dog hung in the shower. Where the dog slept, she picks up a note which reads 
“Humans can lick too.” (Snopes.com, 2006) 
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solution to the paradox of horror, despite its applicability to individual works and 
subgenres.  
 
Equally, I would echo Gaut’s criticism of Carroll’s theory on the grounds that it negates 
many audience members’ testimonies about their own motivations and preferences: why, 
Gaut asks, should we not take at face value ‘Norman’s’ complaint that a film was not 
frightening or disgusting enough? Carroll’s assertion that such protestations in fact betray a 
posturing, macho desire to appear tough or impervious probably has validity with regard to 
some audiences: as Matt Hills notes in his discussion of the pleasures of horror fandom, 
among many fan communities “the act of being scared is predominantly located on the side 
of non-fandom (or casual horror film viewing [public])” (Hills, 2005:74), the province of 
an ignorant, feminised mass-audience who appreciate only ‘inauthentic’ mainstream horror 
(or who appreciate ‘true’ horror in the wrong way). However, there is no reason to 
discount all such statements; while Carroll is inclined to do so because, in his view, they 
are, if taken literally, incoherent, the fact that his theory requires such a wholesale 
disavowal of such testimonies raises questions.  
 
8.2 Gaut’s Enjoyment Theory 
 
In ‘The Paradox of Horror’, Berys Gaut challenges traditional cognitivist and expressivist 
answers to the titular paradox before putting forth his own solution. Gaut’s theory builds 
on an earlier integrationist account formulated by Kendall Walton and Alex Neill, which 
contends that negative emotions are not in themselves “intrinsically unpleasant” 
(‘Horror’:341). Rather, it is the intentional objects of these emotions that are disvaluable 
and, presumably due to force of habit, we conflate the inherent unpleasantness of the 
objects with the only contingently negative feelings they evoke. Gaut raises two major 
objections to this formulation of the integrationist theory. First, he argues that there is a 
“conceptual constraint” (‘Horror’:339) on how far we can conceive of negative emotions 
such as grief existing in a different hedonic register while still being identifiably the same 
emotion. If “we came across a tribe who said that they felt a certain emotion at the death of 
their loved ones, and that this emotion was the most enjoyable one to be had. We would 
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[…] be justifiably reluctant to translate the word they used to name this emotion as 'grief’” 
(‘Horror’:339). Secondly, Gaut argues that surely when we deem an object to be 
unpleasant we are in fact ascribing it the “dispositional property” (‘Horror’:339) of causing 
people to have unpleasant experiences. 
 
In order to strengthen and clarify the central premise of Walton and Neill’s theory – that 
negative emotions are not intrinsically qualitatively unpleasant, and can even prove 
enjoyable in atypical situations and/or for atypical individuals – Gaut dispenses with any 
discussion of intentional objects in terms of pleasantness and unpleasantness, instead 
speaking, in more “general evaluative terms” (‘Horror’:340), of disvaluable or undesirable 
objects. 
 
Gaut’s model is explicitly founded on the cognitivist view of the emotions. As opposed to 
any system whereby emotions are identified with feelings or physiological states, Gaut 
maintains that they can be more aptly characterised as judgements, incorporating cognitive 
evaluations about an object or state of affairs. As such, he argues that it is eminently 
possible to enjoy an emotion while simultaneously experiencing it as a ‘negative’ one; 
“since we can disvalue something without finding it unpleasant, it follows that it is 
possible to find both negative emotional responses and their objects pleasant” 
(‘Horror’:341). While Gaut concedes that the conceptual connection between negative 
affective evaluations and qualitatively unpleasant feelings and physiological states is non-
contingent, i.e. that for most people and in most contexts it holds true, he argues that in 
certain, atypical contexts this causal link can be severed, explaining how we are able to 
enjoy negative emotions and dissolving the paradoxes of tragedy and horror (and related 
genres). 
 
There is of course a strong typical association between the two sorts of evaluations –if it 
were not the case that we customarily find sorrow, fear and disgust unpleasant as well as 
merely disvaluing their intentional objects it would not be sorrow, fear and disgust as we 
know them that we enjoy experiencing in atypical contexts but some other, 
uncomplicatedly positive emotions. In other words, this “background of typical unpleasant 
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responses” (‘Horror’:343) is a necessary precondition for the identification of these 
emotions as negative ones. Just as one cannot style oneself as modishly rebellious and 
alternative in the absence of a more staid mainstream, so without the backdrop of the 
traditional aversiveness of both negative emotions and their objects it would not be 
possible for us to enjoy these same negative emotions in atypical contexts. Because Gaut 
takes a “holistic” (‘Horror’:343) view of the emotions, it is only necessary that an 
informed agent will typically “experience the objects of their emotions and the emotions 
themselves as unpleasant” (‘Horror’:343), the many occasions that conform to the general 
rule providing the necessary context and grounding for those exceptional cases, like our 
emotional responses to fictions, that subvert it. Since the negative emotions are not 
intrinsically unpleasant (but only habitually/traditionally so) there is no “a priori, 
conceptual problem about the enjoyment of negative emotions in real life, or in fiction” 
(‘Horror’:344). 
 
Gaut’s theory represents a considerable improvement on the earlier attempts he outlines 
and criticises. However, as with Gaut’s own criticism of the control thesis, there is a 
puzzling jump or gap in reasoning where one might expect to find a more detailed account 
of what differentiates typical and atypical cases, and how this distinction renders negative 
emotions enjoyable rather than merely tolerable or indifferent. Gaut chooses to remain 
reticent about the precise nature of the appeal of negative emotions in certain contexts, 
arguing that this related question is “the proper subject of empirical, psychological 
investigation” (‘Horror’:344). Although Gaut’s parsimonious model allows for a 
considerably less restrictive – and more reflective – view of horror than either Carroll’s or 
those theorists whose thematic readings I will go on to discuss, I would argue that his 
account still subtly mischaracterises our affective and cognitive engagement with the 
genre. Setting aside my main theoretical objection to Gaut’s model, which is delineated in 
the previous chapter, I will next outline how some of Gaut’s objections to Carroll’s thesis 
in fact highlight these empirical/experiential failings. 
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8.3 Gaut on Carroll 
 
Gaut criticises Carroll’s coexistentalist model on several grounds. First, like several other 
critics, he argues that Carroll’s definition of monsters as “beings not believed to exist now 
according to contemporary science” (‘Horror’:334) is problematic because, as I earlier 
noted, it excludes such “important and popular” (‘Horror’:334) sub-genres as the slasher or 
serial killer film.  Carroll instead defines such films as ‘tales of terror’, thereby, Gaut 
argues, merely shifting the paradox Carroll’s theory ostensibly solves to related genres that 
elicit unpleasant emotions such as ‘art-terror’ or ‘art-dread’. Secondly, Gaut rejects 
Carroll’s contention that we consume horror fictions in spite of the fear and disgust they 
elicit because we are fascinated by their categorially-transgressive, physically anomalous 
monsters. Gaut asserts that “most horror films are so formulaic in their plots, and their 
monsters and killers are so stereotypical” (‘Horror’: 334) that they would struggle to elicit 
even mild curiosity in audience members. According to Gaut’s reasoning, since we already 
know that the rowdy teenagers are ill-fated – and we may often even be able to foretell the 
approximate order and manner of their demises – there can be no room for suspense. I 
would dispute this criticism of Carroll’s theory. One might equally argue that because most 
‘whodunits’ re-use the same old gambits to misdirect readers’ suspicions that they cannot 
elicit genuine curiosity or suspense, or that once one has seen one ‘space opera’ one has 
seen them all; to make this argument is, in a sense, to misconstrue the pleasures of fiction.  
 
Mainstream crime, fantasy and science fiction dramas routinely place their protagonists in 
mortal jeopardy in order to secure viewers’ attention and – while we know that lead 
characters are, for both generic and contractual reasons, unlikely to perish ‘for real’ –  this 
calculated manoeuvre by and large pays off, effectively generating narrative suspense and 
dynamism. We can simultaneously have an approximate idea of how fictional events will 
turn out – the heroic detective will finally solve the seemingly perfect murder, the alien 
invasion will be thwarted in some fashion, the unwary campers will meet a grisly fate – 
while nonetheless harbouring burning curiosity about the particular details of their 
resolution. 
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Furthermore, even in cases when we are already aware of the precise nature of a fiction’s 
outcome, many of us are still gripped by the desire to read or watch on, feeling something 
that seems very much akin to the ambivalent, emotionally-charged fascination Carroll 
identifies as key to horror’s appeal.  When re-reading/re-watching a narrative particularly 
tense scenes or interactions can still provoke an answering anxiety in audience members: 
while I am well aware that Othello will succumb to Iago’s manipulations I may be unable 
to keep from mentally urging him to resist the villain’s blandishments, perhaps even 
feeling an accompanying sense of physical agitation or ‘edginess’. Indeed, the most 
effective stories often employ foreshadowing in order to heighten and prolong suspense, 
events acquiring greater resonance because they have already been hinted at, made to seem 
logically-inevitable or fated.  Similarly, in horror itself, the most unsettling moments are 
often not the sudden and arbitrary ‘jump scares’ but the scenes of creeping, nebulous dread 
or terrifying after-the-fact cognitive reveals.
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For this reason I would argue that Carroll’s suggestion that horror, like the mystery, is 
appealing largely because it elicits our curiosity is a compelling insight, and one that is not 
intrinsically incompatible with Gaut’s own theory. As I argued during the previous chapter, 
what Gaut terms the enjoyment of negative emotions in an aesthetic context is often felt as 
something more akin to an intense, electric state of absorption or mesmerisation – 
pleasurable in the sense that it constitutes an experience that many of us voluntarily seek 
out, but not straightforwardly, light-heartedly ‘enjoyable’ in the sense that consuming a 
comedy or a romance might be. As Gaut’s assertion about the enjoyment of horror fictions 
necessitating a “robust” state of mind suggests, surely if horror’s pleasures were so 
unambivalent they would not require any mental steeliness. The fact that many of us have 
to fortify ourselves in some way before, during and after exposure to frightening narratives 
– whether by turning on the lights and checking behind the sofa, shielding one’s eyes 
during gory moments or compulsively making ‘modality judgements’ to reassure oneself 
of a fictional monster’s improbability – seems to indicate that our affective engagement 
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 As in Shirley Jackson’s The Haunting of Hill House when the protagonist turns on the light after a spectral 
visitation and realises that the hand she has been clutching throughout the ordeal was not that of her 
roommate – who is in fact lying across the room – but in fact belonged to someone, or something, else.  
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with horror fictions is more hedonically-complex or ‘mixed’ than Gaut’s account would 
suggest.  
 
8.4 Why Expressivist Accounts Fail to Offer a Comprehensive Solution to the 
Paradox   
 
Like Carroll, Gaut rejects the contention that we are characteristically attracted to horror 
because it engages, and in some way lightens, our unaddressed anxieties; if, he argues, 
“watching a horror film is the equivalent of ‘talking out’ one’s fears, it is odd that these 
films are least attractive if one is in an uneasy or fearful mood […Indeed,] one needs to be 
in a fairly robust psychological state in order to enjoy these fictions at all” (‘Horror’:336). 
Rather than entering  the cinema oppressed by antecedent feelings of fear and disgust and 
leaving with a sense of relief, horrific narratives characteristically “induce[...] and 
exacerbate[...]” (‘Horror’:336) anxiety, sometimes even sensitising us to potential new 
horrors. Far from easing our everyday worries, exposure to films that dramatically 
highlight the dangers of already anxiety-provoking situations – such as Jaws’ depiction of 
the perils of the sea, or Final Destination’s vividly-rendered air crash – can cause formerly 
unconcerned individuals to acquire new phobias.  
 
Horror fictions can also imbue entirely inert or ordinarily harmless objects with a potent 
sense of menace, alerting us to the uncanny features of dolls, mannequins and clowns. 
Because horror narratives by their very nature force us to envision the direst possible 
consequences of any hypothetical scenario, they act as cautionary tales or ‘warnings to the 
curious’ – showcasing the potentially deadly outcome of being a sexually adventuresome 
teen (Halloween, Friday the 13
th
)
 
or insufficiently watchful parent (The Exorcist, Don’t 
Look Now), engaging in exploitative or culturally-insensitive international tourism (Hostel, 
Cannibal Holocaust), displaying an inappropriately irreverent attitude toward the 
supernatural (Paranormal Activity, The Last Exorcism) or hubristically seeking to meddle 
with ‘nature’ (Frankenstein, The Fly). For this reason, it seems unlikely that horror fictions 
should typically have an emboldening effect on audience members: if horror can be said to 
have an ideology, it would be one of timid, small ‘c’ conservatism, strongly discouraging 
254 
 
reckless insouciance and innovation for-its-own-sake. For this reason, as Gaut points out,  
it usually appears more as though one’s anxieties are inflamed rather than assuaged by 
frightening fictions, given the “lingering sense of fearfulness”(‘Horror’:336) many feel 
after consuming a horror narrative. 
 
One could construct counter-arguments of varying plausibility to these points – for 
example alluding to the suggestive existence of ‘cycles’ within the horror genre (many 
theorists have noted that horror enjoys increased popularity during periods of social unrest 
due, they imply, to its propensity to thematise and address topical anxieties), or by 
suggesting that the mechanisms by which horror eases our anxieties are not subjectively 
transparent (i.e. that it is ineffable internal forces that drive us to consume, and are 
appeased by, horror narratives, rather than consciously felt anxieties). However, I would 
argue that his comments here fairly summarise the problem with most formulations of 
expressivist and psychoanalytic solutions to horror’s appeal.  All too often eliding our 
conscious experiences of engaging with horror or appealing to inaccessible subterranean 
motivations and drives
65
, such theories offer, at best, a partial account of horror’s 
pleasures. I would argue that many expressivist and psychoanalytic interpretations of 
horror are weakened by a shared tendency to advance incautiously general, a priori 
statements about a remarkably heterogeneous genre. While James Twitchell’s 
characterisation of horror narratives as adolescent rites of induction, fables of burgeoning 
sexual identity designed to warn youths away from non- or mis-procreative forms of sexual 
activity, may well apply to the vampire story (or indeed, those slasher films in which pre-
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 This disclaiming tendency is ironically also present in Carroll’s cognitivist account. Carroll maintains that 
“the average consumer of horror”(Philosophy:192) does not relish being afraid, even in the face of many 
fans’ insistence that they do:  
 
Norman complains that a novel is not scary enough; Gaut concludes that Norman takes 
pleasure in being scared. But I am not convinced that we must take Norman's 
pronouncements at face value. On the basis of my own – admittedly unscientific – sample 
of such pronouncements, I think that, when they are assessed contextually, these assertions 
(generally uttered by men, especially adolescent men) most often mean ‘I'm too tough to be 
moved by something like that’. (Carroll, 1995:69) 
 
Carroll argues that even those “specialised” (Philosophy:192) audiences – composed, he again suggests, of 
mostly “adolescent males”(Philosophy:193) – who may truly crave more frightening or repulsive fare 
actually derive pleasure not from their initial responses but from their capacity to manage and withstand them 
(as in Susan Feagin’s theory of meta-reponses). 
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maritally sexually active young people are especially victimised) it is hard to see how it 
can have much validity as a model for understanding the appeal of narratives such as 
Session 9, The Exorcist 3 or The Changeling that deal with middle aged or elderly 
protagonists in a decidedly asexual milieu. 
 
Equally, Barbara Creed’s assertion that “virtually all horror texts represent the monstrous-
feminine in relation to Kristeva’s notion of maternal authority and the mapping of the 
self’s clean and proper body” (Creed, 1993:13) makes perfect sense with respect to those 
films, such the Alien series or The Thing, that figure monstrosity in terms of a slimily-
encroaching, engulfing threat that violates the bodily boundaries of individuals and 
threatens to return them to a state of undifferentiated, gooey oneness. However, it is by no 
means clear that all, or even the vast majority of horror films can be interpreted in this 
way, without, as Cynthia Freeland suggests in her analysis of Creed’s theory, expanding 
one’s definition of the abject to the point of triviality. Further, it is far from obvious that 
we respond fearfully to, and are fixated by, fictional depictions of death, people being 
consumed or the penetration of people’s bodies, whether by alien seedpods or knives, due 
primarily to repressed familial or sexual anxieties, as the majority of psychoanalytic 
readings imply. Rather, I would argue that such events are legitimately fear-inspiring even 
when read literally, and that, with regard to claims of metaphorical import/ deeper thematic 
resonance, it seems less convoluted, and more supported by textual evidence, to interpret 
them as the fantastical realisation of more mundane fears about death and threats to bodily 
integrity or autonomy. 
 
While the majority of films that could be collected under the term ‘body horror’ offer 
outlandish, scientifically impossible visions of bodily metamorphosis or disintegration, 
they in particular map readily onto more realistic anxieties. In a sense, having a body is 
already sufficient occasion for experiencing ‘body horror’: by heaping additional levels of 
oozing, hair-sprouting and growth onto their hapless protagonists, films such as 
Cronenberg’s The Fly, An American Werewolf in London, and Ginger Snaps capture, in 
Bettelheimian fashion, the momentous, disquieting, subjective sense of going through quite 
routine, outwardly uneventful bodily events (most notably, puberty, sickness and ageing). 
256 
 
For most of The Fly, ‘overreacher’ Seth Brundle’s metamorphosis following his disastrous 
merging with a housefly serves as a radically accelerated and exaggerated version of 
growing up (and later, sick/old). Initially, ‘Brundlefly’ experiences an enormously 
increased sense of vitality, virility and strength, becoming an insatiable sexual athlete and 
voraciously eating junk food. He begins to sprout hair in unusual places and becomes more 
aggressive, insistently pressing his dubious girlfriend to undergo the same process that (he 
thinks) precipitated his own ‘improvement’. Soon, however, it becomes apparent that 
Brundlefly’s transformation is still disastrously ongoing: he begins to lose teeth and nails, 
he vomits uncontrollably and he undergoes rapid physical deterioration, sloughing off 
whole external body parts. While in many ways Brundlefly’s metamorphosis differs 
greatly from the gentler, more gradual processes to which I am comparing it, I would argue 
that his journey acts as a dramatically amplified reflection of certain, central aspects of 
human experience and the equally quotidian angst that they induce.  
  
If expressivists locate horror’s pleasures in its therapeutic ability to ease our shared 
anxieties, another set of readings position horror as covertly reactionary in nature, 
gratifying to the extent that it appeals to our inner “Republican in a three-piece suit” (King, 
1993 [1981]:55), pleasurable in its implicit affirmation of the rightness, the immutability 
of, the status quo. Although there are a plethora of competing ideological accounts, they 
can be divided into two main (although overlapping and related) sub-theories.  
 
According to the first sub-type of such theories, horror acts as an “agent of the norm” 
(King, 1993 [1981]:48), serving as a kind of “ritual of inversion” (Philosophy:201), 
invoking the monstrous, the subversive, the abject, only in order to vindicate the existing 
cultural order. Because many horror fictions share deep narrative structures, “appear[ing] 
to proceed by introducing something abnormal – a monster – into the world for the express 
purpose of expunging it” (Philosophy:199), theorists subscribing to this account of horror’s 
pleasures argue that horror acts as a (fixed) “contest between the normal and the abnormal” 
(Philosophy:199). Horror narratives effect this valorisation of the normal through a 
distinctive “three-part movement” (Philosophy:200), guiding the audience through an 
initial phase of normality, its later disruption by an ontologically and morally transgressive 
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monster, and a final stage in which the monster is defeated and normality (and, by 
implication, our “ontologico-value schema” (Philosophy:200) is reinstated and legitimated. 
Much in the way that speculative fiction inevitably comments (favourably or otherwise) on 
the here and now, horror is ideologically eloquent despite its apparently fantastic subject 
matter, its allegiance to the dominant order discernible in its punitive treatment of those 
who dare subvert its conceptual schemes. In Stephen King’s words, horror “tells us it’s 
okay to join the mob, to become the total tribal being, to destroy the outsider” (King, 1993 
[1981]:47), pleasurable, in part, because it indulges our atavistic desire to expel or 
annihilate those ‘monstrous’ Others who upset our sense of normality, the monster’s 
vanquishment symbolising a bloody “reaffirmation of the order we all crave as human 
beings” (King, 1993 [1981]:56). 
 
Even if one accepts the (possibly contentious) equivalence such theorists draw between the 
categorially or ontologically subversive and the culturally subversive, as Carroll points out 
in his discussion of this sort of ideological reading, there is one glaring problem with this 
characterisation of horror. As he argues, it is a relatively “standard variation of the horror 
genre that sometimes the horrific being is not expelled or eliminated at the end of the 
story” (Philosophy:201) (indeed, one characteristic of post-1960s or ‘postmodern’ horror is 
a pronounced tendency towards ambiguous or overtly downbeat endings in which the 
monster is victorious). In an age of compulsive, commercially-driven sequelisation and 
remakes, monsters are often the only common thread linking the various instalments of an 
ongoing horror franchise. However thoroughly Michael Myers, Jason or Freddie Krueger 
appear to have been vanquished the films will usually end with some teasing hint at their 
imminent resurrection, and many narratives that initially appear to have happy/normality-
restoring endings close on a twist that reveals some further, previously-unsuspected threat 
(for example, The Ruins, The Hills Have Eyes and House of Wax). If, he suggests, one 
must read the former variety of horror plot, in which order is restored at the end, as 
conservative, then surely the latter kind of plot must accordingly be read as subversive, 
rendering such readings problematic if they aim to be understood as a general solution to 
horror’s appeal. 
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A second, more compelling articulation of this charge of crypto-conservatism can be found 
in Judith Halberstam’s assertion that horror fiction acts as a “technology of subjectivity” 
(Halberstam, 1995:2), producing “deviant subjectivities opposite which the normal, the 
healthy, and the pure can be known” (Halberstam, 1995:2). She argues, in Kristevan 
fashion, that monsters function as the “radically excluded” (Kristeva, 1982:2) objects 
whose alterity defines and affirms the audience’s own normality. Both Gothic and 
contemporary horror monsters, she asserts, evolve to accommodate cultural anxieties about 
sexuality, gender, race and nationality, embodying shifting constellations of “deviant race, 
class, national and gender markings” (Halberstam, 1995:8). The “body that scares and 
appals” (Halberstam, 1995:8), the notion of the monstrous, changes over time, shedding 
and assuming characteristics in response to the preoccupations of the dominant culture. 
Horror serves as a kind of enchanted (or inverted) mirror, pleasurably affirming its 
intended audience’s status as the normal, the clean and the wholesome by depicting those 
Others that threaten their self-definition in the guise of the monstrous, the impure and the 
perverse. 
 
This ideological reading of horror as the crucible of (an oppositionally-defined) selfhood is 
buttressed by considerable textual evidence, encompassing both persuasive analyses of 
individual texts and of sub-genres as a whole. In his thematic history of horror, Darryl 
Jones argues that during the eighteenth century the Gothic novel was “collusive in  […] 
shoring up the British, Protestant identity of its readers chauvinistically, through its 
presentation of a catalogue of caricatured, untrustworthy foreigners” (Jones, 2002:8). In the 
sub-genre he terms the ‘regional Gothic’, rival nations and cultures were “made to embody 
all that is venal, reprehensible, archaic or otherwise rejected” (Jones, 2002:8), with novels 
such as Matthew Lewis’s The Monk figuring Catholic Spain as the absolute, corrupt 
inversion of Protestant Britain, a festering den of “homoeroticism, blasphemy, nuns, 
transvesticism, Satanism, rape, murder, incest and necrophilia” (Jones, 2002:11). 
 
As he notes, this sub-genre still persists in contemporary horror. In films such as 
Deliverance, The Hills Have Eyes, The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, Death Trap and Wrong 
Turn the monstrous Others are relocated to rural North America, in the 1970s Italian 
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cannibal cycle to the Amazon, and most recently, in Hostel and Hostel 2, to Eastern 
Europe. In these films, those who wander from the ‘path’ of Western civilisation fall prey 
to wolfish (and often literally anthropophagous) primitives. Each film highlights the 
opposition between the intellectually sophisticated yet effete ‘city slickers’ and the 
technologically backwards yet physically powerful locals, expertly playing on cultural 
anxieties about the ‘unnatural’ domestication of modern humans, urban humanity’s 
uncomfortable dependence upon the (economically marginalised) rural poor, and our 
alienation from/desire to escape from our fleshly, animal nature. However, it is important 
to note that the majority of even these films evince a more nuanced view of both 
‘normality’ and the economically/culturally marginalised Others than one might at first 
expect.
66
 
 
While Halberstam’s model is persuasive, and has great validity for certain horror 
narratives/ types of horror, I would argue that it fails to function as a general theory of 
horror’s appeal.  Although it is true that many fictional monsters can be seen to serve as a 
foil or counterpoint to normative subjectivities it is equally true that there is a strongly 
conflicting trend whereby horror fictions interrogate and critique the ‘normal’, disclosing 
what is monstrous within the mundane. If horror of the sort Halberstam identifies elicits 
gratifying meta-responses, affirming, by contrast, the audience’s purity and normality, 
there are horror fictions that make for much less comfortable introspection. Since 
Romero’s genre-defining Night of the Living Dead, the zombie film in particular has been 
characterised by a bleakly-pessimistic view of human nature: in each instalment of 
Romero’s Dead trilogy the eponymous zombies, while obviously dangerous to the 
                                                 
66
 While all of these films engage in chauvinistic stereotyping to some degree, many also incorporate a 
critical view of their ‘civilised’ protagonists. If the monstrous Others of these films desire, quite literally, to 
demote their victims to meat, so too are the Westerners themselves often shown to dehumanise and 
commodify. For the first half of Hostel, the putative hero perfectly embodies the stereotype of the ‘ugly 
American’ abroad, appearing  brash, crude, and solely interested in drinking, taking drugs and (purchasing) 
sex. Most notably, shots of the protagonists walking down a brothel corridor in this initial part of the film 
exactly mirror shots in the second act where they themselves have been ‘bought’, making explicit the 
connection between their desire to purchase access to another’s body, to treat economically disempowered 
others as more or less interchangeable commodities, and their captors’ desire to more radically reduce them 
to mute, unresisting ‘meat’. Equally, as Jones notes, Cannibal Holocaust “continually and explicitly 
juxtaposes images of American modernity and Amazonian savagery” (Jones, 2002:46) in order to suggest 
some level of moral equivalence between the two, presenting its would-be filmmakers as rapacious, 
exploitative and (murderously) unethical.  
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protagonists, seem curiously passive, almost benign, in comparison to many of the human 
characters, whose petty, vicious power-struggles and in-fighting prevent them from 
realising how manageable many of their problems are. The zombie is perhaps horror’s 
most misanthropic monster. In a world beset by overpopulation, overconsumption and 
ever-dwindling resources the vision of humanity as a seething, self-cannibalising, 
tumourous mass, rendered most dangerous by its monstrous efficiency in reproducing 
itself, has obvious thematic resonance. As Barbara cries in the 1990 remake: “They’re us. 
We’re them and they’re us.” 
 
Equally, there is a pervasive tradition within the horror genre whereby films such as Boy 
Meets Girl, Henry: Portrait of a Serial Killer, Man Bites Dog and The Last Horror Movie 
interrogate the audience’s appetite for scenes of ultra-violence, explicitly or implicitly 
aligning our fascination with the works of human ‘monsters’ with the fictional killers’ own 
sadism. Henry in particular purposefully thwarts the audience’s (presumed) desire to 
witness its protagonist’s atrocities firsthand for much of the film, instead showing us their 
ominous precursor (as when Henry stalks a young woman through the streets) or the 
bloody, pathetic aftermath. Finally, at the climax of the film, after permitting us 
increasingly graphic glimpses of Henry in action, we see Henry and his protégée Otis 
committing a vicious home invasion during which they torture, sexually menace and 
murder a suburban family – at which point, the camera “cut[s] to Henry and Otis watching 
the snuff videotape on television much as we the audience have been watching Henry” 
(Recreational:102), a pointed juxtaposition which, as many critics at the time uneasily 
noted, has the effect of making viewers feel as if “we’ve become accomplices in the 
making of a snuff film” (Recreational:102). We, the audience, are implied to be complicit 
in such scenes on two levels. First, our willingness to keep watching allows the carnage 
within the world of the film to continue: despite our disapproval or protestations of moral 
disgust, we have the ability to walk away at any time, the avidity (ambivalent or not) with 
which we view scenes of violence belying our professed distaste. Secondly, the film seems 
to ask whether our fascination with fictional violence might not represent a muted version 
of Henry’s own predilections, symptomatic of some deep ugliness within human ‘nature’ 
that manifests itself, to varying degrees, within us all. Whether one agrees with these 
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aspersions or not, it is hard to see how viewing such films could elicit the kind of 
pleasurable meta-responses and self-evaluations that many critics deem to be horror’s 
central pleasure.  
 
While I reject those expressivist solutions to horror’s appeal that attribute our enjoyment of 
the genre as a whole to its alleged ability to purge us of ‘negative’ emotions or to lighten 
our anxieties, I would maintain that horror is attractive, in part, because of the way it 
articulates and addresses real life fears, without necessarily resolving them as such.  In 
Recreational Terror Isabel Pinedo analyses the pleasures afforded specifically by the 
‘postmodern’ horror film. Pinedo suggests that a fundamental shift occurred between pre-
and post-Sixties horror. The classical horror film “exemplified in films such as Dracula 
(1931), Frankenstein (1931), and Dr. Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1931)” (Recreational:15) has a 
narrative structure that proceeds approximately as follows: “the film opens with the violent 
disruption of the normative order by a monster […] The narrative revolves around the 
monster’s rampage and people’s ineffectual attempts to resist it. In the end, male military 
or scientific experts successfully employ violence and/or knowledge to defeat the monster 
and restore the normative order” (Recreational:15). In such narratives, the monstrous is 
easily demarcated from the normal and good almost invariably vanquishes evil, “thus 
producing a secure Manichean worldview in which the threats to the social order are 
largely external and (hu)man agency prevails, largely in the figure of the masterful male 
subject” (Recreational:15). In contrast, postmodern films such as Nightmare on Elm Street, 
The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, Halloween, The Thing, Night of The Living Dead and 
Henry: Portrait of a Serial Killer “locate horror in the contemporary everyday world” 
(Recreational:16), blur the boundaries between good and evil, human and monstrous, 
repudiate narrative closure in favour of disquietingly ambiguous endings,  and  replace the 
“efficacious male subject” with “the ordinary [often female] victim” (Recreational:16).  
 
Like Carroll, Pinedo identifies overweening rationality as an important theme in both types 
of horror narrative. Horror “throws into question our assumptions about reality and 
unreality” (Recreational:18), radically cheating our expectations and undermining our faith 
that “we live in a predictable, routinised world” (Recreational:18). In the classical horror 
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narrative this threat often issues from a geographically remote or exotic location, with evil 
positioned as thoroughly ‘outside’ and opposed to the normative order. Conversely, 
“postmodern horror treats violence as a constituent element of everyday life” 
(Recreational:18), a treacherous undertow that is always already lurking beneath society’s 
apparently placid surface. If the “trajectory of the classical narrative is to deploy science 
and force […] to restore the rational, normative order” (Recreational:23), the postmodern 
horror film is “generally unable to overcome the irrational, chaotic forces of disruption” 
(Recreational:23), meaning that its critique of rationality is more sustained and pervasive. 
Horror films “assert that not everything can or should be dealt with in rational terms” 
(Recreational:23): those who flatly deny the existence of monsters or ghosts or alien 
invasions rarely live to see the end of the film, as do those who try to reason with them. 
The “rational sceptic […] is punished or killed for his epistemological recalcitrance” 
(Recreational:24), and only those who learn to “eschew critical tenets of rationality” 
(Recreational:25) such as the irreversibility of death or the nonexistence of monsters have 
any chance of survival.  
 
Equally, where classical horror films usually offer a reason or justification for their 
improbable and unsettling events, however contrived or implausible, “causal logic […] 
collapses in the postmodern horror film” (Recreational:26). Henry: Portrait of a Serial 
Killer effectively satirises facile attempts at ‘explaining’ evil: Henry’s glibly unconvincing 
account of childhood abuse and his changing description of how he murdered his mother 
(he claims variously to have bludgeoned, stabbed or shot her) underlines the inadequacy of 
such origin stories. In Night of the Living Dead, while some believe the reanimation of the 
dead to be caused by radioactivity from an exploding space probe, this hypothesis is never 
either confirmed or falsified – or even much discussed – throughout the Dead films  (more 
poetically, other characters attribute the dead’s zombification to there being ‘no more room 
in hell’). 
 
Many expressivist accounts that locate horror’s pleasures in its ability to resolve audience 
members’ anxieties seem premised on the notion that all or most horror fictions share the 
normal-abnormal-normal plot structure Pinedo identifies as characteristic of the classical 
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horror film. As I will argue, while such theories may well apply to certain types of horror 
narrative – those that close on a state of restored normality, with a just resolution of all 
conflict/violence – they are ill-suited to explaining the appeal of the type of horror 
narrative that Pinedo discusses, in which evil just as frequently triumphs or the outcome 
remains worryingly uncertain.  However, there is another frequently proposed (if not often 
formalised) solution to the paradox that is perhaps more applicable. In Stephen King’s 
words, we find horror compelling, in part, because “we’re waiting to be told what we 
already suspect – that everything is turning to shit” (King, 1993 [1981]:48). Horror appeals 
to us “because it says, in a symbolic way, things we would be afraid to say right out 
straight” (King, 1993 [1981]:47). 
 
Similarly, Pinedo argues that postmodern horror’s depiction of “an unstable, open-ended 
universe in which categories collapse, violence constitutes everyday life, and the irrational 
prevails” (Recreational:48) transfixes us not only because of the ways in which it 
(mercifully) departs from our day to day experience but because of the ways in which it 
reflects it. Such films, Pinedo argues, “attest to the need to express rage and terror” 
(Recreational:48), affording us a “welcome release from the fiction that life is ordered and 
safe” (Recreational:50). If ‘classical’ horror films console us by showing evil vanquished 
and good rewarded, by implying the existence of a guiding intelligence, however 
unforgiving, behind what at first appear to be random atrocities, then ‘postmodern’ horror 
speaks to our growing suspicion that there are no resolutions, no satisfactory explanations, 
and that happy endings are provisional at best. 
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Concluding Remarks  
 
The horror genre is typically characterised as perverse in nature, at best viewed as puerile 
and cheaply manipulative, and at worst as evincing a ghoulish (and, it is often implied, 
lascivious) enjoyment of others’ suffering. Like tragedy, horror deals in grim subject 
matter and (often) unhappy endings, yet it is usually viewed as more akin to pornography, 
affording its audience members an equivalent opportunity to slake socially unmentionable 
appetites.  
 
Throughout this thesis I have argued that the paradox of horror – and the periodic eruptions 
of fervid cultural anxiety regarding it and other populist genres with aversive content – is 
the product of a set of tacit assumptions about narrative pleasure. The fact that narrative 
genres which foreground suffering and elicit negative emotions are seen as problematic – 
so glaringly atypical as to demand especial psychological explanations such as the 
purgation hypothesis, or to incite moral panics about their self-evidently anomalous 
audiences – hinges on the presumption that we ordinarily choose to consume only those 
fictions that accommodate our real life desires. Despised genres such as horror videos and 
comics, penny dreadfuls, shock docs and misery memoirs therefore perturb the public 
because their pleasures seem to emanate from other people’s suffering, awakening potent 
anxieties about social change, the opacity of other minds and human nature itself. 
 
An alternative explanation for media violence’s ubiquity is that “violence works” 
(Myth:12), in narrative terms, because of the ways in which it diverges from our desires, 
expectations and values. Conflict remains a “production staple” (Myth:8), playing as 
pivotal a role in modern storytelling as it did in the Iliad or the Old Testament, not because 
we find brutality intrinsically enticing, wishing vicariously to perpetrate equivalently dark 
deeds, but because it by and large succeeds in compelling our attention and emotional 
engagement.  
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As I have noted, many influential models of our relationship with ‘paradoxical’ genres 
contrive to reconcile their appeal with more conventional or straightforward notions of 
pleasure – positing that we can derive enjoyment from tragic or horrific fictions because 
they allow us to discharge painful emotions or to gratify impracticable appetites. In 
contrast to this view, I have presented a very different account of our relationship with 
fictions, suggesting that affective and attentional involvement, rather than any 
straightforward enjoyment, or approval, of depicted events, is central to our attraction to 
narratives, that our responses to fictions with negative content are genuinely ambivalent. 
Horror, tragedy and other narrative genres that are defined by their shared preoccupation 
with suffering and violence (including factual ones such as misery memoirs and true crime 
documentaries) lay claim to our attention and emotional investment precisely because of 
the ways in which they calculatedly confound our expectations, values and desires.  
 
I rejected accounts of the origin and appeal of fictions which contend that our appetite for 
fictional narratives represents a selected-for trait, suggesting that the evidence 
adaptationists offer in support of this position is inconclusive and that equally consistent 
with the adduced facts is the more conservative hypothesis that our ‘fiction instinct’ is a 
mere exaptation or spandrel.  However, I would maintain that naturalistic analyses of the 
sort offered by Steven Pinker are genuinely instructive, serving to illuminate why certain 
culturally- and historically-ubiquitous features of fictional narratives are so predominant, 
reliably exacting our attention and emotional energies. We are demonstrably most 
compelled by narratives that act as super-normal stimuli, mimicking the kinds of 
information to which we are predisposed to attend.  In other words, fictional and factual 
narratives alike succeed when they make us feel that their outcome matters to us, 
stimulating our curiosity and engaging our emotions by confronting us with humanly-
salient problems. Narratives with content that excites strong emotional responses, that 
strongly transgresses audience members’ sense of what is desirable, are particularly 
effective at commanding our attention because they are camouflaged as potentially 
important information, playing to the cognitive biases that filter and inflect our conscious 
experience.  
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Ultimately, it has been my aim to elucidate the appeal of paradoxical and reviled narrative 
genres such as horror by placing the problem in a broader human context – grounding my 
solution to the paradox in my analyses of significant related topics such as the emotions, 
our putative psychological adaptedness, and fiction-making and -consuming as cultural 
practices. Adopting a synthetic and interdisciplinary approach has enabled me to draw 
upon important insights from various fields but also, I hope, to demonstrate that the alleged 
paradox generated by our attraction to agonistic narratives rapidly dissolves when one 
views the subject from an adequately ‘holistic’ perspective. Our fascination with fearful 
and otherwise distressing fictions is far from problematic or aberrant – indicative of a 
bewildering and “[in]excusable” (‘Karenina’:173) lapse from our customary standards of 
logic, taste or morality – but is in fact perfectly consistent with  other foundational, and 
often eudaimonistic, human traits.  
 
Indeed, I would suggest that our attraction to narratives that, by definition, invite negative 
emotional responses is philosophically intriguing because of the ways in which the 
phenomenon highlights, rather than controverts, the operation of such tendencies. While 
populist and low-brow fictions are often characterised as indulgent ‘mental cheesecake’ for 
the intellectually-idle masses – providing audience members with neatly-packaged doses of 
simple fantasy-fulfilment – the overwhelming majority of fictions demonstrate a more 
complicated relationship between narrative pleasure and our real-life wishes and values. 
The agonistic, desire-thwarting content of most fictions is so theoretically interesting in 
part because analysing the human mind at play tells us much about how we perceive and 
respond to the world in general, reflecting our affective and cognitive hypervigilance, our 
craving for certain kinds of information and our need to be challenged, provoked and 
stimulated. 
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